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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
In 2004, the British Broadcasting Company’s (BBC) World Service produced a special 
series on the social and environmental problems generated through globalization, 
including a story about modern agriculture in Carchi, Ecuador, entitled Dying to Make a 
Living.1 The program opened with an explanation that medical researchers working with 
the International Potato Center (CIP) had discovered serious health problems associated 
with pesticide use in potato production – among the highest rates of poisoning reported 
anywhere. The problem was not due to the continued distribution and sale of pesticides or 
products that had been made illegal in Europe or the United States. Instead, it was the 
result of the widespread use of properly registered products combined with a reality 
identified by the pesticide industry itself (Atkin and Leisinger, 2000:126): “pesticides are 
used unsafely under the socio-economic conditions of developing countries” and “…it 
appears that there are few if any easy ways to promote change among large numbers of 
poor smallholders.” Provided those unsavoury facts, the industry financed study 
recommended: “…any pesticide manufacturer that cannot guarantee the safe handling and 
use of its toxicity class 1a and 1b products should withdraw those products from the 
market.” As a result of the widespread use of these “highly toxic” pesticides and other 
problematic but less toxic products, the CIP-led studies in Carchi concluded (Yanggen et 
al., 2003:195), “The health problems caused by pesticides are very severe and affect an 
important percentage of the population.” 
 
During the story, Euan McIlwraith of the BBC interviewed Christian Verschueren, Global 
Director of Crop Life International – the umbrella group representing the international 
agrochemical companies – about the pesticide concerns in Carchi. 
 
McIllwraith: Is there a pesticide problem? 
Verschueren: Mostly what we have identified in the South – whether we are 
talking about Latin America, Africa, or Asia – are problems with practices 
of using crop protection products. 
McIllwraith: Is it the responsibility of the chemical manufacturers to assure the 
safe use of their products? 
Verschueren: It is clearly a shared responsibility to educate the farmers, and we 
have shared the responsibility for educating and training them. And we 
have done this sort of training for the better part of the last 12 years now, 
educating over 12 million farmers in over 80 countries. It is quite 
considerable, but of course it is but a drop in the bucket if you compare it 
to the four billion farmers that live in the world.  
McIllwraith: In Carchi, the North of Ecuador, we came across farmers and 
shopkeepers completely unaware of the dangers of the products they were 
                                                       
1 The two-part BBC series on pesticides in Carchi, entitled Dying to Make a Living, is available at: 
www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/1646_dying/index.shtml 
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using. Do you think it is morally acceptable to sell these products if you 
cannot guarantee that they will be used safely? 
Verschueren: It is difficult to assure 100 percent awareness and 100 percent 
safety. I think we do recognize that, but we also try to lead by examples, by 
providing training and education in those particular areas. We recognize 
that we do not live in a perfect world. But, I do not think that that is a 
reason for saying that we should stop selling those products. Clearly, 
farmers in those regions realize that it is a challenge to produce food and 
cultivate crops, and doing that without their products is not going to be 
possible. 
 
The industry blamed farmers for abusing their products and passed on the responsibility 
of controlling biocides to governments. This led McIllwraith to ask a rhetorical question: 
“Then, why don’t countries do something about it?” He went on to interview Carlos 
Navas, the National Director of Pesticide Regulation at the government Servicio Ecuatoriano 
de Sanidad Agropecuario (SESA), charged with registration and licensing of pesticides in 
Ecuador, with one central question in mind: “Why has Ecuador not been able to ban 
highly toxic pesticides, the products that were found to be killing its public and making it 
sick?” 
 
McIllwraith: Does Ecuador need these dangerous chemicals? 
Navas: We need scientific and technological support to be able to cancel product 
registrations. This office does not have the staff or resources to conduct 
those studies. So we need studies from abroad or someone to pay us to do 
studies. Only then could we ban a product. 
McIllwraith: Why don't they do it? 
Navas: As I said, as well as scientific and technological support, we need cost 
effective substitutes for certain pesticides. When alternatives are available, 
then we can ban highly toxic pesticides. There is no possibility to do that 
without alternatives to the products. 
McIllwraith: Do the private companies have any influence over you? 
Navas: About 97 percent of the companies that produce chemicals are not 
national companies. Almost all ingredients are imported, and the State does 
not have control over those. The companies give courses independently to 
farmers and only tell them about the good side of pesticides, which 
influences farmers when they make decision on what to purchase and 
apply. We cannot control private companies. 
 
In its summary, the program explained that modern potato farming in Carchi presented a 
conundrum. Farmers said they could not produce without pesticides. CIP researchers 
agreed that as a result of a number of nefarious pests, commercial potato production in 
Carchi without pesticides was not realistic. At the same time, the medical researchers and 
economists argued that the negative health consequences associated with pesticide use 
placed into question the productivity of potato farming. Meanwhile, the industry did not 
accept responsibility for harm generated by its products, claiming that they were necessary 
for “feeding a growing population,” and the national regulatory agency claimed it did not 
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have the means to control the companies. The program ended with a single, concise 
question: Could anything be done? 
 
Uncanny timing: a prelude 
 
I did not arrive in Ecuador in May of 1998 to work on pesticide concerns or to write a 
dissertation, but rather to purchase an old jeep. My partner Myriam Paredes – the reason 
why I had moved to South America – had been accepted to study her MSc at Wageningen 
and would depart for The Netherlands a few months later, leaving me to fend for myself 
in her native Ecuador. After working day and night for over ten years on sundry rural 
development projects in Central America, Myriam looked forward to graduate study, and I 
looked forward to taking a break and getting to know her country. We had lived a 
minimalist lifestyle in Honduras and rarely took vacations, so money would not be a 
problem for a while. My immediate goal was to purchase a jeep and spend the ensuing two 
or three months getting it ready for the rugged roads of the Andes. After Myriam left for 
Europe, the plan was for our dog Cacho, a Honduran aguacatero (literally an “avocado 
eater” or mutt)2 and I to travel the countryside for a year. I aimed to acclimate myself to 
the culture by hanging out in villages and camping and hiking in the mountains. My self-
financed sabbatical, as I described it, lasted less than a week. 
 
Prior to departing Honduras, I sent out a letter of interest to Hubert Zandstra, the 
Director General at the International Potato Center (CIP) in Lima, Peru. I was not 
immediately interested in finding employment, but felt that I should put out a feeler for the 
future. Amused by a mistake with the date of birth in my curriculum vitae (instead of 1966, I 
had put 1996), Zandstra forwarded my message to Charles Crissman, the person in charge 
of the CIP-Ecuador station, with the note, “This person has impressive experience for a 
two year old!” This must have captured Charlie’s attention, because he sent me an 
immediate email reply, “Please come visit us at the CIP research station in Quito upon 
your arrival to Ecuador. We are in search of a participatory trainer in IPM and may be able 
to use your services.” Two days after my arriving to Ecuador, I found myself seated with 
Greg Forbes, a CIP plant pathologist, and Charlie over coffee amongst the green houses 
of the CIP-Ecuador research station, located at the Instituto Nacional de Investigación 
Agropecuaria (INIAP) in Santa Catalina, about 20 kilometres south of Quito. 
 
Charlie told me, “You couldn’t have come at a better time.” He explained that Canada’s 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) had just approved funding for the 
three-year EcoSalud (in Spanish, salud means “health”) project, which centred on 
continued research into the health effects of pesticides but also interventions to help rural 
families to decrease their exposure to harmful pesticides. Charlie went on to briefly 
summarize nearly a decade of economic and health research in Carchi, Ecuador’s 
northernmost province. Referring to a copy of his recently published book, Economic, 
Environmental, and Health Tradeoffs in Agriculture (Crissman et al., 1998), he explained the 
basic concepts behind economic Tradeoffs of Agriculture Analysis (ToA) as a policy 
formulation tool. He drew on a white board a figure composed of productivity and health 
                                                       
2 Unless otherwise noted, the author is responsible for all Spanish to English translations in this 
dissertation. 
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axes and ran different technology-based scenarios. For example, he explained, through 
ToA they had identified a “win-win” scenario where pesticide safety education combined 
with “off-the-shelf” Integrated Pest Management (IPM) technologies could help rural 
families avoid exposure to highly toxic pesticides without adversely affecting production. 
The follow-up EcoSalud project, he explained, proposed additional production and health 
data collection. More importantly, he emphasized, it was time to take all of this research 
and change things on the ground. Greg explained that they wanted to test the Farmer 
Field Schools (FFS).  I found their enthusiasm contagious and volunteered a summary of 
my experience. 
 
Since 1988, I had worked with different agencies on peer-based, “farmer-to-farmer” 
movements in Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.3 From a technical perspective, my 
experience centred on helping hillside farmers improve their agriculture through soil 
conservation and the use of green manures and cover crops as well as Integrated Pest 
Management. Growing up in rural New Jersey, I had a strong appreciation for the 
ingenuity of farmers, which shaped my outlook on development. At university and during 
my Peace Corps service in Honduras I became steeped in knowledge-based approaches to 
rural development based on the ideas of Paulo Freire (1973 and 1990). I later worked with 
Keith Andrews and Jeffrey Bentley at Zamorano, the Pan-American School of Agriculture 
in Honduras, to train networks of Central American farmers on certain hidden biological 
phenomena, such as nitrogen fixation or the existence of beneficial insects. During that 
period I conducted Masters research at Cornell University, which involved a collaborative 
project with Zamorano to help smallholders to “master the mystery” of plant disease 
through action research on pathogens and disease management (Sherwood, 1995). My 
colleagues and I had found that improved “ecological literacy” enabled farmers to better 
understand the relationships between their agriculture and the environment, thereby 
leading to more purposeful innovation (Bentley, 1989; Bentley and Andrews, 1996; 
Sherwood, 1997).  
 
I told Charlie and Greg that while I did not have specific experience with FFS, I was quite 
familiar with the approach through the literature and interactions with colleagues at the 
FAO, especially Pat Matteson, a pioneer of FFS in Asia and Southeast Asia, who had 
joined us at Zamorano’s Plant Protection Department the previous year. I explained that 
our courses at Zamorano similarly focused on helping farmers “to read” the biology and 
ecology of their agriculture through the study of specific insect pests and diseases. FFS 
applied similar discovery-based approaches, while also tying learning more broadly to the 
cropping season – from soil preparation through planting, crop protection, and harvest. 
Additionally, during my time at Cornell, I had spent a summer working with New York 
                                                       
3 Farmer-to-farmer emerged from the experience of World Neighbors in Central America in the 1970s, as 
described in the groundbreaking book on people-centred development Two Ears of Corn (Bunch, 1982). Rather 
than rely on professional extensionists for social organization and capacity-building, farmer-to-farmer 
depended on the initiative of local volunteers who both developed technology on their farms and worked to 
diffuse innovation among fellow farmers in their community and surrounding villages. Due to its impressive 
results, farmer-to-farmer subsequently became both a methodology and movement throughout Central 
America, Mexico, South America and elsewhere, as described by Selener, Chenier, and Zelaya (1997), Pretty 
(1994 and 2002) and Uphoff, Esman, and Krishna (1998) and Holtz-Gimenez (2006). 
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potato growers on IPM. I was confident that with technical support from INIAP’s potato 
team and farmers, we could quickly adapt FFS to potato farming in the Andes.  
 
The timing of my arrival to Ecuador was uncanny. Charlie offered me a job on the spot as 
a “Participatory IPM Training Specialist,” a temporary charge tied to the EcoSalud project 
that potentially could become a more permanent CIP position. I agreed to start the 
following Monday. I left the research station thinking to myself, how was I going to 
explain to Myriam, not to mention Cacho, my sudden change of plans? 
 
Arrival in Carchi: discovering the challenges of abundance 
 
During my first trip to the EcoSalud project site in Carchi, a four-hour drive from Quito, 
Charlie and I talked about the difficulties of agriculture in Central America, a region where 
smallholder farmers were relegated to eke out a living on steep rocky hillsides with little to 
no rainfall. Education levels were low, infrastructure poor, and access to commercial 
markets and modern technology limited to non-existent. Admittedly, those conditions 
made proposals of rural development ambitious. Upon arriving in Carchi, the 
conversations shifted to the on-going research and the totally different context than the 
one to which I had become accustomed in Central America. Unknowingly, Charlie framed 
the issues that would come to occupy much of the next ten years of my life.  
 
In contrast to my experience in Central America, the challenge in Carchi, Charlie 
explained, was how to support rural development when you've got it all: deep, highly 
organic soils, 12 hours of sunlight per day, rainfall throughout the year, an educated rural 
population, good infrastructure, and access to national and international markets. Looking 
out the window over the green landscape, it was immediately clear to me that the 
challenges of Carchi were not associated with scarcity but rather abundance. Admittedly, 
after a decade of working with farmers under the difficult conditions of Central America, 
the prospect of spending the next few years with these relatively resource rich farmers 
seemed like a nice breather. Not unlike my previously mentioned sabbatical plans, this 
respite proved short-lived. 
 
Charlie explained that there were serious problems in the agricultural paradise of Carchi – 
the “model of modern agriculture.” The CIP research confirmed that Carchense potato 
farmers out-produced the rest of Ecuador – 21 t/ha or three times the national average, 
but it also uncovered a number of hidden problems that placed into question the ultimate 
returns and sustainability of the potato system. Soils were rapidly degrading, and, in 
response, farmers over applied fertilisers, which increased productivity but created long-
term soil nutrient and biological imbalances. Intensive farming did not just produce a lot 
of potatoes but also pests, which in recent years had grown out of control, leading farmers 
to apply more and more pesticides. They came to rely on the cheapest products on the 
market, which also tended to be the oldest and most toxic. Medical research had found 
that chronic exposure to pesticides could cause dermatitis, neurological disorders and 
reproductive problems. In fact, pesticides had become the second leading cause of death 
in the province and the farmers most exposed were poorer decision-makers and less 
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efficient producers. Meanwhile, potato prices were increasingly variable and unpredictable, 
leading farmers to lose money on nearly half of their potato crops.  
 
I spent my initial time in Carchi – a good six months – talking with farmers, extensionists, 
commercial agents, and public officials about the CIP research. The typical farmer argued 
that he had to compete in the market to survive, and potato was the only viable cash crop 
in the highlands. Labour had become too expensive for manual ploughing of soil, so 
tractors needed to be employed. Soils had become “tired,” so crops no longer responded 
without chemical fertilizers. The pests were so aggressive that they would wipe out an 
entire crop without continual pesticide applications. How could a farmer pay for the 
modern technologies without cash? For farmers, low prices and highly variable markets 
were to blame for the situation. They asked for cheap credit and new technologies that 
could improve production. The typical extensionist commonly argued that technologies 
were responsible for the prosperity of modern agriculture, a fact that was borne out in 
statistics showing increased production by area. Alternatives to agrochemicals were 
“romantic” – i.e., they were either not productive or not cost effective. For extensionists it 
was irresponsible to question the value of technologies. What farmers needed was greater 
access to technologies and more training on how to use them appropriately. Extensionists 
requested funds for more courses and research on new technologies such as improved 
varieties and better pesticides. The typical agrochemical vendor claimed that the crop 
protection industry bore a responsibility for feeding the growing population. Without 
agrochemicals, they argued, many more people would go hungry. Yes, improper 
management of pesticides could cause harm, but farmers themselves were responsible for 
misusing products. Vendors generally believed that the benefits of technology far 
outweighed their harmful effects. They argued that government agencies and NGOs 
should provide more courses on Safe Use of Pesticides (SUP), as well as access to cheap 
credit, ostensibly so that farmers could purchase more products.  
 
The different actors argued for what I viewed as more of the same: greater market access 
and more externally based knowledge and technology, i.e., further agricultural 
modernisation. The problems associated with agriculture were defined as an oversight or 
lack of technology or market integration, rather than the product of modern agriculture 
itself. None of the explanations were wrong, but they were only partial representations.  
 
Andean agriculture was age-old, and farmers had grown potato on the hillsides of Carchi 
for millennia. What had gone wrong in recent times? No one I consulted placed the 
problems of agricultural in historical context. There was no questioning of the origins of 
the pests or market exclusion and even less discussion about relationships between 
problems and the institutions of science, development, government, and industry that 
championed ideals of modernity. The problems associated with modern agriculture were 
an accepted part of modern life; they had become integral with the bucolic Andean 
landscape. 
 
Charged with enabling a response to the crisis, I eventually realised that I had greatly 
underestimated the difficulties posed by Carchi. It became clear to me that the same logic 
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that had created the problems of modern agriculture was not going to help farmers 
overcome their predicament.  
 
A PhD project 
 
The thought of writing a dissertation based on the Carchi experience did not occur to me 
until after the EcoSalud project. In March 2001, I met Niels Röling, who would become 
my supervisor at Wageningen, at the meeting of the CGIAR System-wide Program for 
IPM that took place in Nairobi, Kenya, where I was invited to present the CIP-led activity 
in Carchi. 
 
During my presentation, I argued that despite a wealth of research on the harmful effects 
of pesticides as well as impressive farm-level results of FFS in enabling alternatives, it was 
far less clear whether meaningful change was possible for more than a fraction of farmers 
in Carchi. We had effectively established a “best practice” that was congruent with goals 
for human and ecological health, productivity, and farmers’ incomes. Yet we encountered 
great difficulty in making it standard accepted practice. We had made substantial efforts to 
disseminate the research results in communities and at all levels of local and national 
government. Thousands of farmers, government officials, scientists and development 
practitioners had participated in seminars on the research findings, and they had seen first-
hand how FFS graduates had decreased reliance on pesticides, especially the highly toxics, 
while sustaining or improving agricultural productivity. Nevertheless, greater forces 
perpetuated present practice. Local pesticide salesmen, though sometimes visibly moved 
by the accounts of poisonings, continued to argue that they were tied to the bottom line: 
sales goals. In fact, a friend in the industry informed me that sale of highly toxics in Carchi 
were at an all-time high. Officials at SESA, the national regulatory agency, continued to 
operate under political pressure, which all too often caused them to concede their roles as 
public advocate to influential private interests. Local government officials seemed 
interested only to the point where the dramatic events in Carchi could attract attention to 
their political agenda. Private industry was always quick to step in to prevent “drastic 
measures” that could interfere with their bottom line. Researchers and extensionists 
worked from within institutional constraints of their own that limited their ability to 
respond to promising opportunities that often seemed to lie outside of their disciplinary or 
project boundaries. Meanwhile, preoccupied with feeding their families, all too often 
farmers felt that they could not afford to preoccupy themselves with seemingly abstract 
concerns of health and the environment. Having seen the warnings on product labels, 
farmers tended to blame themselves for not using pesticides safely. Contrary to popular 
belief of the day, I had reached the conclusion that change was not a function of 
knowledge, technology, or cost-benefit analysis. As a result, at the meeting in Nairobi, I 
argued that the CGIAR needed to move beyond its preoccupation with technology and 
efficiency and give greater attention to the institutional and political factors that greatly 
shaped farming outcomes.  
 
I doubt that I was successful at convincing my colleagues to change their agenda, but at 
the very least, following my presentation, Niels came up to thank me for the talk and to 
invite me to join him for breakfast the following morning. The next day Niels told me that 
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he held great appreciation for on-the-ground experience, and he liked the interactive 
agriculture, health, and environmental information included in the presentation. He saw 
what he described as a highly viable “dead body,” which in the sense of an Alfred 
Hitchcock thriller meant a compelling and scientifically relevant story. Niels suggested a 
number of provocative sources that could help me further explore my experience, and he 
encouraged me to come to Wageningen during the summer to write a PhD proposal. I 
did, and in December 2001, submitted my proposal, which started me on this long and 
arduous journey.  
 
The dissertation 
 
The dissertation is the direct outcome of ten years of research and development practice 
in Carchi. It is not a “case study” in the sense of a case that tests a hypothesis. This thesis 
reflects unfolding experience with different phases of hope, discovery, and ambition.  
 
Justification 
 
For a long time, I worked hard to establish the historical causes of the predicament 
Carchense farmers face and to establish alternatives, especially through introducing IPM 
practices by means of Farmer Field Schools (Table 1.1). This process led to “hard” results 
that are themselves of scientific interest, if only because the radically different paradigm 
and approach to agricultural development that are embedded in the FFS are still in need 
of further scientifically documented analysis (see van den Berg and Jiggins, 2006). The 
Carchi experience is perhaps special because of the emphasis we gave to human health, in 
addition to agricultural production. So far, few studies have explicitly looked at this aspect 
(see Mancini, 2006 for a recent study in India). But what makes the experience reported in 
this thesis especially relevant is the fact that the best practice we had established, 
according to criteria for human and ecological health and production that reflect 
“development” in every way, did not significantly change potato production in Carchi.  
 
My colleagues and I made great efforts to systematically understand the challenges in 
Carchi from a multidisciplinary perspective, and we intervened to influence farming 
practices as well as to introduce systemic change at the potato industry level. This work 
was widely published (see Appendix A for a long list of publications that emerged from 
the Carchi activity), and it led to substantial recognition from our peers in both the 
research and development communities in the Andes and beyond. Our best practice was 
strongly supported by quantitative “facts,” and there can be no question that we did not 
succeed to introduce our best practice because of lack of rigorous data, demonstrated 
potential, or exposure of the main protagonists to our results. Thus my long-standing 
experience faced me with an important second-generation issue that seemed worthy of 
scientific analysis and promising, not only in terms of making an original scientific 
contribution as requested of PhD dissertations, but also as an analysis of more global 
relevance, given the anthropogenic predicament that we humans have created for 
ourselves. 
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Table 1.1 Reflective practice: professional developments and milestones associated with 
this dissertation 
 
Period Developments and milestones 
1998  
June Employment with CIP and arrival in Carchi 
November Initiation of IDRC-supported EcoSalud project 
1999  
 Collaborations established with IPM/CRSP and FAO Global IPM Facility 
September Completion of regional training of trainers in FFS methodology and first FFS in Carchi 
October Provincial-wide forum on pesticide impacts in Carchi 
2000  
January Initiation of three-year IDB/PROMSA-supported EcoSuelos project 
June Pumisacho, M and S. Sherwood (eds.). 2000. Herramientas de Aprendizaje: Manejo Integrado de la 
Papa. INIAP-CIP-IIRR-FAO, Quito, Ecuador 
November Initiation of two-year FAO-supported project to scale-up FFS throughout Ecuador 
December Sherwood, S. G., R. Nelson, G. Thiele and O. Ortiz. 2000. Farmer Field Schools in potato: a 
new platform for participatory training and research in the Andes. LEISA. December. 16(4): 
24-25 
2001  
January Initiation of two-year PROMSA/IDB-supported Wachu Rozado project 
March System-wide IPM meeting in Nairobi and meeting Niels Röling 
Mar.-Apr. Independent research at Wageningen 
March Paredes, M. 2001. We are Like the Fingers of the Same Hand: Peasants’ Heterogeneity at the Interface 
with Technology and Project Intervention in Carchi, Ecuador, MSc thesis. Wageningen University, 
Wageningen, The Netherlands 
May National forum on pesticide health, productivity, and environmental impacts, Quito 
June Completion of first Carchi-level training of trainers in FFS 
September Día por Día. 2001. Amarga Cosecha (Bitter Harvest). A television documentary produced by 
Rodolfo Asar. (aired in Ecuador in September and October) 
October Independent research at Wageningen 
2002  
February Colleague Veronica Mera-Orcés dies in an airplane crash on the Colombian border 
April Cole, D., S. Sherwood, C. Crissman, V. Barrera, and E. Espinosa. 2002. Pesticides and health 
in highland Ecuadorian potato production: assessing impacts and developing responses. 
IJOEH: Special series on Integrated Pest Management 8(3): 182-190 
May Sherwood, S., C. Crissman, and D. Cole. 2002. Pesticide exposure is poisoning in Ecuador: a 
call for action. Pesticide News. London, UK, 55:3-6 
June Pumisacho, M. and S. Sherwood (eds.). 2002. El Cultivo de la Papa en Ecuador. INIAP-CIP-
Abya Yala, Quito, Ecuador 
July Departure from CIP 
July-Aug. Independent research at Wageningen 
November Employment with World Neighbors Andes Area Program 
2003  
January CEPIP-W/CERES grant 
February Formation of Carchi research team for CERES-supported research (through 2004) 
February Independent research at Wageningen 
June Yanggen, D., C. Crissman y P. Espinosa (eds.). 2003. Los Plaguicidas: Impactos en Producción, 
Salud y Medio Ambiente en Carchi, Ecuador. Abya-Yala, Quito, Ecuador 
December Carchense farmers shut down Pan-American Highway in protest over farming crisis 
2004  
May  BBC (British Broadcasting System). 2004. Dying to Make a Living. A two-part World Service 
series on globalization and pesticides. Aired worldwide in May 
June Borja, R. 2004. Documenting Farmer Field School in the Ecuadorian Highlands: A Case Study of Carchi. 
MSc thesis, Cornell University: Ithaca, NY 
Oct.-Dec. Independent research at Wageningen 
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2005  
January  Independent research at Wageningen 
January Sherwood, Stephen, Donald C Cole, Charles Crissman and Myriam Paredes. 2005. From 
pesticides to people: improving ecosystem health in the northern Andes. Chapter 10 in: J. 
Pretty (ed.). The Pesticide Detox: Towards a More Sustainable Agriculture. Earthscan Publications, 
London, UK. 147-164 
September Pumisacho, M. and S. Sherwood (eds.). 2005. Guía Metodológica sobre ECAs: Escuelas de Campo 
de Agricultores. FAO-CIP-INIAP-WN. Quito, Ecuador. 
2006  
March Schut, M., 2006. A House Does not Make a Home: Challenging Paradigms through Farmer Field 
Schools. MSc thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands 
Aug.-Sept. Independent research with Donald Cole at University of Toronto 
2007  
March Independent research at Wageningen 
April Sherwood, S., D. Cole, and C. Crissman. 2007. Cultural encounters: learning from cross-
disciplinary science and development practice over ecosystem health. Development in Practice 
17(2): 179-195 
June Cole, D., S. Sherwood, M. Paredes, L.H. Sanin, C. Crissman, P. Espinosa, F. Muñoz. 2007. 
Reducing pesticide exposure and associated neurotoxic burden in an Ecuadorian small farm 
population. IJOEH 13: 281-289 
July-Sept WN-supported sabbatical to write up final chapters 
September Sherwood, S., D. Cole, D. Murray. 2007. It’s time to eliminate highly hazardous pesticides (in 
English and Spanish). LEISA, September. 23(3): 32-33 
October Ecuadorian National Congress’ Health Committee proposes a law for the elimination of 
highly toxic pesticides (interrupted by Constitutional Assembly) 
December Independent research at Wageningen 
Schut, M. and S. Sherwood. 2007. FFSs in translation: scaling up in name, but not in meaning 
(in English and Spanish). LEISA, December. 24(4): 28-29 
2008  
December Delivery of dissertation to reading committee 
 
It appears that scientifically established best practice and public acknowledgement of 
proof of the same are unable to foment social change, be it at the level of farmers, 
extensionists and facilitators, commercial companies, public agencies or politicians, such 
as ministers of agriculture. In fact, at all levels, major stakeholders seem to be locked into 
a non-adaptive, lethal, and eventually self-destructive (from e.g., financial, human health, 
and soil fertility points of view) system of food production. The long experience and the 
very “success” of the team, of which I was part, in establishing best practice supported by 
irrefutable evidence allowed us to hit upon this second-generation problem and gave me 
the opportunity to make an initial attempt to analyse it.  
 
This dissertation has provided me with a unique opportunity to make sense of the whole 
disconcerting chain of events. It will hopefully allow me to be more effective in my 
continuing contributions as an actor and “change agent” in the Andes. The research seems 
particularly relevant in the face of current optimism that, when governments agree on 
clear and “... comprehensive controls on carbon movements into and out of the 
atmosphere, policed with good science, the market is capable of delivering the 
technologies needed for the staggering cuts in emissions we now know to be essential.”4 
In fact, the experience with agriculture technology in Carchi suggests that commercial 
                                                       
4  New Scientist. 2007. December, 22(29): 5 
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pressure is capable of preventing governments from establishing clear and comprehensive 
controls.  
 
Research problems 
 
In all, this dissertation looks at the following series of research problems:  
 
1. The description of the landscape and agriculture in Carchi and analysis of the 
pathology associated with modern-day potato production in terms of human and 
environmental health with major conclusions about longer-term economic 
feasibility and ecological sustainability. This led to the identification of “impact 
points” for the development of scientifically supported and replicable “best 
practice.” 
2. The historical analysis of the emergence of this pathology in a high-potential 
agricultural area such as Carchi. 
3. The ex-post examination of interventions to address the pathology through the 
application of best practice, especially through enhanced cross-disciplinary 
research-development practice as well as the introduction of Farmer Field 
Schools. The latter included the training of a cadre of facilitators to implement 
the FFS approach beyond the initial pilot project by third-party agencies 
(community-based organisations, municipal governments, and NGOs).  
4. The analysis of the failure to date to make an impact at the policy level, with an 
emphasis on the institutional factors that, at different levels of aggregation, 
explain a society-level inability to address the pathologies associated with modern 
agriculture. 
5. An integrated analysis on what we can learn from this rather unique (in the sense 
of running into a second-generation problem after producing a best practice to 
solve the apparent prima facie pathology) experience.  
 
The resultant thesis is a monograph that tries to establish a coherent “story” among 
seemingly independent stories. Many of the experiences and the scientific studies that 
were carried out during the course of my ten years in Carchi and that feed into this thesis 
have already been published elsewhere (Appendix A). Rather than concentrating on a 
single theoretical framework, due to the multiple levels of inquiry and the inherent 
complexity of the study, I placed different conceptual “lenses” on the history of Carchi as 
well as personal experience with local- and national-level interventions to establish 
empirical data. I then searched relevant literature for more critical theoretical perspectives 
at both the levels of discrete (i.e., individual chapters) and integrated (the book) inquiry. 
As a result, the research was guided by an iteration of grounded experience and theory, 
reflecting my perspective as a development practitioner and historical actor in Carchi. 
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Theoretical framing 
 
The overall objective of this research is to provide fresh historical and social perspectives 
on the pathology of modern agriculture in Carchi and the limitations of current research 
and development efforts to address that situation.  
 
Table 1.2 summarizes the overall research approach that I employed in this dissertation. 
Following the identification of the earlier mentioned problems, I applied the following 
investigative lenses: 
 
1. Historical organization of modern agriculture in Carchi for greater social insight 
on how the present-day situation came to be; 
2. Practice of research-development aimed at addressing the problems generated by 
modern agriculture; 
3. Multi-institutional realm of policy and politics; 
4. Socio-biological phenomena of agricultural decline in Carchi. 
 
My inquiry was guided by a series of questions linked to the different research lenses as 
well as theoretical explorations. I found it difficult to see beyond my own paradigms 
because a paradigm – as one’s model of signification and abstraction – defines how one 
sees. As a result, I aimed to be explicit about my own thinking and its evolution over the 
duration of this research. During initial data collection and processing and analysis, I 
continually explored relevant literature for further information, insight, and explanation. 
Sometimes my explorations simply produced additional information. For example, 
Lándazuri’s (1995) work on the violent depopulation of Carchi during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries helped me to understand why the region’s natural resources largely 
remained in tact through the beginning of the twentieth century. Other times, a search led 
me to see things in entirely new ways. For example, Giddens’ (1990) work on the 
phenomenology of modernisation helped me begin to understand agricultural decline in 
Carchi as not just the result of technical oversights or a lack of technology, but the 
expected product of modernisation itself. Theory brought both greater resolution to my 
research lenses as well as entirely new perspectives, thereby providing new colours, shapes 
and contours to my observations and experience. It provided me entirely new ways of 
seeing and thinking as well as further explanatory power.  
 
With regard to the first lens (historical perspective), the main research question became:  
 
What historical events preceded agricultural decline in Carchi? 
 
During my research on the historical events leading up to modern-day Carchi, I immersed 
myself in the Andean historical, anthropological, and sociological literature. Troll (1968) 
explained the geographic division between the southern puna or dry Andes and the 
northern páramo or wet Andes, which helped me to place Carchi’s environment in context 
within the broader Andean landscape. I came across Murra’s (1972) theory of “vertical 
control,” explaining agricultural and agrarian differentiation along altitudinal belts, as well 
as Salomon (1980) and López-Sandoval’s (2004) applications of that theory to the  
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Table 1.2 Research strategy: lenses, theoretical explorations, information sources, and 
methods 
 
Lens/guiding question  Theoretical explorations Information sources Methods  
Lens 1: Historical realm    
• What historical events 
preceded agricultural decline 
in Carchi? 
• Andean socio-cultural 
development: Murra (1972), 
Costales and Costales 
(1974), Uribe (1977), Barsky 
(1978, 1984, 1988), Barsky 
and Cosse (1981), Newson 
(1992), Landázuri (1995), 
Escobar (1995), 
Rostworowski (2001), 
Murra (2002) 
• Agricultural modernisation: 
van der Ploeg (2003) 
• Resilience and adaptive 
management: Holling 
(1973, 2000), Gunderson 
and Holling (2002) 
• Published literature 
• Hacienda records 
• Transcriptions 
• Crissman et al. database 
(1990-1992) 
• National Census data 
(1954, 1974, 2004) 
• Paredes and Sherwood 
database (2003-2004) 
• Critical review of 
secondary 
sources 
• Semi-structured 
interviews with 
key informants 
• Participant 
observation 
• Interactive 
workshops 
Lens 2: Project realm    
• What social and 
institutional factors 
prevented the uptake of 
recommended best practice, 
in the form of cross-
disciplinary research and 
knowledge-based, people-
centred interventions? 
• Development: Röling 
(2000), Röling and Leeuwis 
(2001) 
• Modernisation: Giddens 
(1990, 1994), Beck (1992) 
• Socio-technical change: 
Nelson and Winter (1977), 
Rip and Kemp (1998), 
Gibbons et al. (2000), van 
der Ploeg (2003) 
• Personal experience 
• Notebooks 
• Transcriptions 
• Project documents 
• Paredes and Sherwood 
database (2003-2004) 
• Paredes (2001) 
• Student theses: Paredes 
(2001), Mendizabel (2002), 
Borja (2004), Schut (2006) 
• Reflective 
practice 
• Participant 
observation 
• Semi-structured 
interviews with 
key informants 
• Qualitative 
analysis 
 
Lens 3: Policy realm     
• How did institutional actors 
respond to policy proposals 
for the elimination of highly 
toxic pesticides? 
• Risk society: Haraway 
(1989), Giddens (1990), 
Beck (1992), Beck, et al. 
(1994) 
• Actor Network Theory: 
Callon (1986), Latour and 
Woolgar (1979), Law (2004) 
• Sociology of development: 
Jansen (2000, 2008), Long 
and Long (2002) 
• Personal experience 
• Notebooks 
• Transcriptions 
• Project documents 
• BBC interviews 
 
• Reflective 
practice 
• Semi-structured 
interviews 
• Qualitative 
analysis 
Lens 4: Integration    
• What were the institutional 
features behind the 
production and continuity of 
agricultural decline in 
Carchi?  
• What lessons does Carchi 
hold for more sustainable 
agriculture? 
• Risk society: Beck (1992, 
2000, 2001); Beck et al. 
(1994), Giddens (1990), 
Adam et al. (2000), Van 
Loon (2000) 
• Resilience and adaptive 
management: Holling 
(1973, 2000), Gunderson 
and Holling (2002) 
• Lenses 1, 2, and 3 
 
• Summary 
• Integrated 
analysis 
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northern páramo Andes. This body of literature shed new light on the ecological 
implications of the arrival of the Spanish and the subsequent horizontal redistribution of 
land under the hacienda system, as per the practice in Spanish mesas. With this insight, I 
was better able to explain certain environmental vulnerabilities in Carchense agriculture 
centuries later. 
 
Rostworowski’s (2001) anthropological research exposed me to new details of traditional 
Andean culture, and Uribe (1977) and Landázuri (1995) revealed agricultural practice and 
social differentiation of the Pasto civilisation that settled at the border region of present-
day Ecuador and Colombia. This research enabled me to more fully appreciate the depth 
of social disruption during the colonial period and the absence of native languages and 
indigenous populations in modern-day Carchi. Newson’s book “The Cost of the 
Conquest” introduced me to the diverse patterns of the Spanish Conquest in Latin 
America, and the evolution of its policies to gain control over territory and people. The 
detailed historical analyses of Costales and Costales (1974) and Barsky (1978, 1988) 
provided insight on the historical events leading up to agrarian reform in the 1960s as well 
as its negotiated outcomes and expressions in northern Ecuador. This body of literature 
explained the unique pattern of land distribution in the north that influenced the 
prominence of smallholder agriculture in Carchi today.  
 
I referred to Escobar (1995) and McMichael et al. (2000) for a general introduction on 
how agrarian reform was tied to constructions of poverty and development as well as 
modernist ideals of market integration and technological development. I drew on Barsky 
and Cosse (1981) and Barsky (1984, 1988) to understand how foreign development aid 
and technical assistance arrived in Ecuador and became an integral part of agrarian reform 
and ensuing agricultural modernisation policies. 
 
I close my historical reflections with an examination of the Carchi experience in light of 
van der Ploeg’s (2003) research on the modernisation of Dutch agriculture. I then draw on 
the resilience and adaptive management literature, especially Holling (1973, 2000) and 
Gunderson and Holling (2002), to explore the interactive socio-biological factors 
influencing the historical macro tendencies in Carchi. 
 
With regard to the second lens (project-level perspective), the main research question 
became:  
 
What social and institutional factors prevented the uptake of recommended “best practice,” in the 
form of cross-disciplinary research (i.e., the EcoSalud project) and knowledge-based, people-
centred interventions (Farmer Field Schools)? 
 
During my research on contradictions between development discourse and practice, I read 
Röling’s (2000 and 2005) articles on the “ecosystem challenge.” This work provided fresh 
perspectives on the interactive biological and social dimensions of the “modern 
predicament” and pointed me to new schools of thought, including the Santiago Theory 
on the biological roots of knowledge (Maturana, 1996 and Maturana and Varela, 1998), 
Reflexive Modernisation (Giddens, 1990 and 1994), and Risk Society (Beck, 1992). This 
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material influenced my thinking throughout the remainder of the course of this 
dissertation.  
 
Ensuing dialogue with Röling introduced me to literature on the management of complex 
issues associated with social systems and the environment (Miller, 1983 and 1985; 
Bawden, 2000), as well as the Resilience Alliance (Holling, 1973 and 2000). This 
heightened my awareness of the need to break down disciplinary and professional barriers 
in agriculture research and development practice. Leeuwis’ (2004) review of rural 
innovation and subsequent conversations helped me to appreciate both the opportunities 
and underlying problems of paradigm and process inherent in cross-disciplinary research-
development practice. 
 
Ironically, I struggled most during my explorations of an area where I had gained the most 
experience – the implementation of Farmer Field Schools. It took me over two years to 
write up that experience and my drafts underwent numerous transformations. Eventually, 
I settled on the work of Gibbon et al. (2000) to analyze the experience through an 
application of the Mode 1 (expert-led) and Mode 2 (lay or people-centred) framework of 
knowledge production. A need to explain institutional struggles over the multiple and 
divergent expressions of FFS took me to the literature on socio-technical change (Nelson 
and Winter, 1977; Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2004), technology management 
(Rosenkopf and Tusman, 1994; van de Ven and Garud, 1994), and evolutionary 
economics (Potts, 2000; Schot and Geels, 2007). I also consulted van der Ploeg’s (2003) 
The Virtual Farmer, which provided much insight into the organisation of expert systems 
and their influence over farmers, farming, and rural life. 
 
With regard to the third lens (policy-level perspective), the main research question 
became:  
 
How did institutional actors respond to policy proposals for the elimination of highly toxic 
pesticides? 
 
Nuijten’s (2002) research on corruption in Mexico and Jansen’s (2000 and 2008) work on 
the struggles over pesticide policy agenda in Honduras helped me break through my rather 
conventional understandings of government, governance, and regulation. Following 
further exploration of Latour (1987) and Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) work on the 
“constructedness” of science, I adopted the view of pesticides as a ready-made product of 
science around which networks of actors had consolidated and matured. This led me to 
explore “modes of enactment” – the creative ways in which individuals and networks of 
actors produced myths around the “indispensability” of technologies (i.e., agrochemicals) 
and the translation of prestigious symbols (e.g., FFS and IPM) as means of consolidating 
belief systems through which interests were promoted, rules were created and enforced, 
and discretion was exercised. 
 
I drew on aspects of Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Callon, 1986; Latour and Woolgar, 
1979; Law, 1992 and 2004) to further explore observed processes of “heterogeneous 
engineering” during which social, technical, and conceptual pieces become fitted together 
   Learning from Carchi 16 
into co-evolving structures of influence. I applied this insight to explore how people do 
not just network to interact with other people but also to interact with people and 
materials, in this case over agriculture technology. ANT helped me to explain an 
observation that networks of objects – agrochemicals – participated in the social, thereby 
influencing human relationships and activity. If pesticides disappeared, as I came to argue, 
then so would a particular social order. 
 
I employed aspects of the Risk Society (Beck, 1992 and Beck et al., 1994) and Reflexive 
Modernisation (Giddens, 1994) theories to investigate how a pro-pesticide alliance in 
Ecuador ultimately consolidated influence and authority in its attempt to perpetuate the 
continued sale and distribution of harmful technology. The insights from this body of 
work helped me to understand the rise of dissent over pesticides in the form of a 
breakdown of allegiances and the emergence of sub-political movements and how 
ultimately the institutional claims to knowledge and technology and the deepening and 
broadening of pesticide effects on society and the environment may be providing the pre-
conditions for demise and change. 
 
With regard to the fourth lens (integrated perspective), the main research questions 
became:  
 
What were the institutional features behind the production and continuity of agricultural decline 
in Carchi? What lessons does Carchi hold for more sustainable agriculture? 
 
For integrated analysis of the earlier research, I returned to the Risk Society (Beck 1994, 
2000, 2001; Adam et al., 2000; and van Loon, 2000) and Reflexive Modernisation 
(Giddens, 1994) literature to summarise the general features of the pathology of 
agricultural decline in Carchi and to establish ties to broader processes of globalisation. 
This enabled me to assess the degree to which Carchi had become a theatre of risk. 
 
Additionally, I drew on the Resilience literature (Holling, 1973, 2000; Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002) to explain the interactive socio-biological phenomena associated with the 
development and use of agriculture technology in Carchi and subsequent environmental 
feedback, primarily in the forms of soil fertility loss and the proliferation of pests. I found 
the applications of the metaphor of the “lazy eight” in Hurst (1995), Röling (2002, 2005), 
and Jiggins et al. (2007) useful for describing the seeming oxymoron of sustainable 
development and identifying opportunities to guide needed institutional change.  
 
Research approach 
 
Table 1.2 summarises the research strategies employed in this dissertation. Each chapter 
independently provides details on relevant methodological considerations. As per the 
challenges posed by each particular research lens and its corresponding questions, I drew 
on diverse information sources, research methods, and theoretical explanations. I 
employed both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Due to the wealth of existing 
quantitative information from the earlier research in Carchi (Appendix A), including the 
on-going research of Paredes (in process), I limited quantitative methods to standard 
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descriptive statistics, for example, of historical production data, and relied most heavily on 
qualitative strategies. 
 
Information sources 
 
To ground the research in locality, I focused on four case study sites. Three of the four 
locations (Santa Martha de Cuba, San Francisco de Libertad, and San Pedro de Piartal) 
were chosen a priori by the CIP research team in 1998. Sites were chosen based on 
geographic location (to include both the western and eastern Andean ridges), relevance of 
potato production, and self-selection (i.e., communities agreed to take part in the medical 
studies). In 2004, Paredes and I added a fourth site to our respective research, Mariscal 
Sucre, due to expressed interest of the community to address pesticide health issues and 
an on-going IDRC-funded sister project on “sustainable biodiversity” with the NGO 
EcoPar, which committed additional human resources to data collection.  
 
To avoid selection biases, the research included the perspective of broad categories of 
actors from communities and among public officials, scientists, and development 
professionals working in the province. For community participant selection, I heavily 
drew on Paredes’ (2001 and in process) quantitative and social analyses of “farming styles” 
in the same case study sites as a means of assuring heterogeneity in my populations.  
 
I had access to diverse quantitative information sources, including existing CIP databases 
from the 1990-1992 field research as well as the EcoSalud activity between 1998-2001. 
Additionally, Paredes and I constructed a complementary database of production 
information from 94 potato fields of 92 farmers across the four case study sites during the 
2003-2004 growing season. For historical information, I relied on National Census data 
from 1954, 1974, and 2004 as well as processing of that data by other authors, especially: 
Costales and Costales (1971), Barsky (1984 and 1988), Cosse (1980), and most recently An 
(2004). 
 
My role within the CIP research team permitted unique access to project events, informal 
communications, grey literature, and official documents. Over my professional career, I 
have developed the habit of taking copious notes during daily conversations and project 
activities. For qualitative data, I utilised my field notes from the EcoSalud project between 
1998-2002 as well as those from subsequent work with the FAO between 2001-2003. I 
had access to essentially all of CIP and INIAP’s project documents from Carchi between 
1990 and 2003. Further, I analyzed transcriptions from semi-structured interviews of key 
informants, including community members, researchers, public officials, and 
representatives from private industry. These included interviews that I held directly as well 
as those conducted by my project staff. Additionally, I obtained the original recordings of 
interviews held by the Día-a-Día program during its production of the documentary 
Amarga Cosecha (Bitter Harvest) and BBC’s World Service program Dying to Make a Living.  
 
   Learning from Carchi 18 
Interpretation and analysis 
 
As a historical actor in Carchi, analyses largely resulted from reflective practice and direct 
observation of agriculture, research, and development in practice. While my role as an 
“insider” provided substantial access to the inner workings of projects, my mixed role as 
intervener-researcher posed considerable methodological challenges, especially over 
measurement bias. This included both my ability to dispassionately listen to informants 
and interpret experience as well as preventing informants from limiting their responses to 
socially desirable answers. Over the years, I expressed my positions in publications, public 
events, and the media. As a result, farmers, public officials, and industry representatives 
tended to tell me what they thought I wanted to hear, which may have been an endearing 
cultural trait but one that could greatly bias research outcomes. Paredes (in process) faced 
similar challenges. 
 
Consequently, between 2003-2004 Paredes and I employed an independent, 
multidisciplinary team of four national researchers made up of an agronomist, forester, 
economist, and sociologist to assist in our respective data collection. We added additional 
people when research demands were high, for example during planting periods. We 
trained the team in quantitative and qualitative research techniques, as per the needs of 
particular inquiries. Throughout that period we held regular bi-weekly discussion sessions 
and planning meetings. The research team collected secondary data, it conducted 
interviews with farmers, agrochemical salesmen, industry representatives, public officials, 
and technical specialists, made homes visits, and held meetings with focus groups to 
discuss and review findings. Team members generated raw data (e.g., notes, interview 
recordings, and surveys) and produced technical reports on topics of particular interest 
(e.g., the arrival of the tractor and agrochemicals or the loss of local potato varieties). This 
material was presented to other team members and discussed as a means of cross-
checking findings. Additionally, I supported specialised research on substantive topics, 
such as over the nuances of the Farmer Field Schools (Paredes, 2001; Borja, 2004; Schut, 
2006), the internal struggles over participatory research at CIP (Mendizabel, 2002), and 
government policy (An, 2004). 
 
Outline 
 
The dissertation unfolds across eight chapters (Figure 1.1). Chapter 2 provides the 
contextual backdrop of the research. It begins with a description of the Carchense 
geography and landscape before explaining the local pasture-potato production system. I 
then summarize the first generation of CIP-led research on the productivity, health, and 
environmental tradeoffs of potato farming. This research identified a number of concerns, 
most notably over soil degradation and a latent, endemic health burden associated with 
pesticides, placing into question the sustainability of modern agriculture. The research 
included integrated tradeoffs analysis that identified a number of promising win-win 
educational and technological scenarios, with the implication that the application of best 
practice would generate corrective action and change.  
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Figure 1.1 Dissertation outline 
 
Chapter 3 initiates my conceptual shift to reflective practice. In order to better understand 
the current challenges in Carchi, I found it necessary to first look back at the foundations 
of its modern agriculture (Lens 1: historical realm). The chapter summarises major 
historical developments since the arrival of the Incas and Spanish up through the hacienda 
period, and agrarian reform. It looks at how traditional Andean agriculture became 
uprooted in terms of land distribution, social organisation, and farming practice and how 
these events shaped modern developments. Chapter 4 concentrates on the period since 
land reform and recounts the story of agricultural modernisation in four communities. It 
examines major events of continuity and change in potato production involved in the 
historic organisation of the “production of decline” – i.e., the establishment of self-
destructive tendencies in Carchense agriculture. 
 
Drawing on the successes and disappointments of personal experience with the CIP-led 
initiatives to install best practice in Carchi, the dissertation then shifts attention to the 
institutional obstacles to enabling change. Lens 2 was placed on project-level 
interventions, particularly the application of trans- and cross-disciplinary approaches to 
research-development (Chapter 5) as well as the people-centred, discovery-based Farmer 
Field Schools (Chapter 6).  
 
In recent time, scientists, development agents, and the public increasingly have become 
aware of the multi-dimensional nature of ecosystem decline, and hence the need to 
increase co-operation across scientific disciplines and professional and practitioner 
cultures (for example, Forget and Lebel, 2001). In Chapter 5, an occupational and 
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environmental health specialist (Donald Cole from the University of Toronto), an 
agricultural economist (Charles Crissman from CIP), and myself as a rural development 
specialist recount our knowledge struggles over the three-year EcoSalud project – a joint 
knowledge generation and development intervention for greater “ecosystem health” in 
Carchi. The chapter examines the challenges encountered and the compromises made, as 
it highlights remaining issues for the design and practice of cross-disciplinary research and 
development. 
 
Farmer Field School methodology – a higher order interactive learning approach that 
employs well-established principles of adult education, in-depth knowledge of 
agroecology, and social organisation – has won recognition as state of the art for enabling 
the transformation of agricultural practice, especially with regard to pesticide use reduction 
(van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007). Based on my efforts to introduce FFS in Carchi as a 
means of enabling farmers to address pesticide health concerns, Chapter 6 examines the 
performance of FFS as well as its spontaneous transformations following its release into 
the hands of researchers, development practitioners, farmer leaders, and their 
organisations. The chapter closes with a wider discussion on how FFS, and in general 
“people-centred” approaches, may evolve from a niche-level contribution to influence the 
broader trajectory of agricultural development. 
 
The third lens focused on policy-level interventions, as per my personal experience with 
multi-stakeholder policy formulation involving farmers, conservationists, public officials, 
scientists, and industry representatives. The diverse donor agencies that supported the 
research in Carchi, including the Rockefeller Foundation, IDRC, and USAID, demanded 
that the CIP-led research be based in communities and linked to public policy. As a result, 
the different projects explicitly sought “community participation,” “gender equity,” 
“collaboration,” and “multi-stakeholder” involvement in deliberative processes of 
education and advocacy for change. Based on ensuing public debate over pesticides, 
Chapter 7 investigates how institutional dynamics came to form, transform, and influence 
policy outcomes and how certain actors sought to cooperate, collude, and collide to shape 
public opinion. It goes on to more closely examine how differently positioned actors built 
and rebuilt allegiances, gained control over public and private resources, and exercised 
discretion. Ultimately, the chapter exposes institutional dynamics of continuity and change 
with regard to agriculture technology and how modern societies generate “organised 
irresponsibility.” 
 
The fourth lens was placed on integrative analysis. Chapter 8 draws from the insights of 
the earlier chapters to precipitate learning from over a decade of activity in Carchi. It 
opens by directly addressing the questions that guided this research before moving on to 
describe the generalizable features of agriculture decline. The chapter ends with a 
discussion on broader lessons from Carchi, potentially useful for informing future 
research and development practice for more sustainable agriculture. 
Chapter 2 
Modern Potato Production in Carchi 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter provides the contextual backdrop of this dissertation. It introduces the 
geography and landscape of the Province of Carchi in Northern Ecuador as well as the 
modern potato-pasture production system. I then summarize the CIP-led multidisciplinary 
research on the environmental, health, and productivity effects of modern agriculture. The 
findings make clear that behind the bucolic setting of the Northern Andes, something has 
gone wrong: at the turn of the twentieth century, Carchi suffers from a pathology that 
places into question the sustainability of its agriculture. Lastly, I introduce the results of 
the integrated tradeoffs analysis that proposed a “win-win” scenario and the identification 
of scientifically supported and replicable impact points or “best practice” for addressing 
the challenges in Carchi. 
 
Geography, climate, and landscape 
 
The dense oceanic Nazca Plate is subducted under the lighter continental South American 
Plate, producing two parallel ridges of the Andes mountain range that run north-south the 
length of the continent. Located where the equator meets the Pacific Coast, the Republic 
of Ecuador encompasses an area of 256,370 km2 and roughly is the size of the United 
Kingdom (Figure 2.1a). The Andean ridges come closest together at Ecuador, spanning 
between 40 and 60 km. This geography divides the country into three distinct regions: the 
Occidente (Pacific coastal lowlands), Sierra (inter-Andean highlands), and Oriente (Amazon 
lowlands). The unique positioning and dramatic geography of Ecuador make it a country 
of mega biodiversity. Carchi is Ecuador’s northernmost province, located on the border 
with Colombia (Figure 2.1b). 
 
Situated near the equator, the region receives intensive sunlight throughout the year 
(Pourrut, 1983). Local convection rather than major weather fronts determines the 
weather of the inter-Andean valley. Rainfall tends to increase at higher altitudes and at 
greater distance from the valley floor (Knapp, 1991), while temperature is negatively 
correlated with altitude. Between the 1930s and the mid-1990s, the National 
Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (INAMHI) collected data from weather stations 
throughout Carchi, with the longest term data collection in Tulcán, San Gabriel, and El 
Angel (Table 2.1). Local hydrological cycles follow a clear bimodal distribution (Figure 
2.2). Two periods of peak rainfall are defined for the periods of March-April and October-
November. Nevertheless, even during the driest periods, no dry months appear, and crops 
can be planted without irrigation throughout the year. Located at high altitudes on the 
equator, temperature variations are not seasonal, but rather diurnal. Means between 11 
and 12˚C occur between 2,500 and 3,000 meters above sea level (masl), while between 
3,000 and 3,400 masl temperature drops to means between ten and 11˚ C and at 3,400 
masl 8 and 9˚ C (Table 2.1). The geographic position and climatic conditions of Carchi 
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permit continual plant growth, making the province potentially one of the most 
productive agriculture regions on the planet. 
 
  
Fig. 2.1a South America Fig. 2.1b Province of Carchi, Ecuador 
Figure 2.1 Location of Carchi 
 
Table 2.1 Meteorological data from four weather stations in Carchi (Crissman, Antle, and 
Capalbo, 1998)* 
 
 Rainfall (mm) Temperature 
Weather station/altitude Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. dev. 
San Gabriel (2,860) 950 848 12 10 
El Angel (3,065) 984 605 12 14 
El Voladero (3,380) 1,314 n.a. 9 n.a. 
Tulcán (2,950) 996 850 12 11 
* Data for San Gabriel, El Angel and Tulcán averaged over 1970-2000. El Voladero data based on 1985-1995 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Rainfall distribution of Carchi (INAMHI, 1970-2000) 
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Termed the “Páramo-Andes” by Troll (1968), rainfall throughout the year distinguishes the 
highland region of northern Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela from the drier “Puna-
Andes” of southern and central Peru and Bolivia. Cool temperatures and wet conditions 
over millennia contributed to the formation of highly organic soils (12-20% by weight) 
and unique alpine environments, including cloud forest and “páramo” or tropical alpine 
grasslands. Carchi has well-defined western and eastern cordilleras that are topped by an 
extensive alpine plain with unique frailejón grasslands (Figure 2.3a). The western ridge 
forms one of the country’s largest natural páramo environments – the El Angel Ecological 
Reserve, covering about 14,000 hectares (ha). On the eastern ridge, the inter-Andean slope 
boasts an extensive 40,000 ha stretch of forest that is perhaps the best surviving example 
of pristine inter-Andean vegetation (Palacios & Tipaz, 1996). The forest lies on steep 
slopes and is circumscribed above by alpine páramo and below by cultivated agriculture 
(Figure 2.3b). 
 
  
Fig. 2.3a. The frailejón páramo landscape of 
the El Angel Reserve, Espejo 
Fig. 2.3b. The inter-Andean valley of San Gabriel, 
Montúfar 
Figure 2.3 The landscape 
 
The highland Andes of Carchi rest between 2,500 and 4,000 masl (Figure 2.4). In the early 
1800s, the German explorer and scientist Alexander von Humbolt famously characterised 
the biotic systems of the Ecuadorian highlands by three ecological floors: inter-Andes 
(2,500-3,200 masl), sub-Andes (3,200-3,600 masl), and Andes (3,600 masl). Two dominant 
regimes of plant populations dominate the natural ecologies: very humid highland 
montane forest (in valleys climbing up to 3,400 masl) and the frailejón (Espeletia pycnophylla 
spp. angelensis) páramo (3,400 up to 4,000 masl) (Sierra, 1999). The native vegetative cover 
of the highland forest consists of diverse tree and scrub species, including aliso (Alnus 
acuminata), arrayán (Mycianthes rhopaloides), chilca (Baccharis spp.), cedro (Cedrela montana), 
pumamaqui (Oreopanax sp.), quishuar (Buddleja bullata), and yagual (Polylepus sericea) 
(Cuamacás and Tipaz, 1995). The frailejón páramo chiefly consists of Espeletia sp. and 
bunch grasses (Calamagrositis sp., Agrostis sp., Stip ichu, Festuca sp.) (Figure 2.3a). Further, 
the páramo contains rosettes, cushion plants, and dispersed forests of yagual. 
 
The soils of Carchi are exceedingly arable. They were formed by pyroclastic material from 
the Chiles volcano located on the Colombian border, followed by processes of glaciation. 
The last eruption of Chiles occurred about ten thousand years ago. The relatively young 
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soils are classified as Andepts and are derived from volcanic ash and pumice (Figure 2.5). 
Soil formation above 3,000 masl has resulted in surface horizons of one to three meters of 
dark topsoil composed of high quantities of organic matter (10-25% by volume). Known 
as black Andean soils (suelos negros andinos), these soils have low bulk density, high water 
holding capacity, and are particularly apt for agriculture. At the same time, an alophane 
clay structure chemically fixes phosphorus, leading potato farmers to apply high quantities 
of phosphate fertilizers. Commonly formed on top of a thick layer of cemented ash (in 
Kichwa known as cangahua) that may run ten to 100 meters deep, the soils are highly 
vulnerable to human activity (Zembrowski, 1997). Absent of topsoil, the subsurface 
cangahua is impenetrable to water and inapt for agriculture (Figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.4 Topography of Carchi (Stoorvogel et al., 2003) 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Soil variation of Carchi (MAG-Orstom, 1980 in Stoorvogel et al., 2003) 
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Fig. 2.6a Road cut revealing “black Andean” top soil 
and sub-soil layer of cemented ash or cangahua (San 
Gabriel, Carchi; Veen, 1999) 
Fig. 2.6b Degraded soil of northern 
Ecuador revealing non-arable cangahua 
(Bolívar, Carchi) 
Figure 2.6 Volcanic soils common to northern Ecuador 
 
Farmers cultivate a diversity of crops in the inter-Andean region of the Páramo Andes, 
including maize, alfalfa, and field bean, as well as pasture for animals, chiefly cattle and 
sheep. In modern time, a potato-pasture rotation on irregular hillsides of up to 45 percent 
slope and altitudes between 2,400 to 3,800 masl dominates production patterns (Figure 
2.3b). Although potato can be found on the flatlands of the central valley, agrarian reform 
commonly placed farmers on surrounding environmentally fragile hillsides, with expected 
consequential effects on soil and water resources. Modern population growth in the 
valleys has aggravated this tendency. 
 
Modern potato production 
 
The highland Andes contains the greatest genetic diversity among cultivated and wild 
potatoes (Solanum tuberosum L.) (Hawkes, 1978; Salaman, 1985; Harris, 1992). Scientists 
generally agree that the Lake Titicaca region along the border of Peru and Bolivia was the 
site of potato domestication nearly 8,000 years ago. Archaeological studies have found 
that diverse ancient Andean groups, including the Tiwanaco, Nazca, Mochica, and Inca, 
cultivated the crop. In his chronicle of 1538, the Spaniard, Pedro Cieza de León, reported 
that he found tubers called “papas” in the Cuzco Valle, Peru and later in Quito, Ecuador. 
When the Spanish arrived in the early 1500s, potato was cultivated throughout the 4,000 
km long range of the Andes, in what are now the territories of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Bolivia, and Chile.  
 
Of the approximately 2,000 known species of the Solanum genus, about 180 plants form 
tubers (Hawkes, 1978). Of these, only eight are cultivated as edible crops. There are about 
5,000 cultivars of potato in the world, of which today Andean farmers commonly grow 
about 500. In 1994, INIAP conducted a survey of cultivated potato in Ecuador and 
reported over 400 different types between the species andigena and phureja (Pumisacho and 
Sherwood, 2002). Nevertheless, 30 cultivars dominate the modern Ecuadorian landscape, 
of which the varieties Gabriela and Superchola occupy over half the land cultivated in the 
crop. 
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In the sixteenth century, the Spanish introduced the potato to Europe, where it was only 
cultivated as a curiosity for several centuries in small plots or for botanical purposes 
(Laufer, 1938). From Spain, the potato spread throughout the continent and the United 
Kingdom. Andean potatoes only grew well in a few locations in Europe where winters 
were mild, such as southern Ireland. Early in the seventeenth century, the crop was 
introduced to North America, most likely from England. Over time, as the potato adapted 
to the climate and farmers selected more precocious varieties, potato cultivation became 
economically viable in the northern temperate climate. In Europe, potato generally was 
first used for animal feed and was not commonly considered for human consumption. 
Only in the eighteenth century did Europeans and North Americans begin to consider the 
potato a source of low-cost human food, particularly during periods of scarcity due to 
failures of cereal crops and wars. Over time, however, the crop became a basic food 
source the world over.  
 
Today, the worldwide circulation of root and tuber crops generates about $41 billion each 
year, representing one-fourth of the combined value of the cereals wheat, rice and maize 
(Scott et al., 2000). Of the root and tuber crops, the potato has the highest economic value 
(about $16.5 billion/year). It ranks fifth in weight of production among the world's food 
crops. In terms of nutrition, the potato contributes about one-fifth as many calories as 
rice, wheat, and maize to the world diet. The countries with the most area under potato 
cultivation are: China (3.5 million ha), the Russian Federation (3.4 million ha), Ukraine 
(1.6 million ha), Poland (1.4 million ha), and India (1.1 million ha). In Latin America, 
despite being the crop's centre of origin, only about 1.1 million hectares are dedicated to 
the crop each year, of which Ecuador grows about 43,000 ha,1 which is down from about 
66,000 ha during the 1990s (Herrera, 1999; INEC, 2002). The countries with the greatest 
potato productivity are: The Netherlands (44 t/ha), US (39 t/ha), Belgium and 
Luxemburg (38 t/ha) and Canada (27 t/ha) (CIP, 1998; Scott et al., 2000). Of the Latin 
American countries, Argentina has the greatest productivity (22 t/ha), followed by Chile 
and Brazil (15 t/ha). In the Andes, farmers in Colombia and Venezuela grow about 16 
t/ha of potato. The lowest productivity can be found in Bolivia and Ecuador, which 
respectively produce on average six and nine t/ha. 
 
In the developing counties, total potato production has more than doubled since 1965, 
with most growth occurring in Asia and Africa (Scott et al., 2000). Through 2020, yearly 
potato production in developing countries is projected to grow at about 2.7 percent, 
which is greater than that expected for maize, wheat, or rice. The greatest growth likely 
will occur in Asia, followed by Africa and Latin America. In the last 30 years, Latin 
America has experienced an increase in potato productivity instead of an increase in area 
dedicated to the crop. The growth in overall regional production for this period was about 
two percent. Presently, the number of potato growers in Ecuador is about 42,000 
predominantly smallholder farmers (INEC, 2002). The country produces about 480,000 
tons of potato with a brute value of $60 million, maintaining the potato as an important 
source of food and income, especially for rural communities. Carchi is Ecuador's most 
productive province, producing about 40 percent of the country's potato harvest on only 
25 percent of the land dedicated the crop.  
                                                       
1 Based on SICA-MAG data for 2006, available at: www.sica.gov.ec (accessed 1 October 2008). 
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Consumption 
 
Cuando en la sopa no hay papas, es como si fuera agua, aunque tenga fréjol, arveja, col... 
(When in the soup there is no potato, it’s as if it were water, even if there are 
beans, peas, and cabbage…) – a popular saying in Carchi 
 
Andean cultures discovered roots and tubers as a valuable source of energy (Woolfe, 
1987). The nutritive quality and quantity of the potato varies by cultivar and cropping 
conditions. Water content may range from 63 and 87 percent, carbohydrates 13 and 30 
percent (including fibre content 0.17 and 3.48%), proteins 0.7 and 4.6 percent, fats 0.02 
and 0.96 percent, and ash 0.44 and 1.9 percent. Other basic nutrients include sugars, 
ascorbic acid and minor vitamins.  
 
While cereals and pulses are part of a large international trade market, only a small 
percentage of potato harvests is exported from countries. The high water content, 
bulkiness, and perishability of tubers complicate their transport. In the dry puna Andes to 
the South, pre-Incan cultures learned to freeze-dry potato as chuño that was transportable 
and capable of storage – qualities essential for surviving crops failures and war. 
Nevertheless, chuño could not be produced in the wet páramo environments of the 
northern Andes, greatly limiting the utility of the crop. As a result, pre-Colombian cultures 
of the northern Andes preferred maize (Landázuri, 1995). In that region, potato and other 
Andean roots and tubers were relegated to highland areas, where little else survived the 
severe conditions. 
 
For the people of modern-day Ecuador, potato has become a principal food source, with 
an annual per capita consumption of about 100 kg (Herrera et al., 1999). Ninety percent of 
potatoes in the northern Andes, where crops can be grown year round, are consumed 
immediately as fresh tubers. As a result, varieties are not adapted for storage, in contrast to 
the more temperate climates of Peru and Bolivia as well as Europe and North America. 
The food processing industry in Ecuador consumes about 50,000 t/yr or ten percent of 
the annual production. Since 1994, the consumption of fast food in Ecuador has increased 
sharply at an annual rate of about six percent. Restaurants in Quito and Guayaquil only 
consume about 16,000 t/yr, principally as French fries, but that number is growing. 
 
Potato-pasture system 
 
Upon arrival in 1997, my information on potato production in Carchi was based on two 
primary sources of data. Between 1990 and 1992, Crissman et al. (1998) studied 320 plots 
of 40 farmers in the San Gabriel area. This research contributed to a large number of 
economic and health publications, including: Antle, et al. (1994), Antle et al. (1998), 
Crissman, et al. (1994), Cole, et al. (1997a), Cole et al. (1997b), and Cole et al. (1998). 
Secondly, in 1998, Barrera, Norton, and Ortiz (1999) conducted a survey of 100 farmers 
between Tulcán, Huaca, Montúfar, and Espejo. This information concurs with findings 
based on the earlier datasets, except for increases in input prices and lower production per 
area, which apparently was due to an unusually dry year. Later, Yanggen et al. (2003) drew 
on these same two data sources for their description of the production system. I similarly 
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rely on these sources. For biophysical aspects of potato production, I draw heavily on the 
local studies summarised in Pumisacho and Sherwood (2002). 
 
Carchi has been described as a model of the spread of industrialized agricultural 
technologies in the Americas during the Green Revolution that began in the 1960s 
(Barsky, 1984). A combination of traditional sharecropping, land reform, market access 
and high value crops provided the basis for rural economic development. Furthermore, as 
a result of new revenues from the oil boom of the 1970s, the Ecuadorian government 
improved the transportation and communication infrastructure in Carchi. An emerging 
agricultural products industry was quick to capitalize on the availability of new markets. 
Today, a typical small farm in Carchi is owned by an individual family and consists of 
several separate, scattered plots with an average area of about six hectares.  
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, farming in Carchi evolved towards a 
market-oriented potato-pasture system based on a three to five year rotational system. 
One or two cycles of potato are followed by a combination of secondary crops, including 
wheat, maize, bean, favabean, barley, peas, oca or melloco, to take advantage of residual 
fertilizer from potato. Farmers follow this rotation with one or two years of “rest” in 
spontaneously occurring grassland for diary and meat cattle. Due to the intensiveness of 
the system, it depends on external inputs to maintain fertility and control pests. Between 
1954 and 1974 potato production increased by about 40 percent and worker productivity 
by 33 percent (Barsky, 1984). Until recently, the potato growing area in the province 
continued to swell, with yields rising from12 t/ha in 1974 to 21 t/ha in 1992, a remarkable 
three times the national average (Crissman et al., 1998b).  
 
Production costs 
 
During the early 1990s, farmers in Carchi invested on average about $1,500 per ha in 
potato production (Table 2.2) (Crissman et al., 1998b). About 25 percent of outlays went 
towards labour (valuing both family and paid labour as worker days). The average six-
month potato crop employed about 157 workdays/ha, with about 85 percent for men and 
the remainder for women. Labour came both from family and hired sources. Women 
were most involved in planting and harvest (Table 2.3). Rarely were they involved in crop 
management or the applying of agrochemicals. During the 1990s, farmers in Carchi 
cultivated about 15,000 ha/yr of potato, signifying about 2,355,000 workdays of 
employment for the province. About 32 percent of total investment was in fertilizers and 
pesticides. The remainder of variable costs went towards land preparation, harvest, and 
transport (12%). Twenty percent of outlays went towards fixed costs, such as land rent 
and interest on loans. 
 
Profitability of potato production was generally positive but highly variable. In Carchi, 
most potato was sold weekly in local markets of San Gabriel and Ibarra, depending on 
location of fields. Potato farmers found highly variable prices across varieties at harvest 
time. Price at harvest was important, since potatoes in Carchi are not bred for storage, nor 
are the conditions in the wet páramo Andes favourable for storage. Since Carchi is located 
near the equator and rainfall is evenly distributed, monthly price fluctuations were not 
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determined by season, but rather comparative prices with neighbouring Colombia and 
Peru as well as dumping of commodities by countries in North American and Europe. As 
a result of such factors, Crissman et al. (1998a) found that between 1990-1992 farmers lost 
money on about 43 percent of their potato crops. To confront high price variability in 
potato, farmers applied the strategy of "playing the lottery," which involved continual 
production while gambling for high prices at harvest to recover overall investment. In 
summary, potato production in Carchi was a highly risky enterprise. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Average production costs for one hectare of potato (USD) (1990-1992) 
(Crissman et al., 1998b)* 
 
Category Sample (n) Quantity Cost (US$) Percentage of total cost 
Variable costs     
Labour     
Family 320  288 18.7 
Contract 103  55 3.6 
Harvest 270  45 2.9 
Total labour  157 days 388 25.3 
Seed 320 1,716 kg 148 9.7 
Fertilizers   302 19.6 
Nitrogen, a.i. 320 138 kg   
Phosphorus, a.i. 320 327 kg   
Potassium, a.i. 317 163 kg   
Foliar 207  11 0.8 
Total fertilizers   313 20.4 
Pesticides     
Fungicides 320  128 8.3 
Foliar insecticides 314  26 1.7 
Soil insecticides 268  34 2.2 
Total pesticides   188 12.2 
Animal and mechanical 
traction 
153  17 1.2 
Back-pack sprayers 320  10 0.7 
Harvest  320  53 3.5 
Transport 319  105 6.9 
Total materials/services   185 12.2 
Total variable costs   1,222 79.8 
Fixed costs     
Interest   232 15.2 
Rent   77 5.0 
Total fixed costs   309 20.1 
Total costs   1,531 100 
* Note: Average harvest = 21.3 t/ha; gross income = $1,941; net income = $410/ha. Exchange rate 
increased from 890 Sucres/USD in 1991 to 1,700 Sucres/USD in 1992. The authors used 1,300 Sucres/USD 
for conversion; a.i. = active ingredient 
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Table 2.3 Workdays by gender and activity in field potato production (by hectare and 
potato cropping cycle) (1990-1992; n=320 plots) (Crissman et al., 1998b) 
 
Activity Men Women Total 
Soil preparation 17.1 0.1 17.2 
Planting 9.2 6.5 15.7 
Crop management (excluding pesticide applications) 47.9 2.9 50.8 
Pesticide applications 20.2 0.0 20.1 
Harvest (sorting, bagging) 38.3 14.5 52.8 
Total 132.7 24.0 156.7 
 
Soil and pest management 
 
Sixty percent of potato fields are prepared exclusively by tractor, and 25 percent are 
ploughed via a combination of oxen and by hand (Veen, 1999). The remaining 15 percent 
of fields are prepared exclusively by hand. Generally, landscape determines patterns, with 
farmers relying on mechanised tillage for fields of less than 35 percent slope. Chemical 
fertilisers have replaced traditional means of managing fertility, such as rotations and 
extended fallows (Crissman et al., 1998b; Barrera et al., 1999). Essentially, all potato 
growers in Carchi used chemical fertilizers, with an average application rate being 138 
kg/ha of Nitrogen (N), 327 Phosphorus (P), and 163 Potassium (K) (Table 2.2). The 
compound fertilizer 18-46-0 (18% N, 46% P, and 0% K), that responded to a 
phosphorous tie-up problem of black Andean soils, was the most common product 
applied. While still economically cost effective, according to aggregate soil analysis, 
fertilizer use was between 50 and 100 percent above recommended rates for potato 
(Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). 
 
Scientists have identified hundreds of insects and pathogens (biotic disease agents) that 
feed on potato (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). Some of these co-evolved with the 
crop. Because the potato typically is propagated a-sexually by means of tubers, it was 
relatively easy for pests to travel with the crop as it migrated from the Andes to Europe 
and the rest of the world. Other pests and diseases existed locally and adapted to the 
potato when it arrived as a new host plant. In Ecuador, a large number of insect and 
disease pests attack potato, but in Carchi most damage is caused by three: the disease late 
blight (caused by the fungal-like pathogen Phytophthora infestans), the Andean weevil 
(Premnotrypes vorax), and the recently introduced Guatemalan tuber moth (Tescia solinavora). 
Additionally, a complex of minor foliar pests feed on the crop, including leaf flea beetles 
(Epitrix spp.), aphids (Myzus persicae and Macrosiphun euphorbiae), thrips (Franliniella tuberosi), 
and leafminers (Liriomyza huibodrensis). 
 
An exotic pathogen from North America and Europe causes the devastating disease late 
blight. The pathogen was likely introduced to the Andes on seed tubers in the early 
twentieth century, most likely via Europe, after it had contributed to the Irish Potato 
Famine in the early 1840s (Andrivon, 1996). P. infestans is an oomycete, fungal-like 
organism that infects vascular tissues, producing blight symptoms (known in the Andes as 
lancha or rancha) in solanaceous crops (de Bary, 1876). Many plant pathologists consider 
late blight the most economically severe disease on edible crops the world over (Fry, 
1997). The pathogen can enter a field and devastate a potato crop in less than one week. 
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In Ecuador the disease proliferates at altitudes between 2,800 and 3,400 masl (Pumisacho 
and Sherwood, 2002). Studies have found that the pathogen can travel with the wind 
hundreds of kilometres, limiting the usefulness of rotation with non-hosts as a 
management strategy. In humid and cool conditions common to Carchi, spores germinate 
and hypha penetrate the lamina of leaves, reproducing both a-sexually and sexually in a 
matters of hours and destroying tissue. The pathogen interferes with photosynthesis, 
thereby decreasing plant growth and yields. Similarly, P. infestans also can directly infect 
fruits and tubers. Under the right conditions the oomycete can live and reproduce in the 
soil and infect tubers in the ground. For reasons not entirely understood, this means of 
infection is less common in the Northern Andes, perhaps due to biological or chemical 
antagonism of soils (Garzón-Villalba, 1998). As a result of favourable environmental 
conditions for late blight in the highlands and the difficulty of producing multiple gene 
resistance in potato, the pathogen commonly overcomes resistant varieties in less than five 
years. As a result, control strategies in Carchi largely have centred on the use of foliar 
fungicides targeting spore germination and hyphal penetration of leaves. 
 
The Andean weevil, locally known as gusano blanco or the white worm, is an endemic insect 
that co-evolved with potato (Gallegos et al., 1997). In the highland provinces of Ecuador 
its larval stage commonly affects between 20 and 50 percent of tubers, causing 
considerable economic loss for farmers. The small adult beetle survives above ground for 
about 270 days where it feeds on the leaves of potato and other solanaceous relatives, 
causing limited foliar damage. During this period females lay about 260 small white eggs, 
usually at the base of plants. After about 35 days the eggs hatch into small white larva that 
live in the soil for about 38 days, where they burrow into potato tubers and produce 
elongate galleries. The insect passes through pre-pupa (18 days) and pupa (26 days) stages 
in a small dirt cell in the soil and sometimes the potato tuber, before the adult emerges 
and escapes to the soil surface. Adult weevils have highly developed olfaction and may 
travel three to five kilometres in search of host plants. They can survive for three months 
without food. In Carchi, where potato production is continuous, the Andean weevil is 
omnipresent, and the different life cycle stages of the insect can be found in fields at any 
given time of the year (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). Traditionally, the Andean weevil 
was controlled empirically through multi-cropping and crop rotation. Certain cultural 
practices, such as prolonged rotations with non-host crops, companion planting with 
chocho, as well as the wachu rozado reduced tillage system, were antagonistic to the beetle. 
Intensive potato production increased the presence of potato as a host plant and has 
contributed to the proliferation of the pest in recent time. Since larva live in the soil, they 
are difficult to observe and control. Tillage can decrease populations, but it also 
synchronizes life cycles of surviving beetles with the crop. The beetle is small and dirt-like, 
making it difficult to perceive, and as a result, knowledge of the insect’s life cycle generally 
has not entered into rural knowledge systems. As a result, farmers have come to rely on 
soil drench and systemic insecticides that translocate in plants and poison larva at the 
moment they burrow into tubers. 
 
In 1983, the Guatemalan tuber moth or Tescia migrated into South America via a 
contaminated shipment of potato seed from Costa Rica to Venezuela. In 1985, it arrived 
in Colombia via similar means and, subsequently in 1996, reached Ecuador (Barragán et 
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al., 2000). Five years later the pest was found in potato fields and markets throughout 
Ecuador and northern Peru. The adult moth lays between six and 15 white eggs at the 
base of potato plants. Over a course of 12 to 15 days, eggs turn yellow and then purple 
before hatching (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). Larva develop in the soil over a period 
of 30 to 35 days, when they search for and infest tubers, leaving behind galleries. Typically 
larvae abandon the potato at maturity to form a cocoon in the soil, but it also may pupate 
in the potato itself or in sacks during transport and storage. After between 28 to 30 days a 
grey moth adult emerges, which lives for 18 to 22 days. During this period, females lay 
about 250 eggs. The adults feed on plant exudates, but they can survive without eating. 
Exotic to the Andes, the Guatemalan tuber moth does not have natural enemies in Carchi. 
Frequent rainfall effectively suppresses moth populations, but during a dry year the pest 
can recover to devastate crops. In 1998, field infestations in Carchi were so bad that many 
farmers chose not to harvest their potatoes, which contributed to further proliferation of 
the insect. Farmers have not yet developed cultural means of managing the pest, but 
rotations with non-host crops can starve out larva in the soil. Nevertheless, adults can 
easily travel the distances between potato fields in Carchi, so clean fields quickly become 
infested. Farmers commonly apply systemic soil as well as foliar insecticides for the 
control of Tescia, but these have little affect on the insect (Chamorro et al., 2004). 
 
The earlier mentioned complex of foliar pests does little economic damage to the potato 
crop in Carchi largely as a result of frequent rainfall, which controls adults as well as larva 
and nymphs on leaves (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). Even during dry periods the 
damage to leaves, while visibly impressive, rarely influences production. Nevertheless, 
over the years farmers have come to view any presence of insects on their crop as 
threatening, so local understanding of “good farming” has evolved to include regular 
applications of highly toxic foliar insecticides (Espinosa et al., 2003). 
 
Pesticide use 
 
Farmers in Carchi invest three times more money on pesticides in potato than they do on 
any other crop (Table 2.4) (Crissman et al., 1998b). When the products and labour are 
factored, pesticides represent about 33 percent of total production costs. In the early 
1990s farmers applied 38 different commercial fungicide formulations (Table 2.5). Barrera 
et al. (1999) found essentially the same patterns at the end of the decade. Farmers apply 24 
active ingredients of fungicides. The class of dithiocarbamate contact-type fungicides are 
the most popular, with mancozeb contributing more than 80 percent by weight of all 
fungicide active ingredients used. The dithiocarbamate family of fungicides has recently 
been under scrutiny in the Northern Andes due to suspected reproductive (Restrepo et al., 
1990) and mutagenic effects in human cells (Paz-y-Mino et al., 2002). Governments in 
Europe and the United States have raised similar concerns over these fungicides (USEPA, 
1992; Lander et al., 2000). In summary, 80 percent of the fungicides applied in Carchi 
contain a suspected cancer-causing agent. 
 
Farmers use three of the four main groups of insecticides in 28 different commercial 
products. Although organochlorine insecticides can be found in Ecuador, farmers in 
Carchi do not use them. The carbamate group is represented only by carbofuran, but this 
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is the single most heavily used insecticide - for control of the Andean weevil as well as for 
the Guatemalan tuber moth, though carbofuran does not control Tescia). Farmers 
exclusively apply a liquid formulation of carbofuran, which is restricted in North America 
and Europe due to the ease of absorption and the high acute toxicity of the pesticide. 
While the manufacturer recommends just one application of carbofuran for potato, many 
farmers apply more than ten applications. Another 18 different active ingredients from the 
organophosphate (OP) and pyrethroid groups are employed to control foliar pests, though 
only four are used on more than ten percent of plots. Here the OP methamidophos, also 
restricted in North America due to its high acute toxicity, is the clear favourite. 
Carbofuran and methamidophos, both classified by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) as highly toxic (1b) insecticides, respectively make up 47 percent and 43 percent 
of all insecticides used (by weight of active ingredient applied). In summary, 90 percent of 
the insecticides applied in Carchi are highly toxic.  
 
 
Table 2.4 Pesticide expenditures for different crops Carchi (US$/ha) (1990-1992; n=40 
farmers) (Crissman et al., 1998b) 
 
Crop Fungicide Insecticide  Total 
Potato 128 60 188 
Wheat 48 4 52 
Fava bean 33 19 52 
Barley 46 1 47 
Peas 23 10 33 
Maize and field bean  15 14 29 
Maize 12 14 26 
Mellocoa   b 10 10 
Ocaa   b  b  b
 
a Melloco and oca are Andean root crops 
b No pesticides were applied 
 
 
Most insecticides and fungicides come as liquids or wetable powders and are applied by 
mixing with water and using a backpack sprayer. Provided the costs associated with 
spraying, farmers usually combine several products together in mixtures known as 
cocktails, applying all on a single pass through the field. On average, each parcel receives 
6.7 applications with 2.5 insecticides and fungicides in each application (Crissman et al., 
1998b). On many occasions, they mix different commercial products containing the same 
active ingredient or different active ingredients intended for the same type of control. 
Women and very young children typically do not apply pesticides – among the 2,250 
applications that CIP documented in its 1990s' studies, women made only four. 
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Table 2.5 Pesticide use during a single potato cropping season (1990-1992; 320 plots) 
(Crissman et al., 1998b) 
 
Fungicides Amount applied (kg) No. of applications No. of plots treated 
Mancozeba 3,110.67 1,801 304 
Sulphur compounds 333.14 286 99 
Propineba 142.02 146 53 
Maneba 115.11 181 65 
Cymoxanilb 64.93 635 178 
Copper compounds 29.21 94 29 
Fentinacetate 11.34 86 36 
Ferbama 9.55 73 28 
Chlorotalonyl 6.75 6 6 
Fosetil–aluminum 4.74 11 6 
Metirama 3.92 7 6 
Oxicarboxinb 1.95 2 2 
Propiocanazolb 1.39 26 13 
Captan 1.16 7 5 
Methyl tiophanate 1.15 12 5 
PCNB 0.75 1 1 
Dinocap 0.59 5 3 
Tridemorfb 0.30 2 1 
Zineba 0.25 3 2 
Carbendazimb 0.25 1 1 
Carboxinb 0.15 1 1 
Ofuraceb 0.02 1 1 
Metalaxylb 0.00 1 1 
Insecticides Amount applied (kg) No. of applications No. of plots treated 
Carbofuran 224.77 687 262 
Methamidophosc 206.69 999 265 
Profenofosc 20.99 117 62 
Fonofosc 9.77 28 16 
Malathionc 9.72 14 9 
Dimetoatoc 5.40 19 11 
Lambda  0.78 148 64 
Cihalotrina 0.72 3 1 
Diazinonc 0.71 10 6 
Foratoc 0.49 4 1 
Methyl parathion 0.46 92 42 
Deltametrine 0.32 2 2 
Monocrotophosc 0.32 1 1 
Phosfamidon 0.31 7 4 
Cypermetrina 0.19 7 2 
Acephate 0.12 10 6 
Cyflutrin 0.08 1 1 
Formothion 0.08 1 1 
Fenitrothionc 0.05 3 2 
Alfametrina 206.69 999 265 
Methamidophosc 20.99 117 62 
a Dithiocarbamate fungicide; b Systemic fungicide; c Organophosphate insecticide 
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Ecuador's exchange rate policies during the 1980 and 1990s effectively subsidized the 
importation of pesticides, including the highly toxics carbofuran and methamidophos, by 
about 30 percent (Lee and Espinosa, 1998). Econometric evaluations of pesticide use in 
Carchi potato production found that from a financial perspective farmers used the 
products efficiently (Crissman et al., 1994). Four mathematical approaches were 
considered in estimating production elasticity of specific inputs, which showed the overall 
marginal productivity of pesticides to be about 12 percent (Table 2.6). Due to the 
virulence and aggressiveness of the late blight pathogen, plant pathologists consider the 
use of fungicides as essential for obtaining potato harvests, so the return of fungicides is 
consistent and high. Attempts during the 1990s by an environmental NGO to produce 
pesticide-free potatoes in Carchi failed and affirmed this point of view (Frolick et al., 
1999). In summary, the benefit to yields (and revenues) from using pesticides exceeds the 
additional costs of using them. 
 
Table 2.6 Elasticity estimates for pesticides used in potato production in Carchi (n=320 
plots) (Crissman et al., 1994) 
 
                                      Functional form* 
Input Cobb-Douglas  Quadratic Exponential Logarithmic 
Fungicides 0.0827 0.1148 0.0000 0.0000 
Foliar 
insecticides 
0.0217 0.0268 0.0017 0.0010 
Soil insecticides 0.0501 - 0.0038 0.0557 0.0595 
*Note: Exponential and logarithmic forms were specified with a reduction restriction as suggested by 
Lichtenberg y Zilberman.  
 
 
Environmental and health costs of modern agriculture 
 
While a conventional economic analysis of the employment of technologies in agricultural 
production in Carchi showed positive returns – i.e., the benefit of increasing productivity 
through fertilisers or mechanised tillage or reducing losses due to pests and diseases 
exceeded costs – that same use could cause adverse environmental and health effects. The 
previously mentioned elasticity studies on pesticides, for example, showed that pesticide 
use was efficient from a narrow farm production perspective. Nevertheless, that study 
examined pesticide use solely from the perspective of reducing crop losses. When adverse 
health and environmental effects are included in productivity analyses, results can be very 
different.  
 
The researchers developed an integrated assessment method to address this analytical 
problem called the Tradeoffs Analysis Model (ToA) (Antle et al., 1998; Stoorvogel et al., 
2003) (Box 2.1). Interest in developing the model and further understanding the true costs 
of modern agriculture led to further environmental and health investigations. The ensuing 
research primarily looked at different environmental concerns around human-induced soil 
degradation as well as health concerns associated with pesticide exposure. Outcomes 
contributed to integrated analysis of productivity, health, and environmental tradeoffs of 
different technological alternatives and policy recommendations. 
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Box 2.1 Tradeoffs analysis of sustainable agriculture and the environment in the Andes: A 
decision support system for policy makers 
 
Since 1996, CIP, in collaboration with INIAP, Montana State University (MSU), the 
Pontífica Universidad Católica de Ecuador (PUCE) and Wageningen University and Research 
Centre (WUR), among other organisations, have implemented a collaborative project to 
provide a decision support system for assessing tradeoffs between agricultural production 
and the environment for different economic, agricultural and environmental policies, and 
agricultural research. Through quantifying relationships between key economic and health 
or environmental indicators, the Tradeoffs Analysis Model (ToA) uses raw data and 
software to compare different technological alternatives, in search of potential positive 
sum or “win-win” scenarios.  
 
The diagram graphically explains the 
tradeoffs concept. Increasing from 
zero, the vertical axis registers levels of 
growing negative impact on the 
environment or health. The horizontal 
axis presents growing value of 
agricultural production. Changes in 
technology that increase production 
commonly lead to increased affects on 
the environment or health, as 
demonstrated by the climbing rate of 
the curves. Nevertheless, a shift to 
certain technology, for example from 
pesticides to IPM, can produce 
movement from T1 to T2, by decreasing 
negative environmental or health 
effects while maintaining production. 
The result is a win-win development. 
Details on ToA are available at the project website (www.tradeoffs.montana.edu) and the 
model website (www.tradeoffs.nl). 
 
In the Andes, the development and application of ToA has concentrated on pesticide and 
soil management technology. The combination of economics, soil science research, and 
crop and dairy modelling advances methodological development of a conceptual model 
that links economics and environmental research for the purpose of policy analysis and 
technology evaluation. A product development team aims to continually integrate 
developmental research, strategic research and outreach activities. The adaptation of the 
decision support system represents developmental research that has required the 
utilisation of existing secondary information from sources such as soil survey, land use 
survey, weather, farm production, and economic data. As the decision support system has 
developed, the initiative has encouraged outreach through the training of “change agents” 
from NGOs and local governments in transmitting results and providing feedback links 
with on-going policy dialogue. 
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Soil degradation 
 
De Noni and Trujillo (1986) identified Carchi as a region of rapid soil decline. In their 
work on different aspects of soil modelling for the broader ToA effort, Kooistra and 
Meyles (1997) and van Soest (1998) from Wageningen University raised concerns over the 
soil erosion provoked by potato cultivation. These scientists were alarmed to see subsoil 
cangahua emerging at the top of hillsides after three decades of tractor use. Due to the high 
water holding capacity of black Andean soils, Kooistra and Meyles (1997) surmised that 
soil loss was primarily due to mechanized tillage on slopes and not run-off due to rainfall.  
 
Subsequent quantitative studies confirmed these observations. Veen (1999) examined on-
farm soil movement in the San Gabriel area and found that the primary factors behind soil 
degradation and production declines were: longer production history, intensification of 
production, the use of modern technologies, and tractor applications. Valverde et al. 
(2001) documented soil displacement produced by ploughs and disks in Carchi potato 
production. They found that mechanised tillage in a potato field commonly displaced 
between 50 and 100 t/ha of soil, with a displacement of greater than 80 t/ha common in 
slopes over 25 percent.  
 
A dominant pattern of market-oriented production and the positioning of potato as a cash 
crop led to an intensification of agriculture in Carchi. In practice, this signified a shift 
towards total tillage, mono-cropping, shortening of fallow periods, and agrochemical use. 
The CIP researchers surmised that this affected “soil health” – i.e., the capacity of a soil to 
function within ecosystem boundaries to sustain biological productivity, maintain 
environmental quality, and promote plant and animal health.2 Between 1999 and 2003, 
INIAP and CIP conducted a joint study in Carchi on the effects of potato farming on soil 
regenerative capacity through a project named EcoSuelos (in English, EcoSoils).3 While the 
researchers had a difficult time understanding the dynamics of soil ecology in such a short 
period of time, preliminary results pointed to worrisome trends in long-term soil health. 
Changes to soil micro-morphology, such as soil organic matter fractions, nutrient content, 
and water-holding capacity, were not observed. Nevertheless, the research identified a 
change in soil environmental conditions and ecology that appeared to work against long-
term crop health and overall sustainability of agriculture. Pathogenic nematode 
populations (Globodera or Meloidogyne spp.) were found to be relatively low, most likely due 
to heavy use of carbofuran (both an insecticide and nematicide). Using Rhizoctonia and 
Fusarium spp. as indicators, studies found that modern agriculture practices (i.e., total 
tillage, mono-cropping, shortening of fallow periods, and agrochemical uses) in potato 
production combined to contribute to the proliferation of soil pathogens. Further, they 
found that native mycorrhizae populations declined, decreasing the plants’ ability to 
absorb soil phosphorous, thereby potentially affecting root development and overall crop 
growth and production. While studies were not conclusive, it was suggested that beneficial 
                                                       
2 Harris and Bezdicek (1994) explain the difference between “soil quality” and “soil health.” Uphoff and 
Sherwood (2000) argued in favour of soil health in the context of regenerative agriculture, due to its 
conceptual emphasis on the dynamic qualities of soil and inclusion of socio-technical aspects of agriculture. 
3 “EcoSuelos: investigacion para un manejo mas productivo y sostenible de suelos andinos en la ecoregion 
centro-norte del Ecuador” was a collaborative INIAP-CIP project funded by MAG/PROMSA, IQ-CV-049. 
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entomopathogen populations had declined, contributing to the proliferation of a major 
pest: the Andean weevil. 
 
Box 2.2 Wachu rozado: a pre-Colombia reduced tillage potato system 
 
During a first trip to Carchi, Joel,4 the head of the INIAP-Carchi, took me on a drive in 
the project truck to visit some potato fields located on the hillsides above the town of San 
Gabriel. Along the way, I spotted what looked to be a farmer planting potatoes on a steep 
slope of pasture. I asked Joel to stop, and we entered the field to talk with the farmer. The 
farmer explained that he was planting in wachu rozado. The term was an odd mixture of the 
Kichwa word wachu, meaning furrow, and the Spanish rozar, to cut; literally, wachu rozado 
meant “cut furrow.” I came to learn that wachu rozado probably was a pre-Colombian 
tillage system for roots and tubers that appears to have developed in moist highland areas 
such as the páramo Andes.  
 
We conducted a brief follow-up study to better understand the system (Sherwoood, 1998). 
Wachu rozado involved cutting and folding over two parallel rows of sod towards one 
another. The potato crop was cultivated where the line of folded over sod flats met. 
Farmers claimed that wachu rozado was more productive than conventional tillage. They 
also said that it reduced soil erosion, and the crop had fewer problems with late blight. 
They claimed that the potatoes came out cleaner and with less damage due to the Andean 
weevil and potato scab. Despite the thousands of hectares of wachu rozado that remained 
on the surrounding hillsides of the region and the well-known problems of soil erosion, 
the national research service in Ecuador had overlooked the system.5  
 
Further research confirmed what farmers had been saying all along (INIAP-CIP, 2003). 
Economic studies demonstrated that wachu rozado was more cost-effective than hand 
tillage and it compared with conventional tractor tillage. It was also an important source of 
employment, demanding 25 more labour days/cropping season than conventional tillage. 
Soil displacement under wachu rozado was considerably less than under conventional tillage 
(about 15 vs. 40 t/ha). Additionally, wachu rozado produced “cleaner” potato tubers – dirt-
free and with less Rhizoctonia and Andean weevil damage. Apparently, the “heating up” of 
the sod mat in decomposition was antagonistic to soil pests. Research trials showed that 
under equal fertilization regimes wachu rozado out produced conventional tillage (24.13 
vs.19.52 t/ha), most likely due to increased mycorrhizae development and improved 
phosphorus uptake. Under wachu rozado, the potato crop grew on a high ridge and had 
better drainage than with conventional tillage, leading to lower relative humidity around 
the plant. As a result, comparative trials found less severity of late blight infection 
(AUDPC of 471.44 for wachu rozado vs. 629.55 conventional tillage). Wachu rozado proved 
to be both highly productive and resource conserving – a rare combination. Paredes (in 
process) provides further analysis of the survival of the wachu rozado system. 
 
                                                       
4 In this dissertation, I apply fictitious names to local actors to protect the reputation of individuals. 
5 This is in contrast to CORPOICA, the Colombian national research service. During the 1990s 
CORPOICA’s Nariño station had developed a research program on wachu rozado. Pedro Oyarzun, Trip report 
on visit to CORPOICA research station at Obonunco, Nariño, 17-20 March 2001. 
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The combined effects of massive soil erosion through mechanised, total tillage on hillsides 
and a decline in soil health led Pedro Oyarzun, a soil scientist and co-leader of INIAP’s 
National Potato Program to conclude, “Unquestionably, soil degradation [in Carchi] is the 
primary environmental concern of the province and a major threat to agricultural 
sustainability and livelihoods.”6 In contrast, research on the surviving pre-Colombian 
wachu rozado system suggests that traditional soil management was far more resource 
conserving (Box 2.2) 
 
Generation of pest problems 
 
Years ago, we did not need to apply pesticides, but people said that a man who 
lived close to this place started [to apply] first. It seems that the worms came from 
the products, because after that, the pests began to increase. As a result, it is no 
longer possible to produce without [pesticide] applications. – a smallholder 
farmer from Carchi 
 
Essentially every farmer with whom I have talked since arriving to Carchi has made the 
same general claim: pest problems are getting worse with time. When I first arrived they 
spoke of two major pest problems: the Andean weevil (Premnotrypes vorax) that could 
decrease yields by as much as 80 percent and late blight (caused by Phytophthora infestans) 
that could entirely decimate production (Crissman et al., 1998; Yanggen et al., 2003). By 
2000, they added a third major pest: the Guatemalan potato moth (Tescia solanivora), which 
has caused a large number of farmers in drier areas to abandon potato farming (Barragán 
et al., 2000). This modern proliferation of pests is no accident, but rather the direct result 
of changes to agroecologies associated with intensification of agriculture and the 
introduction of exotic organisms (Frolick et al., 2000; Dasgupta et al., 2002). 
 
As explained earlier, the Andean weevil is an endemic insect that co-evolved with potato 
(Gallegos et al., 1997). The intensification of potato production in time and space created 
a favourable niche for the proliferation of this insect to the point where it became a major 
pest. Meanwhile, late blight is caused by an exotic fungal-like organism that was 
introduced via seed shipments between Europe and the Andes in the early 1900s 
(Andrivon, 1996). Similarly, the exotic Guatemalan potato moth (Tescia solanivora) arrived 
in Carchi in 1996 via the introduction of seeds from Colombia and occasionally decimates 
crops, particular during dry years (Barragán et al., 2000). 
 
Further, the wide adoption of non-specific pesticides has disrupted natural mechanisms of 
control, thereby favouring the proliferation of insect pests and diseases as well as causing 
the emergence of a handful of secondary pests (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2003). For 
example, the leafminer fly (Lyriomisa quadrata), an endemic insect that was kept in check 
through naturally occurring parasitism, became a major pest in the mid-1990s, causing 
occasional yield losses of up to 40 percent and leading farmers to increase insecticide 
applications. As a result of the ecological disturbances of modern agriculture, Carchense 
farmers find themselves on a “pesticide treadmill,” as described by van den Bosch (1977). 
                                                       
6 Personal communication during INIAP/PNRT Yearly Evaluation and Planning Meeting, Ambuqui, 15 
October 2001. 
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Pesticides have not only become a necessary part of the production system, but each year 
farmers must make a larger number of applications to sustain production. 
 
Pesticide effects 
 
My husband usually does not take a shower after pesticide applications. I believe 
that he has lost his sense of smell, because he is not able to smell pesticide 
residues on his clothes or body anymore. Nonetheless, after applications I can 
smell a very strong pesticide smell coming off his body... and I have to sleep with 
this! – a mother from San Pedro de Piartal, quoted in Mera-Orcés (2000: 21) 
 
From previous activity in Central America and the Philippines (Cole et al., 1988 and Antle 
et al., 1995), the researchers were well aware that the effects of pesticides were not limited 
to the fields where they were applied. Pesticides were carried in the environment and 
reached homes and people, leading to potentially costly environmental and health 
consequences. 
 
Studies on the environmental effects of pesticides have drawn on a variety of indicators to 
assess the mobility of chemicals in the environment (Table 2.7). For example, 
methamidophos, cymoxanil and carbofuran are highly soluble in water, which can increase 
their mobility in the environment. The Koc indicator measures the affinity with which a 
chemical absorbs to soil carbon – the higher a Koc value, the stronger a chemical’s 
tendency to fix to soil. Carbofuran and methamidophos have relatively low Koc numbers, 
signifying that these products do not fix to soil carbon, and therefore they are highly 
mobile in the soil. A long half-life of a pesticide signifies that a chemical breaks down 
relatively slowly and thus is highly persistent in the environment, thereby prolonging 
potential harm. Mancozeb, maneb, carbofuran and fonophos each have long half-lives and 
are relatively persistent pesticides. 
 
Table 2.7 Selected properties of pesticides commonly used in potato production in Carchi 
(Stoorvogel et al., 2003) 
 
Pesticide Half 
life 
(days) 
Koc 
(mL/g) 
Water 
solubility 
(mg/L) 
Long-term 
human 
toxicity 
(mg/L) 
Long-term 
fish toxicity 
(mg/L) 
Short-term 
fish toxicity 
(mg/L) 
Carbofuran 50 22 351 40 18 387 
Cynoxanil 5 391 800 91 1.53 600 
Fonophos 40 870 17 10 3.5 3045 
Mancozeb 70 2000 6 6 3.17 6335 
Maneb 70 2000 6 6 0.0019 3.86 
Methamidophos 6 5 1,000,000 7 165 826 
Profenos 6 2000 28 0.35 2.9665 5933 
 
The research team surmised that carbofuran had significant environmental effects, so it 
became the focus of attention. Jaramillo (2000) and Jaramillo et al. (2001) presented the 
research on carbofuran leachate in soil, groundwater, and surface water in and around 
potato fields in Carchi. While the research validated the effectiveness of the Leaching 
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Estimation and Chemistry Model (LEACHM), it did not find exceedingly high rates of 
carbofuran in water sources. Carbofuran was found in soil leachate, groundwater, and 
surface water samples, but concentrations were at 0.4 ppb, well below the Maximum 
Contamination Level permitted by the US Environmental Protection Agency (40 ppb). In 
light of the high use of carbofuran in potato production, it was concluded that the low 
concentrations were due to the unusually high organic matter content of Carchi soils and 
their potential for rapidly degrading pesticides. 
 
Kosten (2001) studied the effects of carbofuran on three families of benthic aquatic 
macro-invertebrates in the field and in streams. While she detected carbofuran 
concentrations in all six water bodies studied, she did not find conclusive evidence of 
structural change in soil ecologies associated with carbofuran. This may have been due to 
previous species selection as a result of exposure to carbofuran, which could lead to 
resistance build-up. The study suggested that resistance might have been a factor, since 
immobilization of invertebrates by carbofuran in Carchi was 1,000 times that found in 
other studies. 
 
Most of the CIP-led research concentrated on pesticide management, exposure 
conditions, and ensuing health effects. Based on survey, observational and interview data, 
farmers generally purchased pesticides by commercial names (Espinosa et al., 2003). Only 
a small minority of farmers reported receiving information on pesticide hazards and safe 
practices from vendors. Pesticide storage was relatively brief (days to weeks) but occurred 
close to farmhouses because of fear of theft. Farmers usually mixed pesticides in large 
barrels without gloves, resulting in considerable dermal exposure (Merino and Cole, 2003). 
Smallholders and, on larger operations, day labourers applied pesticides using backpack 
sprayers on hilly terrain. Few used personal protective equipment for a variety of reasons, 
including social pressure (e.g., masculinity has become tied to the ability to withstand 
pesticide intoxications), as well as the limited availability and high cost of equipment. As a 
result, pesticide exposure conditions were high. During applications, most farmers wet 
their skin, especially the back (73% of respondents) and hands (87%) (Espinosa et al., 
2003). Field exposure trials using patch-monitoring techniques showed that considerable 
dermal deposition occurred on legs during foliage applications on mature crops (Cole et 
al., 1997b). 
 
Subsequent studies found that family members were chronically exposed to low quantities 
of pesticides in their homes and at work through a multitude of contamination pathways 
(Merino and Cole, 2003). Excess mixed product was applied to other tuber crops, thrown 
away with containers in the field, or applied around the house. Clothing worn during 
application was often stored and used repeatedly before washing. Contaminated clothing 
was usually washed in the same area as family clothing, though in a separate wash. Extent 
of personal hygiene varied but was usually insufficient to remove all active ingredients 
from both the hands of the applicator and the equipment. Separate locked storage 
facilities for application equipment and clothing were also uncommon. Swab methods 
found pesticide residues on a variety of household surfaces as well as on farm family 
clothing. 
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Active surveillance of hospital records revealed that pesticide poisonings in Carchi were 
among the highest recorded anywhere (Cole et al., 2000). While there were some suicides 
and accidental exposures, most poisonings were of pesticide applicators. Clinical studies 
found that both applicators and their family members were at risk. Exposure to fungicides 
caused diverse eye and skin disorders, including conjunctivitis and cutaneous and sub-
cutaneous effects on the neck, trunk, back, underarms, and genitalia (Cole et al., 1997a and 
b). Comparisons between urban control populations and farm families found that rural 
people suffered dermatitis (68% of the at-risk population and 55% of applicators, 
compared with 31% of the control population, p < 0.001), and pigmentation disorders 
(25% of the at-risk population and 10% of the control, p < 0.06). In the case of dermatitis 
(n=117), five percent tested positive for maneb in patch studies for contact allergies. In 
logistic regression analysis, the significant predictors of dermatitis (p < 0.1) included years 
using fungicides and deficient application practices. Chronic exposure, lack of personal 
protective equipment, and use of high concentrations of chemicals were associated with 
incidence of pathologies. Additionally, climatic conditions as well as living and work 
environments were mentioned as important contributors to disorders. The researchers 
concluded, “The findings point to fungicides as the most important contributor to the 
prevalence of dermatitis among the Ecuadorian farming population.” 
 
Other studies looked at neurobehavioral disorders caused by the most commonly used 
insecticides: highly toxic methamidophos and carbofuran. The health team applied a 
World Health Organisation (WHO) recommended battery of tests to determine the 
effects of exposure on peripheral and central nervous system functions (Cole et al., 1998; 
Cole et al., 1997a). The results showed high proportions of the at-risk population affected, 
including both farmers and their family members. Average performance scores for farm 
members were a standard deviation below the control sample. The researchers determined 
that 60 percent of rural people were affected and women, although not commonly active 
in field agriculture, were nearly as affected as fieldworkers. Alarmingly, both Mera-Orcés 
(2000) and Paredes (2001) reported that acute poisonings and deaths among infants and 
young children were common in rural communities, with cases identified in every 
community studied. 
 
In summary, the medical team concluded that chronic and acute exposure to pesticides 
resulted in considerable health impacts that ranged from sub-clinical neurotoxicity (Cole et 
al., 1997a, 1998), poisonings with and without treatment (Crissman et al., 1994), to 
hospitalizations and deaths (Cole et al., 2000). The human health consequences included 
poisonings (at a rate of 171/100,000 rural population), dermatitis (48% of applicators), 
pigmentation disorders (25% of applicators), and neurotoxicity (peripheral nerve damage, 
abnormal deep tendon reflexes and coordination difficulties). Mortality due to pesticide 
poisoning was among the highest reported anywhere in the world (21/100,000 rural 
population). Cole et al. (2002) summarised the pesticide health impacts as a classic 
epidemiological pyramid (Figure 2.7). 
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Figure 2.7 Epidemiological pyramid of pesticide health impacts in Carchi (numbers per 
10,000 rural population) (Cole et al., 2002) 
 
Acute pesticide poisonings led to significant financial burden on individual families and 
the public health system (Cole et al., 2000). Median costs associated with pesticide 
poisonings were estimated as follows: public health care direct costs of $9.85/case, private 
health costs of $8.33/case, and lost time indirect costs for about six worker days of 
$8.33/agricultural worker. All of these were over five times the daily agricultural wage of 
about $1.50 at the time, in 1992. The researchers did not attempt to judge financial 
valuation of the deaths associated with pesticide poisonings nor the effects of pesticides 
on quality of life, both of which would substantially increase the estimates of overall 
economic burden of illness. 
 
Integrated tradeoffs analysis: in search of “win-win” scenarios 
 
Integrated production-health analysis by Antle et al. (1994) found that pesticide use led to 
serious health consequences that placed into question the economic value of present 
technology, particularly of highly toxic insecticides. Table 2.8 provides summary statistics 
on the potato production data. The essential role that pesticides played in crop production 
was indicated by the positive and significant coefficients on the fungicide, carbofuran, and 
foliar insecticide variables. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the neurobehavioral health 
variable was statistically significant at all conventional levels, and its negative sign indicated 
that farmers with higher neurobehavioral function obtained lower cost of production per 
hectare and thus higher productivity. The magnitude of the coefficient indicated that the 
elasticity of cost with regard to health was about -0.15, which was comparable to estimates 
obtained by Antle and Pingali (1995) with rice growers in the Philippines. This signified 
that the total quantity of carbofuran applied during the season had a negative effect on 
neurobehavioral performance. Through modelling, Antle et al. (1998) showed that the use 
of highly toxic insecticides adversely affected farmer decision-making capacity to a level 
that would justify worker disability payments in other countries. 
 
Through applications of ToA, the researchers explored a number of potentially positive 
sum (win-win) policy alternatives. These included a combination of taxes or subsidies on 
pesticides, price increases or declines in potatoes, technology changes with IPM (in the 
Learning from Carchi 44 
form of insect traps for the Andean weevil, as explained in Pumisacho and Sherwood, 
2001:134-5), and the use of personal protective equipment (Antle et al., 1998; Crissman et 
al., 2003). The results were examined in terms of farm income, leaching of pesticides to 
groundwater and health risks from pesticide exposure. Normally, changes in a particular 
policy or technology generates tradeoffs – as certain factors improve, other factors may 
weaken. The analysis of pesticide taxes and potato price changes produced such a result. 
As taxes decreased and potato prices increased, farmers planted more of their farm with 
potatoes and tended to use more pesticide per hectare. Thus a scenario of pesticide 
subsidies and potato price increases produced growth in income and increases in 
groundwater contamination and health risks from pesticide exposure.  
 
Table 2.8 Summary statistics for Carchi potato production data (1990-1992 database; 
n=219 plots) (Antle et al., 1998)* 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Total variable cost (US$/ha) 14.16 0.35 
Expected yield (kg/ha) 9.87 0.14 
Area (ha) -0.96 0.85 
Mean neurobehavioral score -1.53 0.94 
Fertilizer quantity (kg/ha) 6.31 0.40 
Land preparation labour (days/ha) 2.37 0.90 
Crop management labour (days/ha) 3.90 0.37 
Fungicide quantity 11.90 1.43 
Carbofuran quantity (kg/ha) -0.04 1.12 
Foliage pest insecticide quantity 10.42 2.24 
Fertilizer price 6.45 0.18 
Land preparation wage 7.66 0.31 
Crop management wage 7.80 0.27 
Fungicide price -0.97 0.67 
Carborfuran price 9.71 0.30 
Foliage pest insecticide price -1.22 1.22 
*Note: All variables are in natural logarithms except the mean neurobehavioral score. Fertilizer in total N, P, 
K applied. Fungicide and foliage pest insecticide quantities and prices were quality adjusted using the hedonic 
procedures described in Antle et al. (1994).  
 
When health was included in the cost function, a tax levied on carbofuran alone resulted 
in a negative relationship between the tax rate and average cost. The positive effect of a 
higher pesticide price would be more than offset by the cost-reducing effect of improved 
health. The clear policy implication was that reducing carbofuran use could be a win-win 
proposition. Through modelling, the researchers showed that when exposure to 
carbofuran was reduced, farmers became healthier and more productive. This was because 
the productivity gains from improved health outweighed the negative productivity effects 
of reduced pesticide use. The authors concluded, however, that a policy to reduce all 
pesticide use would be less efficient and would result in a tradeoff between health and 
productivity. 
 
Figure 2.8 summarises the result of the ToA scenario comparing the base technology 
(carbofuran) with IPM in the form of insect traps for the management of the Andean 
weevil. The vertical axis utilizes carbofuran leaching as a proxy indicator for health risk, as 
measured in increments of measurement for neurobehavioral standard performance 
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(MNBS). The graph shows that through adopting the use of insect traps and substantially 
decreasing use of carbofuran from three to one well-placed application, farmers could 
effectively control the Andean weevil while decreasing burden to health and without 
negative consequences to production – a win-win scenario. Further modelling of other 
scenarios showed that a combination of IPM and protective clothing could produce even 
more optimal results (Figure 2.9).  
 
 
Figure 2.8 ToA outcome comparing two scenarios: base technology versus IPM traps for 
Andean weevil management (health risk indicator is measurements of neurobehavioral 
standard performance (MNBS) associated with carbofuran exposure and value of 
production is net return (x $1,000/ha)) (Antle et al., 1998; Crissman et al., 2003) 
 
 
Figure 2.9 ToA outcome comparing different technological scenarios: from base to IPM 
and Personal Protective Equipment (health risk indicator is measurement of 
neurobehavioral standard performance (MNBS) and net returns ($/ha)) (Antle et al., 1998; 
Crissman et al., 2003) 
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As a result of these findings, the policy recommendations became measures to decrease 
the use of highly toxic pesticides (through targeted taxes, tighter regulations, or removal 
from their market), SUP education, and IPM (Antle et al., 1998; Cole et al. 2002; Yanggen 
et al., 2003). According to Yanggen et al. (2003:195), the investigations on pesticides in 
Carchi produced two fundamental conclusions: 1) the problems that pesticides cause in 
health are severe, and they affect an important percentage of the population, and 2) 
solutions exist that are economically viable and that can substantially improve the health 
of farmers and protect the environment. The answer was a function of reorganisation 
around best practice. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Provided its natural endowments, generally educated population, infrastructure and 
market access, Carchi is potentially one of the most productive agricultural regions of the 
Andes. Potato farming there has evolved to become a major source of livelihoods, 
dominating the modern landscape. Through widespread adoption of mechanized tillage 
and agrochemicals, as well as organisation around commercial markets as a means of 
financing technologies, potato farming intensified. Provided the resource base and the 
industriousness of its people, average production in Carchi during the 1990s reached over 
20 t/ha -- about three times the national average. On less than a quarter of the country’s 
land area dedicated to the crop, during the 1990s the province came to produce nearly 40 
percent of the national potato harvest.  
 
The modern technologies on which farmers came to rely enabled substantial production 
increases, but they also created pathologies. The multidisciplinary economic, health, and 
environmental research revealed that modern potato farming did not just produce a lot of 
potato, it also produced a number of harmful consequences, many of which were hidden 
from the public eye. Tractors and total tillage displaced between 50 and 100 t/ha during 
the season. Farmers lost money on over 40 percent of their potato crops. Additionally, 
exposure to pesticides caused a number of health problems. Nearly half of applicators 
suffered from skin and eye disorders, such as dermatitis and conjunctivitis. Most 
worrisome, over two-thirds of the rural population – including men, women, and children 
– suffered neurological damage to degrees that affected the productivity of their farms. As 
a result of modern agriculture, Carchi was in the throes of a serious public health 
epidemic. 
 
Fortunately, alternatives existed. Through integrated economic-environment-health 
simulation modelling, Antle et al. (1998b) identified rigorously tested best practice for 
achieving positive sum policy recommendations. The authors demonstrated that 
combinations of taxes on the most toxic pesticides, pesticide safety education, and 
promotion of IPM could curb harmful human health and environmental consequences 
without negatively affecting productivity. My colleagues and I thought that change was 
primarily a function of educating farmers and policy makers on best practice. Or was it? 
Chapter 3 
 
History of Agrarian Development in Carchi: 
Spanish Arrival, Hacienda System, and Agrarian Reform 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Beginning with a general description of land use and agrarian society prior to Spanish 
arrival, this chapter provides a chronology of major historical events leading up to the rise 
and fall of the hacienda system in Carchi and ensuing agrarian reform. It was beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to produce a critical analysis of heterogeneous outcomes, such as 
the unfolding of differential relationships as a result of particular events. Although painted 
in broad strokes, a look back is useful for understanding how traditional society became 
uprooted from local context and how thousands of years of relatively stable agricultural 
development became disrupted. The chapter aims to set the stage of contemporary 
ecosystem decline on which the master discourse of agricultural modernisation came to be 
performed. 
 
A number of early Spaniards documented the Incan advance into the Northern Andes in 
the sixteenth century, including Cieza de León, Cabello de Balboa, Fernández de Oviedo, 
Sarmiento de Gamboa, Garcilaso de la Vega, Alonso de Borregán, and Gerónimo Aguilar. 
The Ecuadorian Historical Archive and the Central Bank store these documents, often in 
original form. Combined with scant archaeology of the ancient cultures of northern 
Ecuador, this material provided the evidence for the findings asserted in the historical 
literature on pre-Colombian Carchi and reported here.  
 
In addition to a consultation of the available historical literature, I drew on semi-
structured interviews with contemporary hacendados (or hacienda owners) as well as their 
personal libraries and papers. I am particularly grateful to Juan Carlos Landázuri, who was 
generous in letting me use his hacienda, La Bretania in San Gabriel, as a research base 
during 2002-04. Landázuri introduced me to the “Grupo de Discusión,” a collective of nine 
hacendados who convened for purposes of cross-learning and technical exchange until 2003, 
when extortions and kidnappings by irregular armies from nearby Colombia compelled 
many of them to abandon Carchi. 
 
Pre-Colombian Carchi 
 
Tawantinsuyo, the name of the territory administered by the Incas in the fifteenth century, 
came to span much of the Andes of present-day Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. Although the 
Incas, under the rule of Túpac Yupanqui in the mid to late fifteenth century and later his 
son Huayna Capac in the early sixteenth century, only came to politically control present-
day Ecuador less than 50 years prior to the Spanish arrival, the region quickly established 
strong cultural and economic ties with Incan society. By the mid-sixteenth century, the 
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area north of Quito, including the Province of Imbabura, were under initial processes of 
consolidation, which included the continuation of the Incan trail and military fortresses 
(tambos) as well as the placement of mitmaq (or mitimae),1 and state displacement of  ethnic 
groups as a strategy of social control and cultural domination. At that time, the Incan 
influence further north – over the area of present-day Carchi – was limited to sporadic 
trade and military expeditions. 
 
As a result, the people of northernmost Ecuador were culturally aligned with the pre-
Hispanic groups of Colombia, especially the Capulí and Cuasmal groups that coexisted in 
the inter-Andean Valley spanning between the Coanque (today, Chota) River in present-
day Carchi to the Guáytara River of the Department of Nariño, Colombia, a total area of 
about 435 km2 (Landázuri, 1995). Named the Pasto ("Pasture") territory by the Spanish, 
most likely due to the lush green environment of the North, the Capulí and Cuasmal 
controlled the area from about 1250-1525. Landázuri explains that today anthropologists 
commonly refer to both of these groups collectively as “the Pastos.” 
 
Land management 
 
Geography, especially altitude, is a major social determinant in the highland Andes. In 
northern climates, mountain cultures tend to be highly mobile as per seasonal cycles and 
climate (Grötzback, 1988). While Troll (1968) explained the geographical division between 
the southern puna or dry Andes and the northern páramo or wet Andes, Murra (1972) 
established a theory of vertical control, which explained agricultural and agrarian 
differentiation along altitudinal belts. In pre-Hispanic time, single ethnic groups of the 
Andes tended to organize themselves to take advantage of ecological niches of distinct 
altitudes. Lauer (1993) applied it to the Puna Andes and Salomon (1980) and López-
Sandoval (2004) applied the theory to the northern Páramo Andes. Soloman (1980) 
described the phenomenon of “micro-verticality” in the páramo Andes due to the extreme 
ecological differences in relatively small areas. Micro-verticality explained how different 
ethnic groups emerged to exploit niches in a communal territory that crossed distinct 
ecological zones. Micro-verticality allowed people to farm different climatic regimes and 
return home in a single day. In support of this theory, no nomadic pastoral groups have 
been found in the páramo belt of northern Ecuador, Colombia or Venezuela prior to the 
Incan and Spanish arrival. 
 
The inter-Andean valley in the Northern Andes runs north and south and lies at between 
1,500 and 2,500 meters. Its surrounding hillsides climb to about 3,500-4,500 meters on 
both the eastern and western ridges. Lying on the equator with fairly evenly distributed 
sunlight throughout the year, temperature changes are not seasonal, but rather diurnal, 
with highs and lows determined by altitude. Altitude variability leads to ecological niches, 
and social organization historically has been influenced by the unique micro-vertical 
features that determine plant growth and, with the advent of managed ecologies and 
agriculture, livelihood opportunities.  
 
                                                       
1 Mitimaq or mitimae is the Kichwa term for forced labour parties, usually translocated across geographies. 
History of Agrarian Development 49 
At the time of the Spanish arrival, coca and maize were the most important crops of the 
lower and middle elevations (1,500-2,000 m), with coca leaves in high demand throughout 
the region. Andean roots and tubers (potato, mashua, and olluco) and quinoa were 
cultivated in highland valleys of altitudes (2,000-2,500 m) (Table 3.1). Farmers managed 
soil fertility through intercropping, crop rotations, and fallow periods. This included the 
utilisation of legumes, such as Lupinus mutabulis (known in Kichwa as chocho or tarwi) as 
well as different field beans (Phaselous spp.), in intercropping and rotational systems. 
Farmers applied manures and other organic amendments at planting. They produced roots 
and tubers through a reduced tillage regime called wachu rozado, which involved cutting and 
folding over two parallel rows of sod towards one another and planting tubers in the 
middle of the decaying sod (see Box 2.2).  
 
Table 3.1 Principle crops of the Pastos (Paz Ponce de León (1528) in Landázuri (1995)) 
 
Common name  
(Cuasmal, Kichwa, or Spanish) 
English name Latin name 
Highlands (2700-3000 masl) 
Papa Potato Solanum tubersosum 
Quinua Quinoa Chenopodium quinoa 
Chocho Lupine Lupinus mutabilis 
Oca Oka Oxalis tuberosa 
Mayua o mashua  Tropeolum tuberosum 
Olluco  Ullucus tuberosus 
   
Medium zones (2000-2600) 
Tomate de arbol Tree tomato Cyphomancra betacea 
Mora Raspberry Robus spp. 
Maíz Maize or corn Zea mays 
Paico  Chenopodium ambrosicides 
Auyama  Lucubita palmata 
Capuli  Prunus salidifolia 
Frijol o poroto Common fieldbean Phaseolus vulgaris 
   
Lowland areas (1500-2000) 
Piña Pineapple Ananas comosus 
Aguacate Avocado Persea spp. 
Yuca Casava Manihot escuelenta crantz 
Frijol o poroto Common fieldbean Phaseolus vulgaris 
Algodón Cotton Gossypium spp. 
Ají Pepper (spicy) Capsicum sp. 
Coca Coca Erythroxylon sp. 
 
Domesticated animals were limited to guinea pigs and pigs. In contrast to the Puna Andes 
of the South, llama as a pack animal and source of manure was not present in the North 
due to the animal's limited adaptability to the wet highlands. The majority of meat and 
animal products came from hunting wild animals. Remains of small rounded settlements 
(bohios) in the highland areas (circa 3,500 m) suggest that hunting activities occasionally 
took people to the highland areas. Farming was limited to subsistence needs, and as a 
result, large areas of forest remained intact. 
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At the end of the eighteenth century, when French scientists arrived in the area to 
measure the meridian arcs and the German explorer, Alejandro von Humbolt, was 
realising his studies that would lead to the founding of the field of geography, dense 
humid highland forests covered the inter-Andean valley of the Pasto territory. This was in 
sharp contrast to the non-Pasto areas to the South that had been heavily deforested for 
centuries. The vast majority of Ecuador’s northernmost highland forests fell victim to 
colonization during the 19th and 20th centuries. Nevertheless, today the western flank of 
Carchi represents one of the country’s largest conservation sites: the El Angel Ecological 
Reserve that spans several thousand hectares. On the eastern side, the inter-Andean slope 
boasts an extensive 40,000 hectare stretch of forest that biologists consider one of the few 
remaining examples of pristine inter-Andean vegetation (Palacios and Tipaz, 1996). 
 
Social organisation, technology, and economy 
 
The tribute documents belonging to Spanish subjects in the mid-sixteenth century and the 
archaeological explorations reported by Uribe and Cabrera (1977) provide some evidence 
of social differentiation during the Pasto civilization. Drawing on these sources, Landázuri 
(1995) concluded that the social organization resembled the casicazgo feudal-like structure 
found in indigenous cultures of Southern Ecuador. The system was led by a relatively 
wealthy curaca or priest, followed by direct family lineage and then by more numerous and 
poorer agrarian subjects, who commonly paid tribute in the form of crop surpluses in 
exchange for land rights. Archaeologists found Pasto settlements distributed among 
locations of fertile soil and following rivers on the inter-Andean valley floor. The largest 
settlements had up to 12,000 inhabitants. In Carchi, these were: Tulcán, Guaca (today, 
Huaca), Tuza (San Gabriel), and Mira. These locations are conserved in modern-day 
gerrymandering, with each representing a principal county seat of the Province's modern-
day political structure. The people who inhabit the four communities studied in this thesis 
most likely belonged to the Guaca (Mariscal Sucre and Piartal) and Tuza groups (Cuba and 
La Libertad), though more recent settlers continuously migrate from earlier Pasto areas of 
present-day Colombia.  
 
People inhabited single room, rounded bohio structures made of local materials, usually 
structured of wood, woven with horizontal strips of cane grass mixed with mud, and roofs 
of highland bunch grass, known as bahareque (Oña and Muñoz, 2000). Uribe and Cabrera 
(1977) studied burial sites in Pupiales, Colombia that consisted of three concentric areas 
containing patterned series of tunnels. They found higher castes buried in deeper tunnels 
penetrating to depths of up to 40 m located in the centre and tunnels of lesser depths in 
the areas radiating outwards. Ceramics found in such burial sites dating back to the early 
periods of the Pasto civilization were of high quality, demonstrating sophisticated 
geometric patterns and applying cire perdu technology,2 gold inlays, as well as conch shells 
from the coast. 
 
It is believed that pre-Incan groups such as the Pastos cultivated plots of about 1,500 m2, 
which were large enough for subsistence production and meeting curaca tribute payments 
                                                       
2 A bronze casting following the method of heating wax to let it run away out of casts and then using molten 
bronze to fill the space. 
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(Rostworowsky, 2001). Hand tools likely included a version of the Incan chacqui taclla, a 
foot-driven wooden shovel used for turning over soil, and a large wooden mallet used to 
break up grass clods (Landázuri, 1995). Early farmers used a dibble stick for planting 
maize. There is no evidence of field irrigation structures in medium to high elevations, 
where the climate is generally humid and rainfall well distributed. Maize production took 
place at lower elevations (1,500 to 2,500 masl) and generally near rivers, where farmers 
likely applied gravity-fed irrigation. Knapp (1992) identified a pre-Hispanic irrigation canal 
at Pimanpiro (Chapi) in the Chota Valley of unknown origin that was likely constructed by 
early Pasto groups. Crop health likely was managed empirically through crop rotations, 
intra- and inter-specific plant biodiversity, mounding and reduced tillage systems, as well 
as fallow periods of at least five years (Thurston, 1992; Landázuri, 1995; INIAP-CIP, 
2003). The lack of storage capacity of potato and limited area appropriate for maize 
cultivation affected Pasto capability of surviving catastrophes, due either to natural 
disasters or war (Landázuri, 1995). Poor storage capacity also may have constrained 
capacity for wealth accumulation and redistribution in the region. 
 
As evidenced by the absence of irrigation infrastructure and constructed roads, labour was 
characteristically non-collective. It is believed that the Pasto civilization had a degree of 
labour differentiation. This included a degree of unbalanced reciprocity that demanded 
political administration controlled by the curaca. Commoner households were dedicated to 
general agriculture for sustenance and tribute. Specialization was limited to textiles. Due to 
the absence of a labour force, particularly during harvest periods, the curaca's were resistant 
to subject mobility (Grijalva, 1937). Uribe and Cabrera (1977) found remains of cotton 
textiles in tombs, which may suggest an advanced artisan tradition. Nevertheless, while 
such textiles were valued during tribute payment, small quantities suggest that industry was 
limited to home enterprises organized for subsistence use rather than for trade outside the 
territory. 
 
Salomon (1980) argues that barter exchange existed, especially for storable maize, coca, 
and cotton. Reciprocity was achieved through labour, cultivated products, textiles, and 
land access rights. Landázuri (1995) proposed three forms of trade: balanced exchange of 
goods and labour between households, within multiple households of family lineage, and 
unbalanced trade between curaca and subject in the form of labour and good in exchange 
for access to land, as per the subsistence needs of the curaca. It is assumed that this 
relationship led to political stratifications, defined by family lineage and articulated 
through access to privileged goods, especially coca leaves, maize, and gold. Households 
had direct access to basic subsistence crops – potato and maize – while trade enclaves 
composed of multi-ethnic groups controlled the exchange of prestige commodities – coca, 
cotton, salt, and metals – that were centred in the Chota and Guáytara valleys. While these 
were distributed within the Pasto civilization, the majority was exchanged with groups 
from the Amazon basin and the Southern highlands in exchange for exotic goods, such as 
fruits, textiles, and metal products. The curaca controlled mindales (merchants) who 
administered exchange agreements and received special status within the political structure 
of the territory that limited their service to tribute payments, but did not include 
subjection for agricultural production. 
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Landázuri (1995) applied the methodology of Polanyi et al. (1976) regarding material 
reciprocity, geographic distribution, and market commerce as central factors of social 
organization. Drawing on existing historical records, he concluded that ecological and 
economic potential determined social differentiation. Coca was the most prestigious and 
profitable crop of the period and was grown by relatively well-off farmers of Andean 
lowland areas, followed by maize that grew at medium altitudes, and then tubers grown by 
small populations of farmers relegated to the highlands, which were vulnerable to frost 
and hail. In contrast to the Puno Andes to the south, the Páramo Andes had higher 
temperatures and humidity and thus it was not possible to convert potato to storable 
freeze-dried chuño, useful for surviving dry spells, travel, and war. As a result, in the 
Northern Andes maize had a comparative advantage. Nevertheless, because of the limited 
dry ecological zones appropriate for its cultivation, access to areas adequate for maize 
cultivation was valued and controlled. In contrast, areas appropriate for potato cultivation 
were more abundant and less restricted. Landázuri concludes that it is likely that social 
differentiation for the agrarian class was expressed in entitlements, especially access to 
land for coca and maize and mobility for crop production. 
 
Depopulation 
 
While it is believed that the Incan ruler Tupac Yupanqui reached Pasto territory between 
about 1450 and 1480, excursions at that time were not violent but limited to trade 
interests. The Incan ruler Huayna Cápac reigned over Tawantinsuyo from 1480 to 1525. 
He entered Pasto territory during his final military campaign, after conquering the 
Caranquis and Cayambis in a series of violent battles that ended at the site of what became 
known as Yahuarcocha (Kichwa for “Lagoon of Blood”), just south of present-day Ibarra 
(Ramón, 1987). Huayna Cápac and his army then continued north with little resistance 
from the Pasto to the Angasmayo River, located deep in Pasto territory in present-day 
Colombia, where they established defensive military enclaves. The lack of a Pasto military 
suggests that the diverse groups were relatively autonomous and not politically aligned to a 
larger confederation (Landázuri, 1995; Rostworowski, 2001). The Angasmayo River 
represented the northernmost reach of Tawantinsuyo. Afterward, Huayna Cápac turned 
his troops to the Pacific and headed south along the coast to the Gulf of Guayaquil before 
returning to Tomebamba in the Sierra where he succumbed to a disease (most likely 
smallpox) in 1534. It is believed that Pasto territory was under Incan rule for about ten 
years, probably from the period of 1525-1534. Nevertheless, the absence of social 
structures and the survival of the Pasto language through the arrival of the Spanish 
suggests that Incan cultural and political domination only reached initial stages. The chief 
motivation of incursions appears to have been control over the coca and salt production 
of the Chota Valley. Populations of Pastos (mitimae) were taken to the Lake Titicaca region 
of the Southern Andes, but there is no evidence of forced labour parties that were 
brought to the Pasto region of the North. 
 
Evidence of effects of the Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century and early processes 
of colonization on indigenous populations in the Northern Andes is scarcely documented. 
Diverse authors show that depopulation was a major feature of the period. Between 1525 
and 1595, the population of the savannah of Bogotá (excluding the city of Bogotá), north 
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of the Pasto Territory, decreased was from 140,000 people to 62,791 (a decline of about 
2.2:1) (Villamarin and Villamarin 1975). In the Central Andes, south of the Pasto area, the 
population declined from about 4,641,200 to 1,349,190, a proportion of 3.4:1 (Smith, 1970 
and Cook, 1981). Larrain (1980) estimates that when the Spanish arrived in the Pasto 
territory in 1534, the population of the area was about 240,000, spread among 25 major 
settlements. By the end of the sixteenth century, that population was less than 60,000, a 
proportion of 4.0:1. In terms of depopulation, the Pasto Territory may have been the 
most affected region of the Andes. According to Larrain, the primary causes were two 
fold: wars with conquistadors and forced extraction of populations as labourers and slaves 
to faraway lands.  
 
Spanish settlement and the e ncom ienda 
 
The indigenous diaspora [in Carchi] created conditions for an easy amalgamation 
between indigenous and whites that would open the way for a mestizo amenable to the 
cultural whims of the colonists. – Miño (1985: 99) 
 
Following the death of Huayna Cápac, the death of his son Huascar to Atahualpa in the 
Incan Battle of Cuzco, and the capture and execution of Atahualpa in Cajamarca in 1533, 
the Spanish had effectively conquered the Incan Empire that spanned from northern 
Chile through southernmost Colombia. The Spanish Crown increasingly claimed 
ownership of all natural resources and people in the region, and initially it distributed 
governance rights to conquistadors. The early colonization process in the Americas 
centred on the assignation of land concessions and the native people who lived on it, a 
policy known as the encomienda (Newson, 1992). The majority of conquistadores and 
colonists wanted to acquire wealth and return to Spain with improved finances and higher 
social status. While the concessions in the Northern Andes were large, the difficult 
climactic conditions and relatively low value of highland crops at the time made 
agriculture a difficult means of fast wealth. Furthermore, agriculture required investments 
in time and resources that were beyond the immediate plans of the visitors. In the 
sixteenth century, the chief means of wealth were slaves and minerals, especially gold and 
silver. The population of Carchi was relatively small and distant from the Caribbean, 
Central American, and South American trade centres. No gold or silver deposits were 
found in Northern Ecuador, so the area largely was overlooked. Meanwhile, the discovery 
of deposits in Peru and Bolivia led to tremendous mineral exploitation activity that would 
carry on for centuries. It was not until the value of slaves and minerals dropped at the end 
of the sixteenth century, that the Spanish began to show interest in agriculture as a means 
of accumulation.  
 
The enconmienda policy was first implemented during the re-conquest of Spain against the 
Mores. Its introduction to the Americas was modified to avoid problems that were found 
on the Iberian Peninsula, particularly with regard to land titling. As a result, the policy 
applied in the Americas no longer included absolute entitlement to land (Chamberlain 
1936; Newson, 1992). As practiced in the Andes, the encomienda involved the award of a 
number of native peoples to an individual in exchange for their protection and conversion 
to Catholicism. In return, the encomendado could charge tribute and demand labour services 
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of subjects. Initially, territorial governors had the authority to assign encomiendas with the 
approval of the Crown. Following the New Laws of 1542, entitlements were conferred to 
the local governing unit of royal subjects, known as the Real Audiencia. In the case of 
Northern Ecuador, the Real Audiencia de Quito exercised this authority.  
 
The first encomiendas were awarded for life to outstanding conquistadors. Thereafter, the 
governing officials tended to award them to family and friends. Colonists complained to 
the Spanish Crown that they were not included in awards, and as a result, the New Laws 
of 1542 excluded church and government officials from receiving encomiendas. 
Entitlements were highly unstable due to endless concessions, annulations, confiscations, 
and reassignments. The Crown was hesitant to relinquish control over land, but due to 
pressure from the new landholders in the Americas, it eventually agreed that concessions 
could be passed down for two generations. The New Laws also gave the Crown the right 
to recover expired encomiendas and to terminate future awards.  
 
Due to the progressive decline of indigenous populations throughout the Americas, the 
Church pressured the Crown to adopt more humane laws. Furthermore, following initial 
mineral exploitation and the transition to agrarian economies, a labour shortage became a 
concern. As part of the New Laws, the Crown began to make provisions for the 
abolishment of slavery and distribution of limited land entitlements to indigenous people 
for subsistence agriculture. In practice, conquistadors distributed land first, and then local 
rulers or cabildos distributed the remainder among the indigenous. Nevertheless, Newson 
(1992) raises doubts over whether the laws were obeyed. The encomienda and the practice 
of forced personal services continued, if informally, until their abolition in 1812.  
 
Newson (1992) explains that the repartimiento was a series of laws that attempted to create 
more flexible labour markets. In part, this legislation was demanded by those who did not 
benefit from the encomienda but who had labour needs. The policy involved forced labour 
that was paid a fixed price upon completion of a contract. By design, the encomendado or 
the Crown could not oblige participants to pay tribute. The employer agreed to provide a 
stipulated financial compensation, adequate food, and guarantee humane work conditions 
and treatment of subjects. Commonly, the contract lasted two or three weeks. The law 
stipulated that labourers could not be employed at great distances from their communities 
(maximum of ten leagues) and that indigenous could not do certain dangerous jobs (such 
as mining, a provision that was later lifted due to labour shortages). The Real Audienca 
governed over these contracts, with an assigned judge deciding upon the distribution of 
the indigenous labour force. Once the stipulated period of work was completed, subjects 
were free to return to their community and were replaced by a new group of labourers, 
usually from the same community. In practice, employers violated many of these 
stipulations. For example, payment was often in-kind and food and living conditions were 
inadequate. Further, assigned tasks commonly were impossible to complete, which was 
used to justify incomplete compensation. 
 
In addition to the alteration of indigenous economies due to depopulation and the 
redistribution of land, Newson (1992) found that the arrival of the Spanish affected 
patterns of survival in other ways. For example, land concessions excluded indigenous 
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people from farming and hunting activities. Forced labour and tribute payments reduced 
time available for independent productive activities. While falling populations decreased 
food demand, they weakened social organizations and disassembled collective labour 
needed for critical moments during the cropping cycle, such as land preparation and 
harvest. Labour demands forced people to abandon their communities for extensive 
periods of time, leading to crop failures and seed losses. The imposition of new crops 
further interrupted seed availability and disrupted traditional markets. A large portion of 
harvests was paid as tribute. For example, maize farmers commonly handed over between 
25 to 50 percent of their harvest to encomendados or local governors. Indigenous people also 
had to pay for increasing costs of the Church associated with building structures, paying 
clerics, and conducting religious ceremonies.  
 
The Spanish saw that once native caciques accepted external authority and converted to 
Catholicism, the rest of the community followed. As a result, the cooption of local leaders 
became a political strategy throughout the Americas. Caciques were given privileges, such 
as exemption from tribute payments and routine labour. They sometimes were allowed to 
carry arms, mount horses, and own slaves. Their offspring gained access to Spanish 
schools. In this way, they became political intermediaries between the encomendados or 
colonial authorities and the commoners. 
 
The Spanish made strategic efforts to destroy the religious symbols of indigenous 
populations. They built churches on top of temples and replaced idols with symbols of the 
crucifix and the Virgin Mary. Family structures were decimated through death during 
conquest battles, forced labour and migration of members, disease, and starvation. 
Furthermore, many officials, priests, and encomenderos had forced sexual relations with 
indigenous women and appropriated them for personal services, such as domestic labour. 
This led to a large number of orphans (Benzoni, 1967). 
 
While miscegenation occurred during the sixteenth century, its contribution to indigenous 
depopulation was only significant in later generations. Newsome (1992) explains that 
miscegenation was a function of the degree of interaction with other races and was 
encouraged by male dominance in European and African cultures. It was most common 
in communities where indigenous were forced to work as domestic servants for whites, 
such as in mining towns and under the hacienda system of agricultural development, 
where men of mixed blood were hired as administrators over local indigenous 
populations. Knapp (1991) compared the 1780 and 1950 censuses and found that the 
national population increased from 412,000 to 3,154,000, an annual growth rate of 1.20 
percent. The highlands grew more slowly than the lowlands, with only Carchi and the 
southernmost provinces of Loja and Azuay growing at comparable rates. During the same 
period, the indigenous populations, i.e., those classified as indigenous under the colonial 
tribute system, grew from 265,000 to 444,000 people, an annual rate of 0.30 percent. 
According to Knapp, this rate was not due to emigration or mortality, but rather 
acculturation – i.e., the process of miscegenation to mixed ladino (Spanish-indigenous) 
culture. Rates of acculturation in the highlands generally were less than one percent. In 
contrast, that of Carchi was over two percent. 
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While the colonists depended on local crops for sustenance, they began to introduce 
higher value cash crops, such as sugarcane, tobacco, and wheat (Triticum aestivum) for 
export to Europe. It has been estimated that in the seventeenth century, one ton of sugar 
cost the lives of two slaves (Hobhouse, 1987). By 1700, the ratio had dropped to one ton 
of sugar equalling one life. By the end of the eighteenth century, two tons of sugar cost 
one life. Hobhouse estimates that between 1690 and 1790, Europe imported 12 million 
tons of sugar, at a total cost of about 12 million lives. Sugarcane was introduced to the 
Chota Valley at the beginning of the seventeenth century and became the major export 
crop. Wheat and barley were grown at median altitudes. Cattle were introduced to lower 
elevations of the coast, where grass was too tall for sheep. Cattle, horses, and sheep were 
introduced to the Páramo Andes of Venezuela, Colombia, and Northern Ecuador 
(Monasterio, 1980; Llano, 1990). 
 
Spanish activities affected indigenous communities through demands on land, labour, and 
production. While mines and forced migration led to depopulation, locally the Spanish 
began to place greater pressure on land access as well as available labour to work on 
expanding agricultural enterprises. While tribute payments contributed to poverty, other 
non-official obligations, such as forced purchases, increased this burden. The heightened 
demands on production and labour combined with decreased access to natural resources 
reduced the viability of native communities, obligating people to look for salaried 
employment. In the new social and economic environment, the indigenous communities 
generally lost access to natural resources and their racial and cultural identity began to 
steadily decline. 
 
Hacienda system 
 
The hacendado generally is humane and compassionate, he exercises over his 
workers a paternal authority that, distant from carrying the rigours of slavery, can 
be considered as beneficent tutelage for a race that little by little is entering the 
road to a civilized life. – Luis Felipe Borja, documented in Huasipungo, by Jorge 
Icaza, 1934. 
 
Of all the Spanish activities, agriculture was what had perhaps the greatest impact 
over the lives of the indigenous. – Linda Newsome, The Cost of the Conquest (1992: 
201) 
 
According to Guerrero (1975), the hacienda system was the result of three interconnected 
events: the expropriation of community land by conquistadors and the Crown during the 
17th and 18th centuries, retention of populations on hacienda land, and continued 
subjection of farmers to the payment of tribute from caciques to the crown and finally to 
the hacienda. By the end of the seventeenth century, agriculture became the source of 
economic development in Ecuador and the hacienda system the principle means of 
agricultural production. As a consequence, Ecuadorian society came to revolve around the 
hacienda.  
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Remaining vestiges of pre-Colombian Andean cultures, particularly traditional social 
structure and “ecological verticality,” would end with the hacienda period. The hacienda 
system evolved in response to growing domestic and regional markets as well as the 
distant markets of Spain, as with the case of wheat and sugar. The type of agriculture and 
its demands on indigenous land and labour depended on the local environment and the 
productivity of land. Diverse researchers have argued that the Spanish were interested in 
agriculture due to the high cost of living and the absence of opportunities to earn money 
in cities and towns (Newson, 1992; Borah, 1951). Sometimes, it was in search of mere self-
sufficiency, particularly in response to declining indigenous populations and food 
productivity. In the seventeenth century this occurred as a result of an economic 
depression in the Americas associated with the decline of the mining industry and trade 
with Spain. The exhaustion of mines and ensuing food demands in Europe resulted in the 
expansion of area under cultivation in the Americas and demands for labour, heightening 
pressures on native peoples. 
 
A requisite for agricultural production was land, which could be obtained in diverse ways. 
The most common, particularly following the conquest, was to forcibly capture land from 
native populations. Secondly, Spaniards could purchase land from a community and 
present a request on their behalf for legalized ownership. Indigenous people often did this 
to encomiendos as a means of liberating themselves from tribute debt. Prospective 
landowners also could declare an area abandoned and request a concession. With the 
decrease in indigenous populations, it became increasingly difficult to maintain land in 
cultivation. As such, fallowed land was prone to concessions. Officially, communities were 
to be consulted, but in practice concessions commonly occurred in silence. In 1591, the 
Crown ordered that all land obtained illegally be returned to the Crown, but at the same 
time, it declared that all illegal land could be legalized through the payment of a 
commission. In practice, this policy formalized the illegal purchase of land, and it raised 
money for the Crown. Further, cattle or sheep ranching on underutilized land was a 
favourite tactic of Spanish settlers for obtaining access and control over new territory. 
With the economic growth brought on by the conquest of the Americas, such processes 
accelerated during the seventeenth century. As miscegenated populations increased, they 
began to enter into conflict with native-borne Spaniards over land use and ownership.  
 
In the eighteenth century, the Spanish Crown took measures to support agricultural 
development and promote exportation of essential food and cash crops to Europe. This 
included exclusions from taxes and quotas for priority crops, such as indigo dyes, cotton, 
cacao, sugar, and coffee. Import taxes on processing equipment for sugar and coffee were 
abolished. Sheep and cattle production were advantageous due to their low labour costs 
and the ability to exploit natural grasses. Nevertheless, a poor transportation system and 
isolation made export of animal products impractical and limited to a secondary 
enterprise. The European textile crisis at the beginning of the eighteenth century caused a 
crash in sheep production in Ecuador, which led haciendas throughout the country to 
shift production towards extensive grain production for export, especially wheat, barley, 
and maize. The extensive nature of grain production increased the demand for labour, 
which was compensated for by “passing rights” (i.e., permission to cross through hacienda 
territory) as well as by access to land, water, and firewood. By the beginning of the 
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twentieth century, the haciendas of Ecuador eventually produced over 80 commodities for 
export (Hurtado, 1977). 
 
The hacienda would come to mean individual ownership of land on which resided a stable 
servant population, whose labour was exchanged for in-kind payment, often through land 
rent. There was a direct relationship between the landowner (in Spanish, the patrón) and 
the hacienda. The patrón’s personality often shaped the nature of the hacienda as a social 
and productive enterprise. Land was cultivated with limited technology and a limited 
portion of capital generated from production was reinvested in the enterprise, with the 
rest consumed by the landholder and his family. Generally, the patrón extracted surpluses 
for personal profit or investment in emerging business opportunities elsewhere, such as 
industry, finance, and urban speculation. The hacienda became the dominant form of 
social organization in rural areas under what became known as the “minifundio-latifundio” 
model (Tannebaum, 1965; Barahona, 1970; Guerrero, 1975). 
 
A stable labour force lived on the property as wasipungeros,3 complemented by a paid part-
time work force during periods of high labour demand, such as at planting and harvest. 
Payment continued to be in-kind through passing rights, access to land, water, and wood 
in the case of wasipungeros as well as a portion of the harvest in the case of part-time 
labourers. Landowners provided primary-level formal education as well as religious 
indoctrination. Generally, labour was not indebted to the landowner, but workers 
preferred to stay on the hacienda due to the absence of opportunities elsewhere. Labour 
was collective and distributed by simple, non-technical tasks. Men worked in the fields. A 
small number of women worked as domestic servants. Kids usually did menial jobs 
around the house, but also contributed to planting and herding animals. The hacendado 
commonly resided at the property or lived in a nearby city and delegated administration of 
the productive enterprise to a mayordomo who supervised labour and coordinated on-farm 
activities.  
 
Due to the relatively large labour force (in comparison with earlier periods), technological 
development was not a priority. Technology was limited to animal drawn traction, hand 
implements, such as shovels and hoes, and local varieties. An increasing proportion of 
farmland was dedicated to pasture for animals, especially cattle for dairy and meat. The 
majority of crops was sold domestically and met domestic consumption and extractive 
needs.  
 
The system of wasipungo land rent to large landholders continued through the 
independence movements and the creation of the Republic of Ecuador in 1830. In 1831, 
the first President, Juan José Flores, created the Ministry of Hacienda and passed a law 
formalizing the “sistema de concertaje,” which, similar to the wasipungo, tied indigenous labour 
to the haciendas through debt and jail sentences. In practice, this indefinitely perpetuated 
the encomienda system. The legislature produced diverse laws to establish indigenous rights, 
especially a law in 1865 that would award indigenous communes collective usufruct rights 
                                                       
3 Wasipungero is the Kichwa term generally used to refer to the indentured servants of the hacienda system. In 
exchange for labour, the wasipungero commonly was provided a small plot of land and resided in a settlement 
known as the wasipungo. 
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to land. In practice, however, the system of concertaje remained unaltered (Jaramillo-
Alvarado, 1983). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the hacienda conserved many 
of its traditional qualities. In 1913, the Archbishop of Quito, Monsignor Polit wrote, “The 
concertaje exists always with the character of a sentence of life in prison in the latifundios and 
when a peasant resists its servitude, be it in the city or in the towns, the official complicity 
leaves open the jail for entombing the Indian” (Saénz, 1933: 107, cited in Barksy, 1988). 
 
According to Jaramillo-Alvarado (1983), the liberal revolution of 1895 and ensuing 
political movements to abolish the concertaje system gained force into the twentieth century. 
Following the American emancipation of slaves in the mid-1860s and the Mexican 
Revolution that began in 1910, public opinion in Ecuador began to shift against the 
exploitation of native peoples. Despite strong opposition by large landowners, in 1918, the 
liberal President, Alfredo Baquerizo Moreno, passed a law through Congress abolishing 
the concertaje system. 
 
Growth of towns and cities in Europe as well as Colombia and Ecuador during the period 
between 1880 and 1930 created new demands for agricultural goods. Haciendas in Carchi 
showed a marked expansion in export activity to Europe – especially cattle hides and 
grains – as well as diversified production for local markets, including wood, wheat, barley, 
potato, animals (sheep, cattle, and horses) and lesser products to Colombia. According to 
Orellana (1928; cited in Barsky, 1984: 50), in 1926, the province’s exports exceeded its 
imports by a factor of 70 (Sucre 1,801,418 for exports versus Sucre 26,017 for imports). 
The hacienda increasingly became a commercial enterprise, producing new tendencies 
towards production intensification and profit maximization. Over time, this would change 
the management of capital and technology, as well as the relationship between landowner 
and labour.  
 
Market-oriented haciendas invested in machinery (primarily tractors and ploughs) and 
later, agrochemical inputs (first synthetic fertilizers, followed by pesticides) and improved 
plant varieties. Additionally, they began to transition towards specialised salaried labour. 
“One good paid worker could do the job of five wasipungeros in minga.”4 The global 
financial crisis of 1929 and ensuing events left these haciendas heavily indebted to 
creditors. In the 1930s and 1940s Ecuadorian companies, especially from the beer 
industry, protested against the export of wheat and barley to their competitors in 
Colombia, leading to a government policy prohibiting the export of these products and 
contraband. The devaluation of the Colombian peso in the 1950s combined with 
Ecuadorian subsidies for commodity imports severely hurt grain producers. As a result, 
many haciendas went into economic decline during this period, forcing hacendados to seek 
financial opportunities elsewhere and become absentee landlords. In the North, many 
haciendas began to abandon intensive production for export and to concentrate on the 
more simplified potato-pasture system that dominates the Carchi landscape today. 
 
Given the financial difficulties of agriculture, many hacendados turned to business and 
industry for wealth. Their families moved to the city. While the hacendado commonly 
travelled to the hacienda to supervise activity, his wife and children generally stayed in the 
                                                       
4 Conversation with Juan Carlos y Diego Landázuri, 10 December 2003. 
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city. During this period, on-farm investments were limited, while off-farm investments 
made many hacendados wealthy. In some cases, the traditional hacendado altogether lost 
interest in agriculture as a business, and investors arrived to purchase properties. Many 
absentee and ex-hacendados became business and political leaders, forming a powerful elite 
throughout Ecuador (Tannebaum, 1965).  
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, haciendas diverged between two 
principal economic survival strategies: 1) the traditional, labour-intensive and low profit 
enterprise that conserved social characteristics of the past, and 2) a new, more intensified 
form of the hacienda as a moneymaking enterprise. This latter strategy involved 
mechanization of tillage, the introduction of new varieties and agrochemicals, improved 
pastures, and infrastructure improvements, introducing more production oriented 
management. These enterprises tended to increase the capitalisation of the hacienda, 
turning it into an agribusiness. New administrative mechanisms were apparent in the 
technical training of mayordomos, the increased attention paid to bookkeeping, and the 
expansion of area under production. They strategically made permanent capital 
investments that replaced variable capital – e.g., the wasipungeros and other forms of 
informal labour. The hacienda as an agribusiness increasingly replaced in-kind payments 
with labour for salaries, which permitted greater control and demand over activities. 
Labourers began to work fixed hours from Monday through Saturday. 
 
By 1950, population growth in the wasipungo sector as well as in the outskirts of towns led 
to a growing labour force and unemployment. Youths born on the wasipungo began to feel 
that land and natural resources belonged to them. These tendencies produced growing 
social malcontent. Meanwhile, market integration led to a situation where it was 
increasingly less convenient for hacendados to share products with wasipungos. In Carchi as 
well as in Pichincha, changing economies towards milk production, requiring about one-
tenth the labour of agriculture, aggravated the labour crisis. As a result, it was increasingly 
convenient to find ways of breaking ties with the wasipungos. This created a class of 
unemployed and landless former wasipungeros and the need to attend to their concerns.  
 
Urban growth, the collapse of the cacao industry, and low food production affected 
foreign exchange earnings and created domestic food shortages. As a consequence, 
governments throughout Latin America began to develop policies centring on two 
interactive agricultural development strategies: resolution of the agrarian situation, 
especially inequitable land distribution, and improved production through technology 
development. It became important for hacendados to resolve matters in the face of growing 
organizational strength of peasant movements that were beginning to endanger the 
interests of large landholders, particularly their control over large tracts of land and natural 
resources. As a consequence, during the 1950s Ecuador saw numerous cases of voluntary 
handover of marginal land from both private and public haciendas.  
 
Barsky (1978) and Barsky and Cosse (1981) described a great deal of social differentiation 
between the wealthy rural elite in Northern Ecuador. Tensions emerged between 
traditional hacendados and a newer class of market-oriented landholders that emerged with 
the growth of the “technification” and commercial development of the dairy industry. 
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Based on historical factors of establishment and development, farmer access to resources, 
and retribution systems, Barahona (1970) identified two basic types of haciendas during 
this period: 1) the traditional hacienda in disintegration – either through absentee 
landlordism or public haciendas under social conflict with farmers, and 2) the modern 
hacienda – either in process of diversifying production and formalizing employment 
arrangements or an emergent industrial era hacienda fully capitalized and organized under 
business principles.  
 
As a result of his study on the diverse political responses of the large landowners (or 
terratenientes as they are called in Spanish) to agrarian reform, Barsky (1988: 390) concluded: 
 
The original sin [of the terratenientes], the wasipungo system and other forms of 
subjection of labour, whose social consequences have been the backwardness and 
misery of vast sectors of rural society, and at the same time the accumulation of 
wealth of the hacendados, is present. That which for many years had been seen with 
indifference by a good part of society, today is the target of open criticism by 
influential communication media that collects a growing national sentiment as 
well as the currents of reform pushed from the United States. 
 
By the mid-1950s most large landholders came to view agrarian reform as inevitable and 
were obliged to adopt strategies of transition towards eliminating a precarista class. The 
precaristas were from the informal labour sector, commonly made up of landless labourers 
who were paid in specie and were outside the modern currency economy. The large 
landholders commonly faced two options: sell their land at strong market value or fight to 
save the farm. In Ecuador, this second strategy did not involve confronting social groups, 
but rather, the full subjection of their haciendas and themselves to processes of 
“modernisation.” Meanwhile, competing hacendado interests prepared for a prolonged 
public debate over agrarian reform.  
 
Agrarian reform  
 
The proposals to end the hacienda system differed considerably across Latin America. In 
Peru, policies emphasized breaking up the monopoly of landholdings. Elsewhere, policies 
centred on opening up new territory for agricultural colonisation. Agrarian reform policies 
generally were aimed at transforming the latifundio system into multiple, independent agri-
businesses employing new relations of production, modern technologies, and forms of 
market integration. The outcomes varied according to the unique political environment of 
each setting. In Mexico and Bolivia, for example, large landholders commonly kept 
control over the most fertile valleys and relegated the different forms of ex-wasipungeros 
and campesinos to less fertile, surrounding mountainsides. The process in Ecuador shared 
this quality to a degree, but it was influenced by the country’s unique political context. 
 
In Ecuador, a series of laws that appeared during the mid-1930s on communes, 
communities, and cooperatives (Ley de Organización y Régimen de las Comunidades and Estatuto 
Jurídico de la Comunidades Campesinas in 1937) and the Worker’s Code5 marked a shift in 
                                                       
5  Código de Trabajo, 1938 
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agrarian policy in favour of fundamental social reform (Costales and Costales, 1971; 
Hurtado, 1977; and Barsky, 1988). Following decades of growing national and 
international pressure to address the “indigenous problem,” in part in response to the 
success of the Cuban peasantry revolution of 1959, on 31 January 1960, President Velasco 
Ibarra issued an Executive Decree creating the National Commission on Agrarian 
Reform, charged with leading public debates and policy formulation.  
 
Barsky (1980) identified two obstacles of the policy negotiation process in Ecuador: the 
notorious fragmentation of indigenous and campesino movements, particularly those from 
private haciendas, and the weak, newly emerging urban-based industrial class with its own 
unique concerns and priorities. While hacienda owners increasingly appreciated the need 
to handover areas of land, they also sought to eliminate access to land, pastures, water, 
and fuel wood. Four competing factions emerged among the large landholders (Barsky 
1980: 140-141): 
 
1. Industrialised and capital-intensive agriculture sector: This grouping was 
composed of large landholders who had “modernised” – i.e., intensified 
production through large investments in technology, such as mechanization of 
tillage and milking, as well as the drainage and irrigation systems used in dairy 
farming. Galo Plaza was the leader of this group. He sought to end the precarious 
wasipungo system that threatened lesser capital-intensive haciendas. He promoted 
agrarian colonization of unused land, particularly in the Amazon basin, and 
industrialization as a means to employment.  
2. Moderately intensified agriculture sector: This sector was composed of large 
landholders who had made fewer capital investments. Farm improvements were 
achieved through less expensive technologies, such as genetic improvement of 
herds, improved pasture management, and a lesser degree of mechanization. This 
group represented the more feasible model of development for most large 
landholders as it did not require a continual flow of capital. Prior to the agrarian 
reform law, many of this group already had begun voluntary transfer of land to 
wasipungeros. 
3. Vulnerable large landholders: This group was made up of diverse actors, most of 
who controlled large, but resource limited tracts of land. Other members were 
from the second grouping, but who had rejected agrarian reform. This faction 
was generally represented by the Agricultural Bureau and was led by its President 
Marco Tulio González. Due to limited resources of these enterprises, large 
landholdings were essential for maintaining profit margins. While they generally 
accepted the need for formalizing labour relationships, they were less willing to 
give up land. 
4. Resistant landholders: A fourth sector was composed of landholders whose 
productive strategy was dependent on cheap labour and dominant control over 
the wasipungeros. This group opposed any policy that would decrease landholdings 
or formalize labour relationships. Members were from haciendas in the South of 
the country. Haciendas from the Centre and North generally had accepted the 
need for fundamental agrarian change and generally did not belong to this group. 
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The text of Costales and Costales (1971) provides a detailed account of ensuing 
deliberations and political confrontations that transpired during the years prior to agrarian 
reform. The authors argue it was not a single modernizing sector or an external 
technocratic intervention enabled by a dictatorship and its military that made possible 
agrarian reform in Ecuador. Rather, it was the result of a confluence of interests, including 
those of the Catholic leadership, urban-based landholders, as well as agribusiness sectors. 
Diverse church and government bureaucrats, particularly from the National Geological 
and Anthropological Institute, fulfilled important mediation roles and brought about the 
consolidation of an imperfect policy that attempted to accommodate highly irreconcilable 
interests. 
 
At a decisive moment, Pope John XXIII challenged the Catholic Church in Ecuador to 
take a stronger stance in favour of agrarian reform. In a 1963 letter to the government and 
people of Ecuador,6 the Church called for “the promulgation of a law of agrarian reform, 
that will provide the bases for an adequate solution,” and conciliation of the competing 
factions of its diverse constituency – military, terratenientes, campesinos, and the broader 
public, all of which shared a single religion. The Pope argued, “It is our fervent desire that 
this Catholic nation lives its faith in the practice of justice,” and “The Church has become 
proletarizado,” allegedly so should the rest of Ecuador. Growing public opinion and 
political parties organized around this opinion, and eventually, the resistant terratenientes 
came to the conclusion that agrarian reform was inevitable. The political stage was set for 
change. On 22 September 1964, the military dictatorship issued Supreme Decree No. 1480 
stating:7 
 
The Government of Ecuador, with the expedition of the present Law of Agrarian 
Reform and Colonisation indicates a change of historic transition in the economic 
and social structure of Ecuador. Given the importance of agriculture for the 
economy and life of the entire Ecuadorian society, the vices of agrarian structure 
have become reflected in the social institutions of the country, in which they have 
promoted less just treatment in the relations between the men that take part in 
the process of agricultural production. The modifications established the legal 
bases of said structure. Thus, began the Agrarian Reform, and the Government 
placed the first stone for building a more harmonious, just, and dynamic Ecuador. 
 
A multifaceted piece of legislation that reflected the social complexities of the time, in 
practice, the Law of Agrarian Reform and Colonization pursued three central objectives: 
1) the abolishment of precarista or “pre-capitalistic” forms of labour and creation of a new 
working class or proletariat; 2) “national integration” through allowing peasant farmers, 
especially ex-wasipungeros, access to land, credit, education, and technology, and 3) greater 
agricultural production through market integration and agricultural intensification. 
 
The implementation of the policy was highly controversial and contested. The Instituto 
Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC), the agency charged with 
administration, faced tremendous challenges from the resistant terratenientes as well as from 
                                                       
6 “Carta Pastoral del Episcopado Ecuatoriano to the people of Ecuador over the agrarian problem,” 23 April 1963. 
7  The decree later would be published in the Congressional Registry No 297 on 23 July 1964. 
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farmer groups that usually were not very united. According to Cosse (1980: 414), “… the 
traditional sector of the terratenientes had done everything possible to first block, then slow, 
and finally, eliminate the agrarian policy of the military government, first in 1963-1966 and 
later in 1972-75 in alliance with fractions from other dominant classes.” By no means was 
land distribution in Ecuador fully implemented. 
 
By the end of agrarian reform in 1979, the Ministry of Agriculture concluded that IERAC 
managed to distribute just 33 percent of the territory slated for redistribution, reaching 
just 29 percent of intended rural beneficiaries.8 Even when farmers acquired land, other 
challenges prevented them from improving their well-being. According to Costales and 
Costales (1971: 129), “Today the wasipungero, in many haciendas, is exposed to conditions 
worse than before. In many cases, the provision of land to the wasipungos became a 
negative.” Resentful as a result of being the target of public hostilities, many previously 
sympathetic hacendados began to deny campesinos access to other resources needed for 
production, such as seeds, water, and tools. Chiriboga (1982: 104) concluded, “Agrarian 
reform [in Ecuador] has just produced a light expansion in the number of properties. The 
reasons for the increase in minifundios lie in the weak application of the Agrarian Reform 
Law, which as implemented, impeded access to land and productive resources for the 
great majority of campesino families.” In contrast to the results elsewhere, agrarian reform 
in Carchi largely met the policy’s objectives. 
 
Abolishment of the precaristas9 
 
With three articles, the Law abolished the precaristas:10 
 
Article 51. The precarista is understood as the campesino who works for his own 
benefit on land owned by others and who pays for its use in money, products, 
work, or other services. 
Article 52. Informal exploitations are prohibited. 
Article 117. The retribution for agricultural work will be made in cash currency. It 
is prohibited to pay in kind and to provide labourers, as total or partial payment 
for its work, access rights to land or the use of water. 
 
While in practice it would prove difficult to implement, the legal precedent for liberating 
the wasipungeros and their communities was unmistakably established. Barsky (1988) 
explains that Carchi experienced uncommon patterns of cooperation with agrarian reform. 
The North was the region with greatest communication infrastructure and market access 
for milk and beef cattle production, where labour easily could be replaced by machinery or 
temporary work. As a result, the demands for labour were not as great as in other parts of 
the country. According to de Janvry and Glikman (1991: 120): 
 
                                                       
8 “Evaluación de la Reforma Agraria: conclusions y recomendaciones.” Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia, 
Quito, Ecuador. Cited in C. Verduga (1980: 452). 
9 “Precarista” or informal labourer; also known as an indentured servant or slave. In Ecuador, it took diverse 
forms, including the wasipungero, the yanapero, and arrimaje (see annex for definitions). 
10  Law of Agrarian Reform and Colonisation, 1964 
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Agricultural activities in the Sierra have demonstrated a particular incapacity of 
retaining a labour force principally as a result of modernisation and the growth of 
cattle and milk farming. The production of milk in the Sierra has displaced with 
pastures an important part of the production of wheat, potato, maize, and barley, 
as a result aggravating problems of unemployment. 
 
By holding on to choice fertile valleys, terratenientes in Carchi were able to meet their 
pasture needs, while selling the more difficult and less fertile hillsides to campesino groups, 
which provided additional currency to finance additional capital investments. Further, 
milk and dairy production for the cities provided a cash flow uncommon to haciendas 
elsewhere. Land transfer combined with a shift towards regular cash payment for labour 
allowed terratenientes to free themselves of social problems that had become associated with 
having wasipungos on their property and providing them access to their natural resources. 
 
Miño (1985: 20) pointed out that one of the particularities of agrarian reform in Carchi 
was, “… the regional terrateniente, as a consequence of the popular land occupation 
movements, tended to move to other provinces, and as a result the regional control of 
terratenientes disappeared from the rural scene.... Agrarian reform produced a des-
articulation of a previous dominant player in the society.” For the ex-wasipungeros and other 
campesino groups, the relative absence of terratenientes represented a unique opportunity for 
their future involvement in Carchi society. 
 
Land redistribution 
 
A separate article addressed land redistribution as well as access to productive resources, 
credit, education, and technology: 
 
Article 1. The Agrarian Reform constitutes a process of gradual change of the 
agrarian structure and its economic, cultural, social, and political aspects, through 
planned operations of afectación [see below for explanation] and redistribution of 
land, as well as credit resources, education, and technology, for advancing the 
following objectives: national integration, transformation of the life conditions of 
campesinos, redistribution of agricultural income, and organization of a new social 
system of market-oriented enterprises. 
 
Agrarian reform did not represent a land give away. IERAC facilitated the sale of land to 
the wasipungeros and other emergent farmer groups. Land could be obtained through two 
chief means: afectación (essentially, public seizure) or colonisation. According to the Article 
38, afectación was “the absolute or partial elimination of ownership rights over rural 
properties that do not fulfil their social function. Afectación aims to correct the defects of 
the current structure of land tenure and land use.” Non-fulfilment of “social function” 
primarily referred to land that was idle or underutilised, as well as situations where 
landowners did not respect the Worker’s Code. In the Sierra, only properties larger than 
800 hectares were vulnerable. Colonisation chiefly took place in the lowlands of the Coast 
and especially the Amazon. It required relocation of families and entire communities. 
From the beginning, a goal was “to put to work land that was idle, abandoned, and land of 
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the State,” as a means of relieving the “overcrowded” Sierra and “to civilise” the wild 
Amazon, thereby bringing it into State patrimony.11 
 
In practice, land redistribution to groups commonly meant sale of fragile highland areas of 
questionably productive potential, thereby handing the ex-wasipungeros debt as well as a 
legacy of poverty. Joined by independent farmers, they became a growing class of 
marginalized rural poor – the minifundistas or campesinos. As a result of its limited resource 
base, this growing sector was not well positioned to accumulate wealth through market 
integration. In contrast, land redistribution in Carchi handed an emergent class of 
campesinos far more favourable conditions. 
 
Based on the census data of 1964 and 1974, IERAC handed over a total of 2,280,000 
hectares of territory in Ecuador, about 500,000 hectares of which came from haciendas. In 
1954 1,400 families (0.4% of all farms) owned farms larger than 500 hectares, which 
represented about 45 percent of all cultivated land in the country. Meanwhile, about 90 
percent of farm families cultivated small farms (areas of less than 20 hectares). By 1974, 
the number of landholdings over 500 hectares had dropped to just over 100 families, with 
about 500,000 hectares being distributed in the favour of smaller holders. Jordan (1988) 
explains that this was not only the result of agrarian reform but also inter-family divisions 
through inheritance and sales.  
 
The three northern provinces of Carchi, Pichincha, and Imbabura were the greatest 
beneficiaries of land reform. Carchi led the way, with 92 percent of campesino groups 
receiving about 41 percent of all arable land, followed by Pichincha (30% receiving 27% 
of land) and Imbabura (24% receiving 24%). Costales and Costales (1971) points out that 
the land handed over generally was of poor quality with limited or no access to water, 
except in the North where there was a greater abundance of fertile soils. Between 1964 
and 1971, about 50 new farmer organizations were formed in Carchi for the purposes of 
land acquisition. Groups were made up of different kinds of farmers, including ex-
wasipungeros and migrants from Colombia and elsewhere. Generally, campesino groups in the 
highlands were sold the least productive land at prices higher than market value (Costales 
and Costales, 1971:132). In Carchi, however, groups negotiated prices closer to market 
value. According to the 1956 census, 0.14 percent of all landholdings in Carchi controlled 
63.1 percent of the provincial area, and 125 farms controlled 117,000 hectares, with the 
nine largest farms averaging 5,911 hectares each.12 Barsky and Llovet (1982) assessed 
inequality of land acquisition through comparing Gini coefficients between 1954 and 
1974.13 While the average change throughout the Sierra was an improvement of -0.332, in 
Carchi the coefficient dropped the most of any other province, from 0.8612 in 1954 to 
0.7860 in 1974 – a change of -0.752. Overall, 91 percent of land distributions in the Sierra 
ended up as properties between ten and 100 hectares in size (Table 3.2). In Carchi that 
figure was 56 percent. About 40 percent of all land distributions in the province were of 
                                                       
11 Abel Gilbert, Vice-President of the Plaza Administration, upon proposing the National Institute for 
Agrarian Reform in 1959, in Costales and Costales (1974: 69). 
12 National Agriculture Census, 1954, cited in Barsky, 1984: 50. 
13 The Gini coefficient measures the inequality of income distribution within a country. It varies from zero, 
which indicates perfect equality, with every household earning exactly the same, to one, which implies absolute 
inequality, with a single household earning a country's entire income. 
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less than ten hectares. More than any other province of the highlands, agrarian reform 
converted landownership in Carchi from large holder to smallholder farms. 
 
Table 3.2 Distribution of land (by number of parcels and area) in Carchi compared to the 
rest of the Ecuadorian highlands before and after agrarian reform (Barsky and Llovet, 
1982) 
 
 Change in number of parcels between  
1954 and 1974 (%) 
Change in area of parcels between  
1954 and 1974 (%) 
Size (ha) Highland provinces Carchi Highland provinces Carchi 
0.1-1 +35.5 +65.3 +22.7 +13.3 
1-5 +7.7 +34.6 +4.9 +23.6 
5-10 +29.5 +37.9 +26.2 +31.6 
10-20 +72.8 +48.8 +69.8 +48.8 
20-50 +88.4 +38.2 +91.9 +33.3 
50-100 +67.3 +17.6 +68.2 +20.9 
100-500 +23.9 +21.1 -7.1 +14.2 
500-1,000 -5.4 -44.0 -9.9 -47.6 
1,000-2,500 -19.9 -65.0 -17.0 -52.7 
> 2,500 -37.7 -66.0 -46.6 -71.6 
 
Market integration and agricultural intensification 
 
Tied to land tenure was agricultural intensification. MAG and the Banco de Fomento 
provided loans in the form of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. To payoff debts, groups 
immediately had to produce for the market and earn currency. For most, it was the first 
time they had a direct relationship with commercial markets.  
 
Potato quickly became the cash crop of Carchi. In 1974, it represented about 70 percent 
of the gross internal product of the province,14 the vast majority of which was for export 
to Colombia and elsewhere in Ecuador. During this period, between 61 and 67 percent of 
farms became economically specialized in potato production. The mono-crop of potato 
created a new paid labour market in the province, often filled by a landless peasantry that 
lived on the margins of towns and had not benefited from agrarian reform. 
 
The 1970s became a decade of oil exploitation in Ecuador that would become the central 
preoccupation of the government to this day. Oil financed the “professionalisation” of the 
military, national infrastructure (roads and electricity), as well as national debt. As a result, 
the agriculture sector became much less important as a growth strategy. Additionally, 
because the benefits of agriculture were widely distributed, it was far easier to concentrate 
the wealth from oil for both public and private purposes. A final surge in agrarian reform 
occurred during the first half of the 1970s, largely for the politically expedient purpose of 
quieting the rural masses. The farmer movements that had organized for land acquisition 
did not normally have the capacity to address the subsequent individual and collective 
needs of farmers – namely intensification of agriculture and the penetration of markets. 
As a result, many cooperatives disbanded and divided land that earlier had been won 
under agrarian reform. 
                                                       
14 National Agriculture Census, 1974. 
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During this period, the remaining large landowners and private business interests – many 
of them former hacendados – organized a counter movement culminating in the 1979 Law 
of Fomento y Desarrollo Agropecuaria,15 which created the legal framework for ending further 
land redistributions and criminalising informal farming as well as land invasions. With the 
arrival of this law, the period of agrarian reform ended. More than elsewhere, agrarian 
reform in Carchi effectively converted the large properties and reorganised agrarian 
society around commercial markets, leaving behind an unusually solid foundation for 
smallholder-based agricultural development. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Who knows what genes supported what characteristics. The truth is that the 
strong mix of blood between natives and Spanish [in Carchi] seems to have been 
one of the most compatible in our country. As a result, the social structure of 
Carchi has been much less stratified and racist than in the rest of the country. – 
Mariana Landázuri C. (2003) 
 
Many people of Carchi little understand its history. As Mariana Landázuri wrote, present-
day Carchi is made up of relatively well-off smallholder, mestizo growers. The province 
does not suffer from racial tensions between native highland peoples and the “more 
civilized” Spanish-speaking populations. How did Carchi’s apparent serenity come to be? 
 
The agriculture of the highland Pasto culture of the Northern Andes evolved to exploit 
environmental niches distributed across ecological floors. Without idealising what 
traditional society may have been, this “micro-vertical” organisation led to relatively stable 
food production that supported substantial populations, roughly equivalent to that of 
modern time. The brief arrival of the Incas in the early 1500s and immediately followed by 
the Spanish sparked a violent uprooting of traditional society, a processes of socio-
environmental dis-embedding that would carry on into the twenty-first century. 
 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Spanish Crown, conquistadors, the 
Catholic Church, and other externally based regimes reorganized traditional society 
around distant interests. The Pasto resisted assimilation and may have been the last 
highland culture in Ecuador to loose its native language. Nevertheless, as a result of labour 
camps, forced migration, and to a lesser extent disease, the present-day region of Carchi 
was de-populated by about three-fourths. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Pasto 
language and remaining vestiges of its culture had been supplanted and disappeared. 
 
Most conquistadores came to the Americas to extract wealth and return to their 
motherland with improved social standing. The most expedient way to achieve that was 
through minerals, and the Crown awarded highly regarded subjects control over silver and 
gold mines. The remainder were relegated to agriculture and were provided territory and 
control over its denizens under a policy called the encomienda. This arrangement eventually 
evolved into a feudal-like hacienda system, which in the eighteenth century, came to reign 
                                                       
15 In this context, fomento means the promotion or intensification of agriculture, signifying both crops and 
animal production. 
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over the majority of the highlands. While some products were exported to Europe, 
originally the hacienda concentrated on local production.  
 
Lacking mineral prospects, Carchi society became organized around agriculture, and its 
remaining population became indentured servants or wasipungos under a handful of large 
haciendas. With the decline of the mining industry and food shortages in Europe during 
the later half of the nineteenth century, the hacienda in Carchi increasingly became an 
export-oriented enterprise, thereby providing surpluses and wealth for the hacendados. This 
tendency continued over the ensuing 150 years, complemented by the growth of domestic 
markets in what became the Republics of Ecuador and neighbouring Colombia.  
 
By the mid-twentieth century, growing public concern over the “indigenous problem,” 
diversely understood as a human rights issue as well as the “impractically” of a mass 
population of destitute rural poor, followed by a series of international events, including 
the independence movements in Africa and the Cuban Revolution, shifted public opinion 
away from the hacienda system and towards social reform. Further, growing food 
demands in cities and a stagnant national economy created the conditions for the 
“capitalisation” of haciendas and more equitable land redistribution, which culminated in 
the 1964 Law of Agrarian Reform. 
 
The social roots of present-day Carchi are largely hidden from view. With the decline of 
the hacienda system nearly five hundred years after the Spanish arrival, traditional Andean 
society underwent tremendous change. The system of vertical farming was supplanted by 
extensive, horizontally oriented agriculture vulnerable to the climatic extremes of highland 
mountain environments as well as pest and diseases. While overall agrarian reform was 
only partially implemented – by most estimates about 30 percent in terms of land 
redistribution to ex-wasipungeros, it effectively ended informal precarista labour. Agrarian 
reform in Carchi uniquely led to a fundamental redistribution of land towards an emergent 
class of smallholder farmers or campesinos. Chapter 4 examines the ensuing developments 
of agricultural modernisation in four communities. 
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 Chapter 4 
 
Agricultural Modernisation in Four Communities 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Growing protests over the exploitation of indigenous peoples during the twentieth century 
culminated in the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law. The ensuing period would usher in to rural 
life the agriculture expert, industrial era technology, and the commercial market. With its 
ample resources, communication infrastructure, mestizo population1 as well as its access to 
markets in Ecuador and Colombia, at the beginning of the 1970s Carchi was particularly 
well poised for agricultural modernisation and development. Nevertheless, experience 
elsewhere would raise doubts over such optimism. 
 
Based on research in the American Midwest, Cochrane (1958) coined the metaphor of the 
“agricultural treadmill” to describe the self-defeating process of innovation and debt 
associated with modern agriculture, especially when a large number of farmers produce the 
same undifferentiated commodity. Under such conditions, no individual can influence 
prices (i.e., farmers are “price takers”), so competitiveness depends on improved 
productivity through on-farm innovations that increase production per area or decrease 
costs. Cochrane found that when an individual farmer innovates, others quickly follow 
course and over time average productivity rises, production levels increase to the point 
where market supply becomes saturated, and commodity prices drop. Under such 
conditions, Cochrane argued, the “early adopters” gain a windfall profit, but later adopters 
are compelled by price squeeze to also follow suit. Thus diffusion becomes market 
propelled. Those who cannot keep up eventually drop out and their resources are taken up 
by the stayers. Ultimately, the agricultural treadmill leads to scale enlargement, as a 
relatively small number of individuals who have unique access to assets and capabilities for 
innovation squeeze out the less fortunate and efficient majority.  
 
Leeuwis (2004: 41) explains why governments tend to favour the treadmill: 
 
While farmers are often unhappy about such a “rat-race,” governments tend to like 
it because “treadmill” processes tend to be accompanied by: (a) lower prices of 
agricultural products for consumers; (b) increased competitiveness of agriculture in 
comparison with other countries; and (c) release of labour for non-agricultural 
work. 
 
Meanwhile, agriculture support institutions built around external knowledge and 
technology, such as public extension agents, agrochemical dealers, credit banks, and 
                                                       
1 As summarised in Chapter 4, the depopulation of Carchi during the 16th and 17th Centuries followed by 
processes of re-population with mixed-raced Spanish speaking mestizos signified for some that the North no 
longer had to deal with the “indigenous problem” of the Southern highlands.  
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marketing structures, emerge to feed and drive technology development (Röling and 
Jiggins, 1998). Over time, these actors organize into a politically influential network that 
promotes the sale of products and services, thereby becoming an indispensable 
complement to the treadmill.  
 
The large number of relatively small family farms that emerged from agrarian reform in 
Carchi created the conditions that allowed treadmill processes to take place, while ensuing 
modernisation policies encouraged integration in commercial markets. Due to the 
environmental limitations of the highlands, farmers came to rely on a single commodity – 
potato. Supply provided by many smallholders meant that no individual could drive prices, 
so essentially, all potato farmers in Carchi received the same price for their harvest. As 
individual farmers adopted technologies to improve their efficiency of production and 
technologies diffused, Carchense farmers became increasingly exposed to price squeeze, scale 
enlargement, and external competition. 
 
In light of the experience of four rural villages, this chapter pursues a single line of 
questioning: what influence did agricultural modernisation have on smallholder agriculture 
in Carchi, and how have developments affected rural people and their communities? I draw 
on multiple methods – farmer self-registries, national census data, semi-structured 
interviews, participant observation, situational analysis, and consultative workshops – to 
examine major developments and trends since agrarian reform at the four locations. To 
explore potential influences of expert knowledge and technologies in the macro-context of 
agricultural modernisation through treadmill processes, I concentrate on the evolving use 
of technology in potato production, especially the management of varieties, tillage, soil 
fertility, and pests associated with market integration. I go on to present how the 
communities summarised their history of social formations and transformations since 
agrarian reform, before making judgements on the outcomes of modernisation, in terms of 
agricultural sustainability and social consequences. I now begin with an introduction to the 
Ecuadorian rendition of agrarian reform and the arrival of technical assistance. 
 
“Constructive justice” of agrarian reform 
 
The agrarian reform process in Ecuador emerged as a result of what Barsky (1988: 390) 
described as the “original sins” of human exploitation and cruelty inherent to the encomienda 
and concertaje policies that were institutionalised through the hacienda system. The Law of 
Agrarian Reform of 1964 proposed to: “correct antiquated social relations” through “social 
justice,” “equality of opportunities,” “healthy living conditions,” “production,” 
“productivity,” “adequate pay,” and “integrated society.” In practice, however, agrarian 
reform took on different meanings. 
 
For the US government, agrarian reform became “land reform,” a policy designed to quell 
increasingly hostile rural populations in Latin America. It was part of a geopolitical project 
to eliminate communism from the Western Hemisphere, as a result of growing social 
movements in Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, 
and elsewhere. Following the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the Kennedy Administration 
championed land reform in the region, and tied it to what became the “Alliance for 
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Progress” initiative.2 Less publicly, the policy included clandestine support of tyrannous 
dictators and militaries throughout Latin America and assassinations of tens of thousands 
of students, politicians, and political leaders.3 “Liquidation of the precaristas”4 was a means 
of diffusing the rise of controlling “ultra-nationalism,” the “virus of communism,” and 
setting the groundwork for US-based regional security. 
 
Unified around common concerns over urban growth, interests in inexpensive food for the 
cities, and agriculture as a means of capturing foreign currency, disparate parties in Ecuador 
found consensus around agrarian reform as a means of “economic development” and 
“modernisation.” According to Costales and Costales (1971: 174), once the agenda of 
“liquidating the old precarista problem” for economic growth was agreed upon as the way 
forward, the problem became what to do with a massive population of ex-wasipungeros5 who 
“did not have the most basic and rudimentary concept of land property rights” and who 
had “scarce or no preparation for receiving land.” Further, it was argued, “In no case was 
there the social maturity or the previous preparation to constitute themselves as agents of 
change,” so progress would depend on external intervention. The answers were built into 
the proposal for “agricultural modernisation.” 
 
Galo Plaza, owner of the large Zuleta hacienda in northern Ecuador and President of 
Ecuador between 1948 and 1952, became an outspoken proponent of the movement to 
modernise the haciendas and agriculture in general. Barsky (1988) explains how Plaza’s 
proposals won public favour during the formulation of the agrarian reform policy and its 
early implementation. The analysis summarises what came to be the consensus on poverty 
and how it should be addressed (Box 4.1). For Galo Plaza, agrarian reform provided the 
means of eliminating “inefficient” haciendas that “perpetuated the precaristas.” Rather than 
place the future of food production in the hands of the ex-wasipungeros, he argued for 
leaving the fertile highland valleys to the “modernised haciendas,” what he described as 
“agribusinesses.” 
 
Citing the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), and the US government, Plaza argued that it went without 
question that medium and large agribusinesses were the most capable of bringing 
knowledge and technology to bear on the pressing problem that he framed as “efficient 
food production.” He contended that the ex-wasipungeros should be converted to a paid 
work force or proletariat to support agribusinesses as well as new urban-based industries in 
food processing, textiles, and small manufacturing sectors. Implicit in his message was that 
there was not enough room for smallholder farmers in the highly valuable fertile valleys of 
the highlands, so the activity of the ex-wasipungeros should be limited to subsistence farming 
                                                       
2 John F. Kennedy first publicly proposed the Alliance for Progress development program during a speech on 
13 March 1961. On 15-17 August 1961 the US government led a call for “regional land reform” and 
“integration of rural people into modern society” at a meeting organized by the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council of the Organization of American States, which subsequently would became known as the “Carta 
de Punta del Este,” for the location of the meeting at Punto del Este, Uruguay. 
3 Noam Chomsky (1992) includes a critical analysis on US foreign policy in Latin America during this period. 
4 As explained in Chapter 3, precaristas were the ‘precarious workers’ or informal rural sector that lied outside of 
the market economy. 
5 As explained in Chapter 3, wasipungeros were indentured servants of the hacienda system. 
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of less productive areas or unused regions of the Amazon through processes of re-
colonisation. Galo’s son, Leonidas Plaza, was more explicit:6 
 
In synthesis, liberated agrarian property in our country should be: 1) land of the 
Indian in the high Sierra combined with individual plots of communal pasture 
land; 2) promotion of internal colonisation, [as response to the] traditional panacea 
for the problem of men without land and land without men; 3) free competition of 
different systems of medium and large agri-businesses – individual, cooperative, 
and collective; 4) punishment of the vestiges of the latifundio, [i.e.,] of the 
unproductive ownership of land by progressive imposition. Agrarian policy could 
not be more practical and just, a product based on constructive justice. 
 
Closely tied with the agrarian reform policies, the Ecuadorian government adopted new 
language. For example, in the documents of the Ministry of Agriculture the finca or granja 
(farm) became the “Unidad de Producción Agropecuaria” (UPA) (literally, the Agricultural 
Production Unit), and the hacienda (plantation) became the “medium to large enterprise.” 
The UPA was: “all the land that is dedicated, either partially or in entirety, to agriculture 
and animal production and that is worked, directed, or administered as a technical or 
economical unit, directly by a person (the producer) or with the help of other people, 
without consideration to ownership, legal condition, size, or location. The UPA can be 
composed of one of various lots or parcels of land.”7 The campesino or hacendado became the 
small or large holder “producer,” signifying “the legal or natural person who had 
responsibility for managing the UPA, to which corresponds technical initiatives and that 
owns full economic responsibility of the said property or as shared with others (e.g., 
through sharecropping).” The government officially converted agrarian reform from a 
policy based on social to economic ideals. Land reform as a means to  “empowerment” and 
“social justice” became a means to “rural development” in the name of “increased 
production,” “efficiency,” and “productivity.” 
 
Through consensus around urban-based priorities of ample, cheap food as well as geo-
political interests of anti-communism, the “constructive justice” resolved the controversy 
over agrarian reform. Hacendados would come to own less land, but they strategically would 
hold on to the richest resource base of the valleys, forests, and water. That, combined with 
control over labour and markets, enabled them to conserve their economic capacity and 
social position. Many would get involved in industry, especially the agrochemical and food 
processing industry, and politics. As Ecuador shifted from military dictatorships to 
democracy, the earlier class of hacendados would become congressmen, ministers, and 
presidents. The new concern became implementation of the modernisation project. 
 
Who would decide on matters of efficiency and productivity? How would new knowledge 
and technology arrive to agriculture? The answer became the nascent rural development 
industry led by a new class of agricultural experts made up of researchers, técnicos, and 
salesmen. 
                                                       
6 El Comercio newspaper, 17 September 1961, as quoted in Barsky (1988:94). 
7 ‘Basic concepts and definitions’, National Agriculture Census, 1974. 
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Box 4.1 A summary of Galo Plaza’s proposal of land reform as agricultural modernisation 
(as described in Barsky, 1988: 90-94) 
 
• Colonisation of barren or uncultivated lands – based on the implicit understanding that 
the highlands were not large enough to employ the existing rural population 
• Colonisation of under-used or inefficiently exploited land – the traditional, inefficient 
hacienda will no longer continue 
• Strengthening of efficient haciendas or agribusiness – increasing efficiency (usually, 
production by area) became a central focus of the government and an overriding 
justification for its policies. 
• Land transfer to wasipungos – land reform must end “outdated” social relations and 
generate an agricultural working class available for the development of agribusinesses. 
While Plaza was committed to ending the precaristas, in practice, this meant closing the 
inefficient traditional haciendas that accumulated wealth through extracting rent for 
land and water access. 
• Elimination of the minifundio8 – Through processes of colonization in other regions 
outside the highlands and ending processes of subdivisions, the administration 
proposed that farmers who lived on land of limited size or questionable arability must 
migrate either to new areas of colonization (primarily the Amazon) or to urban areas. 
• Development of urban-based industry – Foreseeing the growth of urban areas, the 
administration proposed urban development as a means of absorbing the displaced 
working class. Particularly, it proposed the growth of food processing, textile, and 
small manufacturing industries. 
 
Arrival of technical assistance 
 
Global tendencies 
 
Similar to other parts of Latin America, during the mid-twentieth century, Ecuador was 
introduced to an emerging regime of thought around notions of poverty and development 
(Escobar, 1995; McMichael et al., 2000). The US land grant system beginning in the 1860s, 
the independence movement of India in the 1930s followed by ensuing de-colonization 
processes led by the League of Nations in Asia and Africa, the New Deal Policies in the 
United States during the 1940s, and post World War II reconstruction efforts in Europe 
and Japan opened the way for the role of outsiders, especially technical experts and 
“technology transfer,” in “community development.”  
 
The advent of technical assistance in the Americas was closely tied with geopolitics. Just 
prior to World War II, the US became worried about Nazi infiltration of Argentina, Brazil, 
and Mexico, so it began to explore cooperative agriculture programs as a means to 
strengthening political ties with those countries (Flora and Flora, 1989). The US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) established experiment stations throughout Latin 
America and Nelson Rockefeller supported professionals from the USDA and land grant 
colleges to conduct agricultural development work. In the 1940s Colombia requested US 
support to “relieve the general state of social and economic crisis in Colombian 
                                                       
8 As explained in Chapter 3, a minifundio was a small landholding permitting a family-level subsistence economy. 
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agriculture” (Cronshaw, 1982: 99). A particular concern was the opposition of large 
landholders to its 1936 land reform policy and the absence of an agricultural middle class 
(Smith, 1947).  
 
According to Ruttan (1989: 173), “Lagging agricultural development was interpreted 
primarily as the failure to make effective use of available technology.” At the end of World 
War II, the United Nations created the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for the 
purpose of becoming a “global ministry of food and agriculture.” The FAO mandate 
included the provision of technical assistance to countries, support to education, the 
collection of statistics on land use and production, and the publication of technical 
materials. By 1950, the United Nations had established development programs in over 60 
countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as smaller initiatives that were 
supported by missionary organizations and private organizations such as the Ford, Kellogg, 
and Rockefeller Foundations. By the next decade, however, the emphasis on “technology 
transfer” shifted, as agricultural research became central to global agricultural development 
strategies. 
 
In 1941, the Rockefeller Foundation had begun to support technology assistance and 
transfer programs in Mexico, based on the land grant extension model (Mosher, 1957). 
Eventually, this led to the experience with plant breeding in maize and wheat, leading to 
the creation of the International Rice Research Institute (IIRR) in the Philippines in 1960 
and the International Center for the Improvement of Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT) in 
Mexico in 1966, the first two centres of what would become the Consultative Group of 
International Agriculture Research Centers or CGIAR (Ruttan, 1989). By 1980, 12 
international agriculture research institutes would be created, including the Lima, Peru-
based International Potato Center (CIP) in 1971. The global ministry of agriculture had 
been complemented by a global agriculture research service. 
 
Entry into Ecuador 
 
In 1956, the UN initiated the Andean Mission in Ecuador – the first international 
development project of its kind in the country (Barsky, 1988). It proposed infrastructure 
development and “campesino integration” with Ecuador society through agricultural 
intensification and market integration in six provinces of the Sierra: Imbabura, Tungurahua, 
Chimborazo, Cañar, Azuay, and Loja. Though individual haciendas had regularly brought 
in technical expertise from Europe and the United States since the late 1800s, the Andean 
Mission represented the formal arrival of the technical expert and the project on the behalf 
of rural communities. Additionally, the Cuban Revolution in 1959 marked a period of 
intensive social and political agitation throughout Latin America among both rural and 
urban poor, especially students and intellectuals. In Ecuador, these international events 
combined with deepening protests and violence in rural areas led to policy discussions over 
agrarian reform, which were high profile and captured public attention. Two years later the 
US arrived with the aforementioned Alliance for Progress program.  
 
In 1961, Ecuador’s military government created the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones 
Agropecuarias (INIAP) for the purpose of “elevat[ing] the productivity of human and natural 
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resources through the generation and adoption of technologies of easy diffusion and 
application…”9 INIAP was charged with two specific objectives: 1) to investigate, develop 
and apply scientific knowledge and technology for the exploitation, utilisation, and 
conservation of the natural resources in the agriculture sector, and 2) to contribute to 
increased production, productivity, and the qualitative improvement of agricultural 
products, through the generation, adaptation, validation, and transfer of technology. In 
1964, the government created the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia (MAG) charged with 
“promot[ing] and diffus[ing] the results of research and experiments produced by INIAP 
and other public and private industries.”10 
 
Initially MAG was provided considerable resources, and its administration and operations 
were centralized in Quito (Barsky and Cosse, 1981). Through the processes of 
“government modernisation,” based on ideals of market liberalisation, the progressive 
privatisation of natural resource ownership, and the elimination of public services, MAG 
was weakened considerably. In the course of time, the Ministry underwent a major 
restructuring to “decentralise” decision-making and operations to the provinces. The Law 
of Agricultural Promotion and Development (1979) and the Law of Agrarian Development 
(1989) shifted MAG from a primary provider of technical services to a more passive role 
organised around the production of capacity-building plans, the “arbitration” of training 
responsibilities, the “coordination” and “normalisation” of the agriculture sector, which 
included the regulation of private property rights, “fair and open competition,” free 
importation of inputs, improved seeds, animals, plants, and machinery, “unfair 
competition” from foreign countries, “administrative skill-building,” and credit for 
agribusinesses.11  
 
Similarly during the 1980s and 1990s government restructuring weakened INIAP. While 
the rhetoric of agricultural research survived, INIAP became the Instituto Nacional Autónomo 
de Investigaciones Agropecuarias, shifting it from a public-run research organization to a 
“decentralised, private entity with a joint social and public mandate with economic, 
administrative, financial, and technical autonomy...” In the process, the semi-private 
Institute gained control over its infrastructure, including four major research stations and 
three sub-stations, and a special public budget for “advancing scientific research, 
generating, validating, and diffusing technology in the agriculture sector.” Despite its new 
status as an autonomous entity, through the 1990s to date salaries and the vast majority of 
INIAP’s operational budget continued to come from public sources, though during that 
period its budget decreased markedly. 
 
Carchi: model of modern agriculture 
 
The national agricultural research institutes in Latin American generally followed the US 
land grant model of technological development, particularly through intensification of 
                                                       
9 Supplement, Official Government Registry Number 315, 16 April 2004. 
10 Reglamento Orgánico Funcional del MAG. During the shift towards oil exploitation in 1970, the military 
government combined the MAG and the Ministry of Industry into the Ministry of Production. In 1973, MAG 
was re-established as an autonomous ministry. 
11 Supplement, Official Government Registry Number 315, 16 April 2004. 
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production through market integration, mechanisation, and the use of agrochemicals (Flora 
and Flora, 1989). Beginning in the mid-1950s, this included the “green revolution,” the 
development and application of genetic technology to alter the growth and productivity of 
crops and animals. This period also saw the institutionalisation of waged labour, including 
paid teams of specialized migrant labour, known as cuadrillas or “squadrons.” Carchi 
expressed these patterns of development more clearly than the rest of Ecuador and, as a 
result, the province has been described as a model of agricultural modernisation.  
 
According to Barsky and Cosse (1981), unique conditions in Latin America interfered with 
externally-led policy and technology development processes in Ecuador. At the Spanish 
arrival, agrarian societies were restructured around the interests of extractive enterprises 
oriented around export markets. Following the 1930s, this arrangement was transformed by 
a new industrial era of order organized around diverse articulations of import substitution. 
These phenomena were accompanied by emergent conflicts and contradictions between 
more recent industrial and earlier agrarian order, sustained by the monopolization of 
resources and control over surpluses of production and the realization of emergent 
industrial social forms as the principal means to wealth accumulation. In practice, these 
conflicts expressed themselves as political in-fighting among divergent interests that 
effectively divided the State between internal social structures and modern industrial 
perspectives, often supported by international politics and industry. This inevitably led to 
structural "incoherencies" that influenced policies and generated political battles, 
antagonism, isolation, and ultimately, disputes for control over the State and its projects. 
While this phenomenon was generally true for the Ecuadorian highlands, Carchi was 
another story. 
 
Rural communities of Northern Ecuador were transformed to what Barsky (1984) 
described a "bimodal system" dominated by two principal actors: large farmers who had 
undergone processes of technification and capitalization, and smallholders, likewise 
transformed by a degree of technification but lacking land or capital resources, who 
achieved only limited accumulation from within this context. Following agrarian reform, 
Carchense agriculture underwent profound technological change that at first fuelled sharp 
increases in potato production and productivity. These developments occurred 
concurrently with the conformation of new State apparatus as a result of the 
problematisation of the agrarian and agricultural concerns and its orientation towards 
modernisation through common patterns of technology development and diffusion. More 
than anywhere else in Ecuador, farmers in Carchi widely accepted the recommendations of 
the emerging network of agricultural experts and support agencies. Within five years of 
agrarian reform, essentially all farmers began to organise their production around 
commercial markets and externally based technology. They adopted mechanized tillage, 
synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, and new potato varieties, as well took on debt.  
 
Agrarian developments in four villages 
 
To understand rural transformations in Carchi since the hacienda period, I conducted in-
depth case studies in three villages: San Pedro de Piartal (Piartal), Santa Martha de Cuba 
(Cuba), and San Francisco de Libertad (La Libertad). Since 1998, these had been the 
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locations of multiple CIP and INIAP studies, including those of the EcoSalud project to be 
discussed in Chapter 5. All three locations had been part of the described economic and 
health research, and self-selected groups of farmers took part in Farmer Field Schools. Due 
to a long history with farmers in these villages, the Carchi Research Team and I were 
provided broad access to individuals and their families that were generous in working with 
us to shed light on the local experience with agrarian reform. In addition, Myriam Paredes 
(in process) and I added a fourth community, Mariscal Sucre (Mariscal), due to its unique 
settlement history and recent involvement in development and conservation activities, 
including the Farmer Field Schools. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Map of case study sites 
 
While farmers generally agreed upon certain dramatic moments of change, as Paredes 
(2001) reminds us, in Carchi there existed substantial variation in how individuals, families, 
and communities responded to emerging events. In her research on both commodity and 
non-commodity circuits, Paredes identified four farming strategies that dominated the 
mediation of modern social fabric in Carchi, with groupings described locally as: riesgosos, 
intermedios, pragmaticos, and jornaleros. These divergent “farming styles” illustrate degrees of 
autonomy, but also the varying effects that commoditized forms may or may not have had 
on particular values and relations, depending on the specificities of local circumstance and 
what became central to providing value to goods and relationships. Diverse family-level 
phenomena are the focus of Paredes (in process). This chapter limits analysis to global 
socio-technical phenomena. 
 
During the period of 2003 to 2004, Paredes and I employed a farmer from each of the four 
communities who implemented weekly registries of agricultural activities throughout the 
potato-growing season. Three of the recorders were FFS graduates with whom we shared a 
long history of interaction. These people had strong knowledge of agroecology and 
especially Integrated Pest Management and were part of broad social networks with people 
both inside and outside the FFS movement. The fourth person was a female leader from 
Mariscal who had worked closely as an extensionist with the Jatun Sacha Foundation, a 
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conservation organization, and more recently with EcoPar, an environmental consulting 
firm.12 She was highly experienced with community forestry and had a broad social 
network of people both inside and outside the conservation activities. The farm registries 
were digitalized into a database (referred to here as “Paredes and Sherwood database, 
2004”). The plots were selected based on two criteria: 1) willingness to participate in weekly 
recording of production activities throughout the growing season and 2) social diversity, as 
per the farming styles determined in the social heterogeneity study of Paredes (2001). To 
assure a robust sample size for standard statistical analysis, we sought at least ten percent of 
the farm household population in each community. In the end, a total of 94 fields from 92 
farmers were documented (at least 10% in each community and over 12% of the overall 
population). Paredes (in process) provides further details on the size and social 
heterogeneity of the sample selection. This database complements the earlier CIP and 
INIAP studies and gives insight into changes since “dollarisation.”13  
 
My mixed role as intervener-researcher in Carchi raised objectivity concerns, posing 
methodological challenges. This included both my ability to dispassionately listen to 
informants and interpret experience as well as to receive unbiased information from others. 
Additionally, over the years I expressed my perspective in publications, public events, and 
the media, and many farmers, public officials, and industry representatives were aware of 
my positions.  As a result, people tended to tell me what they thought I wanted to hear. 
Paredes faced similar challenges. Consequently, it was difficult for her and I to obtain 
objective information during interviews. 
 
To overcome this obstacle, Paredes and I employed a team of four Ecuadorian técnicos – an 
agronomist, forester, economist, and sociologist, who conducted interactive research on 
political history, social developments, farming changes, and market integration across the 
four sites between January 2003 and August 2004. We added additional people when 
research demands were high, for example during planting periods. We trained the team in 
quantitative and qualitative research techniques, as per the demands of specific inquiries. 
Throughout that period we held regular bi-weekly meetings to discuss findings and revise 
on-going studies. The team and I taped and transcribed interviews of individuals and group 
discussions, and we took copious notes during field visits. Unless otherwise stated, the 
quotations reported here are from that material. The research team collected secondary 
data, it conducted interviews with farmers, agrochemical salesmen, industry representatives, 
public officials, and technical specialists, made homes visits, and held meetings with focal 
groups to discuss and review findings. Individual members generated raw data (e.g., notes, 
interview recordings, and surveys) and produced technical reports on topics of particular 
interest (e.g., the arrival of the tractor and agrochemicals or the loss of local potato 
varieties). This material was presented to other team members and discussed as a means of 
further cross-checking findings. The research concluded with a series of workshops both in 
                                                       
12 Jatun Sacha Foundation established and set up the Guandera Reserve in 1991 and had a long history of 
working with Mariscal Sucre on the conservation of the remaining track of forest. EcoPar was a three-year 
IDRC-funded project to address concerns over the sustainable management of biodiversity of the eastern 
Andean flank. Over the years, we had developed close relationships with project leaders from both 
organizations and often shared human and material resources to advance tasks of mutual interests. 
13 Dollarisation was the name commonly given to the Ecuadorian currency conversion from the Sucre to the 
US Dollar in March 2000. I will further discuss this policy and its effects later on in this chapter. 
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and among communities from May to July 2004 to review findings and to synthesize 
conclusions across studies. 
 
I go on to summarize how farmers in each of the four research sites described major 
events of agrarian development following land acquisition. I then examine the evolution of 
technology and social transformations in recent time. 
 
Post hacienda land redistribution and settlement 
 
El Vínculo Hacienda originally extended the length of the eastern Andean ridge from the 
Chota Valley north to present-day Huaca, an area of tens of thousands of hectares. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century it was owned by Ignacio Fernández Salvador. Upon his 
death, the hacienda was divided among family members into three smaller haciendas: Mata 
Redonda, El Salado, and Indujel. By mid-century, the parish of Mariscal Sucre and the 
town of San Pedro de Piartal would emerge from these haciendas. The generally drier and 
less fertile western flank of the Andes contained a larger number of smaller haciendas, 
where wasipungeros generally were mistreated, in part so that the administrators could meet 
profit margins. Relatively violent processes of land reform in the early 1970s of two such 
haciendas – El Quatis and La Rinconada – would lead to the settlement of the towns of 
Santa Martha de Cuba and San Francisco de Libertad. In continuation, I present how 
groups of farmers in each community accounted their general modern history – i.e., since 
obtaining land, becoming active in the market, and ensuing technological and economic 
development. In addition to following this structure, the cases are presented as per the 
particular emphases that emerged during interviews. 
 
Mariscal Sucre: “groundbreaker in colonisation” 
 
The agrarian reform [of the 1960s] did not affect the people of Mariscal because 
there were no [traditional] haciendas in Mariscal when the laws came into effect. – 
elderly farmer from Mariscal Sucre 
 
The village of Mariscal Sucre was a groundbreaker in colonisation. Some thirty years prior 
to land reform, a collection of smallholder farmers purchased the land that would become 
the present-day community. Large landholders of the region did not escape the great 
economic depression of the 1930s. More dependent on foreign exchange than Ecuador, 
Colombia was hardest hit by the Great Depression and suffered relative devaluation of the 
Peso. During this period, numerous Colombians migrated across the border and into 
Carchi in search of land and opportunity. In 1932, Clodomiro Aguilar led 11 farmers from 
the nearby Carchense town of Huaca to purchase 800 hectares of essentially abandoned 
steep forested land through an independent arrangement with the hacienda owner, Ricardo 
Fernández Salvador. This area became the “People's Agricultural Colony of Huaca” and 
later the Parish of Mariscal Sucre. The land was mortgaged to a national bank, and the 
purchasers took over that debt, paying three payments each of 63.11 Sucres (S).14 The 
families distributed land via a lottery system, with lower lying forests designated for 
agriculture.  
                                                       
14 The value of the Sucre in 1932 was Sucres 5.48:1US Dollar. 
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The wasipungeros of El Salado generally liked Ricardo Fernandez Salvador. According to the 
child of one of Mariscal’s founders, “I remember Don Ricardo, who like most from the 
city was a tall man. No, he was extremely tall, but for some reason he could not walk. The 
workers’ children used to volunteer to help him. Two by two, we’d spend a day under Don 
Ricardo’s shoulders, helping him to get about.” In addition to the 800 hectares of land sold, 
Ricardo Fernández Salvador donated 16 hectares at a lower margin of the colony for the 
construction of a town centre, where in 1936, the colonists responded by building a public 
primary school and, in 1940, a church.  
 
The modern town centre of Mariscal Sucre was located about half way up the eastern ridge 
at 2,900 meters above sea level (masl) and had a population of about 2,500 people, who 
were distributed among six neighbourhoods and five smaller settlements. Over 90 percent 
of the town's denizens were Catholic. The chief economic means came from farming the 
potato-pasture system. The parish included the private Guandera Reserve, the largest track 
of remaining inter-Andean mountain forest. Today, the El Salado Hacienda continues to 
cover about 300 hectares and is run by the previous owner’s son, Pedro Fernandez 
Salvador, who was one of the country's largest potato producers and who owned a herd of 
nearly one thousand meat and dairy cattle. 
 
Initial settlement activities centred on “taming” the dense mountain environment. This 
involved felling trees and burning logs for sale as carbón15 in the nearby markets of San 
Gabriel and Tulcán, where it was subsequently redistributed for a profit to larger markets in 
the cities of Ipiales, Colombia and Ibarra and Quito, Ecuador. A dense, wet montane forest 
covered the hillsides. According to an elderly man who helped clear the land, “I remember 
when we arrived and looked up at the inhospitable forest. The first thing we had to do was 
throw the mountain onto the ground. We cut down and burned the trees, and then burned 
them again, before we could actually see the ground. Only then could we think about 
planting.”  
 
"In order to survive, we had to dedicate ourselves to carbón production. There was no other 
means of income. In exchange [for carbón], we paid off our land debt and brought rice from 
Julio Andrade and San Gabriel." 
 
In those days, Mariscal was not connected to the Pan-American Highway, so charcoal had 
to be carried down the mountainside on horseback. Charcoal extraction was an important 
source of income for decades. By the end of the 1960s, however, the forest resource finally 
depleted to the point where charcoal increasingly was no longer a viable means of income 
for all but a small minority of the population.  
 
"The forest ran out by 1970. Each family had its block of forest that ran out, and [as a 
result] had to turn toward something else." Nevertheless, a small number of families 
continue to rely on charcoal production and commonly employ teams of labourers from 
                                                       
15 Carbón or 'charcoal' refers to the partially burnt carbon mass leftover after the oxidation of wood and other 
organic material that people from Carchi commonly used as an energy source for cooking and heating prior to 
the arrival of electricity and natural gas in the 1970s. 
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Colombia to fell the remaining outcroppings of forest hanging stubbornly to the steep 
mountainsides. 
 
The people we interviewed recalled that, previously, the sale of five to six mules (200 
pound loads each) of charcoal would meet a family's financial needs for a year. Following 
deforestation, land slowly became converted to subsistence agriculture. Initially, families 
sold charcoal and purchased grains from the drier region of La Paz. Due to the harsh cold 
and wet climate of the time, cultivated crops were limited to Andean tubers, oca, melloco 
and mashua that were planted among the tree stumps and underbrush with a shovel-like 
tool. Families usually reared guinea pigs in homes, and free ranged a gaggle of chickens. 
Typically, each family reared a pig for consumption during holidays, such as Christmas, 
Holy Week, and the town's patron saint day. As the forest disappeared and the weather 
dried, soils drained to the point where farmers could plant potato, quinoa, maize, fava 
bean, and lupine.  
 
In the 1960s, a wave of new colonists, primarily of Colombian origin, arrived to exploit 
carbón. Many early colonists sold land and migrated to urban centres, especially Ibarra. This 
caused conflict with the founder, Clodomiro Aguilar, who found his leadership challenged. 
In light of the emerging land reform policies, Clodomiro left Mariscal and organized a new 
group of colonists to seize land in nearby Monte Olivo and later Santa Martha de Cuba. 
The town's people built a new and larger Catholic church. At the end of the 1960s, 
Ecuador decided to begin to exploit its oil reserves, of which a portion of profits was 
“planted” or invested in development, which included rural infrastructure development.  
 
In 1970, under a cost-sharing arrangement through mingas (a Kichwa word for communal 
labour), the government financed a potable water project in Mariscal. In 1975, Mariscal 
purchased a small diesel electrical generator that provided electricity to a handful of stores 
and houses located at the community’s centre. That year, a family bought a small black and 
white television, which became very popular. Through mingas and local government 
donations, the town constructed a water drainage and sewage system that connected 
houses in the urban centre. In 1979, the community and the Ministry of Education built a 
public high school. Electricity was installed in the early years of the 1990s. While a single 
telephone line reached the community in 1985, it was not until 1992 that a central network 
was established and individual houses received telephone service. In the mid-1990s, the 
non-governmental organization Jatún Sacha purchased a large section of surviving forest 
and páramo and established the private Guandera Biological Reserve.  
 
Over the years, the Church congregation had been haunted by the theft of a number of 
religious artefacts, beginning in 1950 with the theft of the Rosary Virgin from the parish 
centre of Huaca. In 1980, the Virgin of San Vincent and the Jesus child were stolen from 
the church in Mariscal, which interrupted many traditions, including the “Castle of Fruit” 
that involved the construction of large structures ornately decorated and filled with fruits 
during the town's patron saint day. In the late 1980s, the congregation collected donations 
and commissioned a replica of the Rosary Virgin, but tragically, that statue also disappeared 
in 1993. According to many townsfolk, since that period Mariscal had given in to 
“modernity.” Fireworks replaced the “Castle of Fruit” tradition, and rather than celebrate 
   Learning from Carchi  84 
together during festivals, neighbourhoods began to compete with one another. In reference 
to these developments, one elderly woman declared, "The meaning of faith has changed." 
 
San Pedro de Piartal: “no longer dirty carboneros” 
 
San Pedro, a town lying on the edge of the Parish of Piartal, is situated at about 2,800 masl 
on the eastern flank of the Andes, just south of Mariscal Sucre. The area largely was part of 
the 4,000 hectare Indujel Hacienda, which was a subdivision of the larger El Vínculo 
Hacienda. Indujel chiefly produced potato, wheat, and barley on the lowlands. The area 
that would become San Pedro was part of a forested mountainside, thought too steep and 
dense for agriculture. The rainfall gradient decreases as one travels south along the eastern 
Andean ridge, so while Mariscal received greater amounts of rainfall (about 1,050 vs. 950 
mm/year), Piartal’s climate remained relatively wet throughout the year. 
 
In 1942, the El Salado Hacienda sold 1,200 ha of prime land for S219,00016 to a group of 
45 relatively wealthy individuals from San Gabriel as well as several groups of smallholders 
who bought into the purchase with the help of a state-owned bank.17 Meanwhile, in 1945, 
Luis del Campo Fernandez Salvador took over the Indujel Hacienda and began a slow 
process of modernisation through mechanized tillage, the introduction of agrochemicals, 
improved pastures, and new races of cattle.18 The people we interviewed claimed that 
Indujel workers suffered poor treatment from its Colombian caretaker. According to one 
respondent: 
 
The caretaker marched about with dogs and large juetes, and when workers did not 
hurry up, they whipped them. Sometimes they sicked the dogs and people were 
bitten. That was a time of slavery, [a time of] true poverty. Now people say that we 
are bad off, but they’re wrong. Poverty was in that time because the people, our 
parents, were peasant workers. Children stayed home in the house and cried, 
because there was no one to give them attention or give them food. 
 
The El Salado sale and continued mistreatment raised expectations among the wasipungeros 
of the Indujel Hacienda. Nevertheless, it was not until 1964, under mounting pressure from 
the Agrarian Reform Law, that Luis del Campo relinquished control. An elderly woman 
explained: 
 
Our grand illusion was to own something, to advance, to have a place for your 
children to live and work without having to pay rent. As a consequence, several of 
our leaders met, and a group of people came out of hiding and they met right there 
[pointing] at the land divide. There is where it all began. They told the different 
families to take possession of a selected plot of land. Beneath that tree that you see 
there, my family built a little hut, bringing with us a load of páramo grass [for the 
roof]. They carried my mother and me in a hammock. I had just been born three 
                                                       
16 The value of the Sucre in 1942 was about S.14.20:1USD. 
17 Revista Los Arayanes, No. 5. September 2003. 
18 Revista Los Arayanes, No. 2., September 1996 
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days earlier. Folks told my father that he was crazy, that they were going to kill his 
mujer. 
 
Another woman recalled, "There was a meeting in San Gabriel during which the leaders 
asked us, how are we going to be slaves to the patrones? They said that now there is a law, 
and they proposed that we create a union to reclaim the land that we work for nothing. 
Over 200 people signed an agreement. We set a date and during the night moved together 
and sat on the land." 
 
In 1964, Luis del Campo entitled plots of land as retirement for his most faithful workers, 
and he sold a single concession of land to about 250 ex-wasipungeros who had formally 
organized themselves with state-sponsored financial support and legal representation. 
Eighty percent of the ex-workers were of Colombian origin. As in Mariscal, the colonists 
distributed land among its members through a lottery. The average price was about S100 
per hectare,19 and plots were commonly distributed in lots of ten hectares. Today, the 
Fernandez Salvador family continues to operate the Indujel Hacienda that covers an area of 
about 300 ha. 
 
An elderly man told me that there was a saying in Carchi, "When a child is born, the forest 
shakes in fear." As the most accessible forested areas near Mariscal became depleted, the 
charcoaleros migrated south towards present-day Piartal. In 1946, the road reached San 
Pedro, providing easy access to the forest. This activity heightened following the 
colonization of the Indujel, with carbón sold principally in San Gabriel. Interviewees claimed 
that the activity was not highly regarded and that townsfolk degradingly referred to the 
people from Piartal as the "dirty charcoaleros.”  Between 1970 and 1975, the farmers of 
Piartal actively began to market potatoes in San Gabriel and Ibarra. Nevertheless, bartering 
practices continued until the 1980s, with guinea pig, bread, and potatoes exchanged for 
wheat. While entirely Catholic at the moment of settlement, over the years, Piartal had 
become increasingly divided between Catholic and Evangelical faiths. When we visited in 
2004, about 25 percent of families claimed allegiance to the latter. 
 
Santa Martha de Cuba: “inspired by the Cuban revolution” 
 
Recently, Santa Martha de Cuba changed its name to Cuba. Different from Mariscal and 
Piartal, the remaining communities of Cuba and San Francisco de Libertad were established 
during the agrarian reform period, but through far more conflictive processes of forced 
land acquisition, followed by violence on the part of the hacienda owner and, in the case of 
Cuba, the military. The area of present-day Cuba was part of the Quatis Hacienda owned 
by Army Commander Guerrón. Unlike El Salado, Guerrón did not intensively manage 
Quatis nor did he seek to increase production through the use of modern technology. The 
hacienda was situated at the foot of the western Andean ridge that had been deforested 
long ago. As a result, the land was significantly drier than that of the eastern ridge. 
Additionally, the hacienda was located at lower elevation and on more even terrain than 
that of the other case study sites. In 1970, the workers and volunteers from neighbouring 
                                                       
19 The value of the Sucre in 1964 was about S.18.00:1USD 
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villages seized land that would become present-day Cuba. The village, located at about 
2,800 masl, in 2004 was composed of about 250 households.  
 
When I asked about life on the hacienda, a man responded, “We had to be responsible 
before the patrón; day and night we had to do what the Patron said.” In the late 1960s, the 
Quatis hacienda was in general neglect. The cattle herd was poorly bred and managed, 
pastures were overgrown and underutilized. Infrastructure was in disrepair. Originally, 
Commander Guerrón wanted to independently sell the land to the wasipungeros, but he 
refused after they failed to organize themselves into a viable cooperative and raise sufficient 
funds.  
 
As with Mariscal Sucre in the 1930s, Clodomiro Aguilar played a role in the settlement of 
Cuba forty years later. In 1970, following the leadership of Galo Sierra, an organiser from 
IERAC, Aguilar helped to establish the "Cooperativa La Calera.” That year, nearly 70 
wasipungeros combined with several dozen people (oportunistas or opportunists) from the 
villages of Monte Olivo, Huaca, and San Gabriel invaded a large section of the hacienda. 
Guerrón protested and sent in armed soldiers to throw off the settlers. After bloody 
confrontations and deaths on both sides, the government intervened. The land was 
adjudicated to IERAC and sold to the settlers. As elsewhere, following land acquisition the 
settlers distributed the land among the group under a lottery arrangement. 
  
Many of the initial settlers of Cuba were opportunists. One of the original settlers told me, 
"The first inhabitants sold their land and went to live in Ibarra, San Gabriel, and Huaca. 
This opened the way for other people – campesinos – who had always been there and really 
needed land, to purchase it and begin to earn a living." 
 
The first settlers in Cuba looked to the little remaining forest for immediate income needed 
to pay off the government loan and to plant the new economic crop: potato. According to 
a founding member, "In order to cover the costs of our first potato crops, we let people 
cut down forest. The wood was turned into carbón and sold in Tulcán." By the end of the 
1970s, deforestation and charcoal production opened the way for widespread potato 
production. 
 
Like farmers elsewhere, the people of Cuba quickly learned to use agrochemicals. 
“Mancozeb enabled us to control late blight. Carbofuran enabled us to control the gusano 
blanco [the “white worm” or Andean weevil]. These are no longer problems for real potato 
farmers. The only pest that has been able to take us by surprise is the Guatemalan potato 
moth.” The soils were relatively poor in Cuba, so fertilizers were particularly important. As 
conditions with their government loans, farmers adopted new varieties, fertilizers, and 
pesticides. First, these arrived through the Ministry of Agriculture, and later, they 
purchased them from the new agrochemical stores in nearby San Gabriel. Several farmers 
told us about 4-H volunteers from the US who arrived in the 1970s to teach them how to 
use fertilizers and how to breed animals. The Guatemalan potato moth arrived in the late 
1990s. During dry years, such as 1998, it completely devastated crops. “We did not even 
bother to harvest. We hoped the worms would die of empacho [bloat] in the ground.” 
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In the late 1990s, a handful of farmers began to reorganize production around broccoli 
under contract for export companies such as AgroFrio. Beginning in 2000, purchasers 
started to refuse harvests, usually making questionable claims that the crop did not meet 
quality standards. As a result, farmers sold harvests in Ibarra at a significantly lower price 
than that agreed under contract. Combined with inflation associated with the introduction 
of the dollar, this led to bankruptcy for many. Such losses and unfair treatment became 
public, and farmers increasingly lost interest in contract production with companies. Many 
farmers turned to milk production. “When we see no way out, we stop spending money, 
which means we cannot plant potatoes. Our cows keep us alive. When a farmer sells his 
cows, you know he is no longer alive.” Since dollarisation, many people in Cuba sold off 
their land and animals and migrated to Tulcán, Ibarra, and Quito.  
 
San Francisco de Libertad:” freed from slavery” 
 
Previously known as Aliso, in 1696, the settlement of the modern-day Parish of La 
Libertad included about 40 indigenous families (Miño, 1985). By that time, the Spanish 
controlled all the land. The community of San Francisco is a caserio (or neighbourhood) of 
La Libertad, which is located a few kilometres above the town of El Angel, the county seat 
of Espejo. San Francisco de Libertad is situated in the uppermost reaches of the páramo of 
the western Andean ridge between 2,900-3,600 masl. The zone is wet (1,100 m/yr of 
rainfall) and cold (average yearly temperature of 10 °C). Similar to elsewhere in highland 
Carchi, the soils are deep, black Andean formed on top of cangahua (cemented volcanic ash) 
subsoil. 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, a handful of haciendas essentially covered the 
cultivable regions of La Libertad and El Angel (Miño, 1985). Two of these controlled the 
vast majority of area: La Rinconadita and La Riconada. The European textile crisis at the 
end of the eighteenth century greatly weakened these haciendas, which were largely 
dependent on the international wool market. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
traditional families dating back to the Spanish arrival would lose control over these 
haciendas, and they would be bought out by new business people who earned their wealth 
in nearby cities and through controlling transport of the growing trade between Ecuador 
and Colombia at the end of the nineteenth century.  
 
In a business venture with Rafael Tamayo, Francisco Galárraga, an aggressive salesman 
who owned mule teams that ran products between Ecuador and Colombia, purchased the 
Rinconadita Hacienda from Emilia Fierro in 1893 that was valued at about S13,000 (Miño, 
1985). Six years later, in 1899, the same group purchased the Rinconada, the second largest 
hacienda in Carchi (after the Vínculo in San Gabriel) for about 50,000 Sucres. The value of 
these haciendas in Espejo skyrocketed during the early part of the twentieth century, in 
large part due to the growing traffic of commercial goods between Ecuador and Colombia 
but also do to their expansion. Both of these haciendas increased their territory during the 
early 1900s through buying out traditional hacendados and claiming unused regions of 
páramo. Expansion enabled them to increase earnings through renting land to other 
hacendados as well as charging wasipungeros for crossing rights (i.e., the privilege of travelling 
through the hacienda), wood, water, as well as land for planting crops and foraging animals. 
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By 1920, the Riconadita land was valued at S50,000 and the cattle S15,756.20 At this time, 
the Rinconada Hacienda was valued at S175,000 and carried 3,500 head of cattle valued at 
S63,552. The Tamayo brothers were known as progressive hacendados and early adopters of 
new technology. They were the first to import Holstein from France, which subsequently 
were crossed with cattle from neighbouring haciendas. 
 
In 1945, the Cooperativa de Crédito, Producción y Consumo “Eugenio Espejo” and the Junta 
Central de Asistencia Pública managed to obtain a land access and production contract with 
the nearby Pucará Hacienda. The following year, landless members of the cooperative and 
from surrounding areas occupied the hacienda, which led to an open conflict with the 
hacendado and contributed to similar uprisings in other parts of the highlands. A decade 
later, in 1956, President Ponce Enríquez initiated a process of land distribution of the 
Pucará Hacienda, which some would describe as a predecessor of the 1964 Law of 
Agrarian Reform (Barsky, 1984). 
 
When I consulted people of La Libertad about their history of land settlement, the first 
response was: “There was no liberty during the haciendas. We had to work all the time, 
even when we were sick.” Nearly everyone worked in the Riconadita Hacienda. The peones 
(peasants or wasipungos) lived on the hacienda and were given access to land and in-kind 
payment through harvests. Ganadores were landless people who lived off of the hacienda 
and worked in exchange for pay. In 1970, the pay for adult male labourers was two reales 
per day. Women and children were expected to work for free. The children threshed and 
washed wheat and barley. Older people dug and maintained irrigation ditches. Women 
cooked for the mingas and milked cows. The wasipungeros received a yearly ration of food as 
payment for labour. For example, in the 1970s, they received seven quintales (one hundred 
pound sacks) of wheat, seven quintales of barley and two quintales of fava bean. The value of 
this food was discounted from their salaries. 
 
In the late 1960s, a company arrived in La Libertad to exploit the wild plants pyrethrum 
and guanto for the production of botanical soaps, medicines and pesticides. Milton Vaca, 
from the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (FENOC), led the creation of the 
“1° de Mayo” syndicate. When the company went bankrupt and closed down in 1972, Vaca 
reorganized it into the “Asociación 23 de Julio” that quickly grew to about 180 farmers, made 
up of wasipungeros, local landless, and migrants from Colombia. In late 1972, the Association 
invaded hacienda land in and around La Libertad. This led to violent repression that 
resulted in multiple deaths and the imprisonment of its leaders. The government, in 
particular IERAC, stepped in to mediate. Due to the political environment at the time, the 
hacendados were worried about further land invasions, so they decided to sell land, especially 
the less fertile degraded areas as well as the páramo. In 1975, the Association became 
legalised as a cooperative, and the land sale went through. By 1977, the government 
awarded the cooperative legal control over the land title. At that point, the Cooperative 
decided to divide up the property among its members through a lottery. Due to 
refinancing, the members did not pay off the original debt until 1999. 
 
                                                       
20 The value of the Sucre in 1920 was about S2.54:USD. 
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The wasipungeros and labourers from La Libertad generally were poorer just prior to land 
reform than those from the other case study sites. During the hacienda period, they lived 
isolated on the hillsides of the hacienda. Native forests and bush lands surrounded their 
communities, and water springs were ubiquitous. Nevertheless, the wasipungeros did not 
have rights to land, trees, or water. It was prohibited to pass through haciendas without 
paying a fee, which meant one had to walk around extensive areas – often thousands of 
acres, thereby greatly inhibiting circulation. During the 1950s and 1960s, the population 
grew and exceeded employment opportunities on the haciendas. People began to migrate 
in search of work. Up through the mid-1970s, houses continued to be made of traditional 
bahareque (dried mud and grass), and people slept on animal hides on the floor. Most people 
walked barefoot, but many men wore alpargatas (sandals made of rope) followed by quelales 
(sandals with rubber soles). 
 
Following the break-up of the haciendas, the people of La Libertad began to work their 
own land. Relatively isolated from Colombia by the páramo, people tended to employ local 
labour through families or landless labourers living in and around El Angel and La 
Libertad. Sharecropping was even more common than in the other case study sites, with 
one partner contributing the land and the other labour and inputs. 
 
When I asked what was traditionally grown, an elderly farmer responded, “On the 
wasipungo, we grew more or less the same crops as the hacienda: favabean, wheat, barley, 
potatoes, melloco, and oca. We planted potato in small plots using wachu rozado. Only the 
hacienda had a tractor. We kept our own varieties, some of which were purple and black 
and not liked by the mayordomo. We ate everything we grew, so we did not care.”  
 
The haciendas became modernised prior to land reform. The Riconadita used tractors, 
fertilisers, and pesticides. The haciendas also introduced the back-pack sprayer. With 
market integration, the emergent class of smallholder farmers began to earn money, which 
they invested in fertilizers to improve production. MAG introduced the compound 
fertilisers 10-30-10, 8-20-20, and 15-15-15 as well as a number of pesticides. Manzate (a 
mancozeb-based product) was the first fungicide to appear and was used for late blight in 
potato. The first insecticides to arrive were DDT and parathion, which were used for 
everything – from treating tubers to foliar pests to controlling lice on chickens and 
children. The insecticide Monitor (methamidophos) followed. People were unanimous that 
the 1970s brought prosperity to La Libertad. “Life was sad and hard. Later, people began 
to live well, now that they have opportunities.” 
 
In 1980, a road was built that linked San Francisco to La Libertad and El Angel, which 
provided access to the city of Ibarra. During the 1980s people stopped growing barley in 
response to low prices. Similarly, farmers stopped cultivating lupine and fava bean. Families 
managed a similar crop rotation: two years of consecutive potato followed by five years of 
pasture as a fallow. Sometimes farmers would grow three cycles of potato or they would 
shorten fallow periods, but the Andean weevil populations would become so bad that not 
even carbofuran would control it. As a result of a shift from farming for community 
consumption to supplying markets in Ibarra and Quito that demanded Superchola, in 1993, 
the community lost the local potato variety Morasurco. 
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By the mid-1990s, potato production began to fail. This situation was particularly 
problematic in La Libertad where the altitude and cold weather made potato the only viable 
alternative. One farmer explained, “The soils became tired, and we no longer could 
produce as before. Earlier, we would get 30:1. Now, we are lucky to get 10:1.”21 The 1996 
El Niño brought two seasons of drought, followed by heavy rains in the North and 
multiple years of late blight problems and low market prices due to high production 
elsewhere and imports from Colombia and Peru. People increasingly turned to milk 
production, but the prices were not sufficiently high to cover living costs. With 
dollarisation, input prices doubled and tripled, fuelling a financial crisis and forcing many to 
sell their animals and land to pay off debts. As a result, many people became jornaleros for 
the larger landowners or they migrated to cities – commonly Ibarra or Quito – in search of 
menial labour. Often, children who had left for the city to study did not return to their 
villages. Following graduation, they commonly sought urban-based work and sent home 
remittances for their families. In numerous cases, young people who did not find 
opportunity joined the guerrillas (revolutionary groups) in Colombia. Dollarisation left the 
community of La Libertad in shambles. 
 
Summary of the four case study sites 
 
Each of the four case study sites was unique in geographical setting and history (Table 4.1). 
The founders of Mariscal Sucre and San Pedro de Piartal were pioneers of land reform, 
organising to peacefully purchase land from haciendas in the 1930s and 1940s, respectively. 
Those from Mariscal generally had been treated well under the hacienda system, while 
those from Piartal had received cruel treatment. Both communities were located on the 
steep eastern flank of the inter-Andean valley, with relatively fertile hillsides of deep black 
Andean soils, ample sources of water and large areas of native highland forests. From the 
beginning, their goal was individual land acquisition. The groups converted trees to 
charcoal to pay off land and transition to family agriculture as a means of livelihoods. 
Initially, each community developed relatively diverse cropping systems based on rotations 
of Andean roots and tubers with grains and pulses, which over time became converted to 
the intensive potato-pasture system.  
 
The founders of Santa Martha de Cuba and San Francisco de Libertad were primarily 
hacienda workers who suffered cruel treatment and gained access to land through relatively 
violent means during the period of agrarian reform in the early 1970s. These communities 
were situated on the western flank of the inter-Andean valley, a region that was relatively 
dry and degraded at the time of purchase, especially the area of Cuba. Nevertheless, San 
Francisco was located high in the páramo. While the conditions there were cold and moist, 
the farmers of San Francisco benefited from ample soil and water resources. As per the 
agrarian policies of the time, both groups were obligated to obtain land through communal 
arrangement, and upon land acquisition, they were handed loans in the form of seed and 
agrochemicals. As a result, the groups immediately converted land to potato production 
                                                       
21 The ratio refers to potatoes harvested to potatoes planted. Since farmers plant about 30 quintals per hectare, 
30:1 signifies about 900,000 lbs of potatoes at harvest or 41 t/ha. By 2000, farmers regularly harvested 10:1 or 
14 t/ha. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of case study sites 
 
Characteristic Mariscal Sucre San Pedro de 
Piartal 
Santa Martha de 
Cuba 
San Francisco de 
Libertad 
Descriptive motto Groundbreaker of 
land reform 
No longer “dirty 
charcoaleros” 
Inspired by the 
Cuban Revolution 
“Freed from 
slavery” 
Geographical 
aspect and 
characteristics at 
acquisition 
Eastern flank, 
2,800-3,400 m, 
sloped to steep 
terrain; heavily 
forested 
Eastern flank, 
2,900-3,400 m; 
sloped to steep 
terrain; heavily 
forested 
Western flank, 
2,800-3,200 m; flat 
to sloping terrain; 
deforested 
Western flank, 
2,900-3,600 m; 
sloped to steep 
terrain; montaine 
environs 
Natural resource 
base (soil, water 
and forests) 
High Medium Low High 
Climate (avg. 
rainfall and 
temp.)* 
1,050 mm/yr 
11.5 °C 
950 mm/yr 
11.5 °C 
800 mm/yr 
12.5 °C 
1,200 mm/yr 
10 °C 
Hacienda origin 
and relationship 
Originally El 
Vínculo and then 
El Salado; 
eventually modern 
hacienda; good 
relations. 
Originally El 
Vínculo and then 
El Salado, Indujel; 
modern hacienda; 
workers suffered 
harsh treatment. 
El Quatis, 
traditional and 
poorly managed 
hacienda by 
absentee Patrón; 
workers suffered 
harsh treatment. 
La Riconadita and 
Rinconada; 
modern haciendas; 
workers suffered 
harsh treatment. 
Land acquisition 
and distribution 
1932, 11 families 
from Huaca and 
organized by local 
leader; peacefully 
purchase 800 ha 
through assuming 
hacienda debt; land 
distributed by 
lottery. 
• 1942, 45 outsiders 
peacefully 
purchased land 
from El Salado 
• 1960, 250 
additional workers 
purchase land from 
Indujel under land 
reform; later lottery 
distribution. 
1971, inspired by 
Cuban revolution, 
103 workers and 
others organized by 
outsider; aggressive 
seizure and 
purchase of land; 
communal 
management; later, 
lottery distribution 
(1975). 
1972, 180 workers 
organized and 
aggressively seized 
land; managed 
communally; later 
lottery 
distribution; 80 
families sold land 
entitlements 
(1975). 
Economic 
development 
Charcoal 
exploitation (1930s-
1960s); slow 
conversion to 
potato-pasture 
(1960-today) 
 
Charcoal 
exploitation; large 
scale (’45-80); slow 
conversion to 
potato production 
(‘70-75) 
Immediate 
conversion to 
potato production 
and rapid 
technification 
(1975) 
Subsistence 
production; 
landless labourers; 
conversion to 
potato and grain 
production 
following land 
settlement 
Principal markets San Gabriel and 
Tulcán 
San Gabriel and 
Ibarra 
San Gabriel and 
Tulcán 
El Angel, Ibarra 
and San Gabriel 
Population (2003) 200 households 120 households 250 households 180 households 
Cropping 
development 
(from traditional 
to market 
integration) 
From Andean roots 
and tubers, pulses 
and quinoa to 
potato, pasture for 
market 
From Andean roots 
and tubers, lupine, 
maize, and quinoa 
to potato, pasture 
From pasture to 
potato-pasture 
From Andean 
roots and tubers, 
pulses, maize and 
quinoa to potato, 
pasture and grains 
* INAMHI data 
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to generate income for the banks. Upon paying off debts, both quickly distributed land by 
lottery for individual ownership. In Cuba, about half of the founders sold their land 
entitlements and moved to urban areas. In Cuba, farmers had little option but to continue 
to rely on the potato-pasture system for livelihoods. Meanwhile, those in San Francisco 
also cultivated Andean grains and pulses. Overtime, however, the communities of Cuba 
and San Francisco – not unlike Mariscal and Piartal – came to concentrate on 
intensification of potato production as their chief economic means of livelihood. 
 
Post hacienda land distribution and settlement was accompanied by different social trends 
in communities. The people of Mariscal – the “groundbreaker of land reform” – invested 
heavily in developing the community’s infrastructure, including a cobblestone road, central 
park, potable water and electricity, church and public garden. On the opposite extreme was 
Cuba, which despite its location near the valley floor and closeness to the Pan-American 
Highway, at the turn of the twenty-first century still had dirt roads that became impassable 
during the rainy season, no central park, and less than adequate public services. While older 
people spoke nostalgically about land acquisition, youth generally did not have a clear 
understanding of histories. Despite substantially different histories, all locations talked 
about a common global trend. Land acquisition led to periods of opportunity and 
prosperity, when sadness and hardship became replaced by opportunity in the form of 
work and accumulation. 
 
Nevertheless, this prosperity did not last. In recent time, communities experienced resource 
degradation (e.g., the “tiring” of soils and the “drying up” of streams), growing pest 
problems, rising input costs, price declines for their products, and new hardship. Different 
forms of social “decay” and “disintegration” accompanied this. When talking about recent 
trends, people mentioned: loss of community solidarity, conflicts over faith, abandonment 
of agriculture, sale of land, and emigration to urban centres. At all locations, people 
described unimaginable hopes and dreams associated with land acquisition during the 
second half of the twentieth century, followed by disappointment and concern for the 
future at the turn of the century. 
 
Agricultural transformations and the performance of modernisation 
 
To understand modern technical change in Carchi, I focused on the use of technology in 
potato production since land reform to provide an overview of major trends in cropping 
systems, varieties, pesticides, fertilisers, and tillage. I also examined economic performance 
of modern potato production. Information was gathered from secondary sources 
(MAG/INEC Agriculture Census of 2004, INIAP UVTT-Carchi, Crissman et al., 1998; 
Yanggen et al., 2003; Herrera et al., 1999; Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002), surveys 
conducted by Paredes and Sherwood during the 2003-2004 cropping season, as well as 
semi-structured interviews. The 2003-2004 research team subsequently held focal group 
sessions with the 92 database participants from La Libertad (n=16), Piartal (n=34), Cuba 
(n=19), and Mariscal (n=25) to review, validate, and adjust global trends. Results from this 
research activity are subsequently cited as “Carchi Research Team, 2004.” 
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Cropping systems 
 
The hacienda and wasipungos of Carchi typically cultivated small plots of mixed crops 
containing Andean roots and tubers, fava bean, maize, quinoa, barley, and wheat. As 
wasipungeros moved onto their own land they carried with them seeds from the hacienda and 
began to plant around houses as well as freshly deforested areas. The research team found 
that in Mariscal, where farmers arrived some thirty-five years prior to commercial market 
integration, patterned cropping systems emerged that resembled traditional multi-cropping 
and rotations known elsewhere in the páramo Andes (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). 
 
In the 1950s, the town people of Mariscal introduced meat cattle from the El Salado 
hacienda to feed on outcroppings in cleared forest and areas under fallow. By the end of 
the decade, farmers reared about 100 head of cattle. They managed soil fertility empirically 
through multi-cropping and rotations with legumes, followed by recuperative periods of 
five to eight years. Guinea pig and cattle manure were applied to crops at planting. 
Sometimes farmers prepared botanical pesticides based on species such as jun-jun (Pispura 
spp.) for control of insect pests. Mixtures were carried in buckets and applied by hand. 
Nearby Piartal followed similar patterns, while the settlers of Cuba and La Libertad 
essentially arrived in the fervour of agricultural modernisation and as a result, immediately 
adopted industrialised production. 
 
In the 1970s, potato became the first commercial crop of the agrarian reform beneficiaries 
throughout the four locations. By the end of the decade, potato monocultures quickly 
dominated the landscape. Agrochemical use expanded year by year through the end of the 
1990s, when farmers began to leave land to pasture for dual milk-meat cattle due to the 
combined forces of production declines, climbing input prices, and falling market prices 
for potato. While pesticides generally enabled farmers to compensate for the intensification 
of potato production, the mid-1990s arrival of the Guatemalan tuber moth (Tecia solanivora) 
in an infested batch of seed from Colombia decimated potato production in Cuba, which 
led to a wide-scale abandonment of the crop.22  
 
Between the mid-1970s and the end of the 1990s, the total area of Carchi dedicated to 
potato production increased from about 3,000 to 16,000 hectares.23 This was followed by a 
sharp decline beginning in 1999, largely explained by increased input costs associated with 
dollarisation (An, 2004). The drastic decline in Cuba also was associated with three years of 
severe droughts that began with the El Niño in 1996 accompanied by the arrival and 
proliferation of the Guatemalan potato moth. The most recent 2004 census showed that 
only 6,179 hectares in Carchi were planted under potato. Since 1996, area planted to potato 
in the four research sites decreased dramatically, by about 60 percent (Figure 4.2). Only in 
La Libertad did farmers continue to maintain previous patterns of potato production, 
largely because of the town’s altitude and climate that greatly limited alternatives. 
 
The research team found that by 2004, farmers began to invest in improved pastures, for 
example through the introduction of rye grass mixtures as well as legumes, especially exotic 
                                                       
22 Personal communication with Fernando Chamorro, INIAP-UVTT Carchi. December, 2001. 
23 INEC Census, 2004. 
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clovers. Families increasingly lived off of milk production that was sold for between $0.09 
to $0.11 per litre (in 2007, the government increased this to $0.25/lt) to local distributors 
and processing factories, as well as the sale of beef cattle. Nevertheless, An (2004) found 
that dairy production was not an economic substitute for potato but rather a complement. 
In 2004, we found that many farmers had explored economic alternatives, such as fava 
bean, snow peas, and broccoli, but over time, these crops proved vulnerable to the extreme 
conditions of the northern highlands. As a result, crop failures became common, and 
increasingly, income from agriculture did not meet basic needs. 
 
Figure 4.2 Average cultivated area under potato production (based on INEC data 
processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
Potato varieties 
 
Prior to agrarian reform, a large number of potato varieties were grown on the hacienda 
and on small plots in the wasipungos primarily for local purposes. Commonly, farmers on the 
wasipungo cultivated dozens of potato varieties, including numerous chauchas (or heirloom 
varieties) for household consumption. In the 1960s, the most popular potato was 
Curipamba, which represented about 40 percent of potatoes planted in Piartal and 20 
percent in La Libertad and Cuba. Meanwhile, Chola was the most popular cultivar in 
Mariscal and represented about 30 percent of all potatoes grown. Some of these potatoes 
were traded with haciendas for sale in distant markets, but most of the potato crop was for 
subsistence consumption. As a result, local cultural preferences weighed heavily in cultivar 
selection. Farmers concerned themselves with conserving the favourite local varieties, 
among which were: Morasurco, Pintona, Ratona, Chala, Curiquinga, Sarda, Corneta, 
Aguacata, Morada, Morcilla, Manzana, Pan de azúcar, Pestañaroja, Papapiedra, Cuya, and 
Churo. At the time of our arrival thirty years later, few if any of these potatoes could be 
found in the communities. Of the 94 farmers surveyed from the four research sites during 
the 2003-2004 season, we found an average of 1.30 cultivars in their fields, with a 
maximum diversity limited to 3.0 (Paredes and Sherwood database, 2004). 
 
The research team found that since market integration in the 1970s the number of varieties 
commonly grown in fields, including both commercial and heirloom cultivars, sharply 
decreased (Figure 4.3). As farmers began to produce for the markets in San Gabriel,  
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Tulcán, Ibarra, and Quito, commercial varieties from Colombia arrived to supplant the 
local cultivars.24 By the end of the 1970s the most popular potatoes were Ica-Huila (from 
Colombia), Curipamba, Chola, Guantiva, Violeta, Uva, and Martina. A decade later, a 
handful of highly commercial potatoes, particularly Chola, Superchola and Gabriela, 
dominated the landscape to the point where they represented over half of all potatoes 
planted (Figure 4.4).25 During the 1990s Chola and Superchola came to represent about 70 
percent of all potatoes grown in Mariscal, 60 percent in Cuba and 50 percent in Piartal, 
while only ten percent in La Libertad. By 2004 the percentage increased to about 90 
percent in Piartal, 80 percent in Mariscal and Cuba, and 60 percent in La Libertad.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Average number of potato varieties found in fields (those covering > 5% of 
total area reported) (data generated through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 
2004) 
 
The transition from the subsistence wasipungo system to landed smallholders who produced 
a cash crop for the market generated a loss of potato varieties. Farmers explained that this 
was due to market demand. Over time, they shifted to the variety that received the highest 
prices at the market. The popularity of varieties was determined by preferences in distant 
cities, independent of local environmental or cultural considerations. While Chola and 
                                                       
24 It is technically illegal to import potato from Colombia for phytosanitary reasons, but in practice a vibrant 
trade exists. 
25 Ecuadorian consumers regularly confuse the varieties Chola and Superchola, both of which have similar red 
skin colour, off-coloured dimpled eyes, yellow flesh, large size, and oblong shape. As a result, the two 
commonly demand the same price in national markets. For the purpose of this study, I refer to Chola and 
Superchola as the same variety, unless otherwise stated. Technically, this is incorrect, but it is convenient for 
compensating for the inherent imprecision of historical analysis. In Pumisacho and Sherwood (2002), 
Superchola is correctly described as a cross between Curibamba Negra, Solanum demissum, and Chola. Curiously, 
Superchola, Ecuador’s most popular potato, was not developed by the National Potato Program. Instead, an 
eccentric Carchense, Germán Bastidas, developed numerous potato varieties as well as breeds of meat and dairy 
cattle. 
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Superchola were difficult to grow and demanded heavy use of remedios (“remedies,” a 
common metaphor for pesticides), these crops offered farmers the highest price at the time 
of harvest. 
 
A number of factors governed market preference. Recently French fries and chips 
represented the principal increase in the potato market – from about five to ten percent of 
the national market (Herrera et al., 1999). The industrialisation of potato required varieties 
bred for consistent colour following frying, high dry matter content, and reduction sugars. 
In addition, the market for raw potatoes sold directly to household consumers was very 
resilient to change and tended to favour one or two varieties. The domestic market greatly 
preferred Chola and Superchola, which attracted a price commonly twice as high as that for 
any other potato. Urban consumers rarely recognized the variety they purchased. Instead, 
they simply choose a potato with a certain “look.” Thus, a newly introduced cultivar, in 
order to be commercially successful, needed to be similar in appearance to Chola or 
Superchola. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Average area planted under the three principal potato varieties (CIP and INIAP 
data processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
The predominance of one or two market-ready varieties meant that farmers faced 
increasingly similar problems, and they had little to no local genetic recourse for addressing 
them. In Carchi, selectively bred varieties developed by local breeders or the national 
agricultural research service (INIAP) accounted for over 80 percent of the potato 
population found in fields. New varieties generally were crossed with genetic stock from 
previously popular varieties (usually to ensure market acceptability), thus further limiting 
actual diversity in the agro-ecosystem. For example, the newly introduced Superchola was 
genetically very similar to the Chola variety that it replaced. Unfortunately for growers, 
Superchola was a slow maturing potato that had become highly susceptible to late blight 
and insect pests. As a result, it required six to seven months of time in the field (depending 
on elevation and temperature) and weekly fungicide applications.  
 
Only 50 years ago, dozens of potato varieties were consistently grown with no use of 
fungicides while today even the most resistant Chauchas need multiple applications. 
Although INIAP and CIP maintain extensive in vitro collections in their research stations, 
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as field-level genetic diversity has been lost, it has become increasingly difficult for plant 
breeders to manage and use those collections in a manner that would benefit the long-term 
healthy development of potato varieties under locally changing conditions. Over the long 
run, if local in vivo genetic banks are not developed and maintained, breeders no longer 
would have the basic knowledge and prime materials to continue to develop resistant or 
high yielding varieties. The loss of biological diversity undermines human nutrition and 
food security (Toledo and Burlingame, 2006). From a sustainable agriculture perspective, 
the capacity to adapt to changes depends on the variability present in the farming system 
(Qualset and Shands, 2005). The loss of genetic variability brought by market-driven 
mono-cropping increased the vulnerability of potato crops, thus placing into risk the well-
being farmers and their communities. 
 
Soil management 
 
Cropping intensification associated with market-oriented production further affected soil 
fertility. Agricultural modernisation emphasized the potato as the chief economic crop that 
displaced other, less marketable crops. The arrival of chemical fertilizers in the 1950s 
allowed farmers to intensify agriculture through closer planting distances (i.e., space) and 
shortened fallow periods (time). Essentially all potato farmers in Carchi use chemical 
fertilizers (Crissman et al., 1998; Yanggen et al., 2003). The compound fertilizer 18-46-0 
(18% nitrogen (N), 46% phosphorus (P), and 0% Potassium (K)), which responded to a 
phosphorous tie-up characteristic of black Andean soils, by far became the most common 
fertiliser applied. As a result, I focused on the use of 18-46-0 since the 1970s as a proxy 
indicator for soil fertility. 
 
The research team learned that 18-46-0 first arrived to the haciendas at the end of the 
1950s. The first batches were German-based products. These were quickly replaced by 
Colombian brands in the 1960s. Cheaper, though of lesser quality, Ecuadorian products 
became available in the late 1980s. Prices dropped from about $1.31/kg in 1980s to 
$0.17/kg in 1990. Following dollarisation, the price increased to about $0.38 kg in 2000. 
Farmers described a marked drop in soil fertility over time, causing them to increase 
fertilisation applications (Figure 4.5). In 2004, farmers told the research team that they 
applied “one-to-one” or “two-to-one,” which represented the ratio of the weight of 18-46-
0 applied to potato seed planted (Table 4.2). More precise field data showed that in 2004, 
farmers in the four communities applied an average of 152 kg/ha of N, 359 kg/ha of P, 
and 161 kg/ha of K (Paredes and Sherwood database, 2004), which was about ten percent 
more fertiliser per area than Crissman et al. (1998) reported for the period 1990-1992. 
Usually they used split dressings, with about half applied at planting and the remainder 
applied at the moment of the first aporque or hilling-up of the potato crop. 
 
During a meeting with people in Mariscal Sucre, the research team was told, “Before we 
produced 30 or 40 to one. Today, we are lucky to get ten to one. As a result of the overuse 
of chemicals, our land has become degraded and lost its fertility.” Despite increased use of 
fertilisers, farmers complained that the potato crop no longer responded as previously. 
Subsequently, CIP and INIAP researchers involved with the EcoSuelos project confirmed 
what modern potato farmers had discovered on their own: continual potato production 
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tied with the heavy use of fertilizers and pesticides in Carchi contributed to chemical and 
biological exhaustion of soils and long-term production declines.26 As summarised in 
Chapter 2, EcoSuelos discarded pathogenic nematodes (Globodera or Meloidogyne spp.) as a 
cause of soil fatigue, most likely due to the high rates of carbofuran use. The researchers 
found that modern potato cultivation caused a number of indicator soilborne fungal 
pathogens, such as Rhioctonia and Fusariums spp., to proliferate in the system. Additionally, it 
appeared to have a harmful affect on beneficial organisms, especially entomopathogens 
(useful for keeping down Andean weevil populations) and mycorrhizae (critical for P 
uptake in potato). Nevertheless, funding for the EcoSuelos project ended before the 
researchers could reach more conclusive results on the biological sustainability of soil 
management. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Average application rates of 18-46-0 fertiliser (kg/ha) (based on CIP-INIAP 
data processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
Table 4.2 Average fertilizer applications during the 2003-2004 planting season (Paredes 
and Sherwood database, 2004) 
 
 
Fertiliser 
La Libertad 
(n=16) 
Piartal 
(n=34) 
Cuba 
(n=19) 
Mariscal 
(n=25) 
Mean Std 
dev. 
Nitrogen (N) (kg/h) 134.16 156.16 144.21 161.39 151.39 60.19 
Phosphorus (P) (kg/h) 302.79 338.46 350.74 386.62 347.68 133.55 
Potassium (K) (kg/h) 90.48 145.13 201.56 196.88 161.00 79.71 
 
Insect and disease pests 
 
In all four communities, the research team found that the number of pesticide applications 
had increased since the 1980s, despite a 250 percent increase in potato input costs since 
dollarisation (An, 2004). Research that took place between 1990-1992 showed that Carchi 
farmers applied pesticides to their potato fields an average of seven times during a cropping 
season, with three pesticide products in each application (Crissman et al., 1994). In 1997, 
                                                       
26 Personal communication with Pedro Oyarzun, soil scientists formerly at CIP and INIAP. Also see the final 
report of the MAG/PROMSA supported project IQ-CV-049: “EcoSuelos: investigación para un manejo más 
productivo y sostenible de suelos andinos en la ecoregión centro-norte del Ecuador.” 
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Barrera et al. (1999) also found that farmers applied seven times, with a maximum of 15. 
Both studies found farmers who mixed up to seven products in each application. During 
the 2003-2004 planting season the farmers of Mariscal Sucre employed an average of 10.6 
applications of pesticides per season, followed by Cuba (7.0), Piartal (6.76), and La Libertad 
(4.0), for an overall average of 7.36 applications (Table 4.3). Since 1990, the Central Bank 
of Ecuador reports that the global sale of pesticides in Ecuador increased from about $37 
million to $100 million, even though area cultivated in the country did not increase 
significantly during that period. When I asked the farmers why pesticide use was increasing, 
the group laughed and told me what had become a major feature of modern agriculture: 
pest problems get worse; they don’t get better.  
 
To understand historical pest dynamics, I focused on the employment of the three most 
common pesticides as reported in Crissman et al. (1998) and Yanggen et al. (2003): 
mancozeb (dithiocarbamate family of fungicides used for late blight; these represented 80% 
by weight of active ingredient of all fungicides applied), carbofuran (carbamate-based 
insecticides used for the Andean weevil and 47% of all insecticides applied), and 
methamidaphos (organophosphate-based insecticides used for foliar insects and 43% of all 
insecticides applied). During interviews and workshops in communities, our research team 
referred to common product names to facilitate conversations on historic application 
patterns. 
 
Table 4.3 Average pesticide applications and contents during the 2003-2004 season 
(Paredes and Sherwood database, 2004) 
 
 
Pesticide 
La Libertad 
(n=16) 
Piartal 
(n=34) 
Cuba 
(n=19) 
Mariscal 
(n=25) 
Mean Std dev. 
Applications 4.0 6.76 7.0 10.6 7.36 2.92 
Dithiocarbamate 
fungicidesa  (kg/ha) 
6.47 15.20 14.46 18.69 14.49 7.34 
Organophosphate 
insecticidesb  (l/ha) 
0.72 0.87 2.32 1.94 1.42 1.25 
Carbamate insecticidesc  
(l/ha) 
1.09 1.38 1.82 1.90 1.56 1.55 
a. largely mancozeb-based formulations 
b. largely methamidophos-based formulations 
c. largely carbofuran-based formulations 
 
The research team found that mancozeb use had steadily increased since the early 1970s 
(Figure 4.6). Mancozeb was most frequently applied in the wetter climates of Mariscal and 
Piartal. In Mariscal, farmers increased applications from about 12 in 1970 to 14 in 2004. In 
Piartal farmers had increased from seven to 12. Farmers in La Libertad tended to use fewer 
pesticide applications overall. Paredes (in process) found that this was largely explained by 
their reliance on family labour. Nevertheless, in La Libertad average use of mancozeb rose 
from about four applications per season in the 1970s to ten in 2004. Similarly, in Cuba, 
mancozeb applications rose through the mid-1990s but decreased sharply after 1996, as a 
result of a shift towards a drier climate. In response to this trend, farmers explained that 
they not only increased the number of applications but also the quantity of product used 
(the application rate) from about one to two kg/ha (the recommended rate was 0.7 kg/100 
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litres of water or 1.4 to 2.0 kg/ha, depending on the stage of the crop).27 Nevertheless, 
more precise data from Crissman et al. (1998) and from the 2003-2004 season showed that 
farmers commonly mixed commercial fungicides with the same active ingredients, thereby 
raising the effective application rate to 3.0 to 4.0 kg/ha. On average, farmers applied 14.50 
kg/ha of dithiocarbamate fungicides (nearly all of which were mancozeb-based products) 
on their potato crop during the 2003-2004 season (Table 4.3). We came across farmers who 
applied 34 l/ha of mancozeb to their crop that season. Most farmers believed that late 
blight had become more resistant to fungicides, and as a result, it required both more and 
stronger applications. They generally increased mancozeb applications even after personal 
financial crisis and the doubling of prices for fungicides after 2000. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Average frequency of mancozeb applications for late blight (based on CIP-
INIAP data processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
Methamidaphos applications varied greatly within communities, but overall, the use of the 
insecticide had doubled since the 1970s – from about one to two applications in Cuba and 
La Libertad and two to four applications in Mariscal and Piartal (Figure 4.7). Similar to 
fungicides, application rates of methamidaphos increased from the recommended (250-500 
ml/100 l)28 to twice that in Piartal, Cuba, and La Libertad and four times the 
recommendation in Mariscal. On average, farmers applied a total of 1.42 l/ha of 
organophosphate insecticides (most of which were methamidaphos-base products) to their 
potato crops during the 2003-2004 season (Table 4.3). We found farmers who applied up 
to 8.0 l/ha of methamidaphos to their crop that season. Farmers interviewed explained that 
the reason was a proliferation of foliar pests, especially aphids (Myzus pericae and Macrosiphun 
euphorbiae) leaf flea beetle (Epitrix spp.), leaf miner fly (Liriomyza huidobrensis), and trips 
(Frankliniella tuberosi). This was a particular concern in dry years. In the case of leaf miner 
fly, the effects of insecticides on parasitic flies contributed to the pest’s proliferation. 
According to one individual from Cuba, “Farmers like to see the insects fall from the sky. 
Then, we know we can go home and sleep at night.” 
                                                       
27 Vedemécum Agrícola. 2004. División de Publicaciones Técnicas, EDIFORM, Quito, Ecuador. 
28 Ibid. 
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Figure 4.7 Average frequency of methamidaphos applications for foliar insects (based on 
CIP-INIAP data processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
The number of carbofuran applications for the Andean weevil varied greatly (Figure 4.8). 
Overall, since the 1970s farmers increased applications by a factor of two or four. The 
manufacturer recommended one to two applications (at planting and hilling),29 while 
previously INIAP recommended a maximum of one application.30 On average, farmers 
applied a total of 1.56 l/ha of carbamate insecticides (nearly all of which were carbofuran-
base products) to their potato crops during the 2003-2004 season (Table 4.3). We 
commonly came across farmers who applied up to 12 l/ha of carbamates that season. 
 
Figure 4.8 Average frequency of carbofuran applications for Andean weevil (based on 
CIP-INIAP data processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
                                                       
29 Ibid. 
30 In large part due to the joint INIAP-CIP research in Carchi, in 2002 INIAP’s potato program stopped 
recommending highly toxic pesticides. 
   Learning from Carchi  102 
Farmers explained that previously, they produced potato with little to no weevil damage. 
Likely, the pest was controlled through numerous small plots, spacing between fields, and 
length of fallow season. As the size of potato fields grew and fallow seasons shortened, 
Andean weevil populations exploded, converting from a secondary insect to a major pest. 
Additionally, many farmers believed that the weevil had developed resistance to 
insecticides, so they needed to apply stronger rates. 
 
Patricio, a medium-scale potato farmer and former pesticide salesman from San Gabriel, 
summed up the modern pest problem: “If the gusanos [or worms] choose your crop, they 
win, hands down. No Ingeniero or God can help you.” He went on to tell what had become 
a familiar story: agricultural intensification in Carchi did not just lead to increases in potato 
production; it also produced soil degradation and a proliferation of pests. Most farmers 
said they generally were aware of the health problems associated with pesticide use. 
Nevertheless, modern time had introduced them to a new reality: the only thing worse than 
using pesticides was not using pesticides. They applied more and more fungicides and 
insecticides and used heavier application rates, but they still could not win against the pests. 
Resorting to pesticides was the best they could do to keep their crops alive and eke out a 
living, with the hope of someday being able to pay off their climbing debts. The only other 
option was to sell off land and animals and move to the city. Patricio concluded, 
“Pesticides permit us to live, so that we can plant another day.” 
 
Economic performance 
 
While processes of market integration in Mariscal and Piartal started in the 1930s and 
1950s, respectively, farmers there did not grow large quantities of potato for sale until after 
agrarian reform – about the same time that farmers in Cuba and La Libertad shifted 
towards commercial production. Previously, the farmers of Mariscal and Piartal met their 
debt payments primarily through wood harvesting and charcoal production. For the 
purposes of this research, I focused on economic trends in potato production since the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Particularly, I examined global tendencies in production by area, 
production costs, prices, and productivity. 
 
a) Production by area 
 
In all four communities, farmers said that adoption of mechanized tillage, fertilizer and 
pesticide technologies led to sharp increases in production during the 1970 and much of 
the 1980s, followed by slow but steady declines during ensuing decades (Figure 4.9). 
Despite steady increases in fertilizer use, the land no longer responded. The most drastic 
decline took place in Cuba, where in 1970, harvests reached 55 t/ha, but by the early 1990s, 
production decreased to about 16 t/ha. When I asked why, I was told that first, the soil had 
become “tired,” then the pests came, and finally, the weather changed. While I did not have 
precise weather data for Cuba, farmers emphatically argued that since the early 1990s, 
rainfall had declined and the monthly distribution of rainfall was less predictable than 
previously. 
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Figure 4.9 Average potato yields by area (based on CIP-INIAP data processed through 
focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
While initially there were dramatic differences in production by area among the case study 
sites, differences reduced during the 1980s. Based on high quality, dynamic data from 1990-
1992, Crissman et al. (1998) found an average production of 21 t/ha. Based on interview 
data from 1997, which followed a particularly dry El Niño year, Barrera et al. (1999) 
reported average production of 16 t/ha. The 94 farmers who participated in our 2003-2004 
data collection produced an average of 15 t/ha during a season with normal climatic 
patterns, with average yields for communities varying between 12 and 18 t/ha. Combined, 
these studies generally support what we heard during 2003-2004 – potato farmers of Carchi 
experienced a sharp decline in production between the mid-1980s and the end of the 
1990s. 
 
b) Production costs 
 
Despite global potato production declines over the last several decades, farmers in Carchi 
continue to produce two to three times the national average.31 Nevertheless, farmers there 
also have the highest production costs in the country. Since the mid-1980s, production 
costs have increased steadily, with a sharp increase in the early 1990s due to the elimination 
of government price controls on agrochemicals in 1992, followed by a policy shift in 1993 
towards active management of currency exchange and steady decline in the real-effective 
exchange rate of the Sucre (Lee and Espinosa, 1998; Beckerman, 2002) (Figure 4.10). As a 
result, production costs rose sharply from about $250/ha in 1990 to $1,500/ha in 1993 
(Crissman et al., 1998).  
 
During the 1990s, labour represented about 25 percent of production costs in Carchi and 
external inputs about 75 percent (Crissman et al., 1998; Herrera et al., 1999). According to 
Herrera et al. (1999), fluctuations in real input costs generally explain the variations in 
potato production costs between 1989-1998. Input costs rose faster than labour due to 
revaluations of the Sucre in the early 1990s and the fact that essentially all agrochemicals 
used in Carchi were imported. Between 1997 and 1998, Ecuador experienced an economic 
                                                       
31 INEC, 2004. 
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crisis and spontaneous dollarisation that doubled the real-effective exchange rate of the 
Sucre, leading to a temporary drop in production costs and tremendous windfall profits for 
producers that levelled off following official dollarisation of the economy in 2000 
(Beckerman, 2002). Since that time, input costs increased steadily as a result of the inflation 
associated with dollarisation. In 2004, Paredes and I found potato production costs in 
Carchi at above $2,000/ha. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Potato production costs in Carchi (1984-2004) (Banco Nacional de Fomento and 
INIAP UVTT-Carchi data) 
 
c) Prices 
 
Generally, potato prices in Ecuador are inversely related to the available supply of the 
commodity (Figure 4.11). The supply of potato in the country is largely a function of 
aggregated production as a result of climate, soil fertility, and pest management rather than 
market demand for the crop (Herrera et al., 1999). Potato production has low market 
elasticity; only about 18 percent of production behaviour can be explained by market price. 
Location on the equator and the diverse environmental niches of the inter-Andean valley 
mean that farmers at different locations continually plant and harvest. Volatile weather 
conditions common to highland environments contribute unexpected periods of rainfall, 
drought and frost, with associated effects on insect pests and plant diseases, especially of 
devastating pests such as the Guatemalan potato moth and late blight. Additionally, since 
the environment in the Northern Andes permits continual production, varieties have not 
been selected for storage. Four to six weeks after harvest, potatoes turn green, so they must 
be sold right away. The inability to store potatoes until prices improve increases farmer 
vulnerability. The combined effects of environment, climate, pests, and lack of storability 
lead to highly unpredictable commodity supply. As a result, prices fluctuate tremendously, 
making potato production a high-risk enterprise. 
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Figure 4.11 Variability of potato price with production (MAG and Central Bank of 
Ecuador data, as reported in An, 2004) 
 
 
Figure 4.12 presents minimum and maximum prices for the varieties Chola and Gabriel at 
the Quito wholesale market between the period of 1990 and 2004. The two varieties show 
similar patterns of variability, with Chola consistently presenting higher prices at both 
peaks and nadirs. While minimum prices were relatively stable between years, varying by 
about 50 percent, maximums commonly varied by over 300 percent. In 1996, El Niño led 
to severe drought in the highlands. Price increases between 2000 and 2002 were due to 
inflation associated with the process of dollarisation. Meanwhile, the data on monthly 
prices for Chola at the Quito wholesale market provide greater resolution on the drama of 
price variability (Figure 4.13). With the exception of the 1996 El Niño, the bulk of variation 
in price occurs within years, with little to no perceptible pattern across the months. During 
2002 and 2003, average yearly potato prices tended to decline. Nevertheless, during that 
same period, monthly prices occasionally peaked and crashed to historic levels. During the 
1990s monthly prices fluctuated by a factor of three to six. Since dollarisation, prices have 
fluctuated from $0.80 to $20 per quintal, an astounding factor of 25 (Paredes, 2001; An, 
2004)! The odds of harvesting at a highpoint in market demand indeed were comparable to 
“winning the lottery.” 
 
In a study of price differences among producers, wholesalers and consumers between 1990 
and 1998, Herrera et al. (1999) found that producer prices had decreased 
disproportionately. While relative potato prices increased with inflation for wholesalers and 
consumers, as of 1995, real prices for producers dropped by about 30 percent, a 
relationship that continued through 2004. The potato region with the lowest prices for 
producers was Northern Ecuador. The odds of losing in potato production, especially in 
Carchi, had gone up. 
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Figure 4.12 Extreme monthly potato prices for Chola and Gabriela between 1990 and 
2004 (wholesale market, Quito) (MAG and Central Bank of Ecuador data) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Monthly variation in prices for Chola (1990-2004) (Quito wholesale market) 
(MAG and Central Bank of Ecuador data) 
 
d) Productivity 
 
We did not find reliable yearly data on productivity for the 1970s, but the fact that farmers 
managed to quickly pay off their debts associated with land acquisition and substantially 
increase area planted suggested they did well during that period. Barsky (1984) found that 
between agrarian reform and the mid-1970s production increased by about 40 percent and 
worker productivity by 33 percent. In contrast, INIAP’s data showed that potato 
productivity in Carchi steadily declined since the mid-1980s (Figure 4.14). When the 
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research team shared this data with farmers in the four communities, they concurred, 
explaining that in the 1970s and 1980s soils were more fertile and pests less problematic, 
allowing them to use less agrochemicals. Additionally, in those days prices were relatively 
high and stable. The farmers explained that their prosperity began to change in the early 
1990s. They experienced a series of average to bad years combined with an increase in 
fertilizer and pesticide costs. Lee and Espinosa (1998) explained that the rise in input prices 
during the early 1990s was due to a sharp decline in the effective role of tariff exemptions 
for agricultural inputs. The farmers at our research sites questioned the INIAP data 
showing positive productivity after 2001. Consistent with the findings of An (2004), 
following dollarisation of the Sucre in 2000, Carchense farmers experienced increases in 
input prices and labour costs of more than 200 percent, which negatively influenced the 
productivity of potato farming. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14 Productivity of potato production in Carchi (INIAP UVTT-Carchi) 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, Carchense farmers increasingly lost money on potatoes. Based on 
data from 1990-1992, Crissman et al. (1998) found that farmers in Carchi produced on 
average 21 t/ha, but they lost money on 43 percent of the potato fields they planted. 
During the 2003-2004 season, which farmers classified as a good year, Paredes and I found 
that farmers produced an average of 15 t/ha and lost money on 55 percent of their potato 
crops (Table 4.4). The empirical evidence of production decline and overall production 
failures was overwhelming, especially for certain styles of farming. For example, Don 
Brocardo was famous in Mariscal for betting everything he had on his potato crop. 
According to Paredes’ (2001 and in process) classification of farming styles, Don Brocardo 
was a clear example of a “high risk taker,” the most prestigious group of farmers in Carchi. 
When we visited him in 2004, he had just lost his vehicle, house, and land to mounting 
debts, which made him the talk of the town. According to Don Brocardo and the farmers 
we consulted, the problem was not potato production but rather prices, especially price 
variability. Don Brocardo fell into debt not because of field production but because he 
harvested when prices were low. Three losses in a row led him to financial collapse and the 
loss of his land. In sharp contrast to the successes of potato farmers in Carchi during the 
1970s and 1980s, Paredes and I found that the dramatic failures at the market place since 
the early 1990s were becoming legendary. 
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Table 4.4 Average yield, net revenue, and farmers who lost money on their potato crop 
during the 2003-2004 season (Paredes and Sherwood, 2004)a 
 
Community Average yield  
(t/ha) 
Average net revenue 
($/ha) 
Farmers losing money 
(% total) 
La Libertad (n=16) 17.99 690 31 
Piartal (n=34) 13.73 148 59 
Cuba (n=19) 12.36 -559 89 
Mariscal (n=25) 15.35 534 40 
Average 14.86 203 55 
a For comparison purposes, Paredes and I employed cost-benefit methodology consistent with that used in 
Crissman et al. (1998). 
 
Modernisation: motor of wealth, motor of decline 
 
In summary, performance of agricultural modernisation in Carchi followed a general 
pattern of a sharp rise followed by steady decline. The first communal harvests on 
degraded ex-hacienda soils were low at about 10:1, meaning that for each sack of potatoes 
planted, they harvested ten sacks, which was about 14 t/ha. During the early 1970s, State 
extensionists arrived to offer in-kind loans in the form of sacks of fertilizers and later, new 
varieties and pesticides that had to be paid back in cash. Initial use of agrochemicals led to 
sharp increases in production, so, after paying off debts, farmers were left with surplus cash 
for the first time in their lives. The research team found that fertilizers led to an immediate 
increase in production, often to a ratio of 30:1 (41 t/ha). The técnicos from MAG and 
INIAP advised them to shorten planting distances from about 1.40 m between rows to 
1.00 m, which further contributed to production by area.  
 
The early success of modernisation spread through communities like “wildfire.” The 
beneficiaries of agrarian reform built permanent houses, and entire families moved onto 
the communal land. Area under potato cultivation multiplied by a factor of five. While 
variable, potato prices were generally strong during the 1970s and the first half of the 
1980s, enabling a large number of farmers to “hit the lottery.” This enabled them to pay off 
debts and to accumulate wealth, often in the form of a truck or the purchase of additional 
land.  
 
Diverse success stories were present in each community and were widely known, inspiring 
an entire generation of farmers to go further into debt so that they could afford the use of 
greater quantities of agrochemicals. The farmers who invested most – the “high risk-
takers” – became an admired and highly regarded social group. Farmers generally sought to 
maximize area planted to potato. They increasingly converted pasture, forests, and páramo 
to the crop. Fertilizers enabled them to more intensively plant potatoes, and production by 
area climbed to over 50 t/ha.  
 
After ten or 15 years of accumulation, potato crops began to fail. Soils became tired, pests 
were more problematic, and potato production grew to be dependent on greater and more 
intensive use of agrochemicals. Meanwhile commodity prices became more variable, 
moving towards an overall tendency of decline. At the same time, the government 
dollarised the economy and input prices nearly tripled. As production failures became ever 
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more common and debts mounted, the odds of “winning the lottery” became 
insurmountable. Over thirty years, the products of agricultural modernisation made potato 
production an increasingly expensive and risky enterprise. In 2004, more and more rural 
families found themselves in dire economic straits, causing them to abandon not only 
potato production, but agriculture. For a growing number of rural families, the model of 
agricultural modernisation had reached a state of collapse. 
 
Social transformations 
 
What were the influences of agricultural modernisation on people and their communities? 
Following individual and group interviews on technical transformations, the research team 
moved on to conduct interviews with individuals and small groups of people in each 
community to learn how life had changed since agrarian reform. In 2004, the Carchi 
Research Team interviewed individuals in each community followed by larger community-
level meetings at the case study sites. It employed a common series of questions on the 
source of rural change, role of rural peasants in production and society, relationships 
between peasants and authority, sources and flows of knowledge and technology, 
livelihood strategies, and moments of collective organisation. While there was much 
discussion over terminology and dates of events, participants had little difficulty reaching 
consensus on four general “critical moments” of transition in Carchi: the “hacienda,” “land 
distribution,” “technification and market integration,” and most recently “dollarisation.” 
The synthesised results appear in Table 4.5. In continuation, I provide a summary 
description for each period. 
 
Hacienda period: “era of the patron” 
 
In Mariscal Sucre and San Pedro de Piartal (villages that managed to purchase land well 
before agrarian reform), we found mixed emotions about the hacienda period. The present-
day population of people who worked in the hacienda was low. Most people arrived 
following land purchase and either owned their own land since arrival or worked as 
jornaleros. These people were less dependent on the hacienda for their livelihood in the past. 
We were surprised to learn that parents and grandparents commonly had not told the 
youths about the difficulties on the hacienda. A father told me, “Why should we teach our 
children to hate?” The youth and the colonos or colonists tended to romanticize the hacienda 
time, saying for example, “Before we did not need to worry about our health. We did not 
need to go to see the doctor; we could cure ourselves with plants.” “There was greater 
interest in religious matters. People were more spiritual.” These comments provoked 
controversy. While many of the people who did live under the hacienda in Mariscal 
generally admired the patrón of the El Salado Hacienda, the people of Piartal who lived 
under the Indujel Hacienda had a very different experience. A woman from Piartal said, "In 
those [hacienda] days we suffered incredible poverty. Sometimes we went days without 
food to eat. In those days, not even the Government was around to help. The Government  
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Table 4.5 Summary descriptions of critical periods of modern agrarian change in Carchi 
 
Criteria Hacienda –  
“era of patron” 
Land – 
 “free at last” 
The market – 
 “the risk-taker” 
Dollarisation – 
“period of crisis” 
What is the source of 
change? 
Hacienda State State Market 
What is the dominant 
pattern of authority 
(authoritarian, 
paternalistic, 
democratic)? 
Authoritarian or 
paternalistic patrón 
(depending on 
patrón) – rigid or 
friendly control, 
but top-down 
Paternalistic 
State – help the 
poor farmers 
with land and 
credit 
Paternalistic State 
and técnico – help 
for the poor 
farmers with 
technologies. 
Paternalistic 
politicians – help 
the poor farmers; 
pacify with gifts, 
especially during 
election years 
How does authority 
view farmers? 
Peasants – passive 
agents that need 
supervision and 
control 
Generally 
irresponsible 
peasant farmers 
– need State’s 
care and 
supervision 
Generally 
irresponsible 
farmers or 
producers – need 
State’s care and 
technologies 
Generally 
irresponsible 
producers – need 
State’s care; need 
help to be 
competitive or to 
be given things 
What is the primary 
role of farmers in 
society? 
Follow orders and 
work 
Work – civilize 
land and plant 
crops to pay 
back State 
Produce and 
consume – buy 
products and 
produce so that 
you can pay for 
them 
Go into debt and 
consume – buy 
increasingly 
expensive 
products and try 
to survive 
How do farmers 
perceive authority 
(fear, gratitude, trust, 
or distrust)? 
Fear or gratitude – 
patrón is all 
powerful and 
deserves respect 
Gratitude –State 
is concerned 
about us and 
knows what is 
better for us 
Gratitude –State 
and its técnicos are 
concerned about 
us and know what 
is better for us 
Distrust –State is 
corrupt and 
exploits us; rich 
control markets 
From where does 
knowledge and 
technologies come? 
Patrón State Técnicos Market or private 
companies 
What do farmers need 
to know to be 
successful? 
• How to obey 
patrón 
• How to work 
hard 
• Obedience 
• Rules 
• How to obey 
State 
• How to work 
hard 
• Obedience 
• Rules 
• How to exploit 
services of State 
and NGOs 
• How to manage 
pesticides and 
fertilizers 
• How to produce 
• How to win 
lottery 
• How to exploit 
municipality and 
private industry 
• Integrated Crop 
Management 
• How to compete 
in unstable, lower 
value markets 
• Friends in the 
city who can 
employ children 
How does knowledge 
flow? 
From patrón to 
administrator to 
peasants 
From the State 
to farmers 
From técnicos to 
farmers; among 
farmers 
themselves 
From market and 
industry to 
farmers 
What is the principal 
livelihood strategy? 
Win confidence of 
patrón 
Make land 
produce; pay off 
debts 
Adopt 
technologies and 
win lottery 
Avoid debt; 
educate kids; 
migrate 
When do people 
organize collectively? 
According to 
needs of patrón 
To obtain lands 
and receive loans 
In mingas, to build 
and maintain 
infrastructure 
To protest; “We 
no longer 
organize.” 
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did not care because we were still living under the conquista." Another woman added, "The 
[hacienda] period was the epoch of slavery. The workers were the slaves of the owners and 
administrators." A man added, “We suffered a lot. My childhood was very sad. All we did 
was work for the patrón, and then later, we worked to pay off our land, harvesting charcoal 
and selling firewood.” 
 
In Cuba and La Libertad (villages that obtained land through relatively violent processes of 
social organisation and confrontation), we also found mixed emotions about the hacienda 
period. In each community, people made similar points: “The patrón provided work, a 
house, food in some cases, and education for your children through fourth grade.” “In 
those days we believed in God. We were endiosados [or blessed by God].” “There was forest 
and water, and the land gave us everything we needed.” “As youth we had our strength; be 
it good or bad, at least we were strong.” After hearing these comments, the elderly stepped 
up to remind the group of certain harsh realities of that period. “The youth of today has 
never known hunger.” “I was beaten and placed in jail because I was too sick to work one 
day. We watched compañeros die under the whip.” “We were slaves to the patrón and the 
mayordomo. The peones enjoyed a degree of security, but the jornaleros lived day-to-day.” “All 
we ever dreamed about was having our own little bit of land.” “All we wanted was a place 
for our children to live and work without having to pay rent.” 
 
In summary, communities remembered the hacienda period diversely. The opinions of 
those who lived through it were shaped by relationships with the patrón. There was a 
general impression that the natural environment – the forest, water, and land – was more 
intact and abundant. Compared to modern time, during the hacienda period people were 
more religious and respectful of authority. Nevertheless, the elderly reminded us that it was 
a period of social domination where wealth and prosperity lay in the hands of the few and 
the majority – the workers – lived as servants. Their role was to conform to the situation 
and accept the authority and will of the patrón, to follow orders and work. This produced 
fear in some and gratitude in others. As society was organised, the well-being and destiny 
of the rural peasant was placed in the hands of another. Nevertheless, through hard work 
and obedience, a peasant could win over the confidence of his or her patrón and be 
guaranteed a roof, food, and security. 
 
Land distribution: “free at last” 
 
The experience of obtaining land was less controversial than the hacienda period. The 
communities of Mariscal and Piartal acquired land through “colonisation,” which involved 
collective organisation and peaceful purchase from the haciendas. Cuba and Libertad 
obtained land by forced take-over, followed by government intervention and adjudication 
under the agrarian reform law. In all cases, peasant farmers found “land distribution” a 
period of unprecedented achievement and hope. 
 
In Mariscal a farmer proudly said, “We were united poor. The mingas [i.e., collective work 
parties] were a preponderant factor rooted in the mind and the heart of the Huaqueño. Los 
Huaqueños were the winners of the mingas of the road between Ibarra and Tulcán. They 
worked night and day, and their women worked just as hard.” The people of Mariscal and 
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Piartal made multiple references to the construction of the Pan-American Highway as a 
moment of inspiration (Box 4.2). 
 
Don Clodomiro Aguilar [the leader of the colonisation in Mariscal] said, the voice of God 
could not contradict him. He meant that colonisation was the only alternative for escaping 
our situation. We learned that we were good farmers – we were capable of earning money 
and employing people.” “Between the 50s and 70s we were minqueros de excelencia.” Farmers 
emphasized that they were groundbreakers; they did not receive government assistance or 
credit. In Mariscal, if we wanted something, we organised and worked for it. The people of 
Mariscal had achieved land and prosperity through “initiative, sweat, and tears,” decades 
before land reform. 
 
The people of Piartal told the research team, “We paid for the land with pure force of 
work. We wove panchos in workshops, cloths of wool, fine straw hats. The work in the 
mountains to obtain charcoal was extremely hard.” Another person added, “Before we did 
everything in groups. We brought together money through the force of work, for example, 
when we obtained land or built the roads. This produced value in a person’s word, honour, 
and solidarity. In those days, these values were very strong.” 
 
Not all people, however, were immediately ready to “liberate” themselves from the 
hacienda. One farmer from Cuba remembered fearing the event of separation from his 
patrón: “The illusion emerged from the mind of the very patrón – that we would be better 
off on our own, abandoned by the patrón. He proposed that we should create a pre-
cooperative so that we could own one of his mountains. Many of us were not so sure. I did 
not sleep at night.” As a result of such concern, Cuba’s first attempt of establishing a 
cooperative in the mid-1950s failed. 
 
Similar to their colleagues from Mariscal and Piartal, many farmers of Cuba and La 
Libertad dreamed of “owning land where we could plant, liberate ourselves, and not work 
until we became ill.” Nevertheless, the colonists from Mariscal and Piartal sometimes 
looked down upon communities that ended up receiving land through agrarian reform: 
“The people from Huaca said [of the people from Cuba], the communists have arrived 
there; only communist take land by force. But, we did not feel like communists.” “We were 
honest, hard-working people. We valued hard work and the great effort it took to meet 
debt payments; it was a great value to work organised [in groups].” In Cuba the great 
“illusion” or aspiration was to work together. “Everyone planted in union. We worked 
[together] three days each week. Everything we had, we planted. The credit was collective. 
We all would make it ahead, or we would all sink together.” In all four communities, the 
cooperatives paid off their debts on time.  
 
In summary, for the smallholder farmers of Carchi the period of land distribution brought 
a fundamental change to their lives, and it symbolised an era of great hope. For the first 
time, peasant farmers felt as though they had become a part of broader society – a feat 
beyond the dreams of their parents and grandparents. The State existed, and it supported 
them in the form of the Agrarian Reform Law, IERAC, Banco de Fomento, and MAG. The 
legal system defended their interests. At the time, they felt truly liberated, in the sense that  
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Box 4.2 Construction of the Pan-American Highway in Carchi (Carlos Raza-Salcedo, nd, as 
summarized in M. Landázuri, 2003 and C. Landázuri, 2003) 
 
Through the end of the 1920s the Province of Carchi was isolated from the rest of 
Ecuador. A trip between San Gabriel and Quito took about five days by horseback and 
other precarious means of travel. As a result, the people of Carchi had greater business and 
social interactions with the nearby city of Ipiales, Colombia than with the rest of Ecuador.  
Following a workers protest in 1925 that became known as the “Revolución Juliana,” the 
government decided to build a road between the city of Ibarra and the Rumichaca River on 
the Colombian border. It studied three routes across the highlands of Carchi and chose the 
shortest western flank of the Andes, which would pass through Chota, El Angel, and the 
unpopulated páramo to Las Juntas and finally to the border city of Tulcán. While this 
western route represented the seemingly most economical option, the communities along 
the eastern alternative – Bolivar, La Paz, Sand Gabriel, Cristóbal Colón, Dacha, and Julio 
Andrade – decided to change the calculus.  
 
While the government continued with the western highway, the people of Montúfar had 
decided to build an eastern highway on their own. Led by Manuel J. Bastidas, an eccentric 
farmer-researcher famous for his improvement of potato varieties and cattle, the able 
people of the villages of Montúfar united and on 25 September 1927 brought their picks 
and shovels with them to the main square of San Gabriel. Creating the “Pro-western 
highway Committee,” they took charge of tracing the route of the road, which included 
negotiations with the landowners, provision of tools, and obtaining horses for transporting 
rocks and logs. Additionally, they had to organize food, housing, and other logistical 
support for what would quickly become thousands. The first three-day minga took place 
between 25-27 September and involved 6,250 men, plus hundreds of women and children 
who prepared food, transported water, and provided other logistical support. By the 
afternoon of 27 September, a stretch of highway running North across the inter-Andean 
Valley and measuring some forty kilometres was opened. That same afternoon the first 
automobile arrived to San Gabriel from the city of Pasto, Colombia. This early success 
inspired them to look South. 
 
The highway to Ibarra posed greater challenges due to the difficult rocky and mountainous 
terrain. On 25-27 September 1930, a work party of some 15,000 volunteers, now from 
both Carchi and Imbabura, arrived to the banks of the Chota River, across from the town 
of Juncal, Imbabura. Over three years, the people of Northern Ecuador had opened over 
100 kilometres of road. Impressed by the enormity of this effort, the government ceded 
and financed the construction of the bridges as well as the repair of certain problematic 
sections that would take through October 1936 to finalize. In honour of this effort, in 
1934, the Ecuadorian Congress awarded the industrious people of Montúfar, for the first 
and only time in the country’s history, the “National Distinction of work.” Today, in the 
plaza where the decision was made to build what has become the northern stretch of the 
Pan-American Highway, stands a statue of a nude man with a pick and shovel – the 
anonymous worker and hero of Carchi. 
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they had greater control over their destinies. Their role was to “civilize the land” and make 
it productive so that the cities could eat. They also needed to make money so that they 
could pay back their loans and demonstrate that they were responsible people, which they 
did. In all four cases, the farmers felt that they had benefited from the acquisition of land, 
and they were eager to become modern, which involved producing for the market and 
adopting new technologies. 
 
Technification and market-oriented production: “era of the risk-taker” 
 
I have the vice of planting. Over the years, it has taken everything. We began with 
nothing, but later we made it to just a few steps short of indigence. I don't know if 
you have a vice, but I have only one... I am not a drug addict, I don't smoke, but 
yes, I have one major vice: I like to plant. – Patricio, a “high risk-taker” from San 
Gabriel 
 
Alfonso, from Cuba, told the research team that during the days of land distribution, “We 
believed that the land could produce on its own. All it needed was work and intelligence.” 
With the arrival of técnicos and modern technologies, they were taught that these resources 
were not enough. In Cuba and La Libertad the government-supported land credit was 
conditioned with “technification.” Barsky (1981) explains that technification was part of a 
government-led policy of “agricultural modernisation” in Ecuador built on a model of 
“technology generation and transfer.” The model involved MAG- and INIAP-supported 
“technical assistance” for specialised market-oriented production and the adoption of new 
varieties and agro-chemicals. The research team learned that during agrarian reform the 
different cooperatives in Carchi gained access to tractors, certified seed, fertilizers, and 
pesticides. Victor from Cuba explained, “A group of gringos from 4-H and ingenieros from 
MAG came to tell us how to plant like modern farmers, but we learned almost everything 
we know from other compañeros.” A colleague added, “Later, in 1977, there were more 
courses, but they were only for the Catholics.” Regardless, once they gained access to the 
new technologies, most of the learning came through empirical experience and informal 
farmer-to-farmer communication. 
 
In order to pay off land and product debts, the new farmers had to earn currency, which 
meant entering the markets. Similar to their predecessors in Mariscal and Piartal, the 
cooperative in Cuba decided to "convert the forest to cash" as a means of paying off the 
better part of its land debt. They organised collective work parties to cut down remaining 
outcroppings and reduce the wood to carbón that was sold in San Gabriel and Tulcán. 
Additionally, they pooled resources and planted in communal plots. "The people were very 
united and got together to work, play sports, talk or rotate guard duty. Mingas were very 
common, often every week, and people were willing to help with anything." In Cuba, 
Victor told the research team, “We worked [in groups] three days a week until we planted 
everything we had. We selected Juan Cuespud as our Administrator. He managed the 
money and negotiated with the buyers who came to the fields at harvest time to get drunk 
and pick up their quintales. In those days, no one risked taking out credit on his own.” 
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At all four locations the cooperatives paid off their debts on time. In La Libertad, the 
research team was told, “We, as rural people, like to be honourable. They [the government] 
did not forgive our debt. Instead, they came to complain. They said to us, ‘You have to pay 
your debt. If you don’t, its robbery.’” Later, individual members, especially the 
“opportunists” (those who were not farmers but arrived from outside to take part in land 
acquisition), decided that they wanted control over their own parcel of land. Sometimes 
members wanted to sell out and move to the city, but mostly they wanted access to credit 
for technology, and the banks demanded land titles as collateral. After paying off the land, 
the cooperatives in each village eventually divided up the land among members by lottery. 
 
While members were open to giving people land titles and allowing some to sell their plots, 
they did not necessarily want the cooperatives to disband. A man from Cuba said, “Our 
great error for the end of the organization was when the people began to sell. They did not 
respect the land as belonging to the community. They sold as if the land was theirs.” 
Humberto from La Libertad said, “We all paid our debts at the first opportunity. Later, 
each member [of the cooperative] started to take out credit for himself. This is what 
destroyed the 23 [the Cooperativa 23 de julio].” 
  
Barsky (1984) describes that immediately following land acquisition, rural Carchi 
experienced the spontaneous spread of industrial era technologies and market integration. 
As a result of new revenues from the oil boom, the Ecuadorian government invested in the 
transportation and communication infrastructure of the province, which further fuelled this 
development. Contrary to popular view of farmers as conservative actors resistant to 
change, the people of Carchi demonstrated remarkable adaptive capacity. They generally 
accepted everything that the técnicos and government asked of them. Barsky estimated that 
within five years 70 percent of villages had reorganised around the market. Within a 
decade, essentially the entire rural population of rural Carchi shifted to intensive potato 
production built on externally sourced knowledge, technology, and debt. 
 
Paredes’ research (2001 and in process) found that by the mid-1980s the most respected 
and admired farmers in Carchi became the ones who “bet it all.” These were cavalier 
individuals who planted in large scale and over-extended themselves with external 
technology and credit to the point of great financial risk. Patricio from San Gabriel was an 
example: "I don't plant small areas, I plant big areas – six hectares in one shot. I want to 
feel alive. If I do well, then I will feel reborn. If I fail, I also want to feel that. There's 
nothing like failing for making you feel alive." These were the “true” potato farmers – the 
people who determined local meanings of “good farming” and pioneered technological 
development. The era of technification produced a transformation of potato production as 
well as new farming style of great prestige: the “high risk-takers.”  
 
Dollarisation: “period of crisis” 
 
When I first heard people in Carchi speak of “dollarisation,” I understood it in purely 
economic terms. "Our money [the Sucre] of before was better. Today, a dollar is not worth 
anything; it does not buy a thing. The country has become poorer with dollarisation." 
Dollarisation of the Ecuadorian Sucre was tied to the banking crisis (Beckerman, 2002). 
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Nineteen of 25 national banks had been closed in 1999, causing people to lose confidence 
in financial institutions. A woman from Piartal highlighted a common sentiment: "Our 
cows have become our bank; our cuy [guinea pigs] and chickens our money boxes."32 
Converting from the Sucre to the dollar was difficult. What one day valued S25,000, the 
next day valued just $1. Beyond the problems of rounding off currency fractions, prices in 
dollars started to climb. Between 1999 and 2003, inflation for many items that rural people 
purchased was about 250 percent. Poverty in the country climbed by over 20 percent, with 
the great majority of that occurring in rural areas. The banking crisis combined with 
dollarisation of the Sucre caused 3.5 million people, most from rural areas, to abandon 
their families and communities and migrate to foreign lands. By any standards, it was a 
difficult period.  
 
The economic crisis certainly was part of dollarisation, but people explained that the crises 
went deeper. Thirty years of intensification introduced new social and environmental 
problems. The research team heard many stories about fragmentation between people and 
the land as well as among people themselves. Victor, from Cuba, explained, “Today, there 
is no way to organise ourselves, since no one has time. Each person looks after his own 
interests. Now, it’s the market that gives us orders. A farmer in Piartal confided that as a 
result of dollarisation, “Our land and our agriculture escaped from our hands.” Land 
distribution and market integration brought success beyond dreams, but it also brought a 
quick end to an early project of collectivisation. 
 
A mother in Mariscal told the research team, “The dollarisation has meant the degeneration 
of our youth.” According to a couple in Cuba, “All our children want is a cell phone and a 
one-way bus ticket to the city. All we want for our children is that they leave, so they don’t 
have to suffer as we have.” I responded, “But parents always have complained about the 
crazy ways of youth. I know I made my parents suffer.” The mother corrected me with a 
lengthy argument about how things were different now. Life had “accelerated,” she said, 
kids grew up rapidly and were vulnerable to distant influences. They used foreign words, 
dressed in weird clothing, and listened to strange music. Youth no longer wanted to work 
in the fields. Some children, she confided, had become so frustrated with life that they 
went off to join the guerrilla groups in Colombia – a delicate topic that everyone knew but 
that was rarely brought up in conversations, especially with a gringo in the room. “Forget 
about them going to church,” she said. The best thing that a parent could hope for, she 
repeated, was that their children someday would go off to study in the city and never look 
back. 
 
Additionally, many farmers described a “loss of control” over agriculture. Farming was 
always a risky enterprise, but now it had become more so. In the fields, crises were no 
longer seasonal but weekly, if not daily. Now pest outbreaks seemed to come from all sides 
– from the sky, neighbours’ fields, the seeds, and the soil. Pesticides continued to offer 
relief, but they also began to realise the new problems associated with pesticides, such as 
continual dizziness, headaches, and nausea, as well as the fear that they were not going to 
be able to meet debt payments, which would place into question their honour as campesinos. 
While prices were always a problem, fluctuations had accelerated. Peaks inspired families to 
                                                       
32 Quoted in Mera-Orcés, 2000: 15. 
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plant more, and nadirs carried them further into debt. Even the weather seemed more 
severe. Droughts arrived in the middle of the growing season, and when rainfall came, it 
was violent and accompanied by floods and hailstorms that destroyed crops. Look across 
the hillsides, Alfonso told me, and you won’t see any potatoes planted. That was not 
because they did not want to work, he explained, it was because they did not have the 
money to plant. Alfonso said, “We are living off the cows, but the pasture cannot pay our 
bills.” The success stories of the past had been supplanted by stories of failure. 
Increasingly, farmers were selling off their land. Once proud farmers had become landless 
jornaleros. Others had moved to the city. 
 
Some farmers blamed themselves for their situation: “We are brutos. They gave us the land, 
and we destroyed it. Now, we are all going to have to migrate to the cities.” Others 
expressed resentment towards different forms of authority. With the banking crisis and 
dollarisation of the Sucre, many no longer felt that the State represented their interests. In 
November 2003, thousands of farmers descended on the Pan-American Highway in 
protest over everything – from the economic situation, the cost of inputs, market prices, to 
the government support of the Free-Trade Agreement.33 According to the Sub-secretary of 
MAG who was assigned the task of ending the strike, “They seemed to be angry about 
everything.”34 Such sentiment had grown common throughout rural Ecuador and was 
reflected in a landslide victory for the Correa candidacy in 2006 with the mandate to hold a 
constitutional assembly and put an end to the political oligarchy. Additionally, previous 
blind acceptance of the técnicos and their technologies began to become questioned. For 
example, a farmer from San Gabriel said, “First the ingenieros told us to use agrochemicals. 
Now they are telling us not to use them. Whom are we supposed to believe?” When I 
arrived in Piartal during my final visit in 2006, the President of the Farmer Field School 
told me that the previous night they had ordered a pesticide salesman to leave town. He 
said the farmers had grown tired of being taken advantage of by the industry. As far as I 
know, that had never happened in Carchi.  
 
Discussion 
 
The agricultural treadmill of Carchi 
 
Carchi produced a unique expression of Cochrane’s (1958) agricultural treadmill. As we 
saw in the four communities, following agrarian reform and land acquisition, a large 
number of smallholder farmers rapidly converted to market-oriented production of a single 
crop: potato. As a result of this structure, they became “price takers,” so getting ahead 
depended on stepping on a treadmill of continual technological innovation. Early on, 
essentially all farmers took on debt to finance access to externally based technologies, such 
as potato seed, mechanised tillage, and agrochemicals. At first, groups of farmers produced 
collectively. Nevertheless, in all four cases people quickly chose to divide up property so 
that individuals could own land and thereby obtain access to loans and have greater control 
over their production systems. This development was accompanied by the growth of an 
                                                       
33 This event is further described in Chapter 7. 
34 Personal communication with Fausto Merino, Sub-secretary for the Highlands and Amazon, Ministry of 
Agriculture, January 2002. 
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agriculture support industry made up of government research and extension agents from 
MAG and INIAP, agrochemical vendors from private national and international 
companies, and lending institutions, particularly the public Banco de Fomento, which together 
became an indispensable part of Carchense agriculture. Within a decade of agrarian reform, a 
large number of smallholder farmers in Carchi adopted modern agriculture technologies 
and integrated with commercial markets, leading to substantial increases in production by 
area and worker productivity (Barsky, 1984 and Figure 4.8). By the end of the 1970s, Carchi 
became Ecuador’s largest producer of potatoes, and farmers there began to accumulate 
wealth. 
 
As found in the four communities studied in this Chapter, a decade later this prosperity 
began to take a turn. In contrast to Cochrane’s explanation of the agricultural treadmill, 
however, this did not necessarily occur due to a saturation of the market and a decline in 
prices or because certain farmers could not keep up with the innovation of others. The 
combined effects of a highly variable mountain environment and climate, pest outbreaks, 
and lack of storability of potatoes in Carchi made supply highly unpredictable, leading to 
unstable prices (Figure 4.13). Additionally, environmental and ecological disturbances 
associated with modern agriculture led to new pest problems and soil degradation, making 
external inputs in the forms of pesticides and fertilizers indispensable. Meanwhile, in the 
1990s, international pressure would cause the government to withdraw public support for 
research and extension as well as credit, leaving agricultural support in the hands of private 
industry. 
 
It is possible that increases in production costs would have been offset by higher potato 
prices, if it were not for the porous borders with Colombia and Peru. Following economic 
instability during the 1990s and dollarisation in 2000, input costs rose dramatically (by 
about 300 percent), leading to sharp increases in the cost of production for Ecuadorian 
farmers (Figure 4.10). Meanwhile dollarisation created a comparative advantage for farmers 
in Colombia and Peru, which led to the importation of potatoes, thereby filling the void of 
supply in Ecuador and counteracting potential price increases for Carchense farmers (An, 
2004). 
 
In contrast to Cochrane’s (1958) agricultural treadmill, Carchense agriculture did not 
experience scale enlargement in potato production. While farmers continued to rely on the 
potato-pasture system for livelihoods, the concentration of potato cultivation per farm 
family decreased from a high of about 7,000 families planting 15,000 ha per year (2.14 ha of 
potato/family) in the early 1990s to about 4,200 families planting about 6,200 ha per year 
(1.47 ha of potato/family) in 2000 and 2004 (MAG and INEC data). According to Herrera 
et al. (1999) and the most recent MAG and INEC data from 2004, the land tenure 
structure of potato production in Carchi had not changed significantly following land 
distribution. Roughly 65 percent of Carchi potato production remained in the hands of 
smallholders (owning less than 10 ha), 20 percent in medium size producers (10 to 20 ha), 
five percent in large producers (greater than 20 ha), and ten percent in landless farmers, 
who commonly obtained access to land through rental arrangements and sharecropping.  
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According to Paredes (in process), essentially all farmers from the four communities we 
studied who had abandoned agriculture and migrated to urban centres or other countries 
avoided selling their land. Instead, emigrants loaned or handed over land to family 
members, who converted it to pasture for dairy and cattle production or rented it to others. 
The modality of land rental may have contributed to some scale enlargement in terms of 
potato production per individual producer. Nevertheless, this growth in scale usually was 
not achieved through land ownership, but rather through share cropping with 
moneylenders who owned local businesses or who received remittances from family 
members living abroad. 
 
In summary, price declines did not drive the “rat race” of the agricultural treadmill in 
Carchi. Instead, it was driven by price variability associated with the inherent difficulty of 
farming in the highland Andes, all of which was aggravated by what Röling and Jiggins 
(1998) describe as the “second-generation” problems associated with modern agriculture – 
i.e., the externalisation of human health and the environmental costs of external input, 
market-oriented production. As summarised in Chapter 2 and described by farmers of the 
four communities presented in this Chapter, modern potato production in Carchi 
generated serious human health problems due to pesticide exposure as well as 
environmental problems in the forms of chronic pest outbreaks and soil fertility decline. In 
addition to the externalisation of costs, the aforementioned inflation of input costs 
associated with dollarisation worked against Carchense potato producers, causing many to go 
into debt and, most recently, to abandon agriculture. Further, when potato production 
became more expensive in Ecuador, imports from Colombia and Peru filled voids in 
supply and tended to keep down prices. According to this analysis, over time an interactive 
combination of economic, social, and environmental factors made modern potato farming 
in Carchi unsustainable. 
 
Rural transformation 
 
Drawing on ecological, economic, and to a lesser extent, social perspective, “resilience” 
theory attempts to explain the spontaneous and unpredictable dynamic cycles of social 
organization and collapse apparent in interactive human-natural systems (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002). Holling (2000) proposed the “lazy eight” as a stylized representation of 
ecosystem renewal (Figure 4.15). The cycle is based on two central elements of 
spontaneous adaptation: (1) the potential that is inherent in the accumulated “capital” of 
natural resources or social organisation (Y-axis), and 2) the degree of “connectedness” 
between variables (X-axis). Low connectedness is associated with loosely connected, 
diffuse elements and high outward relations and influence by outside variability. High 
connectedness is associated with tightly aggregated elements and inward relations and 
limited outside influence and externally driven variability. The interactions of the X- and Y-
axes produce four phases: 
1. Conservation (K) – slow change; resources structurally “locked up” 
2. Release (!) – rapid change; previously locked up resources released 
3. Reorganization and renewal (!) –  system boundaries tenuous; restructuring 
around emergent opportunities 
4. Growth and exploitation (r) – resources made available 
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The exit from the cycle at the left of the figure describes how certain potentials may escape 
the system to catalyze new adaptive cycles. 
 
 
Figure 4.15 The “lazy eight” adaptive cycle (Holling, 2000) 
 
Holing (2000) utilises this model to describe the alternating fluctuations between longer 
periods of aggregation and transformation of resources and shorter periods of 
"opportunities" for exploitation and reorganisation as fundamental dimensions of complex 
systems – from cells to ecosystems to societies. Other authors have applied this cycle to 
describe diverse phenomenon, including organisational development (Hurst, 1995), 
Integrated Pest Management (Röling, 2005), natural resource management (Maarleveld and 
Dangbégnon, 2002), and water management (Jiggins et al., 2007). 
 
Holling (2000) describes transformation in socio-biological systems as the release of 
accumulated tendencies. Change is dependent on three interacting processes: myopia, 
pathology, and reflex. Myopia involves, for example, a conceptual limit of institutions that 
may lead to a fragmentation or structural distancing with a locality. In Carchi, for example, 
modern institutions of agriculture came to preoccupy themselves with the forces of distant 
markets, which eventually drove farmers to substantially change crops and varieties, 
planting schemes and rotations that survived in the wasipungos. This represented a structural 
break with long-established forms of organization, which could be described as a 
“loosening” of the coupling between local culture and the environment. As observed in 
this chapter, the products of this uncoupling included diverse forms of environmental 
pathologies expressed in the fields of farmers. As they organised around private interests, 
the activity of institutions, such as the hacienda and later the scientific and agrochemical 
industries, deepened tendencies. This chapter shows how a certain “entrenchment” around 
modes of technology such as mechanised tillage and agrochemicals has led to dysfunctional 
environmental interactions. Associated pathologies produced socio-biological feedback. 
Emergent reflexes contained elements of past legacies, such as an existing social hierarchy, 
as well as innovations, such as land redistribution and the introduction of new market 
arrangements and technologies. Reflexes led to reordering of social forms and interactions 
with the environment, such as those associated with the transition of the hacienda system 
to post agrarian reform society. 
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Drawing on the historical information presented in Chapter 3 and the socio-biological 
developments around modern agriculture presented in this chapter, Table 4.6 is an attempt 
to summarise the global processes of rural transformation in Carchi. The central qualities 
of socio-biological change during the Cuasmal period appeared to be characterised by 
episodic change, meaning periods of slow accumulation of natural or social energies 
punctuated by sudden releases and reorganizations of earlier legacies. Beginning with the 
Incan and Spanish arrivals, periods in Carchi were marked by historical contingencies with 
relatively slow aggregating socio-biological variables and faster disaggregating tendencies. 
Periods of consolidation and the emergence of new organization and stability followed. In 
modern time, the pathology of ecosystem decline has reached epidemic proportions. 
Similar to Giddens’ (1990) explanations of “reflexive modernisation,” drivers of transition 
led to transformations of epoch, marked by seemingly isolated and interactive socio-
biological reorganizations.  
 
Table 4.6 Global processes of rural transformation in Carchi 
 
Period Socio-cultural 
novelties 
Biophysical 
novelties 
Slow, 
aggregating 
variables 
Fast, dis-
aggregating 
variables 
Drivers of 
transition 
Cuasmal 
 
• Closed socio-
technical systems 
• Vertical 
organization of 
agriculture 
• Stable 
ecologies 
• Highly moist 
to wet 
conditions 
• Inhospitable 
environment 
• Internal 
cultural 
dynamics 
• Caste 
system 
• Climate 
• Opening of 
economies 
• Incan arrival 
• Spanish 
arrival 
• Social 
upheaval and 
war 
Hacienda 
 
• Exposure of 
economies  
• Horizontal 
organization of 
agriculture 
• Encomienda 
(indentured 
servitude) 
• Deforestation 
• Introduction 
of species  
• Extensive 
agriculture 
• Heightening 
social 
domination 
and control 
• Ecological 
limits 
• Climate 
• Expanding 
external markets 
• Introduction of 
species 
• Urban growth 
• Social 
disparities and 
conflict 
• Urbanization 
• Market 
growth 
• Technology 
developments 
• Population 
growth 
Land reform 
and 
technification 
 
• Open 
economies 
• Resource re-
distribution  
• Land 
privatisation 
• Market 
integration 
• Potato-pasture 
monoculture 
• Continuous 
cropping 
• Social re-
distributions 
• Rise of 
external 
inputs and 
technologies 
• Financial 
dependencies 
• Unequal 
financial rewards 
• Initial crop 
failures 
• Price variability 
• Industrial 
development 
• Market 
growth 
• Globalised 
markets 
Dollarisation 
and trade 
liberalization 
 
• Highly open 
economies 
systems 
• Deepening of 
market 
integration 
• Political 
instability 
• Declining 
potato 
cultivation 
• Increasing 
pasture 
• Testing 
alternative crops 
(broccoli, 
flowers) 
• Technology 
dependencies 
• Financial 
dependencies 
• Market 
domination 
• Pest and 
disease outbreaks 
• Declining soil 
fertility 
• Price variability 
• Emigration 
• Conflict 
• External-
oriented 
markets 
• Ecosystem 
collapse 
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A global tendency of modernity in Carchi, beginning with the Incan and Spanish arrivals 
and deepening since, has been both a simultaneous and interactive ecological and social 
disconnection, what I refer to as a systematic “disembedding” from localities. The research 
presented in this thesis suggests that through the undermining the fundamental 
mechanisms of ecosystems and social relations, it may represent a systematic breakdown of 
the earlier described adaptive mechanisms. The result is not just a reflex in a cycle, but a 
destruction of the cycle’s integrity. The novelty is that this event is the result of human-
dependent activity. If this were true, the expected product would not be resurgence, as 
described by Holling, but rather an endless rise of uncertainty. 
 
Historically, after two or three cropping seasons, land became biologically and chemically 
fatigued, which led farmers to leave fields to fallow for “rest” or recuperation. 
Nevertheless, in the 1990s farmers began to find that fields did not recover as previously. 
They generally began to experience falls in productive capacity of land and insect pest and 
disease epidemics became increasingly common. The land had lost its recuperative capacity 
despite continual and usually increasing use of agrochemicals. As a farmer from San Pedro 
explained, "In my father's time, they produced 30 or 40 [potatoes harvested] to one [potato 
planted]. And they did not use chemicals. Now, we cannot even expect ten to one."  
 
During each episode in Carchi, stability led to accumulated potential and resources and 
environmental capital. Simultaneously, this signified accumulated vulnerabilities. Over time, 
social systems became less resilient and more sensitive to some internal or external catalytic 
event. For the Andean weevil, it was monoculture and the accumulation of potato leaves as 
an energy source that fuelled proliferation. Foci of late blight epidemics on potato led to 
spore showers over entire regions and increased prevalence of the pathogen. The shift 
towards continual cropping led to strategic depletion of soil nutrients associated with the 
continual growth of a single crop and variety, which in turn led to “weaker” plants, 
increasingly vulnerable to insect pests and diseases.35 After reaching a maximum potential 
in the early 1980s, the system of monoculture increasingly appeared to become a 
manifestation of what Beck (2001: 269) called, “… an accident waiting to happen.” 
 
Holling (1973) explains that historically, human-nature interactions appeared to be “tightly 
wrapped”. In the Andes, endless novelties were tied in with this robustness, such as diverse 
soil biota capable of regulating unstable conditions. For example, entomopathogens that 
evolved on the Andean weevil increased in populations with the pest until they too fell 
vulnerable to change. Further mycorrhizae could enable plants to compensate for nutrient 
imbalances until other soil distortions became so severe that they too fell off, demanding 
increased fertilizer applications to sustain crop yields. Additionally, potato varieties 
included chemical or morphological means to warding off P. infestans until the pathogen 
mutated and overcame them, demanding a change of variety or more commonly increased 
fungicide use. In the end, a perceived acceleration of change coupled with practices, such 
as pesticides and mechanised tillage, that indirectly killed off recuperative biological 
mechanisms appeared to have outpaced environmental means of adjustment. From a 
human perspective, this brought about system failure and collapse. In reference to 
                                                       
35 Chauboussou (2004) explains the biochemistry involved plant health decline as a result of modern 
agriculture. 
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academia’s preoccupation with market-oriented, external input agriculture, Röling (2006) 
summarised this phenomenon as the product of the “death sciences” – i.e., an emphasis on 
the abiotic factors of production (e.g., nutrients), rather than the biological conditions that 
sustain life and ecological processes in agriculture. 
 
Thinking about multinational corporations and industry, the economist Schumpeter (1987) 
described the phenomenon of "creative destruction" – destruction in the sense that it 
triggered system collapse, but also creative in the sense that it released energy that fuelled 
new organization and social forms. From a human ecology point of view, the Cuasmal 
civilization fell victim to the arrival of the Incan Empire, which in turn, fell victim to the 
Spanish Conquest. Each time, societies settled into new structures that, over time, were 
marked by accumulation of potentials and vulnerabilities. Internal or external forces led to 
collapse and change. In modern time, the novelty was a perception of accelerated rate of 
change, technologies of “death,” and effects at new scales. 
 
As presented in Chapter 3, traditional agriculture distributed risks across vertical ecologies. 
The hacienda system reorganized this arrangement during the 18th and 19th centuries 
around markets in distant cities or Europe. The horizontal redistribution of farming in the 
highland Andes eventually lead to the accumulation of cropping vulnerabilities to climate, 
pests and disease that, from a biological systems perspective, would demand new 
compensating mechanisms. This created the conditions for the introduction of agricultural 
technologies and the growth of a new industry in Carchi and elsewhere in Ecuador that 
decades later would become a powerful social force capable of shaping science and 
education policies as well as entire ministries, congresses, and administrations – i.e., 
government. I will further explore this occurrence in Chapter 7. 
 
The growth of urban-based populations in the 1950s and 1960s increased the demand for 
food production, which led to the need for increased agricultural productivity. The low 
productivity of extensive agriculture combined with the exploitative labour conditions of 
the haciendas led to an accumulation of potential and vulnerabilities and release as agrarian 
reform. An emerging industrial agri-technology power matrix quickly repackaged agrarian 
reform policies as “intensification” through credit and green revolution technologies, 
which in turn led to a commoditization of rural life and a tying of smallholder farmers to 
relatively external and distantly referenced markets.  
 
The growth of the agrochemical industry and its increasing influence in government during 
the 1970s and 1980s led to an end of the land distribution component of agrarian reform 
before the policy was fully meted. In its stead, the industry re-emphasized agriculture 
intensification through further “technology adoption” and “market integration” leading to 
the Ley de Fomento Agrícola in 1979. The subsequent Law of Modernisation of the Agrarian 
Sector in 1989 further entrenched these tendencies around notions of enabling smallholder 
producers to “compete in the global marketplace.” 
 
At the end of the 1990s, the collapse of Ecuador’s banking system led to the “dollarisation” 
monetary policy that generated triple digit inflation and sharp increases in the country’s 
poverty rates. In Carchi, agrochemicals prices and labour costs increased dramatically 
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without an increase in potato prices. These tendencies coupled with outbreaks of the 
Guatemalan tuber moth caused the area of potato production to drop from about 15,000 
to 8,000 hectares in 2004, with most farmers leaving systems in pasture fallow and living 
off of milk production. When we visited in 2005, the deepening financial crisis was causing 
farmers to slaughter cows to pay off debts, and several had abandoned farming and were 
working as labourers in remaining haciendas or the flower industry. 
 
In the early part of the twenty-first century, farmers began to describe the natural 
environment as “exhausted" and "inhospitable” for farming and the social environment as 
increasingly "fragmented" and "anti-social,” even "hostile.” Some felt that they were better 
off under the hacienda system, when at least someone, the patrón, cared about them. Many 
farmers did not want their children to continue in their footsteps. Previously, some had 
wanted their sons to become ingenieros, but due to a growing distrust in técnicos or experts, 
they had changed their minds, deciding it would be best for their children to become 
computer or information technicians or not to study at all and to go into business in the 
cities. Youth were migrating to the cities to study or in search of work. In other cases, 
youth had “disappeared,” which commonly meant that they had joined one of the 
revolutionary groups in Colombia. 
 
Farmers spoke in richly diverse ways of mistrust in earlier authority figures such as the 
técnicos and officials from the municipality. One night during a workshop a farmer got up to 
tell a joke: “How does an ingeniero change a light bulb? First he checks his books. When he 
does not find an answer, he calls a meeting in his office, where he asks a farmer to do it, 
that is, after charging him for the light bulb.” The ingenieros and politicians became the 
target of jokes. Two of the four villages in our study had chased away agrochemical 
salespeople. It was common for rural people to label public authority and government as 
"corrupt" and increasingly "out-of-touch with reality.” 
 
Perhaps more important than the farmers who were forced to abandon agriculture in 
recent time were the farmers who managed to carry on. In 2004, Paredes and I found that 
farmers from communities with relatively ample soil and water resources, such as Mariscal 
Sucre and Libertad, still managed to survive the Carchense agricultural treadmill in 
comparison with their counterparts from lesser endowed Piartal and Cuba (Table 4.5). 
Additionally, Paredes (in process) found significant differences across the farming styles of 
individual households. Farmers who relied heavily on external inputs (locally known as 
arriesgados or high-risk takers) failed disproportionately. In contrast, those who favoured 
local knowledge and technology, employed family labour, and nurtured broad social 
networks (the curiosos or inquisitive and pragmatic farmers) were more effective at avoiding 
the risks associated with modern potato. 
 
According to the resilience literature that is summarized in Gunderson et al. (1995) and 
Gunderson and Holling (2002), it is inevitable that the limits of a compensating mechanism 
will be reached. Nevertheless, modern co-developments have permitted the perpetuation of 
what scientists, farmers, government officials and industry representatives increasingly 
understand as forms of self-destructive behaviour. In ecological terms, the compensating 
mechanisms – i.e., agrochemicals – enabled increased potential to the point where one 
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could expect an increasingly violent release – in environmental terms, social ones, and 
perhaps both. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In reference to agricultural intensification as “the misguided utilisation of chemical 
pesticides and fertilisers,” the French plant physiologist, Francis Chaboussou, concluded 
that healthy plants resisted pests and disease and agrochemicals actually weakened crops by 
interfering with the chemical and ecological processes of resistance. He argued (2004: 209), 
“…we need to overcome the idea of ‘the battle’: that is, we must try to annihilate the 
parasite with toxins that have been shown to have harmful effects on the plant, yielding the 
opposite effect to that desired.” Instead, Chaboussou called for a “revolution in attitude,” 
followed by a complete change in the direction of research towards crop health. In other 
words, agriculture needed to learn to work with, rather than against, biology and ecological 
systems. Carchi is a case in point. 
 
Following agrarian reform, smallholder potato production based on mono-cropping and 
externally sourced technologies, especially mechanized tillage, synthetic fertilizers and 
pesticides, quickly transformed the Carchense landscape. As a result, short-term production, 
both by area and labour input, intensified dramatically. Production increased to three times 
the national average, and productivity in terms of return on investment and labour 
heightened. Nevertheless, this progress did not occur without cost. 
 
Market integration and technification were accompanied by potato monoculture, a decrease 
in planting distances, the introduction and increased use of agrichemicals, and a shortening 
of fallow periods. Over time, market forces led farmers to greatly reduce the potato 
biodiversity of their fields. A very fragile, chemically intensive monoculture of a single 
dominant variety, Superchola, came to predominate the landscape. Such changes had 
severe consequences on the ecology and, due to chronic exposure to the compensating 
intervention of agrochemicals, human health. Further, economies became affected. 
 
By the mid-1990s production by area and productivity levelled off and declined. 
Concurrently, real prices for inputs grew – chiefly as a result of dollarisation of the 
economy – and market prices for potato showed increasing rates of variability, with an 
overall tendency towards decline. Studies beginning in the early 1990s showed that farmers 
lost money on a majority of their plantings – from about 43 percent in 1991-1992 
(Crissman et al., 1998) to over 60 percent in 2004 (Paredes and Sherwood database, 2004). 
At the same time, farmers and their families suffered adverse health effects as a result of 
their continual exposure to chemicals (Cole et al., 1997a and b; Cole et al. 2002), which 
negatively influenced the economy of farm management (Antle et al., 1994; Antle et al., 
2003). While agricultural modernisation brought increased production and wealth in the 
short-term, ultimately it undermined the stability of agro-ecosystems and worked against 
the economic interests of rural families, leading to collapse. 
 
The longer-term social effects of modern agriculture were equally dramatic. Processes of 
transformation from the hacienda signified a break with the cruel exploitation of the 
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hacienda system, but they also led to new mechanisms of control. Over time, the 
independent Pasto indigenous groups of Carchi became the wasipungos who, in turn, became 
today’s rural poor, highly vulnerable to the environment and the market and in need of 
external assistance in the forms of technologies and technical assistance. Thirty-five years 
after market integration and technification, an increasing number of rural families found 
themselves in a crisis they called “dollarisation.” The fragile natural resource base and 
volatile compensation for commodities endangered earlier bimodal systems of production. 
This period was marked by growth of two sectors: the landless labourer and the urban 
migrant. A product of agriculture modernisation was a simultaneous and interactive 
ecological and social disembedding that, over the long term, ran in counter to the well-
being of farmers and their communities. Increasing rates of abandonment of agriculture 
and emigration suggested that modernisation placed into question the viability of rural life. 
 
 Chapter 5 
 
Cultural Encounters: Learning from Cross-disciplinary 
Science and Development Practice 
 
 Stephen Sherwood, Donald Cole, and Charles Crissman1  
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Overcoming ecosystem health challenges calls for breaking down disciplinary and 
professional barriers. Based on reflection of the EcoSalud project that used both research 
and development action to address pesticide-related concerns in Carchi, this chapter 
presents the conflicts and the accommodations made between the two dimensions with 
respect to such issues as staff recruitment, baseline assessments, community education, 
and advocacy. In so doing, it exposes underlying problems of paradigm and process 
inherent in bringing researchers and development practitioners together and the 
problematic role of advocacy associated with joint agriculture and health, research and 
development initiatives. 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout Latin America, as in other parts of the world, human activity is increasing the 
pressure on ecosystems, which in turn feed back onto livelihoods and well-being. As 
Ulrich Beck (1992) makes clear, the complex biological and social consequences of 
ecosystem decline spin off effects that cut across geographic, disciplinary and professional 
boundaries, rendering earlier designs of ecosystem analysis and management obsolete. 
Researchers and development practitioners are under pressure to answer this challenge 
with new ways of conceptualizing concerns and mobilizing effective change. 
 
In recent times, scientists, development agents, and the public increasingly have become 
aware of the multi-dimensional nature of ecosystem decline,2 and hence the need to co-
operate across scientific disciplines and professional and practitioner cultures. Research 
methods are expanding to simultaneously accommodate not only biophysical aspects of 
agriculture and health, but also the ecological and cultural systems from which practice 
emerges and operates, leading to an erosion of the boundaries between scientific 
disciplines as well as between science and rural development. Emergent approaches are 
steering rural development practice towards interactive designs that emphasize social 
“brokerage” among actors (for a comprehensive explanation, see Leeuwis, 2004). While it 
                                                       
1 A version of this chapter was originally published as: S. Sherwood, D. Cole, and C. Crissman. 2007. Cultural 
encounters: learning from cross-disciplinary science and development practice over ecosystem health. 
Development in Practice, 17(2): 179-195. 
2 See for example, van Haaften et al. (1998), which shows that psychological factors such as stress and 
alienation proved to be highly correlated with land degradation in African villages of the Sahel. 
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is commonly assumed that such brokerage needs be applied to mediate the differences 
between external projects and communities, we found the challenges of cross-disciplinary 
practice to be substantial. Differences clearly exist among academic disciplines – from 
health professionals, to agronomists, economists, and sociologists. Contrasts underlay the 
assumptions, perspectives, values, and practices of quantitative researchers and grassroots 
development practitioners.  
 
In this chapter, the authors – a rural development specialist, occupational/environmental 
health specialist, and agricultural economist – share their experience with a joint 
knowledge generation and development intervention for greater ecosystem health in 
Northern Ecuador. For each, established approaches to conducting work became 
uprooted, at times leading to questioning the usefulness of the collaboration. Eventually, 
common ground was found, or rather built, however imperfect. This paper examines the 
challenges encountered and the compromises made, as it highlights remaining issues for 
the design and practice of interactive cross-disciplinary research and development. 
 
Setting the scene: EcoSalud 
 
Pesticide dependency is one unexpected and undesired outcome of science and 
development policy, with health consequences globally (for examples, see: Dasgupta et al., 
2002; Eddleston et al., 2002). Since the early 1990s, a number of national and international 
organizations have been working with communities in Carchi, Ecuador’s northernmost 
province, to assess the role and effects of pesticide use in potato production and to reduce 
its adverse impacts.3  Carchi is nationally famous for potato production, growing 40 
percent of the country's potatoes on only 25 percent of the land dedicated to the crop. 
Although potato has been a staple crop in the Andes for millennia, industrial technologies, 
such as tractors and agrochemicals, and market integration have driven unprecedented 
agricultural intensification. Fertilizers and pesticides have enabled increased potato 
production, but at great costs to ecosystem health and exposing farmers to toxic 
substances. 
 
Researchers provided quantitative assessments of community-wide pesticide use and its 
adverse effects during a first phase of research in Carchi. A full summary of the research is 
beyond the scope of this paper but has been reported in detail elsewhere.4 Most 
alarmingly, rates of pesticide poisoning among the rural population were among the 
highest reported in the world.  Medical and psychometric testing revealed that two-thirds 
                                                       
3 Principal collaborators included: INIAP (National Institute of Agricultural Research from Ecuador), CIP, 
Montana State University (USA), McMaster University and University of Toronto (Canada), Wageningen 
University (the Netherlands), and the FAO’s Global IPM Facility. 
4 The research in Carchi has been widely published (see Appendix A) and is summarized in two compendia: 
Crissman, Antle, and Capalbo (1998) and Yanggen, Crissman, and Espinosa (2003). The initial economic 
research on the productivity impacts of pesticides was first published in Antle (1994). The pesticide poisoning 
research appeared in Cole, Carpio, and Leon (2000). The results of two in-depth sociological studies on the 
effects of pesticides on women and farming styles can be found in Mera-Orcés (2001) and Paredes (2001). A 
description of the development approach and lessons learned can be found in Sherwood, Crissman, and Cole 
(2004). Summaries and a link to a two-part BBC World Service Program on pesticide use in Carchi can be 
found at: www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/1646_dying/index.shtml. 
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of the rural population suffered neurotoxic effects from pesticide exposure. Among 
farmers, these effects were associated with measurable decreases in farm productivity. 
Through system modelling, we demonstrated the potential of different strategies to lessen 
pesticide dependency and thereby improve ecosystem health. 
 
Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) established the Ecosystem 
Approaches to Human Health Program on the belief that ecosystem management affects 
human health in multiple ways and that holistic, gender-sensitive, interactive approaches 
to identification and remediation of the problem was the most effective manner to achieve 
improvements (Forget and Lebel, 2001; www.idrc.ca/ecohealth). The research into health 
improvement proposed under the ecosystem approach to human health considers two 
principal aspects: exploration of determinants of health (be they environmental, social, 
cultural, or economic) and attention to associated socio-environmental interactions. In 
development terms, this line of research is intended both to critically assess how 
interventions may mediate change consistent with ecosystem health goals. The program 
demands extensive community involvement in research as a means of assuring project 
accountability to local interests (Figure 5.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 IDRC’s iterative strategy for improving ecosystem health (Forget and Lebel, 
2001)  
 
The model mandates a mix of research and intervention while incorporating attention to 
social diversity and more deliberate interaction among scientists, community stakeholders, 
and policy makers in the construction of alternatives. While fine in theory, such design 
embodies inherent contradictions associated with current research and development 
practice.  This chapter shares reflections on the experience from one IDRC Ecosystem 
Health funded project – EcoSalud. We implemented our project in three stages: 
 
Stage I: Start-up and engagement 
 
This stage involved community selection, recruitment of families from those communities 
willing to participate in both the research and intervention activities, the commencement 
of data collection and the initial participatory encounters with individuals, families and the 
community. Once we selected the three community locations, it included baseline surveys, 
followed by preliminary data analysis to guide the overall project plan. After meetings with 
communities where past research and initial findings were discussed, individuals and 
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families were encouraged to enlist in learning activities, especially Farmer Field Schools 
(FFS). Originally scheduled for six months, stage I lasted nine months due to delays in 
staff training, development and testing of research tools, and information collection and 
preliminary analysis.  
 
Stage II: Expansion of community activities  
 
This stage involved completion of the neurobehavioral measurements and on-going 
research on specialized themes, such as identification and documentation of pesticide 
exposure pathways and measurement of individual nutritional status, a potential 
confounding factor in neurobehavioral impacts. It also involved implementation of FFS in 
each community, educational campaigns, and other intervention activities. We planned to 
complete this stage in one year, but it lasted nearly two years, with certain activities 
continuing through to the end of the project.  
 
Stage III:  Reassessment, sustainability and policy efforts 
 
The stage included the completion of ex-post neurobehavioral assessments and visits to 
each participating farm household to assess changes in pesticide practices. It included 
efforts to inform the public on preliminary research outcomes and advocate policy, both 
in Carchi and at the national level. The project ended before we fully achieved our policy 
objectives, but fortunately new partner initiatives took up some of what EcoSalud left 
behind. 
 
Throughout these stages, implementation of the varied research and development tasks in 
EcoSalud involved continual negotiations among team members. Table 5.1 summarises 
points of difference that emerged during the project and associated outcomes and 
consequences. We go on to highlight four decisive moments: staff recruitment, 
quantitative design and data collection, development intervention design, as well as 
advocacy and policy intervention. 
 
Moments of divergence 
 
Staffing 
 
Divergent ways of seeing, valuing and doing first surfaced during staff recruitment. A CIP 
Senior Scientist, an agricultural economist, was the EcoSalud Project Leader. He recruited 
two Ecuadorian agricultural researchers who had participated in the first phase of research 
in Carchi: a farming systems specialist from the national agricultural research institute 
(INIAP) and an agricultural economist on CIP staff who would lead the research 
component and take responsibility for quantitative objectives associated with before-and-
after measurements. A medical doctor and occupational/environmental health specialist 
based in Canada, who also had participated in the earlier research, continued to support 
the health research components of the project as well as providing input to health-related 
training activities. In addition, a rural development and Integrated Pest Management 
(IPM) specialist was hired to lead the training and development component.  
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Table 5.1 Outcomes and consequences of clashes between the EcoSalud research and 
development teams 
 
Moment of 
divergence 
Research perspective Development 
perspective 
Outcomes and 
consequences 
Staff recruitment Technical expertise Cultural background and 
facilitation skills 
• Technical skills with 
investments in participatory 
training 
Preoccupation Rigor; high quality 
information and analysis 
Relevance to 
community's interests; 
high quality process 
• Rigor over relevance 
Project planning Based on objectives; 
pre-established plan 
Based on learning; 
interactive and iterative 
process 
• Pre-established plans with 
milestones generally not met by 
staff 
Baseline Objective, reliant on 
high quality information 
prior to project 
intervention 
Subjective; should be 
based on methodologies 
such as a participatory 
rural appraisal 
• Lengthy structured surveys; 
communities unmotivated by 
intrusive questions 
• Corruption of baseline 
Project sample 
selection 
Should be random and 
representative of the 
population 
Self-selection based on 
interest 
• Self-selection bias of Farmer 
Field Schools (FFS) 
• Difficulties with quantitative 
design and statistical analysis 
Sample 
maintenance 
Minimize sample loss to 
protect investments in 
data collection and 
maintain observations 
for statistical analysis 
Greater tolerance for 
participant drop out from 
pesticide education 
interventions 
• Selected interventions 
designed to cover all 
participants without option of 
self-selection 
Understanding 
of change 
Better information; 
effective technologies 
High quality dialogue and 
social learning 
• Technologies over process 
Intervention 
design 
Based on outcomes of 
research and technology 
transfer 
Based on community 
priorities and capacity 
building 
• Focus on project priority: 
pesticides 
• Difficulty with community 
participation, especially during 
financial crisis 
Participatory 
approaches to 
training 
Effective but slow and 
expensive 
Necessary investment for 
lasting change 
• FFS became the lead 
methodology 
Community 
incentives 
Financial incentives 
acceptable for inspiring 
change in practice 
Financial incentives 
inappropriate and 
interfere with local 
initiative 
• Use of interest-free loans for 
personal protective equipment  
 
Political 
intervention 
Conflict with researcher 
mandate of neutrality 
Appropriate and 
necessary for change 
• At first limited to 
information, but later, as the 
industry became involved, pro-
active advocacy 
 
The EcoSalud leaders employed a field level staff made up of both research assistants and 
community facilitators based at the INIAP provincial office in Carchi. They would be in 
charge of data collection, community organization, and training. The first differences 
among the project leaders arose over women’s representation in the staff. Some leaders 
were more committed to hiring women, while others were more concerned with hiring 
people who they could count on to complete tasks and act as confidants. Based on the all 
male presence in the INIAP field office and the EcoSalud leadership, bolstered by IDRC's 
demands for gender balance, we agreed to give preference to woman applicants. On the 
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thematic side, the researchers expressed preoccupation over the formal technical 
qualifications of staff. The national staff emphasized a notion of professionalism that was 
based on formal degrees and the capacity to present oneself with authority. Meanwhile, 
the lone development expert emphasized field-oriented people with strong 
communication and process management skills. 
 
A limited pool of professionals responded to our announcements in provincial 
newspapers. We found that individuals with the technical training and expertise for which 
we were searching were not generally available in Carchi. We hired a man from the centre 
of the country who had been a former student of one of the researchers and was his 
trusted confidant. The development leader was at least satisfied that this person came 
from a rural village and had practical farming knowledge. The candidate also had 
conducted his BSc level research in Carchi and was at least familiar with its rural history 
and social dynamics. The remaining two hires were women, only one of whom lived in 
Carchi: the nurse. The other woman was a gender specialist who had worked with 
domestic violence in a nearby city. We found it difficult to find a female gender specialist 
who was willing to subject herself to the difficulties of rural living in Carchi. She would 
have to relocate, bringing with her a husband, who was unlikely to find a job, and her 
child, who would need to leave behind the higher quality schools of the city. Fortunately, 
her parents had originally come from Carchi, so she was open to the opportunity of living 
and working there. Like others, certainly the scarce opportunity for employment must 
have been a motivating factor. Box 5.1 provides a summary description of the staff.  
 
EcoSalud was staffed with people from distinct research and development cultures, 
generations, academic backgrounds and professional orientations who contributed diverse 
perspectives to the project dialogue. We found that differences in gender, nationalities, 
and organizational cultures, combined with conflicting perspectives over roles and 
priorities all contributed to tensions during different moments of the project. Though the 
project was administratively a single unit, functionally it divided into two research and 
development teams. Conflicts between the teams emerged during initial baseline work and 
ensuing project planning. 
 
Quantitative design 
 
EcoSalud sought to combine rigorous quantitative research while simultaneously 
stimulating behavioural change through farmer- and community-led interventions, which 
we generally referred to as “participatory development.” The final design, the result of 
negotiations among the staff, included elements of linear, mechanistic logic needed to 
accommodate the demands of quantitative research as well as more open-ended and 
consultative learning process that sought community involvement in on-going 
information processing and the construction of responses.  
 
The principal research hypothesis was that participatory training would result in reduced 
use of neurotoxin pesticides, which in turn would bring about improvements in 
participants’ neurobehavioral function. The participatory training and other community 
activities were to evoke individuals and communities to make more informed decisions 
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about pesticides that would lead to a reduction in their exposure. The research hypothesis 
required quantitative data collection on knowledge, attitudes and practice about pesticide 
use, identification of direct and indirect pesticide exposure pathways and measurement of 
the neurobehavioral status of individuals (Cole et al., 1997a) before and after the training 
and presumed changes. The research team needed measurements of a representative 
sample of individuals before and after the interventions. The validity of the inferences that 
could be drawn from the measurements rested on respecting established statistical 
procedures for sample selection as well as community consultations.  
 
Box 5.1 EcoSalud team members 
 
Researchers 
• Project leader – US-trained PhD level economist. Experience in S.E. Asia and the 
Andes. Knowledgeable with production and productivity concerns of rice and potato 
systems. A talented communicator and well-liked leader, a convener and conflict 
manager. 
• Research component coordinator – Ecuadorian- and US-trained MSc level economist, 
with expertise in potato and production economics. Traditional and pragmatic; good 
manager of activities, preoccupied with quantitative rigor. 
• Development component coordinator – US-trained MSc level pest management and 
adult education specialist, with 12 years of experience in discovery-based approaches 
to integrated pest management in Central America. A knowledgeable generalist; 
strong connection with rural poor and social change interests. 
• National economist – INIAP staff assigned to the project; Ecuadorian- and Chilean-
educated MSc level economist, experienced in farming system economics and linear 
program; preoccupied with rigor and technology transfer. 
• Human health specialist – Canadian-trained and based M.D. and MSc epidemiologist 
with occupational/environmental health expertise; experience in community health 
programs in Central and South America. Multi-faceted, familiarity with quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. 
 
Field staff 
• Gender specialist – Ecuadorian BSc level educator with expertise in women's 
development concerns. Talented facilitator, sensitive to gender issues, especially 
domination of women. 
• Nurse – Ecuadorian BSc level nurse, with medical centre and farm management 
experience. Lone Carchense of the group, pragmatic and with no previous community 
development or project implementation experience. 
• Agricultural extension agent – Ecuadorian BSc level agronomist with soil 
conservation expertise. Rural background, pragmatic and hard-worker; preoccupied 
with farmer relevance. 
• Temporary enumerators and researchers – Numerous BSc and MSc level students 
who implemented project surveys and conducted extractive research on specialized 
topics, such as nutrition, farm economics, pesticide soil and water contamination, 
farming styles, etc. 
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Meanwhile, the development team sought to implement change through participatory 
approaches that rested on individuals expressing willingness to work with us on 
interventions. It proposed methods that were incremental and resulted in piecemeal 
recruitment of participants. For the researchers, sample selection and sample maintenance 
became one of the fundamental sources of tension. The development team continually 
struggled to limit extractive activities and orient project resources to community interests.  
 
In response to its design demands, the research team needed individuals as part of a 
representative sample of communities. The development team needed individuals as local 
catalysts of change. Thus selection criteria sought communities that were both 
representative of the potato production system and the diverse social dynamics in it. As 
part of its community entry strategy, the development team held open information 
sessions on the previous pesticide exposure and health impacts research. This caused 
problems for the researchers who first needed to establish a baseline study on knowledge, 
attitudes and practice with regards to pest management and pesticides. Participatory 
development demanded an open-ended process, where communities could learn about 
opportunities and voluntarily enlist in activities. The development team foresaw starting 
with a small group of families that would grow and, over time, play an increasing role in 
project design and implementation. From this perspective, beginning with structured 
surveys would interfere with that process. On the other hand, informing communities of 
past research findings could bias the baseline study. Knowledge, attitudes and practice 
surveys are especially susceptible to respondents who adjust their answers to what they 
think interviewers want to hear.   
 
Agreeing on a sample was problematic. Lacking the freedom to construct a sampling 
frame and select from it, the researchers decided to over-sample. For the baseline survey, 
the economic researchers sought to include every household in each of the three 
communities, representing at least 100 families per community. This strategy would 
guarantee inclusion of anyone who decided to participate in the Farmer Field Schools. 
Meanwhile the health research team needed families willing to submit themselves to an 
adapted World Health Organization battery of neurobehavioral tests, both before and 
after project interventions. The health assessments and associated tests took about half a 
day per individual, so it was only realistic to conduct such studies with about 20 families 
per community. This number matched more closely with the priorities of the development 
team. The development team operated under the social concept of critical mass and was 
most interested in recruiting a much smaller population of 15 to 25 percent – the most 
progressive families – as a means of constructing alternatives and eventually catalyzing 
spontaneous change in pesticide use in the broader community.5 As a result, the 
development team only needed to enlist 20 to 30 families in each community.  
 
Concurrently with the research baseline surveys and assessments, the development team 
began to hold sessions with communities as a means of informing them of the project and 
enlisting participants. Although the development team tried to limit information on 
                                                       
5 In the 1960s, Rogers (1983) statistically tested the concept of critical mass to describe the dynamics of 
technology diffusion in rural communities. Bunch (1982) applied critical mass as a strategy for enabling 
people-centred agricultural development. 
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pesticides during initial activities to not bias the baseline, it inevitably did. Furthermore, 
the health professionals grew frustrated that it took so long to identify the population of 
innovators in each community, hence decreasing time between the before and after 
neurobehavioral tests. The development team felt that families first needed to learn about 
training activities and pass through a filter of self-selection based on their interest. 
Researchers feared that this approach would produce a non-representative sample that 
would invalidate their studies. In summary, early on the researchers felt that the 
development team's demands both slowed down the project and placed into danger the 
quality of its information. Meanwhile, the development workers found problems with the 
social effects of extractive research.   
 
During the process of engaging communities some farmers were quick to pick up on 
EcoSalud's priorities and to lobby their own interests. Some sought access to cheap credit, 
seed, and agrochemicals. As a farmer from Santa Martha de Cuba cleverly asked: 
 
Ingeniero, I would like to ask you if it is possible to get some sacks of fertilizer as a 
gift form the institution [INIAP] for a new plot. I know you want to have a lot of 
FFS [Farmer Field Schools] everywhere, and we are the ones who will represent the 
results, and will tell the others that we have had a good experience. I think we can 
also say that the institution gave us good support. That is why we are asking for 
some help.  
 
The development team expressed concern over false expectations that a community-level 
baseline might raise as well as over the drawn out process of health assessments that 
would enervate motivations and discourage families from getting involved in other 
activities. Indeed, the research team’s lengthy interviews on production, socio-economic 
assessments, and medical tests taxed peoples' time and motivation. As a woman from the 
community San Francisco de Libertad confided: 
 
The licenciadas [interviewers] came and asked many questions. We were getting 
tired, but we did not tell them because they were nice people. We even became 
good friends with one of them, but a lot of people tried to hide from them each 
time they came [to conduct interviews]. People were scared of so many questions. 
They even asked us what we ate and the price of our electric appliances. 
 
The reliance of participatory methods on participants’ continued interest and attendance 
created problems for the research team. Some FFS participants dropped out. The research 
team had spent considerable time and funds measuring the baseline neurobehavioral 
status of FFS families and viewed this with concern. Due to the open-ended nature of 
FFS, they feared that too many of the original sample would not change its behaviour 
sufficiently to reduce pesticide exposure and thus measurably improve neurobehavioral 
scores within the project timeframe. The research team sought to guarantee a minimum 
up-take of technology and change in practice among the sample population to assure 
pesticide exposure reduction. 
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Intervention design 
 
The bulk of stage II – expansion of community activities – was supposed to shift from 
quantitative research towards enabling farmers and their families to affect change (Cole et 
al., 2002; Sherwood et al., 2003). At the end of the first year, the teams came together to 
redesign the intervention strategies as per initial project experience. During planning 
workshops, it became clear that the economic researchers favoured more technology 
transfer approaches, while the development practitioners favoured knowledge-based 
approaches. Differences were not always reconcilable. For example, some researchers felt 
that the best way to deal with pesticide exposure was to promote Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE). The development team pointed out that PPE was the central strategy 
of Safe Use of Pesticides (SUP) that had been promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the pesticide industry for decades and led to questionable results in Carchi as 
elsewhere (Murray and Taylor, 2000; Atkin and Leisinger, 2000). They argued that the 
problem was not a lack of information or technology, but rather an internalisation of the 
problem by means of awareness and knowledge raising strategies. This concurred with the 
occupational health literature, so with the support of the health expert, the development 
perspective won out. It was agreed that the second year of the project would centre on a 
series of in-depth, community-led activities and that PPE would come in at the end. 
 
The standard view of IPM centres on pesticide applications based on economical 
thresholds and transfer of single element technologies within a framework of continuing 
pesticide use. In contrast, Farmer Field Schools in IPM, a methodology developed by the 
FAO in Southeast Asia, propose group environmental learning on the principles of crop 
health and ecosystem management as an alternative to reliance on curative measures to 
control pests (Pontius et al., 2002). Since the standard approach to IPM had not delivered 
results in Carchi and the project aimed to test more farmer participatory methodologies, 
we decided to go with the Farmer Field Schools. 
 
During FFS sessions, the farmers, not the trainers, provide the technical expertise. What is 
most important for trainers is a base knowledge of pest biology and ecology and strong 
facilitation skills. To introduce FFS in Carchi, we decided to send staff to an intensive 
three-month training of trainers (ToT) in FFS methodology that was led by the FAO's 
Global IPM Facility. Selecting staff to participate in the ToT exemplified the multiple and 
complex biases faced on grounds of gender, professionalism, and project-based 
employment. The development expert had hoped to send both a male agronomist and a 
female sociologist to the ToT. Nevertheless, research team members failed to see the 
relevance of sending a non-agronomist. Furthermore, one leader only wanted to send 
permanent staff, in part because “soft” project money financed temporary staff, and it 
would be difficult to cover responsibilities for three months. As a result, only one trainee 
was sent: the permanent hire male INIAP agronomist. 
 
INIAP’s staff had great difficulty appreciating the differences between vertical extension 
delivery and enabling farmers to find their own solutions to problems. The concern had 
deep cultural, institutional and philosophical roots that were not easily pruned. Rather 
than facilitate experiential learning in the field, for example, extension agents were inclined 
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to give presentations in classrooms. Rather than use questions to elicit group introspection 
over concerns, extension agents gave answers. Nevertheless, with extensive training, 
supervision and follow-up, a number of INIAP agronomists became high quality FFS 
facilitators and have gone on to champion the methodology.  
 
In an iterative fashion, FFS participants conducted learning experiments on comparative 
(conventional vs. IPM) small plots to fill knowledge gaps and to identify opportunities for 
reducing external inputs while improving production and overall productivity. After two 
seasons, results in three communities were impressive. Through improved management 
and use of alternative technologies, such as Andean weevil traps, late blight resistant 
potato varieties, specific and low toxicity pesticides, and careful monitoring before 
spraying, farmers were able, for example, to decrease pesticide sprays by half while 
maintaining or increasing production. In learning plots, the amount of active ingredient of 
fungicide applied decreased by 50 percent, while insecticides used for pests that had 
commonly received the highly toxic carbofuran and methamidophos decreased by 75 
percent and 40 percent, respectively (Barrera et al., 2001). Through diverse cost reduction 
tactics, farmers increased productivity in test plots by an average of 36 percent. This 
experience made clear that the problem at hand was not a lack of alternatives. 
Nevertheless, we also began to realize that participatory methods alone were not enough 
to enable change. Attention to policy matters was called for. 
 
Advocacy and policy reform 
 
While all agreed on the severe effects of pesticides, the EcoSalud staff participated in 
considerable debate over acceptable degree of advocacy on the behalf of communities. 
The research team initially felt that its only obligation was to inform communities and 
policy makers, with the Ecuadorians more reluctant than the foreigners, likely because the 
national scientists expected to continue their professional careers in Ecuador and probably 
had more at stake. Meanwhile, the development team felt that political matters, especially 
ties between SESA, the government plant health inspectorate with the mandate of 
pesticide regulation, and the pesticide industry, would prevent change and argued for 
more aggressive action. Following a visit by pesticide industry representatives who 
downplayed the severity of the situation in Carchi and placed the responsibility on 
farmers, the Project Leader concluded that it was time for re-evaluating the conventional, 
non-interventionist role of researchers.  
 
After consulting with the project staff and the directors at CIP headquarters and INIAP, 
we decided that it was our responsibility to play a more vocal role in informing the public 
and advocating stronger regulation of pesticides. The development team developed a 
series of radio announcements and educational programs that were broadcast throughout 
the North. EcoSalud linked with strategic partners, such as a consortium of development 
organizations working in Carchi and the local chapter of the Pesticide Action Network, to 
advance common concerns. In addition, project staff held numerous private meetings and 
seminars with government officials and industry representatives and it organized public 
forums. 
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In May 2001, EcoSalud organized a national conference in Quito to present results and 
policy recommendations. Following practices for hazard reduction recommended in the 
industrial hygiene literature (Plog et al., 1996), a priority policy recommendation was the 
elimination of the class of pesticides that were causing the neurobehavioral damage in 
Carchi: WHO Class I or highly dangerous products. The development team lined up 
statements of support from government and non-governmental agencies. Pesticide 
industry representatives from the United States, Central America, Colombia and the city 
of Guayaquil, where most Ecuadorian chemical companies are based, arrived in Quito 
days before the conference to meet with the organizers and relevant government officials. 
Instead of requesting to learn more about the studies and recommendations for improving 
the situation, they seemed to lobby against the veracity or relevance of the research 
findings. They expressed concern about the recommendation for eliminating WHO Class 
I pesticides and persuaded the Director of SESA and the President of the National 
Pesticide Technical Committee to not support that measure. In fact, despite having a 
central role in planning the forum and after confirming his participation, the Director of 
SESA did not show up until after the conference was concluded.  
 
Regardless, representatives from diverse FFS in Carchi travelled to the capital to attend 
the forum and made convincing presentations on their tested alternatives for substantially 
reducing dependency on the problematic products in question: carbofuran, 
methamidophos and mancozeb. They requested governmental attention to the Carchi 
declaration and a National Pesticide Committee proposal. Officials from the Public 
Ministry of Health and the Pan-American Health Organization committed to play a more 
active training, monitoring and advocacy role similar to other projects in Central America 
(Keifer et al., 1997). The Quito conference led to a television documentary on the 
pesticide crisis in Carchi that aired throughout the country and subsequently was 
presented to select audiences in other parts of Central and South America as well as the 
US and Europe.6 Despite the receipt of multiple letters from farmer organizations, 
researchers and development professionals in Ecuador demanding government attention 
to the situation in Carchi, the Director of SESA never responded nor publicly expressed 
concern. 
 
By the end of project, the EcoSalud staff had overcome its most divisive professional 
differences and matured into a formidable research-intervention team. Unfortunately, as 
happens with many development initiatives these days, funding ran out and staff moved 
on to other employment. Complementary projects took over a number of the training 
activities in the project sites and grew into other regions. This included the training by 
INIAP of nearly 100 FFS facilitators in Carchi and nearby Imbabura, the transition of FFS 
to autonomous small-enterprise production groups as well as an expansion of FFS in 
Ecuador and elsewhere (LEISA, 2003b). In July 2003, INIAP, CIP and FAO published a 
Spanish language book (Yanggen et al., 2003) that summarized the research and 
intervention results. In a forum attended by public officials, industry representatives and 
media, the authors emphasized the need to decrease and eventually eliminate the use of 
highly toxic pesticides in Ecuador. Subsequently in-depth radio programs and newspaper 
                                                       
6 Amargo cosecha (Bitter harvest), a 20 minute documentary produced by Adolfo Asar of the Día a Día Program, 
first aired in Ecuador in September 2001. 
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articles repeated the research findings. SESA officials and pesticide industry 
representatives responded with seeming disinterest over the alarming health impacts and 
disdain for calls for the removal of the highly toxic insecticides from the market. As per 
the findings of a BBC World Service radio program that included interviews with 
government officials (BBC World Service, 2004), pesticide salespeople, farmers, and 
hospital personnel in Carchi, the official government position had become: "We have 
established international standards of recommendation and force the pesticide industry to 
obey those rules,” and "We cannot be held responsible for farmers' misuse of pesticides." 
Despite the evidence of over a decade of research that clearly showed the hazards of 
pesticide use in Carchi and feasible alternative practices, it became all too clear that 
effective change would depend on a drawn-out process of lobbying and local action that 
went beyond the constraints of EcoSalud. 
 
Discussion 
 
Complementarity: learning to work together 
 
While personalities were always at play in conflicts, contrasts among our staff were most 
clearly distributed across disciplinary and professional lines. At a most basic level, the 
differences between social and natural scientists had to do with subject: people or the 
environment. The contrasts between scientists and development practitioners most 
generally were over purpose: research or action. Such differences influenced perceptions 
and values. EcoSalud staff applied at least three distinct problem-solving logics to project 
concerns, consistent with what Röling (2000) described as instrumental, economic and 
interactive knowledge domains. Biophysical scientists and medical professionals most 
commonly apply the instrumental approach that centres on addressing causality through 
technology development. Economists and business people tend to use an economic 
approach that looks to utilize market opportunities and comparative advantage as means 
to addressing problems. The economists commonly rely on technology “transfer” 
strategies to readjust advantages. Development practitioners most often use the interactive 
approach. They seek to solve problems through multi-stakeholder participation and 
negotiated agreement. Table 5.2 summarizes these approaches. 
 
The first two approaches – instrumental and economic – have come to dominate research 
and development thinking over the last fifty years. The novelty for the EcoSalud project 
was to acknowledge that these alone would not solve the ecosystem health crises in 
Carchi. The introduction of an interactive approach enabled the project to begin to 
address relevant social issues behind pesticide abuse, the reliance on highly toxic products, 
and the associated human health and productivity problems. Eventually, EcoSalud found 
that all three approaches had important contributions to make in achieving healthier 
ecosystem management, but not without much struggle.  
 
The reality of the pesticide problem struck home during visits to communities, where each 
of us came across personal accounts of pesticide poisonings. The tragic poisonings of 
children found at each location were particularly disturbing. Combined with the invisible 
quality of toxic exposure, the severity of the pesticide problem created a sense of urgency 
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among the staff. Nevertheless, while this may have brought us together at the beginning, 
common sympathy with communities was not enough for overcoming our differences. In 
hindsight, we found that a functional internal project environment was needed to mediate 
regular conflicts among staff. This was enabled through a handful of administrative 
mechanisms, including: 
 
• Shared project responsibility – From day one, the entire staff participated in project 
design and planning, including both research and development activities. During 
workshops, divergent perspectives were elicited and differences accommodated 
through discussion and negotiation. Research and development team leaders mediated 
discussions. When differences could not be reconciled, we commonly referred back to 
the original proposal or the donor's demands. 
• Limited financial resources and transparent administration of funds – appreciating 
EcoSalud's relatively small budget, the project leaders had to creatively pool resources 
from their organizations and on-going projects. Knowing this, the staff pulled 
together to conserve resources and to leverage funds with communities and other 
like-minded projects. 
• Open and regular communication – With the exception of the Canadian-based health 
expert, the remaining project leaders were based at a research station in Quito, where 
they regularly met during regular monthly meetings and informally over coffee to 
assess progress and to iron out differences. The Project Leader had won a reputation 
for 'keeping his door open' and being a good listener. All trusted him, including the 
field staff from Carchi. For difficult problems, such as personality issues, he was 
consulted privately. Similar meetings were held weekly in Carchi, though due to the 
institutional culture of the national partner as well as the leadership style of Director 
of the field office in San Gabriel, those were more structured and rigid. Often, 
conflicts were not resolved in Carchi and demanded the attention of the research 
team and development team leaders. The leaders regularly discussed concerns and 
altered weekly visits to Carchi to interact with the field staff and help it to resolve 
differences before they became major conflicts. 
• Learning and redesign – while the donor operated by pre-determined annual plans, it 
was open to revisions. As research results emerged and communities began to 
contribute ideas to the project, we inevitably discovered new opportunities.  
 
Nevertheless, such administrative mechanisms could not overcome some differences. For 
example, the dominantly male leadership in Carchi frustrated the female staff, which 
found difficulty making it heard and respected, despite the quality of their work. One 
personality conflict between a soft-spoken agronomist and an outspoken feminist lasted 
the duration of the project, despite endless mediation and efforts to force them to resolve 
their differences. Sometimes, this tension permeated upwards to the project leadership, 
playing out between the project's functional research-development divide. We found that 
the old adage about “locking enemies in the same room and forcing them to work 
together on a common task” does not always apply. Nevertheless, by shifting their 
energies to the greater purposes of the project each managed to stay with us through to 
the end of EcoSalud. 
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Table 5.2 Three approaches to solving problems (adapted from Röling, 2000) 
 
Characteristic Instrumental Economic Interactive 
Who? Biophysical scientists, 
pest management 
specialists, medical 
professionals 
Economists, business-
oriented partners 
Development 
practitioners, sociologists 
Predicament Lack control over causal 
factors 
Competition, scarcity Anthropocentric 
destruction of habitat, 
lack of control over 
ourselves 
Dynamics Causation, self-
organization of systems 
Rational choice, struggle 
for economic survival, 
market forces 
Interdependence, 
agency, learning, reasons 
Objective Control or management 
of nature for human 
purposes 
Win, gain advantage, 
optimize utility 
Negotiated agreement, 
concerted action 
Knowledge base Natural and medical 
sciences 
Economics Social science, cognitive 
science 
Effect based on Technology 
(agrochemical inputs, 
biological controls, 
medicines) 
Strategies for technology 
up-take, market 
integration 
Conflict resolution, 
agreement, learning 
Policy focus Engineering, hard 
systems design, 
regulation 
Fiscal policy, market 
stimulation, technology 
transfer 
Interactive policy 
making, social process 
design, dialogues, 
process facilitation 
 
The combined factors of highly relevant research and a growing appreciation among our 
staff of its purpose were essential for overcoming biases against quantitative perspectives. 
For example, early on the development team realized that high quality quantitative 
information could play an important role in calling attention to pesticide concerns. 
Similarly, the researchers began to see the potential of gender-sensitive participatory 
approaches. For example, the women and children, who were brought into the project by 
the gender specialist, were the populations quickest to respond to the health information. 
During one meeting, after the men in the room had denied adamantly careless handling of 
pesticides, one mother pulled a member of our staff aside with a suggestion. She requested 
cameras to be handed out secretly to the town's kids, who would in turn take photographs 
of the men misusing products, for example, washing out backpack sprayers in the streams. 
We handed out disposable cameras and offered to pay for film development. Several 
weeks later we called together the community and the kids gave a surprise presentation of 
their photos, much to the embarrassment of the men. This spontaneous activity and 
others like it were repeated in the other communities and usually were quite successful in 
getting across the point about problems with pesticides. More farmers and their families 
volunteered to subject themselves to the health assessments and to take part in awareness 
raising activities.  
 
Through such interactive cross-disciplinary experience, project staff gained new 
appreciation for the unique skills of their colleagues and their potential contributions to 
the project. Such understanding matured by the end of the project, particularly when we 
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shifted energies to engaging policy reform, which led us to confront influential actors, 
such as the pesticide industry. 
 
Interdependence: engaging policy reform 
 
While the development team was eager to take on advocacy roles on behalf of 
communities, the researches at first hesitated. The scientists ran a risk when they decided 
to take a more pro-active stance in informing the public and policy on research outcomes 
(Sherwood et al., 2002), which could place into question the objectivity of science. Earlier 
critiques of researcher inaction on pesticide-related policy over a decade earlier in the 
Philippines pointed out why such risk, while problematic for science, was necessary for 
change. By the early 1980s, a significant body of research in the Philippines showed 
similar severe health effects among rural people due to continual exposure to highly toxic 
pesticides. Nevertheless, as Loevensohn and Rola (1997) explained: 
 
...it was not until 1992 that policy decisions were taken commensurate with the 
scale of damage that research was projecting. These included a ban or severe 
restriction on a number of popular but highly toxic insecticides and, in 1993, the 
launch of a nation-wide program of farmer training in Integrated Pest 
Management (IPM). 
 
The Philippine government regulatory agency and the pesticide industry applied their 
usual response: SUP training. Local and international industry resisted the prescribed 
voluntary regulation and safer alternatives. Over time, NGOs and IPM programs 
separated from the SUP program, contending that pesticide hazards and alternatives to 
pesticides were not sufficiently emphasized. The international community, especially the 
International Rice Research Institute, FAO, and international NGOs, missed numerous 
opportunities to intervene, largely due to organizational rigidity, obedience to standard 
operating procedures, and diverse forms of self-censorship. The majority of national and 
international researchers refused to share findings and take stand in public meetings and 
media programs. Loevensohn and Rola (1997) argued that both international institutions 
and researchers shared a degree of responsibility for the delay in policy progress: 
 
There was information that was not persuasively put forward to policy makers 
that, had it been, might well have advanced the decisions. This would have led to 
a reduced toll in death and illness, to lesser damage to the aquatic environment, 
and likely to increased rural incomes. Seizing these opportunities would, however, 
have required individuals to act in inhabitual ways, outside the mandates of their 
institutions, and possibly at some personal risk. 
 
Stepping out of their comfortable roles, EcoSalud researchers proactively engaged 
stakeholders in policy debate at both the provincial and national levels. Our position 
evolved to include the reduction of pesticide exposure risk through a combination of 
hazard removal (i.e., the elimination of highly toxic pesticides from the market), the 
development of alternative practices and ecological education. We called for international 
action on the extremely toxic pesticides (Sherwood et al., 2002; Sherwood et al., 2007). As 
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a result, an unknown source threatened a team member by telephone and industry 
representatives questioned our research. Fortunately, such attacks were not as strong as 
those that have occurred to other researchers when publicity about their research has 
threatened to affect the profits of industry or agendas of other special interest groups 
(Deyo et al., 1997). We found that such threats had the effect of uniting the research and 
development teams.  
 
As others (Riggs and Waples, 2003) and we have experienced, private industry often pays 
greater attention to short-term gains for shareholders, than to the longer-term health of 
users of their products and the greater public good. The social science research on 
pesticide use in Carchi substantiates the need for knowledge-based and socially oriented 
interventions aimed at political changes (Mera-Orcés, 2000 and 2001; Paredes, 2001).  
 
Bugs in the system: encountering structural constraints 
 
In analyzing needed change for management of complex issues such as those associated 
with social systems and the environment, Röling (2005) mapped out graphically the 
development of scientific paradigms along the intersections of two axes: positivism-
constructivism and reductionism-holism. Here we have adapted this model to emphasize 
source of knowledge/technology and levels of preoccupation. The “source of 
knowledge/technology” axis is built on extremes of exogeneity (externally generated) and 
endogeneity (internally generated). The “level of preoccupation” axis is built on extremes 
of mono-vision (the control of components or parts) to holo-vision (management of 
systems or synergies of parts). The interaction of these two axes provides a taxonomy of 
development (see Figure 5.2).  
 
Different members of EcoSalud and stakeholders engaged in pest management in Carchi 
embodied particular perspectives and could be roughly assigned to different quadrants. 
Pesticide salespeople and “modern” (i.e., external input intensive) farmers generally 
approached production problems from joint exogenous-mono-vision perspective and fit 
into quadrant I. When considering pest problems, this “techno-centric” perspective 
produced recommendations for “single bullet” solutions, such as the application of 
pesticides or spraying efficiency. Meanwhile, the researchers at INIAP and CIP – often 
biological scientists or economists – tended to draw on a combination of exogenous and 
holisitic perspective when confronting pest management problems (quadrant II). This 
perspective led to the application of hard science and systems thinking and produced 
externally designed research and intervention approaches, such as a call for Integrated Pest 
Management and agroecology practice. Meanwhile, researchers with anthropological or 
sociological backgrounds as well as development practitioners with similar perspective 
tended to value interactive endogenous-holistic design (quadrant III). While continuing an 
emphasis on systems-level complexity, these actors tended to view pest and pesticide 
dependency as anthropogenic phenomena. Thus, when conceiving interventions, they 
argued for culturally centred approaches, for example, the local construction of IPM 
through participatory agroecosystem analysis as practiced in the Farmer Field Schools. 
The health researchers and professionals straddled all three quadrants. Farmers who were 
relatively isolated from external technologies as well as local communities tended to 
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develop technologies autonomously and fell into quadrant IV. Röling (2005) argues that 
successful management of ecosystems requires movement from quadrants I and II to 
quadrant III, since the later lies at a higher systems level and encompasses the previous 
two. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Four development paradigms (adapted from Röling, 2005; originally based on 
Miller, 1983 and 1985; Bawden, 2000) 
 
From our experience, the logics of quadrants I, II, and III were all readily apparent across 
the staff and differences, such as those presented in Table 1, and commonly played out 
along the quadrants. Nevertheless, we found that present institutional and policy designs, 
shaped by the assumptions of exogenous designs, ultimately circumscribed our capacity to 
apply community-based participatory approaches. Sometimes differences were 
irreconcilable, such as over the degree of investment of project resources in either 
technology or process-oriented activities. Commonly, a dominant actor (e.g., the project 
manager) or political manoeuvring (e.g., through leveraging the donor’s priorities) resolved 
differences. Other times, paradigmatic differences were mediated over the thematic 
middle ground found in quadrant II, for example, over the relatively neutral theme of 
IPM. This was where individuals articulated differences during weekly meetings in the 
form of proposed activities and logistical concerns, encountered divergent views, and 
made compromises for the good of the project. Nevertheless, overall, the project would 
sustain a relatively exogenous, expert-centred bias that certainly influenced outcomes. 
 
The success of EcoSalud arguably relied upon the leaders' ability to broker interaction 
among perspectives, especially the success of introducing elements of endogenous design, 
for example, through people-centred, community-based approaches such as the Farmer 
Field Schools. While the FFS and similar activities proved to be effective means for 
enlisting community involvement in the project, ultimately broader structural constraints, 
such as the training of professionals or the linear designs of development interventions, 
limited our ability to more genuinely accommodate local perspectives. Based on observed 
tensions, we envisage the need for a new professional capable of brokering cultural 
differences among research and development professionals and between external actors 
Cultural Encounters 145 
and communities (Table 5.3). High quality information will always be a need for 
measuring and understanding agricultural, health, and environmental concerns, but the 
way we go about defining and prioritizing questions, conducting, interpreting, and using 
research is subject to change. The need was for more interactive platforms that effectively 
brought together diverse perspectives over the common concern. We found that cross-
disciplinary research and development practice demanded professionals with generalist 
academic backgrounds, practical community development experience, and strong 
facilitation skills. 
 
Table 5.3 Towards more interactive community-based research and development (R&D) 
(adapted from the ideas of Pretty, 1995 and Leeuwis, 2000) 
 
 Conventional R&D role: producer of 
knowledge, technologies, and services 
Newer R&D role: facilitator of 
learning and action and negotiation 
Assumptions on 
reality 
Single tangible reality Multiple realities that are socially 
constructed 
Interaction with 
bodies of 
knowledge 
Disciplinary-based, limited interaction with 
other perspectives 
Transdisciplinary-based, on-going 
interaction and transformation of 
perspectives 
Scientific method Reductionistist and positivist: Complexity 
can be best described through independent 
variables and cause-effect relationships. The 
perception of the researcher is central. 
Holistic and post-positivist: Local and 
global categories and perceptions 
mutually acknowledged. Differences 
between subject and object; 
methodology and data are little defined. 
Strategy and 
context of research 
Researcher knows what he or she wants. 
Designs are pre-established. Information is 
extracted from controlled experiments. 
Context is controlled and independent. 
Researcher does not know where the 
research will go. Themes emerge from 
learning-action process. Focus and 
understanding emerge from interaction. 
The context is fundamental. 
Who sets priorities? Researchers and practitioners give priority 
to problems and activities. 
Communities, practitioners, and 
researchers prioritize together. 
Relationship with 
intended 
beneficiaries 
Researchers and practitioners control and 
motivate clients from a distance. Tendency 
to distrust local people, who are principally 
research objects. 
Researchers and practitioners maintain 
close dialogue with constituents. 
Construct trust through joint analysis 
negotiation.  
Intervention 
modality 
Project driven: time and thematic bound. Programs and social movement driven: 
unbound, work in teams based on long-
term commitment. 
Political mandate Inappropriate: threatens objectivity Appropriate and necessary: 
acknowledgement of social role of 
science 
 
Capable brokers of development cannot operate in institutional vacuums. Greater 
involvement of local experience will demand support from organizations that can leverage 
needed structural change. At the very least, externally designed, time-bound projects that 
presently govern most research and development activity continue to be based on 
problematic notions of external control and predictability that work against growing 
appreciation for interactive learning and local participation and ownerships of initiatives.  
 
The ecosystem health approach calls for new ways of thinking, organizing and doing that 
challenges us to go beyond present institutional designs. While we emphasized cross-
disciplinary science, it became clear that what was most needed was a framework that 
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permitted trans-professional, science-development oriented towards greater community 
accountability. Such movement would require fundamental change towards more locally 
democratic and pluralistic science and development, which in turn would place new 
pressures on policy frameworks (Table 5.3). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Differences between the institutions of research and development do much to pull apart 
researchers and practitioners and little to bring them together. Under the demands of 
project implementation, professionals from both camps involved in EcoSalud were forced 
to interact and negotiate perspectives. While this interaction sometimes led to 
unsatisfactory results for some, it also contributed to new skills and understanding 
between previously disparate perspectives. We found cross-disciplinary research 
particularly challenging at the field level. Working cultures for staff members (e.g. 
agricultural extension, participatory research, feminist social change, and health services) 
were built on different sets of assumptions, methods of resolving conflicts, planning and 
perceived roles in interacting with project participants. The mediation of such differences 
sometimes carried high transaction costs. 
 
Through often-difficult processes of negotiation and accommodation, the staff gained 
insight into differences with their colleagues. With new understanding, staff learned to 
work in complementary ways that contributed to successful project outcomes, such as 
more integrated use of research data and participatory methodologies for advancing both 
science and development agenda. When confronted by external obstacles, in this case over 
pesticide policy matters, the staff joined force and collaborated around a common agenda 
for eliminating highly toxic pesticides. 
 
Despite new cross-disciplinary learning and practice, we cannot hide from the fact that the 
vast majority of rural people in the three communities where EcoSalud operated, not to 
mention the rest of Carchi, continue to be chronically exposed to harmful pesticides and, 
as a result, suffer neurotoxic damage affecting their productivity and well-being. 
Regardless of high quality research that revealed dramatic health problems, the conception 
of effective farm-level alternatives, and extraordinary efforts to communicate those to 
policy makers and the public, to date very little has been achieved in improving local 
conditions. We found that fundamental problems of paradigm circumscribed our ability to 
go further with ecosystem health practice. Moving towards greater science and 
development accountability to communities takes us beyond present organizational and 
professional designs and requires a revision of policies, including fundamental change in 
development and research practice. 
Chapter 6 
 
Farmer Field Schools in the Social Wild: Exploring the 
Limits of Methodology-based Interventions 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Concerned about the increasingly apparent social and environmental products of modern 
agriculture, I became part of a growing network interested in Farmer Field School (FFS) 
methodology – a knowledge-intensive, people-centred approach to agro-ecosystem 
management – as an alternative. Despite well-established farm- and community-level 
contributions (see, for example, van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007), FFS requires a 
fundamental shift in the underlying norms and values surrounding agricultural science and 
development practice that can be at odds with the dominant ways of thinking, doing, and 
ordering. As such, FFS represented a radical departure in Carchi – the planting of a 
technological niche innovation aimed at influencing the dominant socio-technical regime. 
 
Drawing on six years of reflective practice, diverse studies, and on-going interactions with 
FFS graduates, facilitators, and Master Trainers, I explore the introduction of FFS to 
Ecuador and the subsequent multiple expressions of the methodology after it was released 
into the hands of researchers, development practitioners, and their organisations – a 
transformative process I describe as FFS in the social wild. I study the spontaneous 
appropriations of the methodologies, concentrating on how researchers and técnicos of the 
expert system diversely translated and transformed the methodology. I then analyze this 
experience in light of present calls for “scaling-up” of FFS. 
 
Introduction 
 
Farmer Field School (FFS) methodology has been proposed as a promising novelty for 
transforming agricultural practice (Kenmore, 1991; Pontius et al., 2002; Luther et al., 
2005). FFS is a high-order, interactive learning approach that employs well-established 
principles of adult education (e.g., discovery-based learning), in-depth knowledge of 
agroecology (e.g., life cycles of key organisms, plant-pest beneficial interactions), and 
social organization. Numerous studies have demonstrated the promise of FFS 
(summarized in van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007), leading a growing number of 
development professionals, researchers, and policy makers to call for its mass 
institutionalisation through “scaling up” and “scaling out” (LEISA, 2003a and b). 
Meanwhile, others have claimed that FFS does not meet their criteria for effectiveness or 
efficiency (Feder et al., 2004; Davis, 2006), provoking responses (Gallagher et al., 2006; 
van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007) and controversy. 
 
Research in the Andes has suggested that FFS is far from a homogeneous entity. Over 
time, actors of government agencies, NGOs, and community-based organizations 
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commonly manage the methodology in different ways, leading to diverse and even 
contradictory expressions (Paredes, 2001; Mendizabel, 2002; Sherwood and Thiele, 2003; 
Borja, 2004; Schut, 2006). In his book Cognition in the Wild, Edwin Hutchins (1996) 
explores how cognition performs in its “natural habitat,” i.e., in the realm of spontaneous, 
culturally constituted human activity. Borrowing from Hutchins’ metaphor, this paper 
examines the performance of FFS in the social wild – i.e., its spontaneous transformations 
following its release into the hands of researchers, development practitioners, farmer 
leaders, and their organizations.  
 
Based on diverse studies (Jiggins, 2001; Paredes, 2001; Barrera et al., 2001; Mendizabel, 
2002; Barrera et al. 2004; Borja, 2004; Maurceri, 2004; Schut, 2006), project documents, 
field visits, interviews with FFS Facilitators and project participants, and nearly a decade 
of reflective practice, in this chapter I pursue a single line of inquiry: what happened to 
FFS in the social wild? Drawing on the literature on socio-technical change and 
evolutionary economics, I close with conclusions and a wider discussion on how people-
centred approaches may evolve from a niche-level contribution to influence the broader 
trajectory of agricultural development. Before going on, however, I need to provide a 
conceptual foundation on knowledge production and socio-technical change.  
 
Conceptual matters 
 
Knowledge production in science and development 
 
In their work on knowledge production of science and research in contemporary society, 
Gibbons et al. (2000) identify an ongoing transformation in practice. They describe two 
modes: more traditional science based on knowledge produced from within the confines 
of a disciplinary perspective (Mode 1) and an emerging form of science produced from 
within the context of application (Mode 2). 
 
Born from classical Newtonian model of inquiry, Mode 1 production of knowledge tends 
to be theoretical and academic. In rural development, the “experts” – i.e., scientists – 
diversely employ this mode from within particular disciplinary contexts – agronomy, 
economics, health or government. Mode 1 is homogeneous in terms of inquiry and skills 
employed. It operates from within established and centralized hierarchical structures, with 
well-defined codes and rules that govern behaviour and how consensus is reached. 
Preoccupied with producing knowledge that is generaliseable across localities, it is 
characterized by low local accountability and reflexivity. Instead, its chief preoccupation is 
upholding disciplinary or professional norms. Quality is enforced through “peer review,” 
with peers selected based on past compliance with norms. This type of production 
rewards individual creativity only within the limits of established norms. Knowledge is 
built on past findings and becomes cumulative. Contributions spread through the 
professions and broader society through spontaneous processes of “diffusion.” 
 
In Mode 2 knowledge production is viewed as “people-centred” in that it prioritizes local 
concerns. It is practical, in that it emerges from the process of localized distributive 
problem solving. This mode represents a new way of thinking, organizing, and doing. It 
Farmer Field Schools in the Social Wild 149 
may involve both experts and practitioners and is transdisciplinary – where multiple and 
even contradictory codes and rules collide and convene. It is heterogenous, in that it 
demands diverse experiences and skills, and operates in heterarchical structures – the 
interaction of mixed and dissimilar organizations with necessarily loose and flexible 
decision-making processes. Consensus is highly conditioned by context and evolves with 
it. Knowledge is context specific and highly dependent on localities. Mode 2 is 
characterized by high social accountability and reflexivity. It is demand-oriented and 
inclusive throughout and highly sensitive to outcomes and impacts. Quality assurance 
depends on the social composition of the review system, but a central preoccupation is 
local relevance of outcomes and impacts. The knowledge production process is 
characteristically distributive. It accumulates through the repeated configuration of human 
resources in flexible and transient forms of organization and decision-making. Spread 
occurs during a process of generation and is largely limited to it. According to Gibbons et 
al. (2000: 1), “The emergence of Mode 2, we believe, is profound and calls into question 
the adequacy of familiar knowledge producing institutions, whether universities, 
government research establishments, or corporate laboratories.” Table 6.1 compares 
Mode 1 and Mode 2 production of knowledge. 
 
Table 6.1 Comparison of Mode 1 (expert-led) and Mode 2 (lay or people-led) knowledge 
production (based on the ideas of Gibbons et al., 2000) 
 
Criterion Mode 1: Knowledge produced 
in the context of abstraction 
Mode 2: Knowledge produced 
in the context of application 
Nature of knowledge 
production  
Theoretical – produced from 
within a disciplinary community 
Practical – produced from within a 
problem context 
Bias – rules that govern 
conduct 
Disciplinary and multidisciplinary 
– single or multiple system of rules 
governing conduct 
Transdisciplinary – dynamic, 
multiple systems of rules collide 
and collude 
Problem-solving – experience 
and skills employed 
Homogeneous – focused, well 
defined experience and skill set 
Heterogeneous – diverse 
experiences and skills involved 
Organization structures Centralized and hierarchical – 
well-established; graded and top-
down 
Diverse and heterarchical – loose, 
flexible, and fluid structures; 
mixed and dissimilar constituents 
Negotiation and consensus – 
resolution of differences 
Closed and static – conditioned by 
pre-established norms and rules 
Open and transient – conditioned 
by context of application and 
evolves with it 
Nature of knowledge Generaliseable and cumulative Context specific and dependent on 
locality 
Social accountability and 
reflexivity 
Low – offer oriented, exclusive 
and low sensitivity to impact of 
outcomes; preoccupied with 
internal criteria and priorities 
High – demand oriented, inclusive 
and high sensitivity to impact of 
outcomes; preoccupied with 
relevance 
Quality control – enforcement 
of ‘good science’ 
Self referential – peer review 
judgements; peers selected based 
on compliance with norms; 
emphasis on individual creativity 
from within disciplinary bounds 
Broadly based – composite and 
multi-dimensional; dependent on 
social composition of review 
system; emphasizes group think; 
socially extensive and 
accommodating 
Theory of knowledge spread  Spontaneous diffusion based on 
merit 
Repeated processes of generation 
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Socio-technical change and the expert system 
 
Van der Ploeg (2003) emphasizes that farmers and their families do not operate in a social 
vacuum but rather other individual actors and social groups are directly and indirectly 
involved, each of which may emerge from colluding or diverging activity. Such tendencies 
in turn produce “constellations of various modes of ordering,” interlocking, and collective 
definitions of courses of action and development opportunities, communities of aligned 
heterogeneous actors or “socio-technical networks.”  
 
Nelson and Winter (1977) described what técnicos believed as possible or desirable as 
producing a “technology regime” and “natural trajectory.” Rip and Kemp (1998) explored 
how otherwise heterogeneous groups of actors involved in science and technology 
produce patterned ways of thinking and organizing that lead to structural properties 
capable of enabling and constraining certain activity. Resulting dominant “socio-technical 
regimes” actively set rules in the form of routines, protocols, norms and regulations 
through problem definition, informing perspectives, engineering practices, and exploiting 
niches of development opportunity, thereby guiding behaviour and enabling means of 
continuity and transition. The regime generates and distributes resources. It creates and 
implements regulatory frameworks that affirm or marginalize certain pursuits. A socio-
technical regime, then, is seen as both a factory and a storehouse of rules and the 
organisation and employment of resources for the production, use, and regulation of 
technological processes and products. 
 
Drawing on biological metaphor to explain the evolutionary processes of socio-technical 
change, Schot and Geels (2007: 5) propose, “They [socio-technical regimes] perform the 
task of genes and define the boundary between technological species.” While genetic 
crossing through sexual reproduction does not exist in socio-technical regimes, 
heterogeneity and “selection” emerge through dynamic interactions of the regime, both 
from within and without its rule structure, opening up “niches” of opportunity for change 
and transition. They emphasize that niches must not be viewed as a market or resource 
void waiting to be filled, but rather the product of social agency. Niches emerge into the 
socio-technical environment as constructions. Niches either represent differential growth 
within the regime (a “market” niche), thereby contributing to its slow and steady 
development within the evolving rule set, or they emerge from without the rule structure 
(a radical “technological” niche), thereby representing a potential de-stabilising force of 
discontinuity (Levinthal, 1998). In the case of radical technological niches, tensions are 
generated, leading to different forms of responses. Individual or collections of firms may 
raise doubts over whether or not established norms and rules are being followed, or they 
may seek opportunity in taking the risk of joining an emergent network. Based on 
perceptions of priorities, governments and other actors might encourage or discourage 
certain tendencies and movement. Over time, developments from within the emergent 
niche, attractive novelties, new rule sets and organisation may emerge to challenge and 
replace the existing order. 
 
Van der Ploeg (2003) explains that during the second half of the twentieth century a 
dominant socio-technical regime became built on an expert system and its modernisation 
Farmer Field Schools in the Social Wild 151 
project. In agriculture, it was characterized by the industrialization of production, 
especially reliance on external inputs and markets. While this “expert system” first 
emerged in the industrial countries, it quickly spread across social and geographical space 
to influence agricultural development across the planet.  
 
An expert system in Ecuador emerged as part of this globalising phenomenon, informing 
and shaping a particular trajectory of development. Emerging with the land reform 
policies of the mid-1960s, Article 22 of the 1989 Ecuadorian Law of Agrarian 
Development provides a clear articulation of what became a dominant view on 
agricultural development: “Agricultural research will elevate the productivity of human 
and natural resources through the generation and adoption of technologies of easy 
diffusion and application with the objective of increasing production….” Accordingly, a 
socio-technical regime has organised around the “generation” and “adoption” of 
technologies, assuming that research will enable the increase of production and 
productivity, leading rural people to fulfilment and satisfaction in life. This regime has 
come to set standards and regulate “best practice,” i.e., innovations that increase the 
coherency, efficiency or prestige of the established order. As we have seen in previous 
chapters, in agriculture, standards emerged as norms for crop and variety selections, total 
tillage, planting dates and densities, and crop management practices. Through means of 
control, such as determination of efficiency and effectiveness criteria and the distribution 
of resources, the regime in Ecuador has systematically come to legitimise proposals that 
resonate with its established ways of thinking and doing. Thereby, it marginalizes others 
deemed less efficient or relevant. Similar to elsewhere, the socio-technical regime in 
Ecuador actively uncovers and promotes as well as hides and conceals. 
 
Competing proposals of development 
 
In northern Ecuador, as elsewhere in Latin America, the roots of agricultural 
modernisation date to land reform, which was followed by government policies aimed at 
“technification” of production through specialised, external sources of innovation, 
particularly information and technology (Barsky, 1980). As such, the socio-technical 
regime that emerged in Ecuador came to value the role of technical specialists or experts, 
while farmers became seen as relatively passive actors with limited knowledge and in need 
of assistance. Exchange of information and technologies became mediated through 
currency and markets, and decisions were based on instrumental logic, such as economic 
cost-benefit (i.e., monetary costs vs. monetary gain) (Barsky, 1984). The central 
preoccupation of expert-led, “technology-centred” development became: what people 
don’t do and how to get them to do something new, for example to adopt a particular 
innovation, such as an agrochemical product or an Integrated Pest Management (IPM) 
package. Since under this paradigm of thought initiatives were largely pre-determined, 
approaches became amenable to external manipulation through relatively closed projects 
with tight budgets, timelines, and administrative controls. 
 
As Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) explain, the contradictions of industrial era 
development, especially the degradation of natural resources and heightened social 
vulnerabilities, give birth to new movements. In rural development practice, during the 
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1970s, an alternative proposal to the technology-centred, expert system emerged around 
diverse notions of user-centred, participatory, endogenous development, or people-
centred development.1 Instead of relying on outside experts to provide information and 
solutions, people-centred development seeks to engage people in a continuous search for 
local novelties as seedbeds of change. Thereby, they value farmers as highly 
knowledgeable and capable of solving problems on their own. Rather than through 
currency and markets, people-centred development emphasizes the mediation of ideas, 
experience, and commodities through social relationships. Highly dependent on local 
perceptions and creativity for outcomes, people-centred development demands highly 
iterative and open-ended learning and action processes, where it is essentially impossible 
to predict outcomes or timelines. To be effective, people-centred interventions require a 
great deal of common understanding with individuals and their communities, e.g., 
knowledge on what people do and why. Much attention is provided to relationships, 
historical analysis, negotiated agreements, and concerted action. Table 6.2 summarizes 
characteristics of technology and people-centred development.  
 
Table 6.2 Conceptual comparison between people- and technology-centred development 
 
Characteristic Technology-centred development People-centred development 
Primary source of 
change 
Exogenous – induced through 
specialized, usually external, sources of 
information and technology 
Endogenous – induced through 
localized contingency and on-going 
practice of living  
Knowledge Expert – specialized and highly 
standardized, quantifiable, 
preoccupation with rigor and 
objectivity 
Lay – general and highly diversified, 
qualitative, highly subjective 
Time Discrete – bound with beginnings and 
ends 
Indiscrete – not divided into parts or 
separated 
View of local actors 
(e.g., farmers) 
Passive – limited knowledge and in 
need of assistance 
Active – knowledgeable and capable of 
solving problems 
Exchange Commoditized; mediated through 
currency and markets 
Non-commoditized; mediated through 
social relationships 
Logic behind 
decisions 
Monetary costs vs. monetary benefits Nurturing social relationships 
Preoccupation Adoption – What people don’t do; 
work to get people to do something 
differently 
Common understanding – What 
people do and why; work with people 
to advance common agenda 
 
Farmer Field Schools as a locus for radical change 
 
Farmer Field School methodology emerged in large part as a response to the adverse 
consequences of modern rice farming in Asia, especially the health and environmental 
effects of pesticides (Kenmore et al., 1987). The methodology was based on the premise 
that farmers were motivated and capable innovators who, provided the insights of 
biology, could come up with effective solutions to their pest management problems 
                                                       
1 The Development literature includes diverse forms of people-centred development (e.g., user-centred, 
learner-centred, participatory, endogenous and farmer-to-farmer development), each with its own histories and 
nuances. For examples in Latin America, see: Freire (1973 and 1990), Bunch (1982), Holt-Giménez (2006). 
Other expressions of ‘people-centred’ development are described in: Chambers (1983), Chambers et al. (1990), 
Krisna et al., (1997), Uphoff et al. (1998), Haverkort et al., (2002), and Leeuwis (2004). 
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themselves. FFS accommodated typical learning styles of lay people, such as hands-on, in-
the-field learning that was closely linked with the priority crop of interest (Matteson et al., 
1994). Over time, the methodology diversified to include new crops, animals, and other 
aspects of rural life (e.g., market interactions, specialized soil and water management, 
human health and AIDS) in different geographies and cultures (see, for example, the 
English and Spanish versions of LEISA, 2003a and b or the examples available at: 
http://www.infobridge.org/ffsnet).  
 
Rather than provide answers to pre-determined questions, FFS brought together farmers 
in groups and involved them in discussions over cropping concerns. The methodology 
strategically aimed to limit information to what farmers don’t know (or do), but need to 
know to improve their agriculture. FFS sought to shed new light on previously hidden 
agricultural phenomena, for example, over insect ecology and especially pest-beneficial 
interactions. It employed discovery-based learning experiments to help farmers “see” what 
was previously hidden, for example over the life cycle of a particular insect of concern. 
Rather than promote specific technologies, farmer groups systematically tested their own 
ideas through comparative trials. Box 6.1 summarizes the design features of FFS.  
 
FFS also came to emphasize collective action for addressing increasingly complex 
community-level social and socio-environmental challenges, what became “Community 
IPM” (Pontius et al., 2002; Röling and Jiggins, 1998). Van der Fliert (2006) summarizes 
how FFS aimed to transform conventional agriculture extension. Through positioning 
farmers as highly knowledgeable, emphasizing social interaction as a means to learning, 
and utilising iterative learning-action processes, the methodology was an explicit 
application of Mode 2 knowledge production and people-centred development.  
 
Box 6.1 Learning principles of Farmer Field Schools (based on Gallagher, 1999) 
 
• Non-formal adult education – Adults have substantial life experience and are largely 
independent, self-directed learners. 
• Interactive group learning – People learn best in groups, where they can interact and 
exchange ideas based on their diverse life experiences. 
• Content linked to crop and animal stages/life cycle – Farmers address technical content 
immediately, as it emerges with the development of the crop or animal and the labour 
and cultural activities associated with its production. 
• The field is the best place for learning – Rural people prefer applied knowledge and learn 
best during hands-on interaction with their crops and animals in the field. 
• Basic scientific concepts – Every farm and every season is different; farmers need to 
manage general concepts and apply them to specific local contexts. 
• Continual learning and experimentation – Agriculture is a highly dynamic enterprise, and 
as a result, farmers never stop learning and innovating. 
• Farmers become “experts” – As a result of the above, participants become critical 
thinkers, highly capable of independently solving problems and taking on the challenges 
of their agricultural development. 
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By design, FFS is knowledge produced through collective problem solving in the local 
context – with local actors in the field and community. The learning-action process is 
transdisciplinary in that it addresses the multiple and interactive aspects of agriculture 
production – soils, plants, pest management, marketing, as well as collective social 
pursuits, such as the formation of groups, associations, and cooperatives. FFS employs 
diverse perspectives of farmers and expert knowledge in open-ended discovery. It emerges 
from organizational processes that are socially mixed and demand extensive negotiations 
and consensus-building among participants. The end product, for example, the practice of 
IPM, is not pre-determined, but rather it emerges through the process of problem solving. 
The specific outcomes of FFS are highly context specific around a given crop, field and 
culture, and as a result, they are not widely applicable beyond a given locality. Spread of 
knowledge depends on repeated application in new localities. The context specific, socio-
environmentally embedded process of learning and action makes it highly reflexive. The 
participants demand relevance from day one and outcomes undergo their continual 
review. In this mode of knowledge production, “good science” is that which leads to 
learning and practice that responds to felt needs.  
 
FFS represented a departure from the expert system and its modernisation project, as 
expressed through conventional extension practice (Table 6.3). Instead of experts who 
provided answers, FFS employed “facilitators” who consulted farmers in process design 
and guide open-ended learning. According to this model, participants became responsible 
for conducting experiments and finding answers. Without significant changes to program 
staffing, resource distributions, and organizational designs, FFS could not be 
implemented. As a result of its conflict with the established practice, it was inevitable that 
the methodology was going to provoke strong reactions.  
 
Table 6.3 Comparison between conventional extension and FFS (Pumisacho and 
Sherwood, 2005) 
 
 Expert-led extension: 
technology-centring 
Farmer Field Schools:  
people-centring 
Underlying logic Instrumental and directed Organic and interactive 
Who chooses content/themes? Expert/specialist Participants themselves 
Learning content Narrow and well-defined Broad and open to questioning 
Teaching/learning methods • Formal lectures 
• Demonstration 
• Controlled experiments 
• Dialogue 
• Discovery-based activities 
• Open-ended experiments 
Role of participants Passive subjects: Collect and 
memorize what is taught 
Active subjects: Question, learn 
and teach, find solutions 
Role of teacher/trainer Active subject: talk, teach, 
discipline, determine relevant 
content, provide answers 
Active subject: Facilitate, raise 
questions, learn and teach, 
provoke discovery 
Primary source of experience Expert/specialist Everyone 
Who is knowledgeable? Expert/specialist Everyone 
Communication style Uni-directional: from expert to 
participants, limited and controlled 
Bi-directional: between facilitator 
and participants, open and free 
How do people learn? Collecting and memorizing what is 
taught 
Reflection over personal 
experience 
Desired effect on participants Learn to adopt and manage 
technology 
Learn to analyze and solve 
problems independently 
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FFS in Carchi 
 
Between 1999 and 2004, Manuel Pumisacho, from the Ecuadorian Instituto Nacional 
Autónoma de Investigación Agropecuaria (INIAP), and I, at the time a Participatory IPM 
Training Specialist at the Ecuador field office of the International Potato Centre (CIP), in 
collaboration with diverse projects and initiatives,2 spirited the introduction of FFS to 
Ecuador as well as other parts of Latin America. During that period, we directly 
implemented Farmer Field Schools, wrote and managed FFS grants, designed and 
implemented Training of Trainers, coordinated and distributed resources to an emergent 
network of FFS Master Trainers and Facilitators, and advocated and lobbied in favour of 
the methodology with public officials. Our approach to FFS is generally summarized in 
Pumisacho and Sherwood (2000 and 2005) and our general experience is summarised in 
Luther et al. (2005). In this chapter I commonly refer to Pumisacho and Sherwood as the 
“FFS project leaders.” In 2002, I left CIP and Pumisacho moved on to new projects. 
While we continued to interact with FFS from a distance, thereafter, neither Pumisacho 
nor I maintained close contact with the FFS movement in Carchi. I describe the ensuing 
period as the release of FFS into the social wild. 
 
Arrival of FFS to the Andes 
 
By the early 1990s, FFS became a major methodological thrust in Southeast Asia 
(Kenmore, 1991). It revealed that insecticide use was largely responsible for pest 
problems, and it contributed to a broad ban on pesticides for rice in Indonesia. Kenmore 
leveraged this experience at the FAO, and he convinced countries to develop national FFS 
programs on rice IPM in the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam, and elsewhere. 
By the end of the decade, Pontius et al. (2002) estimated that over two million farmers of 
Southeast Asia had graduated from FFS. Kenmore and colleagues established the Global 
IPM Facility at FAO headquarters in Rome, in part as a means for exporting FFS to other 
parts of the world, especially Africa and Latin America.  
 
During that period, governments throughout Latin America were well into “economic 
modernisation,” which, in Ecuador, became articulated as the Law of Modernisation of 
the State (1993). For public agriculture policy, this generally involved the dismembering of 
public extension and research services and placing the responsibility of development in 
the hands of private consultancy companies and the agrochemical industry (Beckerman 
and Solimano, 2002; Gallardo-Zavala, 2003). Similar to van der Ploeg’s (2003) description 
of the Dutch agriculture system, the region’s ministries of agriculture, public research 
institutes, and universities, and the growing agrochemical industry still could be viewed as 
coherent units. Despite major reorganizations and budget cuts in public systems, a 
dominant logic of the expert and technology-based change continued to shape and 
enforce agriculture development. In this context, INIAP was in search of new and 
creative ways of pursuing its mandate and CIP was charged with supporting its national 
potato program. 
 
                                                       
2 Specifically, EcoSalud/IDRC, FORTIPAPA/COSUDE, PapaAndina/COSUDE, FAO/TCP-ECU0067 and 
Global IPM Facility, and the Soil- and IPM-CRSP/USAID. 
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By the mid-1990s, word of the success of FFS in Southeast Asia and similar experiences in 
Latin America (for example, Bentley, 1992) had reached people at CIP and INIAP in 
Ecuador through publications, conferences, and often donor demands. By my arrival in 
1998, supervisors in Lima and Quito already had decided that “more participation” was 
called for. My new colleagues expressed frustrations over the shortcomings of past 
experience with technology transfer. The conclusion among the international and national 
staff was: “Farmers are not adopting our technologies.” I essentially was handed a salary 
and project resources, and was told to implement participatory research and Farmer Field 
Schools. Within months of arriving at CIP, contacts at the Global Facility and I began to 
support FFS as an explicit effort to shift the dominant development paradigm of the 
Andes towards more people-centred designs.3 
 
Agriculture professionals and their organizations in the Andes generally were resistant to 
ideas from other regions, but they were willing to explore common experience among 
successful IPM work and to adapt local methods (Thiele et al., 2001; Luther et al., 2005). 
“Participatory approaches” became a passageway for FFS. In 1997, CIP and its partners in 
Bolivia and Peru started to experiment with “participatory training” (Torrez et al. 1999a 
and b), incorporating some elements of the FFS approach, but not the Agroecosystem 
Analysis (AAE), an activity considered at the heart of the methodology (Pontius et al., 
2002). To strengthen the introduction of FFS in the region, in 1999, the Global IPM 
Facility and CIP led a three-month Training of Trainers course at a MAG centre in 
Guaslan, Ecuador for 33 professional extensionists and farmer promoters from Ecuador, 
Bolivia and Peru. The organizers subsequently charged the graduates with the task of 
introducing FFS in their respective countries. 
 
PROINPA (2001) in Bolivia, Ortiz (2002) and Tenorio (2002) in Peru and Pumisacho and 
Sherwood (2005) in Ecuador describe the original designs of FFS in the Andes. Figure 6.1 
summarizes the methodology’s stages and activities. FFS in the Andes aimed to conserve 
the central features of FFS in Asia. Nevertheless, in the Andes FFS emerged in unique 
socio-cultural and environmental contexts that posed new challenges.  
 
In the lowlands of Southeast Asia, FFS focused on the stable crop rice. As a result, insect 
pests, especially the brown planthopper, became a major preoccupation, largely because 
the environmental conditions of the lowlands favoured the proliferation of insects. 
Certainly, the fact that entomologists created FFS also deepened a certain insect bias. 
Meanwhile in the highland Andes, FFS focused on potato and the crop’s major 
phytosanitary concern: the disease late blight (caused by Phytophthora infestans). As a result, 
in the Andes plant pathologists came to play a central role in the initial application of the 
methodology. While public investment in agriculture continued in Southeast Asia during 
this period, as a result of agriculture modernisation in Latin America, the different project 
and institutional contexts placed unique demands on FFS (Sherwood et al., 2000). Because 
of a vacuum of public support for rural development, non-governmental actors in Central 
                                                       
3 As expressed in FAO/TCP/ECU0067 and Sherwood et al. (2000), FFS was proposed in Ecuador and 
elsewhere in the region as “a means for filling the void” made by modernisation of public services and in 
particular expert-led agricultural development. 
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and South America, particularly NGOs and CBOs, were called on from the beginning to 
play a lead role in coordination and facilitation of FFS (Box 6.2). 
 
 
Figure 6.1 FFS methodological process in the Andes (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2005) 
 
In Bolivia, the PROINPA Foundation and the NGO ASAR took the lead in the design of 
the initial FFS training curriculum in the country. These organizations closely collaborated 
to promote the methodology at pilot sites. PROINPA usually assumed responsibility for 
the research activities and provision of plant material, while ASAR took responsibility for 
the multiplication of seeds of resistant cultivars and the replication of the experience at 
new locations. Although the courses incorporated discovery-based learning techniques, 
farmers had little say in content and design. The preoccupation of these FFS was the 
“transfer of technology packages.” In the learning fields, farmers tested previously 
validated strategies of chemical control for late blight with resistant cultivars (Navia et al. 
1995; Navia and Fernández-Northcote, 1996; Fernández-Northcote et al., 1999). Training 
came to concentrate on the application of the strategy and related components. 
Participatory research in FFS largely was limited to evaluation of new cultivars and 
advanced clones.  
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Box 6.2 Obvious differences between FFS in Asia and the Andes 
 
In 1999, when researchers and development practitioners began to test FFS in the Andes, 
potato was the principal economic crop and the one that demanded the greatest use of 
external inputs. In intensive production areas such as Carchi, farmers spent over $2,000 
per hectare on fertilizers, pesticides, tractors, and related labour. FFS in potato IPM 
contained technical content on the organisms that tended to have a comparative 
advantage in higher altitude production systems: plant pathogens and resulting diseases, 
especially late blight (Nelson et al., 2001). The biological motility and aggressiveness of the 
late blight pathogen limited the usefulness of crop-level cultural controls. Management 
generally depended on late blight resistant varieties and judicious use of fungicides. As a 
result, pathologists and host resistance came to play a central role in FFS in the Andes. 
Additionally, in Ecuador researchers quickly found that mechanized tillage on steep 
hillsides was a major cause of soil loss, so FFS focused much attention on soil erosion, 
which was not a concern for lowland rice farmers. Also, potato farmers often over applied 
synthetic fertilizers. As a result, FFS often emphasized how to increase productivity 
through the introduction of resistant varieties and reducing fungicide and fertilizer use.  
 
The conditions of the Andes demanded a suite of new discovery-based learning activities. 
In addition to the FFS experience in S.E. Asia, there was ample experience in Latin 
America on which to draw (Bentley et al., 1993). While discovery-based approaches had 
proven useful in helping farmers to manage plant disease (Sherwood, 1997), the 
microscopic size of pathogens made them invisible to farmers and highly abstract 
(Bentley, 1989 and 1991), which posed unique problems for agricultural trainers.  
 
Rural demographics were very different between the regions. In Southeast Asia, farmers 
commonly cultivated much less than a hectare. Meanwhile, in Carchi, they tended to farm 
three to five hectares. Further, rural people in Southeast Asia tend to live in concentrated 
communities of thousands of families. The communities of the highland Andes are 
commonly made up of less than 10-50 families spread out across large areas. This 
demographic created challenges in bringing together farmers as well as difficulties with 
communication between sessions. Often participants asked for fewer, more intensive 
meetings. 
 
The institutional environment of the Andes, especially the role of public agencies, was 
substantially different than that of Southeast Asia. Andean countries underwent sharp cuts 
in public investment in agriculture and rural development during the decade of the 1990s. 
As a result, governments generally were not amenable to large national-level programs 
such as those that championed FFS in Southeast Asia. Increasingly, short-term consultants 
began to dominate community development and NGOs and these operated time-bound, 
project-based contributions. A number of NGO partners claimed that their 
competitiveness depended on project-based results, implying that staff time had to be 
continually remunerated. They were not commonly willing to send staff to intensive three-
month Training of Trainer (ToT) courses. This led us to shift to semi-presential trainings 
based on biweekly sessions over periods of six or more months. It also led to an emphasis 
on market-oriented approaches to financing FFS and farmer-led FFS. 
Farmer Field Schools in the Social Wild 159 
In Peru, CARE became responsible for community-level implementation of FFS. CIP led 
content design, delivered clones and cultivars, and monitored the data generated as a 
result in the farmer-run research plots. Similar to Bolivia, these FFS included lively 
discovery learning activities, but they also emphasized research intensive activities. The 
FFS became “Participatory Research-Farmer Field Schools” (PR-FFS), a hybrid of the 
learning intensive designs of FFS and research that targeted scientists’ priorities, especially 
the disease late blight (Nelson et al., 2001). As part of the FFS, farmers conducted trials 
on disease resistant cultivars and advanced clones as well as the use of varying rates of 
fungicides. Each FFS lasted two or three years, with emphasis on research during the first 
cycle and thereafter the progressive transfer of responsibilities to participants and 
communities. 
 
In Ecuador, we explicitly proposed FFS as a “strategic people-centred response” designed 
to help local actors “overcome the challenges of modernisation.”4 MAG, INIAP, and CIP 
positioned FFS as “…. an effective response to the on-going privatization of public 
services and decentralization of the state, which places the agenda of agricultural 
development in the hands of local governments, NGOs and the communities 
themselves.” We sought to draw on FFS as a means of institutionalising a “farmer-to-
farmer” approach and proposed the establishment of new communication linkages 
between networks of farmer promoters and development practitioners and scientists. 
Partners proposed to increase local agricultural knowledge, described as “ecological 
literacy,” through experience in FFS and subsequently to support intensive technology 
development by means of research groups composed of FFS graduates as well as técnicos5 
and scientists from a collection of rural development agencies, research institutions, and 
universities. 
 
Emergence as “best practice” 
 
As a result of the startling research outcomes on the problems of modern potato 
production in Carchi (Chapter 2), CIP and INIAP’s agenda became centred around the 
improvement of farm productivity and rural health through decreasing dependence on 
agrochemicals. Following the Tradeoffs research that prioritised IPM and a pilot FFS in 
San Francisco de Libertad in 1999, FFS in potato production became the prescribed way 
forward. 
 
Our first goal was to demonstrate the potential of FFS, so we started off by designing a 
thorough documentation system (described in Borja, 2004), and we commissioned impact 
studies. Organisations supporting FFS have used diverse approaches to assess the 
methodology’s impact (van den Berg, 2004; van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007). Due to the 
time limitations of the projects in Carchi, we chiefly employed before and after evaluations 
of learning on key IPM concepts and cost-benefit analysis from the learning plots 
                                                       
4 See  “Development of the Innovation Capacity in Integrated Pest Management and Production (IPPM) for 
Greater Food Security in the Ecuadorian Highlands,” FAO Technical Cooperation Project (TCP/ECU0067) 
that INIAP, MAG, and CIP conducted between November 2000 and October 2002. 
5 In the Andes, as elsewhere in Latin America, the title técnico or ingeniero is applied to a class of academically 
trained professionals generally holding a four-year, BSc- or sometimes MSc-level technical degree in agronomy 
or a field of engineering.  
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(conventional vs. IPM comparison plots) (Barrera et al., 2001). Subsequently, as a growing 
number FFS were completed, colleagues conducted ex-post studies to assess longer-term 
considerations, such as technology adoption and adaptation (Barrera et al., 2004; Mauceri, 
2004; Schut, 2006).  
 
With initial support from the EcoSalud and FORTIPAPA projects, during 2000 we 
conducted a new round of pilot Field Schools in Libertad as well as Cuba and Piartal to 
demonstrate the potential of FFS in three geographic centres of potato production in 
Carchi. Results from the “ballot box” tests showed that FFS helped farmers to 
significantly increase their knowledge of relevant ecological principals (Box 6.3). 
Economic data from the FFS comparison plots demonstrated how farmers could 
substantially decrease agrochemical use (including synthetic pesticides and fertilizers) 
without decreasing production by area (Table 6.4). Through cost-benefit analysis, we 
argued that FFS graduates could decrease production costs for a tonne of potatoes by 
about 30% (from $104 to $80), leading to arguments that wide scale application of FFS 
could generate a 25 percent gain in efficiency that would carry on year after year. We drew 
on selected studies from other regions, especially 25 world-level studies summarised in 
van den Berg (2004), to further substantiate such claims. We searched opportunities to 
share these data in public appearances and publications, and we utilized the information in 
requests for further investment in our projects.6 
 
Box 6.3 IPM learning: before and after results of “ballot box” evaluations in Carchi 
 
 
 
Farmer Field Schools in Carchi employed before and after ballot box tests on knowledge 
of key biological and ecological concepts deemed essential for IPM, including information 
on soil conservation and fertility management, seeds, varieties, pest and diseases, and 
beneficial organisms, as well as productivity and marketing concerns (Pumisacho and 
Sherwood, 2005). Results were used to make claims on the impact of FFS on participant 
learning (for examples, see Sherwood et al., 2003; Barrera et al., 2004). 
 
The arrival of additional FAO project resources brought on board the Minister of 
Agriculture, who assigned members of the National Directorate of Investigation and 
Technology Transfer (DITTE) to support the “institutionalisation” of FFS in Carchi and 
                                                       
6 For examples, see Sherwood et al. (2003 and 2005). 
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elsewhere. In practice, this involved the creation of minimum standards for FFS graduates 
and facilitators as well as the establishment of a database on approved Field Schools.7  
 
Table 6.4 Cost-benefit analysis of learning plots from three Farmer Field Schools 
(USD/ha) (Barrera et al., 2001) 
 
Community Cuba La Libertad Piartal 
Plot IPM Standard IPM Standard IPM Standard 
Direct costs: 
Soil preparation 42 94 68 85 38 47 
Planting 233 183 289 136 220 220 
Fertilization 261 334 266 272 246 388 
Labour 120 105 50 81 110 110 
Phytosanitary controls 276 362 139 213 133 183 
Harvest 167 237 119 227 180 180 
Storage 21.60 22 18 18 22 22 
Land rent 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Total direct 1,199 1,417 1,030 1,112 1,027 1,229 
Indirect costs: 
Interest (18%) 216 255 185 200 185 221 
Unforeseen (5%) 60 71 51 56 51 62 
Admin. (5%) 60 71 51 56 51 62 
Total indirect 335 397 288 311 288 344 
Total costs 1,534 1,813 1,317 1,423 1,315 1,574 
Harvest (kg) 23,406 17,953 15,680 14,342 18,000 18,000 
Price (kg) 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Gross profit 5,383 4,129 3,136 2,868 3,680 3,680 
Net profit 3,849 2,316 1,819 1,445 2,365 2,106 
Cost/benefit ratio 3.50 2.28 2.38 2.02 2.79 2.34 
Return 250% 128% 138% 102% 180% 134% 
 
 
As part of the FAO project, in 2001, Pumisacho and I formed a coterie of facilitators to 
champion FFS in northern Ecuador and elsewhere (Luther et al., 2005). We supported an 
intensive 400-hour Training of Trainers for 35 farmers and técnicos from the northern 
Ecuadorian provinces of Imbabura and Carchi (26 people completed the training). Most 
of the participants were from public organizations (INIAP, MAG, municipal governments 
and technical schools), national NGOs, and community-based organizations 
(communities and farmer cooperatives). Four were from private consulting firms and 
agrochemical companies. To accommodate the diverse demands of our partners, we 
expanded the technical platform around “Integrated Crop Management” (ICM). Similar to 
the Asian approach to IPM, ICM emphasized soil fertility through managing soil life, 
limited tillage, cover crops and green manures, multi-cropping, rotation schemes, and 
minimal use of synthetic fertilizers. The FFS in ICM were primarily applied to potato, but 
                                                       
7 Borja (2004) describes this system. 
   Learning from Carchi 162 
to deepen the penetration of the methodology, we encouraged partners to apply FFS to 
other crops and animal systems, including field beans, tomato, Andean grains (quinoa and 
lupine), onion, pasture/milk production, guinea pigs, and chickens. 
 
By the end of 2001, positive results from ex-post evaluations on the first round of Field 
Schools began to arrive. Studies found that a high percentage of FFS graduates adopted 
IPM technology, especially resistant varieties and insect traps, enabling many to 
substantially decrease pesticide use (Paredes, 2001; Barrera et al., 2004). Farmers said they 
welcomed the methodology as a refreshing change to the “theory” and “impractical” 
recommendations of técnicos. A number of graduates expressed that they had felt 
abandoned by the government and were eager to work with people who were willing to 
spend time with them in the field and learn about the difficulties they faced, which were 
not always limited to production agriculture. While some farmers were impatient with the 
open-ended, discovery-based learning of FFS (i.e., having to find answers on their own), 
they favoured the exposure to “new technologies,” such as seed and varieties as well as 
information on pests. Overall, studies found a positive trend in learning of key concepts 
and innovation. Participants liked that FFS facilitators treated them as equals. As a result 
of their enthusiasm, FFS graduates became the best salespeople of the methodology. 
 
During meetings and presentations, Pumisacho and I continually referenced the 
contributions of FFS in Southeast Asia, and we cited the FAO and World Bank as 
important international organizations that were committed to the approach. We translated 
materials and showed videos of farmers and técnicos in Indonesia and Cambodia who 
advocated on behalf of the methodology. Presentations were made in numerous public 
and private organizations in Carchi and the capital as well as dozens of communities. We 
claimed that FFS was the “wave of the future” for agriculture extension. Additionally, 
colleagues at the FAO’s Global IPM Facility in Rome lobbied on behalf of our proposals 
to assure that our projects received full consideration.  
 
We found that data were not enough to fully “sell” the methodology. Many officials, 
researchers, and development practitioners asked for more concrete evidence. In 
response, we sent outstanding FFS graduates to the capital so that they could provide 
personal testimonies on the value of the methodology. We aggressively searched 
opportunities for FFS graduates to make impressive demonstrations of their knowledge 
during public seminars, congresses and other forums. We arranged for them to appear in 
newspaper articles as well as on the radio and television. We felt, however, that further 
legitimacy only could be gained by taking the bureaucrats and politicians to the field. 
 
FFS methodology included a field day, a daylong event when participants organized six to 
ten thematic stations to present learning and the outcomes of experiments and other 
activities. Often officials and técnicos who were uninformed about the methodology were 
reluctant to participate, so Pumisacho and I made a habit of meeting officials at their 
homes in the capital and personally driving them to events in the provinces. At first, this 
included the heads of CIP and INIAP, and later, the directors of potential partner 
organizations and donor agencies. We strategically included officials from government 
agencies, such as SESA, the Ministry of the Environment and of Public Health as well as 
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the FAO and the Pan-American Health Organization. We learned to leverage field days 
for maximum benefit. Many events included more than 500 people, including leaders from 
communities where the FFS initiative wanted to expand as well as politicians, researchers, 
donors, and the media.  
 
Studies on field days found that, after listening to FFS participants explain the details of 
their experiments on the life cycle of an insect or the response of a crop to particular 
fertilization regime, for example, attitudes towards FFS and farmers substantially changed 
(Borja, 2004). Técnicos were observed pulling out paper and taking notes. At the end of the 
day, we commonly placed officials in front of the crowd of participants and handed them 
a microphone. Their public comments included: “I did not think that farmers were 
capable of learning so much in so little time,” “We técnicos can’t even tell the difference 
between virus and bacteria,” and “Today was a major coup for farmers.” These statements 
were recorded on video and repeated during our public appearances. Field days became a 
powerful political device. 
 
In addition, we regularly sent FFS graduates to influential national and international 
meetings held throughout Latin America. As an example, one outstanding FFS graduate 
participated in a regional, FAO-sponsored meeting on food security that took place in 
Guatemala. During the event a high-ranking representative from Ecuador’s Ministry of 
Agriculture claimed that his World Bank-financed PROMSA project had made important 
contributions to Carchi. “With all due respect,” interrupted the farmer, “not even a single 
penny of your project has found our communities.” He went on to argue, “Only the FFS 
have made a difference.” Later, the farmer presented his FFS experience, which a 
representative from the FAO later described to me as, “The hit of the meeting.” Such 
impressive public displays of knowledge helped make FFS a prestigious symbol. 
 
As project leaders, Pumisacho and I did not overlook the motivations of técnicos who came 
on board with FFS. While the FFS initiative usually did not have ample resources for 
direct financial rewards, we drew on other forms of payment. Not unlike the pesticide 
industry (see Chapter 7), we held planning meetings at attractive resorts on the coast and 
in the Amazon. Those who trained FFS facilitators were provided status as “Master 
Trainers.” We created new opportunities for our colleagues to publish articles and training 
materials. We sent the media to interview them about their work, and their names 
appeared in newspapers and television. The most outstanding Master Trainers travelled to 
Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and eventually Angola and 
Mozambique for months to support other initiatives. In summary, we actively sought 
attractive opportunities for collaborators, and we leveraged those to advance the FFS 
agenda in Carchi and elsewhere. 
 
By 2003, dozens of farmer groups requested technical support for implementing FFS. 
Mayors and the head of the provincial government in Carchi regularly mentioned Field 
Schools in their public addresses. The regional head of MAG cited that through FFS his 
office was promoting the “cutting edge of agriculture extension,” and he formally 
requested assistance in commandeering international financing for Field Schools. 
Representatives from national and international pesticide companies contacted the project 
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leaders in Carchi to see how they could support FFS. The methodology had become part 
of the spontaneous political discourse of key players of the socio-technical regime in 
Carchi. Arguably, within five years of its introduction, FFS obtained the prestigious status 
of best practice.  
 
Release into the social wild 
 
In April 2001, I optimistically told a team of external reviewers from Global IPM Facility, 
“Thanks to FFS, we are well on our way to instituting people-centred development across 
private, public, and community-based organizations in Ecuador – particularly in northern 
Ecuador.” In its report, the team of reviewers acknowledged the presence of diverse 
organizations, however, it expressed a foreboding concern over what it saw as “weak 
institutional commitment.”8  
 
CIP and INIAP eventually trained over 50 facilitators in northern Ecuador from a 
plethora of organisations, including national NGOs (CEDERENA, Randi Randi, 
EcoPar), universities and agricultural schools (Pontificate Catholic University of Ecuador 
and the Martinez Acosta Agriculture School), networks (the Carchi Consortium and 
MACRENA), local governments and public agencies (Municipality of San Gabriel, the 
Provincial Government of Carchi, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG), and the National 
Institute of Agriculture Research (INIAP)), graduates of FFS from numerous 
communities and farmers organizations, and the FAO’s Food Security (PESA-E) and 
Community Forestry (DFC) programmes. In addition, a handful of these facilitators 
became Master Trainers (i.e., those in charge of training trainers), who went on to conduct 
ToTs in other areas of Ecuador as well as elsewhere in the Andes (Colombia and Peru), 
Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala) and Africa 
(Mozambique and Angola). Table 6.5 highlights major events associated with the 
introduction and expansion of FFS in northern Ecuador. 
 
Our objective of introducing FFS seemingly achieved, in 2003, Pumisacho and I turned 
our attention to new challenges. Pumisacho took on new training contracts on the coast 
and in Honduras, and he began to focus on new areas of learning, especially the creation 
of agri-food chains and producer networks. I left CIP to begin my PhD research at 
Wageningen and took on part-time work as a technical advisor with World Neighbors. 
Later Pumisacho and I discovered that multiple and sometimes contradictory utilisations 
of FFS would emerge to fundamentally transform the methodology, placing into question 
the ultimate contribution of FFS as a means to advancing people-centred development 
and enabling farmers to address concerns over pesticides. 
 
                                                       
8 GIF. 2001. Mid-term review of the Global IPM Facility. J. Jiggins (team leader). April-June. FAO, Rome. 71 
pages plus annex. 
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Table 6.5 Major events associated with the introduction of FFS in northern Ecuador 
 
Date Event 
August-September 
1999 
Guaslan, Chimborazo Training of Trainers – First regional ToT in the Andes, 
including 35 participants from Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador 
October 1999 Provincial forum on health, productivity, and environmental impacts of pesticides 
September 1999-
March 2000 
First pilot FFS in Carchi: CIP and INIAP conducted FFS in potato IPM in the villages 
of La Libertad, Santa Martha de Cuba, and San Pedro de Piartal, Carchi 
October – 
December 2000 
Master Trainer from INIAP-Carchi sent to support first FFS ToT in Central America 
in collaboration with the FAO and PROMIPAC 
November 2000 Beginning of two-year FAO-funded project to introduce FFS to the Ecuadorian 
highlands 
February – June 
2001 
First ToT in FFS methodology in N. Ecuador – Led by INIAP and MAG in 
collaboration with CIP; 26 graduates (2 women and 24 men), including 6 farmers 
2001  Implementation of 13 pilot FFS in Imbabura and Carchi (potato, field bean, pepper, 
and tomato) 
May 2001 National forum on health, productivity, and environmental impacts of pesticides 
July 2001 Master Trainer from MAG-Carchi sent to support FFS ToT in Colombia in 
collaboration with CORPOICA 
2002 Implementation of 10 FFS in Imbabura and Carchi (potato, field bean, pepper, tomato, 
and agroforestry) 
October 2002 FAO-sponsored FFS project ends; Pumisacho and Sherwood shift attention to new, 
non-FFS related challenges, representing the release of FFS into the “social wild” 
February – October 
2003 
Second ToT in FFS methodology in N. Ecuador. Focus on potato IPM; led by 
MACRENA; 18 graduates (6 women, 12 men) 
2003 Implementation of 10 pilot FFS (field bean, potato, Andean crops, commercialization) 
in Imbabura 
April – May 2003 Master Trainer from MACRENA sent to support FFS ToT in Guatemala (coffee) 
2006 Association of Promoters for Integrated Community Development (APRODIC) 
established 
November 2006 Master Trainer from MACRENA sent to support FFS ToT in Perú (guinea pig/cuy) in 
collaboration with Heifer and World Neighbors 
December 2006-
February 2007 
Master Trainer, Max Ochoa of MACRENA, sent to support FFS ToT in Angola and 
Mozambique in collaboration with the FAO 
 
Diverse expressions 
 
Field schools meant different things to different people. A characterization based on 
farming styles (i.e., culture, labour processes, and decisions about technology and markets) 
in Carchi found that FFS were more attractive to certain social groups than others 
(Paredes, 2001). The most enthusiastic participants belonged to two groups: the highly 
pragmatic and inquisitive farmers and landless labourers. The first group was motivated by 
its interest in the FFS alternatives that allowed them a certain degree of independence 
from capital and input markets (credit and agrochemicals). The landless labourers, on the 
other hand, were primarily motivated by the unique opportunity to co-invest in 
production, which effectively afforded them access to land, as well as by more egalitarian 
treatment during training sessions. Meanwhile, Field Schools appeared to be of less 
interest to others. For example, the high risk takers, who commonly depended more on 
the capital and agrochemical input markets for potato production and who readily adopt 
(and abandon) technologies, as well as intermediate farmers, who tended to co-invest for 
production, were generally frustrated by the knowledge-intensive orientation of FFS 
methodology. 
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Andean farmers do not operate alone in isolated farming domains. Rather, they are part of 
unique socio-technical networks in which other actors, organizations and entities 
collectively inform and define courses of action and development opportunities (van der 
Ploeg, 1993). As a result, for farmers as well as técnicos perceptions of the meaning and 
value of FFS respond to a certain way of defining relevant problems and solutions within 
a socio-technical network. Paredes (2001) explains that certain farming styles operate in 
networks in which pesticides came to be accepted as obligatory or unavoidable elements 
of good potato farming - despite the risk they represent for a family’s health. In other 
styles, less agrochemical use was desired to avoid risks, and, in this case, good farming also 
meant safe farming. This perspective helps to explain why different actors may find 
different meanings and opportunities in FFS and how those influence the appropriation of 
the methodology. 
 
Between 2005 and 2006, Schut (2006) conducted research on the diverse expressions of 
FFS in northern and central Ecuador. Over a period of six months he participated in on-
going Field Schools, lived with families of graduates, and accompanied facilitators during 
their daily activity. Drawing on a cognitive interpretation of framing theory (Gray, 2003; 
Aarts and van Woerkum, 2005), he documented the multiple applications and adaptations 
of FFS. Schut (2006: 135) concluded: 
 
In practice I found that different actors have various frames on FFS, its 
fundamental elements, methodological process and roles of participants and 
facilitators (theories). Also the frames on how FFS can contribute to agricultural 
problems in Ecuador (perception of the problem or context) differed between 
actors. Sometimes frames of different people within the same institution were 
divergent or even contradictory. Individual actors used different frames within 
different situations to justify their behaviour, decisions and actions…. I observed 
that actors’ cognitive frames sometimes showed ambivalence with their actual 
behaviour and actions, which created confusing, contradictory situations within 
FFS. I discovered that actors had different reasons and goals for working with 
FFS methodology. 
 
To illustrate the diverse expressions of FFS in Carchi, I present the contrasting 
experiences of three FFS facilitators: Joel, an agronomist from a public research institution 
(INIAP), Lenin, a forester from a conservation NGO (EcoPar), and Eduardo, a leader 
from an organization of voluntary farmer promoters (APRODIC).9 How did FFS 
diversely undergo changes in the hands of these actors and their organizations? 
 
Case 1: Joel at INIAP: the national agriculture research service 
 
Joel was from a small rural town that was taken over by Quito’s urban sprawl during the 
oil boom of the 1970s. He grew up in a rapidly urbanized Kichwa-speaking community. 
His grade school teacher was proud of the agricultural roots of the town and taught the 
students about gardening and fruit trees. Joel applied much of his learning at home. His 
                                                       
9 I have changed the names of individuals involved in this case study. 
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family raised crops and vegetables and reared chickens and pigs to feed itself, while their 
income came from his father’s irregular employment as a factory or construction labourer 
in the city. Joel said with conviction, “That teacher and at home is where my passion for 
agriculture was borne.”  
 
Joel was the best student of his class in high school. He studied animal science at the 
Universidad  Autónoma Nacional and conducted his thesis on pasture systems in Chimborazo 
with INIAP. Following graduation, INIAP hired him for a permanent extension-
researcher position, and he was sent to support the Unit of Validation and Transfer of 
Technology in Carchi. As Carchi was the most intensive potato production region of the 
country, INIAP’s activities there centred on the crop’s production problems. Joel 
conducted applied research on varieties resistant to late blight. He researched IPM of the 
Andean weevil and the leafminer fly. He also conducted research on crop response to 
chemical fertilizers. In 1996, he was sent to CIAT in Colombia, where he was trained in 
the CIAL methodology. In 1999, we selected Joel, who had become a leader in the 
EcoSalud project on pesticide health effects, for the first FFS Training of Trainers at 
Guaslan. 
 
Joel described the ToT as an “awakening.” He was greatly impressed by Iv Pherun, a 
Cambodian who had studied in Cuba and became the Head of the National IPM 
Programme. Given his knowledge of FFS and Spanish language skills, the FAO chose 
Pherun to lead the first ToT in the Andes. Joel said that Pherun’s “commitment and 
passion for IPM impressed the entire group.” Joel became a champion of FFS and earned 
the fame of being one of the country’s best facilitators. 
 
As the provincial head of INIAP-Carchi, Joel came to coordinate many projects, including 
FORTIPAPA, IPM-CRSP, and EcoSalud. Each included FFS as the lead intervention 
platform. In 2001, Joel organized and led the first Training of Trainers for técnicos and 
farmer leaders of the north. In the evaluations the participants gave Joel a perfect five out 
of five star ranking in: enthusiasm, teaching, example, and friendship.10 
 
In a workshop leading up to the Ecuadorian methodological guide (Pumisacho and 
Sherwood, 2005), Joel expressed concern over the “erosion of FFS.” He emphasised that 
a Field School was not a Field School if it did not include: “the agroecosystem analysis, 
learning plot, insect collections and zoos, and experiments.” He lobbied for the creation 
of a test to assure that facilitators and graduates met minimum standards of both the 
technical aspects of IPM and the process management aspects of FFS. Once during a field 
day Joel pulled me aside to tell me that he felt the participants did not own clear 
knowledge of the agroecosystem analysis and that their experiments lacked creativity. Joel 
developed a reputation as a staunch advocate of FFS-by-the-book. 
 
Citing Pherun’s example, Joel actively resisted collaboration between INIAP and the 
pesticide industry. When he left for two years of graduate study, however, his supervisor 
                                                       
10 Final report to the Government of Ecuador. FAO. 2003. “Development of Innovation Capacity for IPM 
and Agricultural Innovation for Greater Food Security in the Highlands.” Technical Cooperation 
Program/ECU/0067, 22 pp. 
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at INIAP in the capital took advantage of his absence to establish a new project with 
CropLife, which involved placing an industry representative inside the field office in 
Carchi. Thereafter, INIAP’s approach to FFS underwent a strong transformation. After 
Joel returned in 2004, he told me that he had been forced to implement a “hybrid of the 
FFS methodology.” A farmer FFS facilitator who collaborated with Joel told me that the 
outcome shared little in common with original Field Schools. The new approach involved 
five modules that centred on getting farmers to adopt an “IPM technology package.” The 
farmer explained that the content was pre-determined, and there was little time for 
learning plots, agroecosystem analysis, and experiments. Despite Joel’s early clarity and 
enthusiasm over the methodology, organizational constraints led him to implement 
technology-centred Field Schools. 
 
Case 2: Lenin at EcoPar: an environmental NGO 
 
Lenin grew up in a small city of southernmost Ecuador. His parents had rural roots, but 
like many youths of his era, Lenin’s aim was to become a professional and move out of 
the campo. The nearby Universidad Nacional de Loja had a highly demanding forestry 
programme, known as the best programme of its kind in Ecuador, which immediately 
attracted Lenin. Later, the FAO’s Community Forestry Program (in Spanish, DFC) hired 
him as an agroforestry extensionist to work in Chimborazo, about four hours north of his 
home. A group from his hometown led the DFC, and Lenin fit right in. He was trained in 
“cutting edge participatory methodologies” and became part of the FAO’s largest program 
in the Andes that was one of the FAO’s most lauded initiatives.11 The Dutch organization, 
ETC, played a central role in informing DFC’s methodology, centring heavily on 
extensionist-led rural diagnostics, participatory planning and implementation, and 
monitoring, evaluation, and follow-up. One of his supervisors at DFC described Lenin as 
“young, smart, and hardworking – one of our best community extensionists.” 
Nevertheless, the FAO eventually ended the project in the early 2000s. When the private 
consulting firm EcoPar won an IDRC grant to implement a biodiversity conservation 
project in Carchi, many former DFC employees were hired, including Lenin.  
 
Midway through his career, Lenin completed an MSc in Community-based Natural 
Resource Management at the Catholic University. He was one of the best students in the 
class. Of the subjects presented in the diverse curriculum, Lenin told me that economics 
made the most sense to him. His thesis on environmental services argued for forest 
conservation through different forms of resource privatization and administrative 
procedures to monetize relationships between urban- and rural-based people. He felt that 
provided the financial incentives, farmers would protect their land and watersheds for the 
people of the cities. 
 
In 2004, the Training Coordinator of at EcoPar – an avid proponent of people-centred 
development and social learning – assigned Lenin to attend an FFS Training of Trainers in 
Otavalo, which focused on “Integrated Potato Management.” She told me that she was 
concerned about Lenin’s “vertical” teaching style. She said, “Lenin likes to spend as little 
                                                       
11 The Community Forestry Program approach in the Andes was amply described in Kenny-Jordan et al., 
1999. 
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time as possible in the campo, and he tells farmers what they should do.” She believed that 
this approach was having little impact. Lenin told me that he attended the ToT reluctantly, 
explaining: “The DFC prepared me in participatory methodologies. The [FFS] training 
was very basic and not always relevant to me.” Nevertheless, he said, “The technical 
training in potato IPM is new and useful, since I am working in Carchi.” Further, EcoPar’s 
donor agency, IDRC, was enthusiastic about participatory development approaches such 
as FFS, so he had decided to learn the methodology. 
 
Following the ToT, EcoPar proposed a series of FFS as a means of building a grassroots 
initiative around the themes of biodiversity and conservation of the forest remnants on 
the eastern Andean ridge of Carchi. Lenin was placed in charge of implementation. 
Technical themes included ecological potato production, soil conservation, and forest 
management.  
 
According to his colleagues at EcoPar, Lenin immediately adapted FFS to fit his own 
understanding of best practice. He decided not to work with larger groups but rather 
individuals, and he chose the dates and times of meetings. He did not involve participants 
in open-ended curriculum design. Instead he pre-determined technical content and 
process. His FFS did not include the central process elements of the methodology. When 
I visited the communities where Lenin worked, participants described having learned 
technical content associated with making a home garden and controlling pests. They had 
not participated in the open-ended, group learning normally associated with FFS. 
Independent of the ultimate contributions of his activity, Lenin’s utilization of the 
methodology involved the transformation of FFS from people- to technology-centred 
designs. 
 
Case 3: Eduardo at APRODIC: a community-based organization of farmer promoters 
 
Eduardo’s parents were resource-poor immigrants from Colombia who, in the 1960s, 
crossed the border into Ecuador in search of work. His father became a member of the 
“24 of May Cooperative” that in the early 1970s demanded land rights from the Bretania 
Hacienda in El Angel, Carchi, under the national land reform policies. Following a violent 
conflict, the national government stepped in and awarded land to the cooperative 
members. Eduardo told me that he remembered growing up in a makeshift hut, high in 
the páramo. One of his stories stood out in my mind: “One day, when my parents had left 
me all alone to take care of the house, I watched helplessly as a puma captured and ate a 
sheep. As a five year old, there was nothing I could do. I locked myself in the hut and 
cried and waited for my father to come home.” Eduardo summarized his childhood as, 
“cold, wet, and lonely.” 
 
Such was the weather when I first met Eduardo in his community on a rainy December 
night in 1999. His father Humberto, his younger brother Luis, and Eduardo were three of 
the 18 participants in our first pilot Farmer Field School. They did not stand out in the 
initial meetings. I remember them as polite and quiet. Over time, however, the creativity 
and enthusiasm of the brothers began to set them apart. They enjoyed the 
experimentation component of FFS and immediately collected a number of insects that 
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they reared at home and studied. They enthusiastically reported back to the group 
impressive details on the mating practices of the Andean weevil, the number of eggs laid 
and hatched, and they fully reconstructed the insect’s lifecycle. They designed their own 
studies, for example, on “how far an Andean weevil adult walks in a day.” Eduardo 
collected “sick” Andean weevils and isolated strains of entomopathogens that he cultured 
in makeshift sterilized bottles of Norteño (a fermented sugarcane-based alcohol) and rice 
as a growth medium. They conducted independent studies on resistance to late blight of 
different local potato varieties. They were not your average people. 
 
Since he did not own land of his own, Eduardo applied his skills to his family’s farm. 
Within a year of the FFS his family stopped using highly toxic pesticides, and they 
decreased by 50 percent their use of fungicides for late blight (from an average of four to 
two applications per season). His learning was not limited to the potato crop. Eduardo set 
up a tree nursery of native species that they used to reforest the boundaries and steep 
hillsides of their property. They set up contracts with the municipality and NGOs to sell 
trees for their reforestation programs. Eduardo and Luis experimented with irrigation and 
pasture varieties and mixtures, which led to substantial improvements in milk production. 
One of his cows produced about 24 litres of milk per day, nearly three times the average 
of his neighbours.  
 
Joel selected Eduardo to participate in the 2001 Training of Trainers. Joel explained that 
while the técnicos struggled under the applied technical content of the FFS, Eduardo’s 
intelligence and his earlier FFS experience enabled him to stand out among the group of 
26 trainees. Often, Master Trainers would draw on Eduardo to explain the process aspects 
of the methodology as well as technical content, for example, on insect and plant ecology 
or the practical aspects of managing a healthy potato crop in Carchi. When I visited the 
ToT, I was struck by Eduardo’s new confidence. He was no longer shy and quiet. Instead, 
he had grown confident standing up in front of a group and defending his ideas. A potato 
specialist at INIAP who was a training mate with Eduardo in the ToT confided, “No one 
knows how to grow potatoes better than Eduardo.” 
 
Prior to the end of the ToT, Eduardo had set up an FFS on IPM with gradeschool 
children in his community. Later, he organized FFS with adults on integrated potato 
management as well as on how to manage pastures. When I visited several of his FFS 
sessions in 2005, I observed that Eduardo applied the central elements of the 
methodology: the participants determined the content, there were comparison plots, 
people conducted experiments, and they implemented agro-ecosystem analysis. 
 
Eventually, Eduardo went beyond merely implementing FFS. He became involved in the 
Humanist Farmers Movement, where he promoted the methodology and helped to set up 
an organization of FFS promoters and researchers in Carchi – The Asociación de Promotores 
de Desarrollo Integrado de la Comunidad (APRODIC). Eduardo told me that the purpose of 
APRODIC was “to make a difference.” Initially, APRODIC hoped to receive financial 
support from the second phase of the CIP-run EcoSalud project to run Field Schools, but 
for political reasons, CIP decided to channel resources to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
municipalities, and the Provincial Government, even though those entities had little to no 
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experience with FFS. Nevertheless, those organizations did not live up to their project 
agreements, so eventually CIP resorted to contracting Eduardo and APRODIC. Eduardo 
was charged with an FFS in another community, as per an imposed curriculum centring 
on pesticide safety. When I asked Eduardo about this FFS, he told me that when hired by 
CIP, “I have to follow their curriculum, which is Safe Use of Pesticides.” He added, 
however, “When I run an FFS myself, I do it the right way – according to what the people 
want.” Table 6.6 summarizes how Joel, Lenin, and Eduardo diversely applied FFS. 
 
Table 6.6 Three expressions of FFS 
 
Characteristic Joel at INIAP Lenin at EcoPar Eduardo at APRODIC 
Professional 
background 
Diligent técnico – locally-
based agronomist with 
specialization in 
biological pest control 
Development 
bureaucrat – urban-
based forester with 
specialization in 
resource economics 
Eccentric farmer – 
lifetime of practical 
experience with potato-
milk farming in Carchi 
Reason for 
learning/applying FFS 
Idealistic to pragmatic – 
“improving lives” was 
later supplanted by 
supervisor’s interests 
Pragmatic – “told to do 
so” by supervisor and 
donor 
Idealistic – “wanting to 
make a difference” and 
pragmatic when working 
with projects 
Facilitation style Open and interactive Closed, top-down Open and interactive 
Preferred location of 
sessions 
In the field and 
classroom 
In the classroom In the field 
Source of funding for 
salaries and FFS 
State and external 
donors (COSUDE, 
USAID, CropLife)  
External donors (IDRC) Self-financed by facilitator 
and participants; punctual 
contributions from 
municipalities and 
external projects 
(EcoSalud). 
Technical platforms Potato IPM (adoption 
of technologies), Safe 
Use of Pesticides 
Agroforestry, 
sustainable biodiversity, 
organic agriculture 
Potato IPM (pesticide use 
reduction), pasture 
improvement/animal 
management 
Number of 
participants 
10-15 1-5 15-30 
Average number of 
sessions 
Decreased from 15 to 6 5 informal meetings 15-20, depending on 
group (primary school 
students or adults) 
Who decides technical 
content 
Técnico, in line with 
project objectives, some 
consultation from 
participants on details 
Técnico, in line with 
project objectives 
Participants, with 
feedback from facilitator 
or employer 
Use of Agroecosystem 
Analysis? 
Yes and no; full 
discussion 
No Yes; full discussion and 
negotiation 
Experimentation? Yes and no; largely pre-
planned and project 
determined 
No Yes; highly open-ended 
and spontaneous 
Didactics Lively and fun: 
Dynamic but largely 
unidirectional 
Formal: Lectures, 
unidirectional learning 
Practical: Discovery-based 
learning, learn by doing in 
the field 
Follow-up  Dependent on project 
funding 
Dependent on project 
funding 
Dependent on group 
enthusiasm 
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Learning from FFS in the social wild 
 
'Tis but thy name that is my enemy; 
Thou art thyself, though not a Montague. 
What's Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot, 
Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part 
Belonging to a man. O, be some other name! 
What's in a name? that which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet; 
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd, 
Retain that dear perfection which he owes 
Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name, 
And for that name which is no part of thee 
Take all myself. 
 
– Juliet, from Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, 1594 
 
Shakespeare’s Juliet makes the argument that what matters most is not what something is 
called, but what it is. Following my experience with FFS in the social wild of Ecuador, I 
would add: what something is (or should be) depends on who is asked.  
 
FFS came to mean different things in the hands of different people. After obtaining status 
as a prestigious symbol, FFS became widely employed. To understand the contributions, 
potential and otherwise, of the approach, one must look beyond the use of the term and 
examine how the methodology became diversely utilised. At the onset of this chapter, I 
posed a single line of inquiry: what happened to FFS in the social wild and why? 
 
What happened to FFS? 
 
The Farmer Field School methodology became diversely appropriated. Adaptation to local 
context – themes of interest, field conditions, and cultural practices – was generally 
consistent with its proposals. Nevertheless, changes to process management and didactic 
design – i.e., the people-centred elements – revealed conflicting expressions of FFS. 
 
According to standard FFS practice, the participants chose the thematic platform. Further, 
through participatory needs assessment, the facilitator and the participants work together 
to determine technical content. In practice, however, these factors commonly were pre-
determined in Carchi. In Joel and Lenin’s cases, their projects in IPM and biodiversity 
conservation, respectively, conditioned the resulting FFS. When CIP’s EcoSalud project 
hired Eduardo the resulting Field School shifted to its priority – Safe Use of Pesticides. 
Only when Eduardo organized his own, self-funded FFS did he consult participants on 
the thematic platform and curriculum. When I asked Eduardo about why he let 
participants define the technical content of these Field Schools, he responded, “When I 
run my own FFS, I don’t have snacks or lunches to offer participants. If they [the FFS 
participants] do not like the content, why should they show up?” 
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FFS required participants to identify priority research concerns and to design simple, 
comparative farmer-led experiments. Nevertheless, I observed that professional biases, 
projects, and organizational priorities commonly pre-determined the content and design 
of experiments. In Lenin’s case, no experiments were used. In Joel’s case, experiments 
were used to “sell” INIAP’s IPM alternatives, especially resistant varieties, fungicide spray 
regimes, and Andean weevil traps, as well as CropLife’s priority: “appropriate” or 
“correct” use of safety. In the EcoSalud-financed FFS, no farmer-led experiments were 
included. In Eduardo’s Field Schools, the participants determined their own experiments 
on themes such as potato varieties, planting distances, and organic versus inorganic 
fertilisers. 
 
According to Pontius et al. (2002) in Asia and later Pumisacho and Sherwood (2005) in 
Latin America, the Agroecosystem Analysis (AAE) is at the heart of FFS methodology. It 
involves teaching farmers how to “read” the health and ecology of a crop, to take samples 
of relevant indicators – plant growth, disease incidence and severity, pest-beneficial insect 
populations, presence of weeds, and moisture conditions, and to report and discuss 
findings with the group. Rather than rely on expert advice, the negotiated outcomes of the 
AAE lead to management decisions on how to assure a “healthy” crop based on the 
experience of the FFS collective. Initially, Joel applied AAE in all of his Field Schools, and 
he asked insightful questions that forced participants to take good measurements and to 
address contradictions between their findings. Nevertheless, the hybrid FFS that he came 
to design and implement de-emphasized AAE. In some cases, the activity was no longer 
applied. According to one farmer participant, “The goal [of Joel’s FFS] is to get farmers to 
adopt his improved practices.” Similarly, Lenin used an AAE activity in one session and 
then never repeated it. He told me that he felt that it took too much time, and that he 
could already predict the outcome beforehand. In contrast, Eduardo drew heavily on 
AAE in all of his FFS, and he challenged participants to look for ways of decreasing 
reliance on inputs, especially of highly toxics pesticides and synthetic fertilizers. Joel’s 
original utilisation of AAE was more nuanced and sophisticated with biological details, 
such as the name of certain insects and their habits, but Eduardo’s group spent 
considerable attention to measurements and time for discussion and negotiation. When I 
asked Eduardo why he emphasized participant decision-making in his FFS, he responded, 
“They [the participants] have invested a lot of money in the [FFS] plots. I’d be lynched if 
the experiments failed.” 
 
The didactics of FFS are based on discovery-based learning (i.e., open-ended, self-directed 
learning through solving problems) and learning by doing (practice and repetition). 
Instead of answers, the facilitator employs lively learning experiments where participants 
discover for themselves not just new technical content but also how to resolve problems 
independently. Rather than academic, classroom lectures, FFS emphasizes in-the-field 
exercises where participants learn through the practice of agriculture. Joel invented 
numerous creative, discovery-learning activities. On multiple occasions I observed him 
masterfully apply “What is this?” – an elicitive approach to helping farmers find answers 
to their own questions. He continued to apply lively teaching in his hybrid FFS, but rather 
than biological and ecological principles, the content shifted towards “correct” 
employment of technologies. Lenin’s colleagues told me that he refused to apply 
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discovery-based activities and that he preferred to give lectures. They said, “Lenin is a 
forestal [i.e., a titled forestry professional or técnico]; he doesn’t like to dirty his hands.” 
Eduardo, on the other hand, had limited formal education, and he was uncomfortable 
writing or talking in front of a classroom. He much preferred to be in the field. He told 
me, “The azadon [the hoe] is my best friend.” As a result, his FFS took place almost 
entirely in the field. Eduardo was judicious with the use of discovery-based learning. 
“When a farmer is testing me, I’ll give him an answer so that he knows that I am a true 
potato farmer. Otherwise, he has to find it [the answer] for himself. Sometimes my 
answers will not be his answers. Each potato field is different. That’s where the ingenieros 
make mistakes.” 
 
Joel, Lenin, and Eduardo applied FFS methodology diversely. Of the three, only Eduardo 
continued to allow participants to determine content, to use AAE, farmer-led 
experiments, discovery learning, and learn-by-doing, but this only occurred when he was 
free of project constraints. In process management and didactics, both Joel and Lenin 
excluded participants from determining the thematic platform, content design, decision-
making, and independent learning. Be it due to project and organizational constraints or 
individual preferences, in the hands of these two técnicos, FFS became transformed from a 
people- to a technology-centred endeavour. 
 
Why did FFS undergo transformations? 
 
Competing modes of knowledge production 
 
With the growing application of FFS, we began to observe diverse expressions of the 
methodology. Many of its defining principles – interactive design, open-ended discovery-
based learning, learning by doing, AAE, and farmer-led experimentation – became 
vulnerable to translation. As Paredes (2001), Mendizabel (2002), Borja (2004), and Schut 
(2006) all describe, FFS progressively acquired diverse and even contradictory meanings. 
 
After visiting the first wave of FFS throughout Central and South America, Sherwood and 
Thiele (2003) expressed concern over the “methodological erosion” of FFS (Box 6.4). At 
the time, we felt that often this was the result of incompetence (faults in our training) or 
project constraints, such as a thematic demand, time limitations, and funding.  
 
Visiting the FFS in Carchi during 2005, nearly two years after we had departed, Schut 
(2006) explored the nuances of these developments. He observed that such tendencies 
repeated themselves across crops, technical platforms, geographies, and institutional 
settings. He observed that previously competent facilitators (i.e., those who were 
acknowledged in project documents as fully applying the methodology) no longer applied 
FFS in its original, people-centred form. This led him to argue that this tendency was no 
mere oversight but rather the result of patterned behaviour. Schut found that certain 
elements of FFS highly resonated with the agenda of the socio-technical regime. For 
example, researchers and técnicos appreciated its ability to “reach farmers” and the platform 
it provided for “enabling technologies to arrive to communities.” Nevertheless, other 
elements, particularly those associated with independent learning and decision-making and 
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open-ended and iterative design proved more problematic. Over time, it was the 
interactive, discovery-based features of FFS (i.e., those elements that made FFS a people-
centred methodology) that captured the attention of the experts.  
 
Box 6.4 Early observations on the transformation of FFS in the Andes (summarized from 
Sherwood and Thiele, 2003) 
 
• Group establishment – Women were systematically excluded. FFS leaders were 
chosen on the outset based on criteria external to the FFS experience. In most cases, 
FFS changed leaders over time. 
• Technical content – Facilitators commonly pre-packaged technical content, as per 
their professional backgrounds and project priorities. 
• Learning plots – Often competitive between farmers and facilitators. Sometimes there 
was no comparative “traditional” plot. Often limited to demonstration of  “improved 
technologies.” 
• Discovery-based learning – Facilitators commonly cut corners on learning. Instead of 
facilitating open-ended learning experiments, facilitators often gave lectures in 
classrooms. 
• Experiments – Facilitators often pre-determined content and design. Researchers 
often introduced complicated designs. 
• Follow-up – Project priorities determined follow-up. This central feature was 
commonly neglected. 
 
The experience of FFS in the social wild illustrates how competing processes of Mode 1 
(expert-led) and Mode 2 (lay or people-centred) knowledge production can lead to conflict 
during the pursuit of rural development. Viewed as a social construction, knowledge is not 
produced in a vacuum. New claims of knowledge are judged in reference to established 
forms. This is particularly true for interventions that represent entirely new ways of 
thinking and organizing. Those that do not conform may be subject to challenge and 
marginalization. Gibbons et al. (2000: 2) argues: “It seems to be a recurrent historical 
pattern that intellectual innovations are first described as misguided by those whose ideas 
are dominant, then ignored, and, finally, taken over by original adversaries as their own 
invention.” FFS faced similar fate.  
 
The process intensiveness of FFS led people from INIAP, MAG, the pesticide industry, 
and elsewhere to challenge the methodology as expensive. After the benefits of FFS 
became overwhelmingly clear and the methodology became legitimized as “best practice,” 
many of the very same actors began to claim ownership of it. In the process of taking 
over, however, FFS became transformed. Schut (2006) found that the facilitation of open-
ended discovery learning often became specialised top-down lectures. Questions became 
answers. The content and processes of FFS were simplified to the point where differences 
between individual FFS were lost. Consistent with the design features of expert systems, 
FFS underwent degrees of homogenization (table 6.1). Rather than broaden Mode 1 
production of knowledge to accommodate the necessary conditions for Mode 2, we 
observed that the experts and their organizations commonly sought to transform FFS, so 
that it became more consistent with their priorities. In the process FFS as Mode 2 became 
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Mode 1 – knowledge production through abstraction. Was the transformation of FFS due 
to a simple oversight, questions of competence, or were deeper forces at play? 
 
Expert-led transformations 
 
Mendizabel (2002) explored how researchers at CIP and its national partners drew on FFS 
for advancing science-based contributions to agricultural development in the Andes and 
Southeast Asia. In so doing, FFS became hybridized to “Farmer Field Schools-Farmer 
Participatory Research” (FFS-FPR). This involved shifting technical content around 
research priorities, such as pesticide-use efficiency (Torrez et al., 1999a and b) or selection 
of late blight resistance varieties (Nelson et al., 2001; Ortiz et al., 2004). Due to the 
demands of science, researchers commonly increased the complexity of single variable 
demonstrations to the point where FFS began to include dozens of variables and other 
subtleties. As a result, the outcomes of FFS experiments could only be seen through 
sophisticated statistical analysis. As described in Nelson et al. (2001), researchers 
commonly conserved the use of discovery learning exercises, but participants commonly 
were excluded from the selection of thematic platforms and curriculum content. In certain 
cases, researchers strategically dropped central FFS decision-making tools, such as the 
Agroecosystem Analysis, and their feedback into activity. In thematics, content and 
process, researchers commonly transformed FFS. 
 
The priorities of researchers, however, were not the only factors influencing FFS. As a 
técnico from a conservation-oriented NGO, Lenin never fully appreciated the relevance of 
FFS. He argued that “participatory research” offered a better balance between the 
demands of participation and his time limitations as an urban-based professional. His 
Field Schools included smaller groups, fewer encounters, and no Agroecosystem Analysis. 
This expression of the methodology shared the features of FFS-FPR. While disciplinary 
demands often constrained CIP and PROINPA researchers, Lenin altered FFS design for 
reasons associated with his individual perspective – specifically the perceived high costs of 
participation. Despite support and encouragement from his organization, Lenin’s thinking 
and worldview blocked him from implementing people-centred FFS. 
 
Joel, who was charged with both applied research and extension activities at INIAP, faced 
different obstacles. His supervisor in the capital, who not unlike Lenin, was inclined 
towards economic rationality and argued against the high costs of “participation.” He was 
quick to cite the work of Feder and other economists at the World Bank (Feder et al., 
2004) in support of such claims. He often referred to the research primacy of INIAP and 
CIP, arguing that extension was a secondary activity. Further, decreases in public funding 
as a result of government restructuring produced a subsequent need for public-private 
collaboration (e.g., between INIAP and CropLife), which worked against Joel’s immediate 
interests in Carchi. On multiple occasions, central government policies intended to 
combat corruption interfered with FFS. For example, one morning Lilian, the EcoSalud 
gender specialist, called me to inform that the police had arrested Joel and impounded the 
project vehicle. As a result, they were not be able to support an FFS session in La 
Libertad. Later we learned that the national government had passed a rule forbidding 
public employees to use public vehicles over holidays and weekends, exactly when 
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communities preferred to hold meetings. Organizational constraints, such as the 
preferences of supervisors, mandates, private funding, and public policies, combined to 
work against Joel’s interests in people-centred FFS. 
 
Meanwhile, Eduardo, an independent farmer who lived in a rural village, escaped many 
such constraints. This was particularly true when he was able to finance FFS through local 
resources. Eduardo’s challenges were more localized, such as how to work together with 
neighbours to advance what were perceived as common interests. In the expert-led 
examples, particularly when Joel was coerced into running technology-centred FFS, the 
central objective was on “what people did not do” (e.g., adopt certain agroforestry or IPM 
practices) and “how to get them to do something differently” (Table 6.2). This primacy 
often had little to do with the priorities of farmers. In Eduardo’s example, the 
preoccupation was with “what people did and why” and how to keep participants 
interested in wanting to learn and work together. When Eduardo conducted the externally 
funded FFS on pesticide safety, he could no longer conserve this orientation. As a result, 
he could no longer motivate FFS participants to make financial contributions, and he had 
to draw on new incentives to get people to attend meetings, such as attractive lunch 
breaks or baseball caps. Through the freedom of self-employment, however, Eduardo 
owned a substantial degree of manoeuvrability allowing him to implement people-centred 
FFS and, to a large degree, conserve the methodology’s central design feature: local 
relevance. 
 
Many experts chose not to relinquish their position or control over resources. Arguably, 
the broader proposal of FFS as a farmer-led movement was never seriously entertained. 
During a public meeting, one public extensionist complained, “If farmers begin to lead 
FFS, then what are we [the técnicos] supposed to do?” Instead, the experts and their 
organizations objectified FFS from human and social development to technology transfer 
and economic development. Impact studies (e.g., Barrera et al., 2004 and Mauceri, 2004) 
came to de-emphasize potential knowledge and social contributions while emphasizing 
environmental and economic ones, especially net return. In such cases, the objective of 
FFS shifted from “the empowerment of individuals and communities” to “profit in the 
market.” The overall effect was that FFS became transformed to the point where 
participants moved from the source of innovation to imitating the experts.  
 
Once safely in the hands of the experts, FFS became diversely packaged and sold. It 
appeared in proposals as means to “organic” or “clean production” (e.g., by INIAP and 
EcoPar), “pesticide-use reductions” (CIP), and “increases in productivity” (IPM-CRSP). 
The expected outputs of FFS became part of an individual or organization’s marketing 
strategy. Researchers, técnicos and their organizations reduced FFS from a participant-led, 
multi-faceted and iterative learning-action methodology to a relatively pre-determined and 
standardized means of technology transfer. The methodology became a simplified object: 
a packaged course. In the process of creating the object, FFS was re-shaped into a new 
form: one essentially in line with the norms of the expert system. 
 
In the social wild, FFS was vulnerable to competing forces involved in knowledge 
production. This was particularly true during processes of going to scale with the 
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methodology. Diverse institutional factors – including professional thinking and 
preferences, project-based constraints, organizational culture, and centralized decision-
making – combined to create obstacles for FFS. Through processes of objectification and 
commoditization, the methodology became de-localized and de-humanized. After the 
experts gained control over FFS, it became transformed into an approach that no longer 
seriously threatened established ways of thinking and doing. Meanwhile, local FFS 
facilitators, such as Eduardo, enjoyed conditions shaped by their geography and culture 
that better positioned them to employ more people-centred forms of FFS. 
 
Wider lessons for people-centred proposals 
 
Anthony Giddens (1990) and Ulrich Beck (1992) explain how the contradictions of 
modernity give birth to new forces of change. Similarly, the negative consequences of the 
expert system in agriculture may provoke institutional innovation favourable for the 
viability of people-centred approaches. As a result of the shortcomings of the dominant 
forms of science and research, Gibbons et al. (2000: 140) argue, “We believe that Mode 1 
[knowledge production through abstraction] will eventually become incorporated into 
Mode 2 knowledge production [through the practice of application] and that the dynamics 
on which it rests will continue to unleash further institutional change.” While, as I argued 
earlier, the tensions between Mode 1 and Mode 2 knowledge production produced a 
cooption of FFS methodology, there was nonetheless evidence of institutional 
confrontation and, perhaps, movement. 
 
I observed a number of counter-tendencies underway in Ecuador that are generally 
described in Gibbons et al. (2000), including: growth of multi-functionality, more 
pluralistic science and development, increasingly fluid communication and practice, and a 
preoccupation with relevance. The fact that certain scientists at CIP invited me to 
introduce more participatory approaches demonstrated a growing appreciation for change. 
On the surface, this movement appeared to be in favour of conditions for Mode 2 (lay or 
people-centred) knowledge production (Table 6.7). Nevertheless, the experience of FFS in 
the social wild suggests that the sum of conditions ultimately continued to enforce Mode 1 
knowledge production. 
 
The proposal of regime change towards people-centred designs was ambitious. It implied 
transformation of assumptions about the underlying causes of poverty and environmental 
degradation, “best practice” and “good agriculture,” and how people should learn and 
organize for development. The performance of FFS in the social wild exposed the 
limitations of methodology-based contributions and especially the utility of “going to 
scale” with such methodologies as means to changing present techno-centric trajectories. 
Drawing on diverse literature on socio-technical change (Nelson and Winter, 1977; Rip 
and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2004), technology management (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1994; 
van de Ven and Garud, 1994), and evolutionary economics (Potts, 2000; Schot and Geels, 
2007), I go on to explore how FFS, as a radical niche-level proposal, may come to 
influence regime configuration and technology. Based on my experience in Carchi, I 
observed at play three interactive processes of innovation: the shaping perceptions and 
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expectations, learning and the construction of a new body of knowledge, and growth 
through multi-functionality. 
 
Table 6.7 Institutional conditions favourable to Mode 1 (expert-led) and Mode 2 (lay or 
people-led) knowledge production 
 
Factor Mode 1: expert-led science Mode 2:  people-led innovation 
Knowledge  Specialized – produced in the 
context of abstraction 
Distributive – produced in the 
context of application 
Role of science Produce basic knowledge and 
spin-offs, set priorities – 
separation between science and 
technology 
Facilitate innovation – little 
difference between science and 
technology 
Preoccupation of science Conformity to discipline and 
truth 
Local relevance and accountability 
Expected products Solutions – answers to questions Process management – 
management of interchanges  
Criteria for recognition Disciplinary knowledge, 
compliance to norms 
Multi-functionality, adaptability 
and responsiveness 
Communication Formal, controlled, limited 
sources, and coherent 
Informal, open, multiple sources, 
and complex 
Access to information Achieved through position Achieved through social 
connections and networking 
Organizational structure Rigid, with stable boundaries Fluid, fuzzy and porous 
boundaries 
Role of government Promote competition Promote competition and 
cooperation 
 
Shaping perceptions and expectations 
 
Over the years, we have learned that more important than the effects of modern 
agriculture can be people’s perceptions. We drew on FFS to enable communities to 
address latent pesticide concerns, particularly the severe health affects due to chronic 
exposure to highly toxic pesticides, among other concerns such as soil erosion. Upon 
arrival, however, it was clear that agrochemicals were not seen as a problem but rather a 
solution. A first task became helping farmers and the general public to change their 
perceptions.  
 
As described in Sherwood et al. (2005), through the interactive learning-action process of 
FFS, the communities of Carchi increasingly uncovered unwanted environmental, health 
and economic products associated with modern farming. We found that people needed to 
discover for themselves the “bads” of their agriculture before they could begin to 
understand the shared responsibility that farmers, communities, and broader society held 
in co-producing those consequences.12 Nevertheless, as we experienced with Lenin and 
Joel’s supervisor at INIAP, many experts did not share the vision of people-centred FFS. 
Working with local perceptions was not enough. We also needed to reach the professional 
brokers of development. 
                                                       
12 The ‘reflexive modernisation’ and ‘risk society’ literature views the ‘externalities’ of modernity, in fact, as an 
‘internality’ or systemic product of societies. As such, socio-technical development in recent times is seen to 
lead to not just ‘goods’, but also ‘bads’ (see, for example, Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1992) 
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According to Pacho Gangotena, organic farmer and founder of the agroecology 
movement in Ecuador, “In order to change their reality, people first must change their 
dreams.”13 FFS needed to become part of a growing movement to inform new visions. 
Through the FFS experience, people – local farmers and experts alike – needed to shape 
new hopes and aspirations for the future. Nevertheless, people do not merely fill visions. 
Visions must supplant other visions, which involves politics and implies power 
relationships. 
 
The socio-technical regime produced contradictions in Carchi, but perceptions were, in 
part, clouded by what Latour (1987) and Knorr-Cetina (1999) describe as the myths and 
mythology associated with the modern production of science and technology and what 
Giddens (1990 and 2004) describes as the peoples’ continued willingness to trust the 
outsiders. FFS will contribute to people-centred change when the public increasingly 
chooses to see through the myths of technology-centred development, and it reorganizes 
around emergent aspirations – around new dreams.  
 
We found that changes of perception led to new expectations, and farmers, such as 
Eduardo, were increasingly willing to voice those. Many communities no longer blindly 
accepted the recommendations of the técnicos from NGOs, the government, and 
agrochemical stores. They began to demand non-chemical, “organic” means for 
improving their agriculture. In several cases, agrochemical salespeople were chased out of 
town. This led to increased demand for FFS. Nevertheless, as a result of the 
transformation of FFS, it was inevitable that the emergent forms of the methodology 
would not meet those new expectations. 
 
Building coherent bodies of knowledge 
 
In his study on “science in the making,” Bruno Latour (1987) describes truth construction 
as an interactive phenomenon involving “black boxing” and the translation of prestigious 
symbols.14 Latour’s black boxes represent the building blocks of myths – belief systems 
that go unquestioned. These may diverge or come together as a coherent network. In this 
way, the collective process of black boxing may represent a formidable “engine of 
change.”  
 
The FFS initiative in Ecuador can be viewed as an example of the process of black boxing 
in the making – an emergent network capable of producing beliefs and belief systems. To 
the point where FFS became a coherent body of thought, it was capable of penetrating the 
institutions of farming, science, and development and redefining the incentives for action. 
At different moments of our experience, especially when we managed considerable project 
resources and we held tight control over FFS as a prestigious symbol, we managed to 
                                                       
13 Personal communication, 26 October 2005. 
14 Latour (1987: 2) borrows the term 'black box', a metaphor that cyberneticians use to simplify highly 
complex machinery. He explains that, "They draw a little box about which they need to know nothing but its 
input and output." Many aspects of agro-biology (e.g., insect and disease cycles, 'pests' and soil biota) and 
agrochemicals (chemical fertilizers and pesticides) are effectively 'black boxed' by science and technology 
brokers. 
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convene a growing array of actors. Nevertheless, as FFS left the protected margins of our 
agenda and entered the social wild, the meaning of FFS became vulnerable to translation 
and cooption by competing interests. In hindsight, it appears that we may have released 
FFS too early – i.e., before it’s people-centred form took full social hold. Schut (2006) 
found that by 2005, the FFS network of actors appeared to have divided between two 
ideological lines: either a “pro-pesticide” or “anti-pesticide” (or “pro-health,” as we called 
ourselves) camp. Earlier, I cited a number of examples of its diverse and often 
contradictory expressions. The movement had yet to mature into a coherent body of 
knowledge. 
 
Nevertheless, certain margins were strengthened. Thousands of farmers gained insight 
into the biological and ecological processes of agriculture. Substantial evidence suggests 
that, for some, this contributed to fundamental improvements in farming, especially with 
regard to reliance on external inputs and the stability of production. Large organizations, 
such as CIP, INIAP, and the FAO, abandoned FFS in its original form. While FFS in 
Ecuador did not appear to have achieved the sort of organization described in the 
“Community IPM” literature (Pontius et al., 2002 and www.communityipm.com), 
arguably collective action was initiated in a handful of communities, local organizations 
(APRODIC) and networks (MACRENA). This came to include a number of creative 
“self-financing” projects, such as the production of treelings for sale under contract to 
municipalities and investment of earnings in collective funds. As a result of ensuing FFS 
activity, these organizations had established linkages with similar groups operating in 
Ecuador and elsewhere, such as the national agroecology movement (CEA) and the 
regional Humanist Farmers Movement. These Field Schools had become part of a 
common and growing network capable of producing and enforcing, at least to a limited 
degree, its own rules. 
 
By mid-2007, the few remaining examples of people-centred FFS continued to operate on 
the margins, but their strong internal organization, self-financing, and diversifying activity 
suggested that they had gained a social foothold in northern Ecuador and beyond. Seeds 
of change were planted, but it was unclear whether FFS as people-centred proposal would 
continue to grow into an increasingly coherent body of knowledge capable of defining and 
enforcing rules of “good agriculture” and “good development practice.” 
 
Growth through multi-functionality: from scale to scope 
 
Attempts to institutionalise FFS have centred on “scaling-up” – i.e., increasing the 
methodology’s geographical and institutional spread, usually meaning its organizational 
reach (LEISA, 2003a and b). People have proposed greater investment in the Training of 
Trainers, better impacts studies (usually through quantitative means), and better (i.e., 
more) communication as a means to convincing researchers and policy makers in their 
own language. Nevertheless, despite a wealth of extraordinarily rigorous and specialised 
economic, environmental, and health studies and substantial investment in communicating 
results in Ecuador, we found the institutionalisation of FFS to be far less rational process. 
While FFS scaled in name, the principles often were lost during appropriation. Instead of 
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enabling desired institutional change, scaling exposed vulnerabilities that led to the 
transformation of FFS.  
 
Rather than preoccupy itself with scaling, the socio-technical change literature would 
suggest that FFS movements should look at the role of differential growth through 
increasing “penetration” of the diverse aspects of social life, what in the literature has been 
referred to as diversification or “broadening scope” of influence (Saccomandi, 1998; 
Gibbons et al., 2000). The business world learned long ago that the most significant 
growth was not connected to size but with function (see for example, the research 
summarized in Gladwell, 2000). For marketing purposes, more important than the length 
of outreach is the ability to broadly exert multi-purpose influences. As a result, a growing 
number of businesses and financial institutions have restructured from horizontal 
(essentially scale) to vertical (scope) integration, and they have sought to broaden linkages 
through creative forms of communication and interaction. Similarly, Saccomandi (1998) 
points out that “economies of scope” involve the creative utilisation of a single 
production factor, which in turn substantially improves returns on both the input and 
output sides of production. The knowledge production literature has reached a similar 
conclusion. According to Gibbons et al. (2000: 142), “…. diversification in the functions 
of [science and research] organisations has increased the number of contacts and 
promotes the convergence of preoccupations and opened avenues for exchange and 
cooperation.”  
 
Similarly, the work of van der Ploeg et al. (2003) argues that rural development stands to 
gain through diversification in the hands of users. The initial attraction of FFS to farmers 
and experts alike was associated with its contribution to improving productivity, especially 
through decreasing input costs. The studies on the diverse utilisations of FFS in Ecuador 
found that the methodology could contribute to multiple aspects of rural life beyond on-
farm production and productivity, such as increasing the regenerative qualities of 
agriculture, enhancing solidarity among participants and their families, as well as 
strengthening the reciprocity of relationships through enhanced circulation of labour, 
goods, and services (Paredes, 2001; Mendizabel, 2002; Schut, 2006). For example, in 2007 
the Canastas Solidarias – largely self-financed consumer groups from marginal 
neighbourhoods of Quito – began to meet with groups of FFS graduates from the north 
to negotiate new consumer-grower arrangements around “healthy food,” a concept 
preoccupied with not just the end product of commodities but also with the production 
process itself.15 Creative new relationships promised to shorten the production-
consumption chain in ways that could improve efficiencies through cutting out 
exploitative intermediaries and improving returns to both producers and consumers. 
Through strengthening linkages and interactions between growers and producers, such 
activities also increased accountability at both ends. This appeared to lead to diverse social 
benefits, such as opportunities for the children of the Canastas Solidarias to be able to 
escape the city and live and work on a farm during breaks in the school year. 
 
                                                       
15 The Canastas experience is summarised in Kirwan (2008). The broad concept of “healthy food” was 
articulated in a national campaign document entitled “Eat well, healthy, and sovereign,” Ecuadorian Collective 
of Agroecology (CEA, Guardianes de Semilla, PROBIO, and UTOPIA/Canastas Solidarias), July 2007. 
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Enabling people-centred development 
 
In this chapter, I have drawn on the extremes of Mode 1 (expert-led) and Mode 2 (people-
led) knowledge production to describe the multiple epistemological expressions of FFS. 
Additionally, I have drawn on theories of socio-technical change to assess how institutions 
appropriated the methodology – e.g., the evolution of FFS as a niche-level innovation to 
its utilisation by the socio-technical regime. In Figure 6.2, I now draw on the interaction of 
these two factors to describe competing stages of socio-technical development, useful for 
describing the evolution of FFS in Carchi from multiple forms of IPM as a novelty to 
IPM in practice. 
 
Initially, we introduced FFS as a niche-level intervention with the intention of making it 
an attractive novelty that would contribute to broader institutional change towards people-
centred development (from quadrant IV to III). While FFS was successful at becoming a 
popular novelty, we struggled to conserve its people-centred qualities during processes of 
diffusion or “massification” of the methodology. At first, we felt this was a question of 
competency (e.g., as a result of the quality of our Training of Trainers), but after observing 
previously competent FFS facilitators, such as Joel, lose hold of the methodology, we 
realized that more subtle social forces were at play. FFS became transformed into an 
expert-led IPM approach (movement from quadrant IV to I) that quickly “up-scaled” 
across heterogeneous groups of actors (movement from quadrant I to II) as a result of the 
structural alignment of Mode 1 knowledge production with the established socio-technical 
system. 
 
Regime technology – 
high stability of rules 
 
II. Expert-centred IPM practice 
 
 
Mode 1 knowledge production 
 
III. People-centred IPM practice 
 
 
Mode 2 knowledge production 
(expert-centred) 
 
I. Expert-centred IPM novelty 
 
 
(people-centred) 
 
IV. People-centred IPM novelty 
Niche opportunity – 
low stability of rules 
 
Figure 6.2 Competing stages of socio-technical change 
 
How could regime change towards people-centred IPM have been enabled? Regime level 
movement between expert- and people-centred development is not expected, since by 
definition the two regimes are organized around conflicting sets of rules, in this case, 
consolidated around the extremes between Mode 1 and Mode 2 rationalities. We 
experienced that the transformation of FFS took place at the novelty level – the 
“protected space” for exploration and innovation. Change tended to happen at the 
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moment of attempting to scale-up the methodology, when our priorities as project leaders 
shifted from FFS implementation to diffusion of the methodology, and we released 
control over the methodology. At that point, the boundaries of influence became more 
porous, making it vulnerable to competing influences. 
 
Institutional movement towards people-centred IPM practice requires a discontinuity with 
the established socio-technical regime that generally must come from “below.” Since there 
is little to no alignment with the rules of the regime, change cannot happen through 
extending reach or scaling up but rather through expanding the depth and breadth of 
social embrace or scope. Influencing regime transformation requires that FFS broadly 
penetrate institutional spaces, transforming norms and values and organizing a new power 
centre around the enforcement of emergent rules. 
 
Conclusions 
 
When I arrived in Ecuador, farmers expressed frustration over the experts, especially 
those from MAG, INIAP, and private industry. Over time, expert recommendations had 
created new, more serious problems. Farmers told me that they had done everything asked 
of them by the técnicos, but after three decades, they were worse off than ever. 
 
A common products of modern agriculture – degrading soil and water resources, growing 
pest problems, dependence on external inputs, unfair prices, and debt – created the pre-
conditions for challenging technology-centred development. In this context, we proposed 
FFS as a novelty for enabling a redirection. While arguably successful at planting a seed of 
change, our ability to establish a coherent body of knowledge that could sustain such 
movement into the future was more questionable. Once released in the social wild, FFS 
took on new and sometimes contradictory forms, especially during processes of going to 
scale with the methodology. This experience exposed us to previously hidden or 
underappreciated social phenomena, especially that associated with knowledge production 
and socio-technical change. 
 
FFS became widely popular with communities, farmer organizations, MAG, INIAP, and 
the local governments as well as international organizations, such as CIP, FAO, USAID, 
and COSUDE. FFS quickly rose to the status of “best practice,” and as such, it came to 
be a prestigious symbol. Researchers and técnicos tended to accept certain aspects of FFS, 
such as its ability to “make technologies arrive to farmers.” Over time, however, the 
professionals found certain aspects of FFS more problematic, particularly the aims of 
placing farmers at centre stage of decision-making and resource utilisation. FFS became 
vulnerable to contestation. 
 
Through processes of translation, the experts, via their projects, organizations and other 
control mechanisms, systematically re-shaped FFS. Over time, participants were excluded 
from determining technical content. “Discovery-based learning” and “learn-by-doing” 
were replaced with unidirectional lectures. Differences between FFS were lost to pre-
determined curricula. The experts reconfigured the proposed outcomes of FFS from 
human and social development to technology transfer and economic development. The 
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methodology was transformed to the point where participants moved from being sources 
of innovation to imitators of the experts. FFS underwent processes of objectification and 
commoditization. It became a simplified and homogenized package that could be 
distributed and sold through projects. In the process, the methodology was de-localized 
and de-humanized. In the hands of the experts, FFS shifted from a means of people- to 
technology-centred development to the point where it no longer seriously threatened 
established ways of thinking, doing, and ordering. 
 
The performance of FFS in the social wild exposes limitations of methodology-based 
interventions, and it places into question present calls for scaling-up FFS as overly 
simplistic. The literature on socio-technical change, strategic niche management, and 
evolutionary economics suggests that in order to redirect the present trajectory, beyond 
scale, FFS must influence scope – i.e., the penetration of broad social processes that 
encourage development within the structure of socio-technical change. Namely, FFS must 
become part of three interactive niche-level growth processes: informing and shaping 
public perceptions, building an increasingly coherent body of knowledge, and social 
network building. Due to the radical proposal of FFS, ability to expose the contradictions 
of modern agriculture and create new expectations is important for legitimising 
institutional investments in an approach that has limited market value vis-à-vis the existing 
norms of development practice. In order to respond to such expectations, FFS must 
enable processes of deep, second-order learning around new norms and values as well as 
reflection on issues of desirability and feasibility. Growth and institutionalisation of FFS in 
its original form requires an increasingly influential social network composed of actors 
from both the competing socio-technical regime as well as emerging sectors capable of 
creating and enforcing new rules on the production and reproduction of FFS among the 
heterogeneous set of actors involved in agricultural development. 
 
It is questionable whether FFS would regain original form in Ecuador and when and if 
ever people-centred development would survive the social wild. Nevertheless, for some, 
FFS contributed to movement towards conditions increasingly favourable for more 
localized forms of knowledge production and change. As such, the experience continued 
to represent a modicum of hope and inspiration. In Chapter 7, I further explore processes 
of socio-technical change in the context of a power matrix that organized around the 
perpetuation of harmful technology. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Dynamics of Perpetuation: The Politics of Keeping 
Highly Toxic Pesticides on the Market 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter is based on reflective practice associated with efforts to influence pesticide 
policy in Ecuador during the ten-year period of 1998 to 2007. The chapter explores how 
institutional dynamics came to form, transform, and influence policy outcomes and how 
certain actors sought to cooperate, collude and collide to shape public opinion over 
agriculture technology. Where Chapters 3 and 4 presented a general history of agrarian 
development in Carchi and Chapters 5 and 6 examined how research and development 
interventions were only marginally effective at leveraging change, this chapter describes 
how certain institutional brokers of science and technology manoeuvred to influence and 
entrench harmful policy. More specifically, I explore how differently positioned social 
actors built and rebuilt allegiances, gained control over resources, and exercised discretion 
as a result of controversies provoked by the CIP-led activity in Carchi.  
 
Introduction 
 
Over time, the agriculture concerns in Carchi boiled down to the elimination of World 
Health Organisation (WHO) Hazard Class Ia and Ib pesticides: the highly toxics. The 
medical community increasingly agreed that getting rid of this class would solve 90 
percent of the acute health problems associated with pesticides (Eddleston et al., 2002), so 
even though the destruction of water sources, soil erosion, and over-use of agrochemicals 
remained serious threats to the ecosystem, eliminating the highly toxics became CIP’s 
priority. A pro-health alliance of farmers, social movements, NGOs, and a scattering of 
individuals in government agencies joined the cause. Further, eliminating the highly toxics 
had become consistent with the evolving interests of the international pesticide industry, 
as product development teams had long ago reached the conclusion that more specific, 
lower toxic pesticides would become the wave of the future. Nevertheless, the national 
industry continued to financially depend on highly toxics, so considerable resistance 
remained.  
 
Despite my resolve to wind up this dissertation, in May 2006, Federico,1 the Provincial 
Director of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) in Carchi, prevailed upon me to attend a 
joint MAG-CropLife meeting in May 2006.2 The title of the meeting struck me as a 
creative mix of terminology: “The Use of Crop Protectors for Improving the Production 
                                                       
1 In this chapter I have used fictitious names to protect the reputation of individuals. 
2 Joint MAG-CropLife strategy workshop, “The Use of Crop Protectors for Improving the Production and 
Minimizing the Risks in the Agricultural Zone of Carchi,” Ibarra, 24 May 2006. 
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and Minimizing the Risks in the Agricultural Zone of Carchi.” Its stated purpose was to 
“analyze and define strategies and actions for improving the use of agrochemicals in 
agricultural production in Carchi.”  
 
In addition to being recently named the Provincial Director of MAG in Carchi, Federico 
was a member of the Humanist Movement, and as such, he was committed to the 
promotion of “non-violence.”3 While Federico viewed the use of pesticides as 
problematic, he said that the meeting was agreed upon between CropLife and MAG in 
Quito, and he found himself in the uncomfortable position of having to implement it. 
Federico telephoned my partner, Myriam Paredes, also a Humanist, to say, “I want to 
make sure that the meeting includes your [pro-health] perspective.” 
 
By then, my views on highly toxics were widely known. The CropLife probably was not 
interested in my participation, but since MAG was the co-organizer, it could not prevent 
the Provincial Director from inviting me. Since former colleagues at CIP – a renown plant 
pathologist and a soil scientist – happened to be visiting that week, I brought them along 
as well as a dozen Farmer Field School graduates, who long ago had stopped using highly 
toxic pesticides. 
 
During a break, I walked over to greet Francisco, the reinstated National Director of 
CropLife, whom I had not seen in years. Francisco, a lawyer, had left CropLife over a 
controversy between the national and international pesticide industry. I explained to him 
that Federico had invited me and that I, in turn, had brought along colleagues from 
MACRENA, the Humanist Movement, CIP, and the Farmer Field Schools (FFS). 
 
In reference to a controversial publication on FFS that CropLife had co-financed despite 
never having conducted a Farmer Field School (Barrera et al., 2004), Francisco said, 
“Have you seen the impact study of our work with INIAP? It demonstrates that we have 
had an impact. We cannot say statistically that there are less intoxications, but we think 
so.” I responded, “My partners and I will not collaborate with an initiative that continues 
to permit the use of highly toxic pesticides.” Francisco said, “CropLife knows that it needs 
to promote safer products. The problem is not the international companies.” Francisco 
went on to explain that there were tensions over the right to produce generic products 
and the US-driven Free Trade Agreement, emphasizing the national industry’s 
misinformation campaign over patents and barriers to formulating inexpensive products 
for Ecuadorian farmers. He added that recently the controversy had quieted down and the 
relationship between the national and international industry was back to normal. As a 
result, he recently had been reinstated as CropLife’s Executive Director, and once again, 
he could speak for both the national and international industries. 
 
During a plenary discussion, a number of farmers, health professionals, and academics 
gave impassioned speeches on their concerns over pesticides. They did not refer to the 
past studies nor did they have precise information, but it was clear that there was a 
                                                       
3 The Humanist Movement espouses non-violence, expressed in physical, economic, cultural, and 
environmental forms, as per the writings of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. For further 
information, see Mario Rodríguez-Cobos (1996). 
Dynamics of Perpetuation 189 
growing public perception that pesticides were causing health problems and that the 
industry and government were responsible. The new Coordinator of the CIP EcoSalud 
project, a medical doctor, and myself emphasized that not all pesticides were “bad” and 
that we needed to focus on the highly toxics, which were behind the bulk of health 
problems. We cited a number of published studies to back up our positions. A young 
pesticide salesman protested in what had become the industry’s mantra: “Pesticides are 
responsible for feeding people in Carchi. There are no alternatives. You cannot be 
romantic and pretend to eliminate pesticides without offering farmers alternatives.”  
 
At that point, the facilitator ended the discussion before we could clarify that we were not 
proposing the elimination of all pesticides or before an FFS graduate could explain that 
many farmers had been producing profitably for years without highly toxics. Nevertheless, 
I had come to know that such evidence would not make a difference. The underlying 
barrier to change was not the highly toxics or a lack of alternatives, but something far 
more social in nature. 
 
Science as social 
 
We have no science here. You know that Ecuadorians don’t like to do research and 
write it up, so science has not arrived to our farmers. Let me tell you something, I 
could take you to see 500 farmers, and you'd find that all 500 cultivated in totally 
different ways. – Patricio, a farmer and former pesticide salesman, San Gabriel 
 
Patricio prided himself as an ingeniero or técnico.4 Further, he grew up on a farm, which 
provided him the insight of “practical experience.” He learned at university that science 
gave universal answers and a “better way of doing things.” For Patricio, the problem in 
Carchi was that farmers needed to be “technified,” which involved everyone learning to 
farm in a single, “right” way: i.e., the way of agricultural science. Such blind faith in 
science and technology lies at the heart of modern agriculture (see for example, Long and 
van der Ploeg, 1989).  
 
In contrast, the literature on socio-technology (e.g., Latour, 1987; Woolgar, 1988; Knorr-
Cetina, 1999) examines the constructedness of scientific knowledge, challenging notions 
of science as monolithic and unified, objective, rigorous, and truth seeking. Otherwise, as 
this chapter will argue, a pesticide would be just a liquid in a container. 
 
According to Actor Network Theory (ANT) scientific knowledge and technology emerge 
from a process of “heterogeneous engineering,” during which social, technical, and 
conceptual pieces become fitted together or “translated” into products of equal 
heterogeneity (see for example, Callon, 1986). This involves humans networking not just 
to interact with other humans, but also to interact with humans and materials. ANT 
emphasises that technology is not just an artefact, but also a simultaneous mixture of 
                                                       
4 Refers to the five-year academic degree of Ingeniero Agrónomo, the equivalent to a BSc-level degree in the 
Agronomic Sciences. Rural people in Ecuador often refer to these people as part of a class of educated 
technicians or técnicos. 
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physical object, human activity, and knowledge (i.e., the know-how to use and sustain 
technology). Ergo, networks of objects, such as pesticides, participate in the social.  
 
In the same way that science can be seen as a construction, the sides of debates over 
technology do not automatically exist, nor are they permanent. Rather, they become a 
matter of negotiation – endless jockeying of interests and coming together over positions 
and platforms. Techno-science networks emerge during the construction of interests and 
identities as a result of processes of alliance building, translation, and representation.5 If 
pesticides disappeared, then so would a particular social order. 
 
While Latour (1987) and Knorr-Cetina (1999) concentrate on the early stages of “science 
in process,” in this chapter I examine a ready-made product of science: synthetic 
pesticides. At this later stage of socio-technical change, actor networks have matured 
largely as a result of the effective popularization of earlier proposals into dynamic 
collectives of allies having well-defined, though always malleable boundaries. These 
boundaries may consist of formalized administrative means with highly articulated 
positions, hierarchies, administrative mechanisms, and rules, as well as growing resistance 
from alternative interests. Later in their social life, networks become made up of 
identifiable organizations and faces that operate in elaborate governing structures – 
“socio-technical regimes” – that deliberately attempt to exert influence over the broader 
techno-science community.  
 
Context and methodology 
 
This investigation took place in the social arena where knowledge encounters and 
negotiations over agricultural technology take place and in the common spaces where 
interests converge and contribute to concerted action among actors. As an active 
participant in the examined activity, I largely base the research on reflective practice. I 
aspired to capture how different groups of actors (farmers, agronomists, health 
professionals, researchers, private industry, and government officials) both intellectually 
and organizationally built alliances, positioned and repositioned around pesticide 
technology, as well as how they reached consensus on explanations, coped, and 
strategised. My analysis concentrates on networks of social actors, while Paredes (in 
process) considers more nuanced individual and localized phenomena.  
 
This chapter draws on a series of critical events that took place between 1998 and 2007, as 
recorded through project documents, published theses and other studies, and media 
coverage, as well as my personal notes and correspondence as a direct participant. I write 
in the first person so that the reader can clearly identify my involvement. Further, the 
team of researchers on which I drew for the historical work in Chapter 4 conducted open-
ended interviews with key informants that were recorded and transcribed. I also draw on 
the recordings of the BBC's interviews during the production of its two-part series on the 
                                                       
5 Latour (1987:29 and 174) forged the term 'technoscience' to conveniently summarize 'science and 
technology'. In practice, he used technoscience to, "describe all the elements tied to the scientific contents no 
matter how dirty, unexpected or foreign they seem.” Latour used ‘science and technology' to designate what 
was kept of technoscience once the “trials of responsibility” were resolved and assigned. 
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effects of globalisation in Carchi, "Dying to Make a Living."6 I make regular use of 
footnotes and citations to reveal sources. Further analysis explores patterned behaviour, 
interactions between and among actors, and subsequent actions and reactions.  
 
I continue with descriptions of two concurrent and interacting key events: public 
discussions and forums on the pesticide research and the industry’s responses and efforts 
to win support for its positions, before shifting attention to the actions and reactions 
generated by this activity. In the discussion section, I examine the social face of pesticide 
policy in action, specifically underlying modes of enactment and change, in order to shed 
light on the constructedness of agriculture technology in Carchi. 
 
Critical events 
 
As summarised in Chapter 2, initially my colleagues and I assumed that influencing 
agricultural policy was simply a function of providing better quality information. Alerted 
to the pesticide concerns in the early 1990s, CIP and INIAP produced extensive 
multidisciplinary research aimed at understanding underlying problems and devising cost-
effective alternatives. Medical studies found that a majority of rural people suffered 
neurological damage. Diverse research on the social and economic factors behind 
pesticide exposure found industry and government Safe Use of Pesticide (SUP) campaigns 
ineffective. Over time, we came to agree with others (for example, Atkins and Leisinger, 
2000) that it was not realistic to expect farmers who lived under the socioeconomic 
conditions of rural Ecuador to use pesticides safely, with or without SUP training. 
Drawing on the recommendations of industrial hygiene, the team of CIP and INIAP 
researchers concluded (Yanggen et al., 2003b: 197): 
 
In summary, our studies, in agreement with the published conclusion of the 
pesticide industry, find that the socioeconomic conditions of rural communities in 
places such as Carchi do not permit the safe use of extremely and highly toxic 
pesticides. As a result of this situation, it is very worrisome that the country 
permits the free sale of these products when it is evident that they will not be 
used safely and that this will cause neurological damage that directly affects 
productivity and the well-being of rural communities.  
 
Meanwhile, we organized around the proposals of Integrated Pest Management (IPM), 
which in Carchi emphasized farm productivity improvement through reduced use of 
agrochemicals – both synthetic pesticides and fertilizers. As described in Chapter 6, we 
promoted IPM practice through the knowledge-based designs of Farmer Field Schools. In 
summary, pesticide-use reduction through IPM became our proposed technology 
trajectory and FFS its carrier. The elimination of the highly toxics became our political 
rallying point and battle cry. 
 
Colleagues produced scientifically rigorous studies under the conceptual framework of 
Tradeoff Assessment on interactive health, environment, and productive factors 
                                                       
6 Lynne Mennie and Euan McIlwraith of the BBC World Service conducted these interviews during 7-14 
September 2003. 
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(Crissman et al., 1994). They identified a number of positive sum policy alternatives 
centring on practices that could potentially decrease exposure and improve production, 
thereby positively contributing to both health and economic objectives. We quickly 
learned, however, that the barriers to change were not so straightforward. After five years 
of attempting to leverage policy change, a somewhat frustrated team of researchers 
concluded (Yanggen et al., 2003a: 2): 
 
The health problems caused by pesticides are severe and are affecting a high 
percentage of the rural population of the Carchi Province in Ecuador. 
Technology and policy solutions exist that can substantially improve the health of 
the province’s population and are economically viable. Despite the gravity of the 
problem, little progress has been made at the aggregate level. Government 
policies have long promoted the use of [highly toxic] pesticides. A clear political 
will has not existed to date to reverse this situation.”  
 
We discovered a complex and dynamic cultural power matrix surrounding pesticide use 
that was far more organized and capable of shaping public opinion and policy than we 
were. This chapter goes on to highlight three interactive processes that took place over the 
eight-year period of 1999 to 2006: a series of public forums on research outcomes, 
ensuing media activity, and the provoked responses, especially from the pro-pesticide 
alliance.7 
 
Against the flow: questioning pesticide technology 
 
I apply pesticides to my potatoes so that I can go to sleep at night. – a farmer 
from Santa Martha de Cuba 
 
In Ecuador, Carchenses are known as hard-working people with richly diverse views who 
generate lively conversation on everything from politics to the potato. Nevertheless, when 
we arrived essentially everyone agreed on one matter: pesticides were a blessing.  
 
The weather, continual pest and disease outbreaks, and market variability made farming a 
high-risk enterprise and farmers a class of gamblers. In this context, a technology that was 
perceived to decrease vulnerabilities was highly valued. Over time, many farmers literally 
came to view pesticide technology as a godsend (Mera-Orcés, 2000 and Paredes, 2001).  
 
Pesticides helped farmers rest a bit more easily at night. They gave extensionists easy 
answers to farmers’ questions, which in turn provided value to their years of study and 
employment as técnicos. If farmers were happy, politicians were happy. Farmer enthusiasm 
                                                       
7 I use ‘pro-pesticide alliance’ to refer to the dynamic collection of individuals and organizations that 
collaborated and strategised to sustain present farming practice. For financial and employment purposes, the 
well-being of these actors depended on the use of pesticide technologies and other external inputs. Over time, 
this situation led to the promotion of over-applications and the extensive use of highly toxic products. A 
competing group emerged around the theme of health and lobbied for decreases in pesticide use and the 
elimination of the class of highly toxics and other problematic pesticides, such as the fungicide mancozeb that 
was of lesser toxicity but a suspected cancer-causing agent. I refer to this group alternately as the pro-health 
alliance or lobby.  
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over pesticides led them regularly to let go of their hard-earned cash, which concentrated 
in the hands of a now well-established class of salespeople and vendors, many of who had 
become rich, very rich. Seemingly, everyone won with pesticides. 
 
The farming sector continued to expand into the 1980s generating exponential sales of 
agrochemicals, which financed new vehicles and houses for industry folk in San Gabriel, 
Guayaquil, Philadelphia, and Bonn. Pesticides had come to allow people to get on with 
daily life. The land in Carchi was robust; the rainfall was evenly distributed throughout the 
year; the sun rose in the morning, and agrochemical technology was plentiful. Things were 
good, that is, until we came to town. 
 
When I arrived in 1998, the Head of CIP in Ecuador, Charlie Crissman, and the 
Occupational Health Specialist, Donald Cole from the McMaster Institute of Health and 
the Environment in Canada, told me that it was our duty to “inform the public” on the 
research findings. I was hired to produce informational bulletins and to organize public 
forums in communities as well as at provincial and national levels as a means of “sharing 
the results.” Since pesticides were not perceived as a problem in Carchi but rather a 
solution, my first task was to shake-up things. 
 
I began by working with the EcoSalud team on a series of radio announcements and 
educational programs for broadcast throughout the province on the startling health effects 
of pesticides. We documented dramatic testimony on intoxications and produced bulletins 
emphasizing that pesticides affected two-thirds of the rural population at levels that would 
justify legal recourse in many countries. We also demonstrated the viability of alternatives 
through modelling and Farmer Field Schools. Staff sought linkages with a broad group of 
local organizations with which we felt there was, or could be, complementary interests, 
such as municipalities, NGOs, and universities. The project nurse participated in 
provincial Health Council meetings and the project educator joined a local development 
consortium. As I worked to mobilise a grassroots response around the Farmer Field 
Schools, I also became increasingly active in lobbying efforts at multiple levels. Eventually, 
this activity would place me in the path of the influential pro-pesticide alliance. 
 
In October 1999, we organised a province-wide stakeholders meeting entitled, "The 
Impacts of Pesticides on Health, Production and the Environment." While preliminary at 
the time, the data already made clear a serious health and economic situation in Carchi 
associated with widescale overuse of agrochemicals, especially highly toxic pesticides. 
Over 120 representatives from government, private industry, development organizations, 
communities, and the media participated in the daylong event.  
 
Following a series of presentations from the CIP-led team of investigators, the legal 
representatives from the provincial councils of agriculture and health chaired breakout 
sessions. Ministerial representatives from agriculture, health and education participated as 
well as the governor of Carchi and mayors from each of its 14 municipalities. One notable 
outcome of the meeting was the formation of an ad-hoc committee composed of 
directors from INIAP, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Public Health 
charged with producing a list of recommendations, which would become “The 
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Declaration for Life, Environment and Production in Carchi” (Box 7.1). The Carchi 
Declaration called for “the eventual elimination of highly toxic pesticides” as well as a 
number of measures designed to heighten awareness over the hazards of pesticides. 
 
Box 7.1 “The Carchi Declaration for Life, Environment, and Production” 
 
As a result of the October 1999 stakeholder meeting on “The Impact of Pesticides on 
Health, Production, and the Environment,” Directors from INIAP, the Ministry of 
Education, and the Ministry of Health drafted the Declaration for Life, Environment and 
Production in Carchi,” calling for: 
 
• assurance of greater control on the part of the Ecuadorian Agricultural Health 
Service (SESA) of the formulation, sale and use of agrochemicals, including the 
prohibition of highly toxic products (WHO Hazard Classes Ia and Ib) 
• introduction of information concerning the impact of pesticides on health, the 
environment and farming productivity into the basic school curriculum 
• inclusion of IPM as part of the degree requirements for university level 
agricultural technical training 
• commitment of further resources to research and training in integrated crop 
management with an orientation towards the reduction of pesticide use and safe 
use of pesticides 
• promotion of awareness-raising in rural communities on the side effects of 
agricultural practices and the use of more environmental and health friendly 
practices 
• the agrochemical industry’s direct financial support in the completion of these 
resolutions 
 
The provincial forum ended with participating authorities asking CIP – specifically me – 
to take the Declaration to the National Pesticide Committee (NPC), the Congressionally 
appointed advisory committee composed of representatives from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Public Health, and the Environment, the Ecuadorian Plant and Animal 
Health Service (known by its Spanish abbreviation, SESA), and the Association of the 
Industry Animal and Crop Protection Products (known by its Spanish abbreviation 
APSCA; today CropLife-Ecuador).8 The NPC was charged with the responsibility of 
overseeing national pesticide policies. The industry’s subsequent activity would assure that 
the Carchi Declaration would never seriously enter into public debate. 
 
 
                                                       
8 APSCA grew out of the Association of Importers and Manufacturers of Agriculture Inputs and Similar Lines 
(known by its Spanish abbreviation, AIFA) (CropLife-Ecuador, nd:2). Created in 1978, AIFA advocated in 
favour of Ecuadorian Law 73, which in 1990 established the norms and standards for the formulation, 
manufacture, importation, sale and use of pesticides and similar products. Also, it directly participated in the 
creation of the 1994 Law of Agrarian Development that ended the government's policy of land reform that 
began in 1966. Later, AIFA lobbied to create unified regulatory standards for pesticide in Ecuador and the 
Andes. In 1999, AIFA became a member of the regional Latin American Crop Protection Association 
(LACPA) and changed its name to APSCA. As part of an effort to modernize its image, in 2001 LACPA 
became CropLife-Latin America and APSCA became CropLife-Ecuador. 
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Industry response 
 
In 2001, I participated in a series of meetings with the National Pesticide Committee over 
the CIP-led research in Carchi as well as the Carchi Declaration. During one meeting, 
Maria, a toxicologist and the representative of SESA as well as acting President of the 
Committee, argued that based on the recent findings, the Committee had the 
responsibility of recommending a review of the policies governing the sale and 
distribution of highly toxic pesticides. This motion caught the attention of the Executive 
Director of APSCA, Francisco, who was quick to argue, “The elimination of pesticides 
would jeopardize farm productivity and food security." I emphasized that the 
recommendations did not speak to all pesticides but just WHO Class I products. Placing a 
dozen publications on the table, including industry-led studies, I explained once more that 
the highly toxics were responsible for the bulk of health problems associated with 
pesticide use in developing countries. While that day I may have made a convincing 
argument before Francisco and the rest of the NPC, the battle over pesticide policy 
reform in Ecuador was far from over.  
 
The NPC agreed to co-sponsor with CIP and INIAP a national forum on the Carchi 
research, which took place in Quito in May of 2001. Several weeks prior to the national 
forum, Francisco invited me to give an exclusive seminar for the members of APSCA. 
Having a number of former students and friends in the agrochemical industry in Ecuador, 
I thought there was a chance that APSCA would consider eliminating the highly toxics. 
The closed-door meeting took place on the top floor of the Ministry of Agriculture 
building and involved 43 salespeople and mid- to upper-level managers from agrochemical 
companies operating in Ecuador.  
 
Entering the seminar, I did not fully appreciate the disquiet stirred by our research. I gave 
a one-hour presentation summarizing the health and economic findings, the potential of 
FFS in IPM as an alternative, and the rationale behind CIP’s policy recommendations. 
The subsequent discussion carried on for over two hours. Many people brought with 
them a bound copy of the preliminary studies from the earlier forum in Carchi. Referring 
to underlined texts, I was asked to provide detailed explanations of different experimental 
designs and analyses. 
 
Days later, the President of APSCA sent me a letter in which he carefully interpreted the 
findings of the CIP-led studies:9 
 
A brief analysis of the studies realized by you [CIP and INIAP] clearly show that 
the production of potato in the Andes requires pesticides and resistant varieties, 
and, in the case of Carchi, their use is economical and efficient. The studies also 
show that the use of these products has not caused environmental contamination, 
nor have they found residuals on potatoes, prior to peeling and cooking, beyond 
permitted limits. These findings, of fundamental importance, indicate that 
pesticides are not [adversely] affecting production, the environment or 
consumers. 
                                                       
9 Letter received from the President of APSCA, 28 May 2001. 
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The letter produced different reactions within the CIP-led team of researchers. The lead 
Ecuadorian economist argued, "Our job is to produce the information. As scientists, we 
should not get involved in politics." At the time, Crissman and the others researchers on 
our team nodded in agreement. In contrast, I argued that as a rural development 
practitioner, I felt we had an obligation to not just produce information but to proactively 
influence public opinion. Eventually, I would come to appreciate that, as a foreigner, my 
future was less threatened than that of my national colleagues by confronting influential 
people in the country. I also would learn that Ecuador's educational system and its 
professional organizations, in particular the Colegio de Ingenieros, created linkages that 
intellectually and socially tied staff to our political opponent: the agrochemical industry. 
 
The day before the Quito national forum a half dozen industry representatives from the 
United States, Central America, Colombia and the city of Guayaquil, where most 
Ecuadorian chemical companies were based, made a surprise visit to the Santa Catalina 
Research Station to meet with the CIP researchers. This time, instead of requesting more 
information on the studies, the industry officials informed us of their collective position. 
The representative of CropLife-Latin America began by saying, "We cannot be held 
responsible for farmers' careless handling of our products,” and he expressed concern 
over our call for eliminating highly toxic pesticides. In lieu of "unnecessarily radical 
measures," another representative suggested that we work together for "more feasible 
changes than the removal of products from the market." After about 30 minutes of 
listening to what sounded like a well-rehearsed script, Crissman abruptly stood up and 
asked them to leave the station. Afterward, Crissman told the CIP team, “I’m now 
convinced that Ecuador needs to eliminate the highly toxics.” 
 
The next day, the Minister of Agriculture and the FAO Country Representative opened 
the daylong national forum for an audience of about 150 people. Although I had met 
privately with each to go over the agenda and provide printed material on the studies, 
both the Minister and FAO Representative strategically avoided the theme of pesticides in 
their respective speeches. Instead, each made vague statements about the importance of 
food security and the role of modern technologies in feeding the rural poor of Ecuador.  
 
Following the introduction, the CIP-led team gave a series of presentations on the results 
of different health, environmental, and economic studies. Afterward, representatives from 
the Farmer Field Schools in Carchi demonstrated their tested alternatives for substantially 
reducing reliance on the highly toxic insecticides carbofuran and methamidophos as well 
as the suspected carcinogenic fungicide mancozeb. Through alternatives such as the 
Analysis of the Agro-Ecosystem and pest traps, the farmers argued, not only were they 
able to avoid health risks associated with pesticide use, but also they substantially 
decreased input costs. The farmers concluded with a call for attention to the Carchi 
declaration and requesting support for the burgeoning FFS movement.  
 
During the day’s question and answer sessions industry officials repeatedly expressed 
concern over the proposal of eliminating Class I insecticides. Surprisingly, the Director of 
SESA (and President of the NPC) did not show up for the forum. A replacement sat in, 
but she lacked the authority to propose the Carchi Declaration. Later, I learned that the 
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same group of industry representatives that had visited CIP had also visited the SESA 
Director the night prior to the national forum. Between that time and the morning, the 
Director had decided not to participate in the forum. Despite dozens of subsequent letters 
from farmer groups and development and research organizations requesting attention to 
the Carchi Declaration, SESA never responded, and as a result the NPC never publicly 
sanctioned the Declaration of Carchi and the provision for eliminating the highly toxics. 
 
At the very least, the Quito forum caught the attention of the media. Following the airing 
of an investigative television program on pesticide poisonings in Carchi,10 I received a 
number of telephone calls from national and international industry representatives who 
expressed concern over what one caller described as the “exaggerated presentation of the 
facts.” Citing the CIP studies, the APSCA representative told me, “The country’s food 
security depends on pesticides and the ability of farmers to manage products safely.” The 
callers generally emphasized the same solution: a collaborative Safe Use of Pesticides 
training program involving CIP, INIAP, the Ministry of Agriculture, and municipalities. 
 
The following year, INIAP, CIP and the FAO publicly launched a Spanish language book 
(Yanggen et al., 2003a) summarizing the overall research to a group of over 100 public 
officials, industry representatives and media. In-depth radio programs and newspaper 
articles followed. SESA officials and pesticide industry representatives responded with 
now familiar behaviour: seeming concern over the alarming health effects of pesticides, 
but disdain for calls for the market removal of the highly toxic insecticides. As per the 
findings of the aforementioned BBC World Service radio program, the industry’s position 
had become the official government position: "We have established international 
standards of recommendation and have forced the pesticide industry to obey those rules" 
and "We cannot be held responsible for farmers' misuse of pesticides."11 
 
Despite over a decade of research and overwhelming evidence on the hazards of pesticide 
use in Carchi and substantial public demonstration of rigorously studied cost-effective 
alternatives, it became clear that policy did not primarily depend on high quality 
information. In the end, we reached the same frustrating conclusion as Wesseling et al. 
(2005) in Central America (p.S697): “Documentation of pesticide poisonings during 
several decades never induced any decisions to ban or restrict a pesticide.”  
 
 
Truth and consequences 
 
We found that in practice policy outcomes on pesticides were not shaped primarily by 
thoughtful analysis of information, but rather strategic framing and reframing of issues 
expressed through the assertions and activity of influential actors and their networks.  
 
                                                       
10 Amargo cosecha (Bitter harvest), a documentary produced by Adolfo Asar of the Día a Día Program, first aired 
in September 2001. 
11 For a link to the two-part World Service program, see BBC (2004). 
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Claims 
 
Carbofuran is the number one selling insecticide in the world for years, and we 
are proud that it was one of the tools in the green revolution that helped feed the 
world's people. – Director of Global Regulatory Affairs, FMC Agricultural 
Products 
 
Jansen (2000: 14) identified three central arguments on which the industry draws to claim 
that Safe Use of Pesticides is the right response to pesticide-generated health concerns: 1) 
pesticides are indispensable for feeding growing populations and enabling farmers to 
escape poverty; 2) experts extensively test and approve pesticides for the public; 3) the 
industry has developed effective safe use programs. The pro-pesticide alliance in Ecuador 
essentially made the same arguments, with the addition that farmers (i.e., users) and not 
industry (creators and producers) were responsible for poisonings. 
 
Indispensability of pesticides 
 
Ever since the research and the Día a Día documentary, no one has wanted to buy 
potatoes from farmers in Carchi. As a result, prices have dropped and farmers are 
going broke. – a pesticide salesman in San Gabriel 
 
Following the presentations by the Head of CIP-Ecuador and me to a large group of 
farmers at a provincial potato fair in Carchi,12 a pesticide salesman stood up and criticized 
the investigations. He contended that our research was responsible for the bad year that 
potato farmers were facing. (Fortunately for us, most of the several hundred farmers in 
the room understood that other factors were behind the situation, specifically low prices 
followed by a late blight disease outbreak.) Claims followed that all pesticides, including 
the highly toxics, were indispensable for farming and the economic well-being of farmers. 
 
This reminded me of a letter than I had received years earlier from the President of 
APSCA, who argued, "In Ecuador, late blight will destroy nearly 100 percent of the potato 
crop if fungicides are not used. The Andean weevil can attach up to 80 percent of tubers 
of a plot if insecticides are not applied. Potato is the only crop that can provide sufficient 
food for the Andean population in these regions of high elevation with little available land 
and short growth cycles."13 He asserted that a reduction in pesticide use would bring 
financial harm to farmers: "...the solution of certain groups to completely abandon 
pesticide use or speak of the elimination of highly toxic compounds would be difficult to 
convert into a practical solution for the population and wild fauna, since it implies a 
drastic reduction in harvests.” 
 
In its brochure justifying the continued distribution and sale of Class I pesticides, 
CropLife-International makes similar assertions (CropLife, nd: 3): "Pesticides are essential 
to farming economies, especially in developing countries and economies in transition, 
where adverse effects caused by weeds, diseases and pests are greater. They are critical in 
                                                       
12 Potato Fair, El Angel, Carchi, 12 September 2003. 
13 Letter received from the President of APSCA, 28 May 2001 
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order to meet the food and fibre needs of the global community."  By drawing the line at 
all pesticides, the industry argues that the harm of eliminating a particular category of 
pesticides is tantamount to eliminating all pesticides, which in turn would lead to 
“poverty” and “hunger.” 
 
In December 2003, PAN-Ecuador interrupted a joint FMC-INIAP conference on the 
"correct stewardship of carbofuran," which involved experts from FMC's public relations 
and pesticide safety units in Brazil and the United States as well as over 30 high-level 
representatives from companies and research institutions – the regional copula of the pro-
pesticide alliance. The response, as managed by Jonathan, the Director of Global 
Regulatory Affairs at FMC Agricultural Products, is instructive on how the industry 
organizes to counter challenges to its position that the highly toxics should remain on the 
market. 
 
Jonathan was addressing the congress when a group of about 15 protesters barged into 
the auditorium, shouting and handing out pamphlets. He waved down the disapproval of 
the audience and stopped the hotel security that had arrived to escort out the protestors. 
Jonathan asked the protestors to stay for a few minutes: 
 
Part of our reason for being here [in Ecuador] is to listen and to gather 
information from every segment of the population. So, we are very interested in 
anything you have to say about pesticides, and specifically FMC pesticides. If you 
have real information about intoxications, please convey that to us. Let us see that 
because we know that these things can happen. Though death, that is, 
unintentional death, is rare for carbofuran, we know that these things do happen. 
We are very concerned about them. We see this as our purpose, to see that we get 
the benefit of insecticides use for farmers and try to avoid the risks, because the 
real purpose of insecticides and pesticides, in the end, is to help feed the starving 
people of the world. And this is well recognized by the FAO, in announcements 
by the Assistant Director General, that pesticides are important, because we have 
many people to feed, and they are just one tool in this toolbox to accomplish that 
goal. But we don't want people to be exposed to unnecessary risks. We just want 
them to get the benefits. So, please send us the information. 
 
The pro-pesticide alliance continually sought the “goods” of pesticides as evidence of the 
value of all pesticides. Meanwhile, it downplayed or completely obviated their “bads.” 
Rather than acknowledge the harmful neurological effects of carbofuran, Jonathan said 
that “unintentional death” due to carbofuran was rare.14 By suggesting action based on 
“unreal” information, he alleged that the “seeming good intentions” of the protestors was 
actually “anti-farmer” and “against the poor.” In so doing, he positioned the industry on 
the side of farmers in its ardent defence of the indispensability of pesticides, including the 
highly toxics.  
 
                                                       
14 In fact, recent research has found that access to acutely toxic pesticides in rural communities indeed is 
associated with high suicide rates (Bertolote et al., 2006) 
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Trust the experts 
 
Furadan... is registered in more than 80 countries for over 30 years.... Today it is 
one of the most studied products. We have over 20,500 bibliographic citations. If 
you go to the university, in universities you will commonly find over 1,500. It is 
important to note that [Furadan] is a highly studied product. – FMC Regional 
Safe Use of Pesticides expert 
 
After the protestors' were gone, the representatives from the national pesticide industry 
apologised to Jonathan for the "indignation." They called the interruption "rude" and a 
"violation," describing it as typical of the socially unacceptable behaviour of “…the 
radicals we have to deal with in Ecuador.” One man stood up and said that rather than 
resort to such "violence," the protestors should solicit "public space for dialogue, where 
they could present their studies and practical alternatives for helping the poor." 
 
Such arguments aimed to shift the burden of guilt from the industry, which was “unfairly 
accused” of poisoning and killing thousands to that of the protestors, who “wilfully” 
violated social norms and disregarded the interests of the poor. Holding the position of 
proprietor of not just the rented space but also of truth and justice, the pro-pesticide 
alliance sought, and often was awarded, the final word.  
 
In reference to the concerns raised by the protesters, I asked Jonathan: 
 
Your coming here indicates that you may have heard about some of the research 
in Carchi, in Northern Ecuador. We've done a lot of studies in Carchi with a 
number of international organizations. Many of these confirm what you say in the 
US – carbofuran not causing serious environmental damage. Certainly we do not 
find quantities of carbofuran [in Carchi] that are above the EPA standards, in 
terms of metabolites in ground water, surface water, even on potato, even before 
cleaning and peeling. We were looking. What we have become concerned about 
are the exposure conditions, which are substantially different than in the US. We 
are finding a large percentage of the rural populations neurologically affected, and 
we believe that this is due to exposure to insecticides. We cannot specifically tell 
you if this is due to carbofuran, methamidophos or a combination of the two, but 
it is suspected that the acute results are due to carbofuran. We are talking about 
60 percent of the population being measurably affected. We find metabolites of 
carbofuran on clothing, in the home, in dust in bedrooms, the kitchen, that is, 
throughout the house. People are continually exposed to carbofuran, which 
makes them chronically ill. 
 
Jonathan responded: 
 
We are always listening. And when there is valid information that we are not 
aware of, then we make an effort to act on it responsibly. The part about 
connecting neurological effects is a very difficult connection to make. What we 
have is correlations. Correlations can be very dangerous and very misleading. 
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Take this as a general comment – it's not about carbofuran. The most humorous 
example of the problems with correlations that I can think of is this: we know 
that the birth rate is going down in Sweden. And we also notice that the stork 
population is going down. And, then we conclude therefore that storks deliver 
babies. Having said that, there are so many different ways to study neurology. We 
need to be objective. It's o.k. to have working hypotheses, for example, that the 
neurological effects are due to pesticide use. Then, as a scientist, I would say, was 
Ecuador a consumer of DDT before carbofuran was even registered? I imagine it 
was. Do we know what the levels of DDT are? Because we know that there are 
still high levels of DDT around throughout the world, including the US. Now we 
say, which one is it due to? Is it a residual effect of DDT? The only thing we can 
do, in the absence of being able to make that connection, is to try our best to 
work to eliminate exposure. And when we find exposure in the household, trying 
to relate that to the native things. From a scientific standpoint, that is all you can 
do. We cannot avoid the working hypothesis that other people come up with, but 
we can put it to a scientific test. If that information is published, then I would be 
interested in getting the reference to it. We are interested. 
 
I responded in support of the research: 
 
As you say, explaining cause and effect is tough, but we do have control 
populations, strong statistical designs, and a high degree of confidence in the 
research results. These are studies that have been published in distinguished 
academic journals – health and economic journals – in the United States, Canada, 
and Europe. The difference between controls and the at-risk populations was 
large. We are talking about one standard deviation off the norm – that's an order 
of magnitude – between the neurological performance of the control and test 
populations. When we explored the different variables, we found that the results 
were best explained by exposure to the insecticides, 90 percent of which were two 
products: methamidophos and carbofuran. 
 
Before moving on to another person, Jonathan provided one last comment: 
 
Science is about being open to error and reconfirming results and having the 
scientific community comment on them. That is the tradition of science. So I 
hope you can send me those references so that I can follow up on those. What 
you say may be an important contribution to what we know about carbofuran, 
and I want to thank you for that. 
 
Jonathan’s reactions to the protestors and me that day represented common behaviour of 
the agrochemical industry. He challenged the validity of the information and then, when 
confronted by claims of legitimacy, he passed on the onus of proof to the public (or its 
government) in providing further information, while placing the industry – the judge and 
authority – in the position of making the final decision. Jonathan expressed sympathy with 
the protestors (and me) and then invited them to “stay in contact” and “keep him 
informed,” ostensibly so that “He,” signifying the experts and the industry, could continue 
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to assign “truth” to our experience and determine appropriate future courses of action. 
This patterned response demonstrated an institutional disregard for the precautionary 
principle – the safeguard doctrine that the introduction of a new product or process 
whose ultimate effects are disputed or unknown should be resisted. Ultimately, the 
industry argued: trust the experts, and in the meanwhile, the highly toxic pesticides should 
be deemed innocent until proven guilty. 
 
The industry’s solution: Safe Use of Pesticides 
 
With backpack sprayers and fumigators in poor condition, without any protection 
or consideration for the harm to their health or the environment caused by non-
adequate application methods, the farmers go out every morning to their jobs, 
without worry about the problems they cause.  – CropLife-Ecuador (nd: 5) 
 
The industry selectively interpreted the INIAP studies, thereby justifying present rates of 
pesticide use: "According to the research of INIAP, the reduction of pesticides will not 
increase crop harvests [of potato in Carchi]; nevertheless, it has been proven that a better 
use of pesticides could help producers reduce production costs by 25 percent, which 
provided total production costs of between 1,800 and 2,200 dollars [per hectare] 
represents significant savings." (CropLife-Ecuador, nd: 5). This paved the way for 
APSCA’s alternative: "... as the same [CIP and INIAP] study indicates, the farmers 
recognize the dangers associated with the use of these products, but the local attitude is 
that pesticides can be tolerated by the strongest people. This fact clearly demonstrates that 
what exists is a lack of awareness in the safe use and management of these products."15 
The pro-pesticide alliance framed the blame of intoxications and deaths on pesticide users: 
farmers. 
 
The industry’s proscribed way forward became: 
 
...an aggressive educational and training campaign on safe use and management of 
phytosanitary products and IPM. For this, the industry has a program that it has 
been implementing throughout Latin America. In our country, we initiated a pilot 
in 1999 with rice producers in the lower watershed of Guayas, which led to 
excellent results, having trained in the first year 2,400 farmers. 
 
The pro-pesticide alliance never confronted the health effects head-on; rather it redefined 
the problem as farmers' “misuse” of pesticides, which eventually became transformed to a 
lack of “safe use.” This primarily meant the promotion of Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE). Since our studies showed that non-users, principally women and children, were 
nearly as affected as those who applied pesticides, we knew that PPE would not work 
(that is, unless women and children wore PPE 24 hours a day). Such evidence, however, 
had little effect on belief creation and policy. 
 
CropLife proposed employing the industry-wide Scarecrow program in Carchi that 
centred on SUP and targeting grade schools as a means to reaching parents (Box 7.2). Of 
                                                       
15 Letter received from the President of APSCA, 28 May 2001 
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the dozens of companies that attended our information sessions, two responded with SUP 
initiatives of their own to the growing public concern over pesticides in Carchi: FMC and 
Bayer. Not coincidently, these two companies were responsible for inventing the two 
products responsible for the bulk of health problems in the province: carbofuran and 
methamidophos, respectively. FMC’s educational campaign focused on "rational and 
adequate use of carbofuran." Similar to the Scarecrow programme, its approach aimed to 
reach adults through grade school children. Meanwhile, Bayer focused on adults through 
"AgroVida," a longstanding program that was developed in Central America. All three 
programs included standard safe-use courses as well as substantial investments in public 
relations material, such as pencils and notebooks for children and baseball caps for adults. 
 
Box 7.2 The Scarecrow program for grade school education on Safe Use of Pesticides 
(CropLife-Ecuador, nd: 4) 
 
In 2001 the industry initiated the "Scarecrow comes out in defence of nature" program in 
the rice-growing region of Guayas province, as part of its "Plan America." That year, it 
presented the program to 1,148 schoolchildren between the ages of 10 and 15 from 28 
rural schools, declaring, “Rural grade school education is central to the future of 
agriculture.” The stated goal of the campaign was: 
 
to change the mentality of adults through their children and to form tomorrow's 
farmers with information on the Correct Use of Products for Crop Protection 
and Integrated Pest Management, in such a way that children were trained to 
recognize the most important local pests and insects, diseases and weeds in the 
area as well as the risks associated with the poor uses and abuse of products. 
 
The training program used a pre-developed slide show and a graphic manual. It included 
drawing contests and written tests where awards were given to the best performers. 
 
As a result of the perceived success of the project, CropLife launched a second Scarecrow 
campaign, which included changes so that "children can retain concepts more efficiently" 
and reach an additional 2,000 children from rural communities in Ecuador. Subsequently, 
CropLife and FMC applied Scarecrow’s central strategy of targeting grade school children 
for its safe use of pesticide programs in Carchi. 
 
In late 2001, an official from Bayer Cropscience invited me to participate in the 
inauguration of its SUP program, AgroVida, which included officials from MAG, SESA, 
INIAP, FAO, and the German government and took place in a luxurious five star hotel in 
Quito. In his presentation, a regional training specialist showed data demonstrating that 
Bayer had trained tens of thousands of farmers in SUP, leading to measurable impact in 
about 20 percent of participants. As a result of this experience, he had discovered that the 
problem of "pesticide abuse is the creation of farmers" and the true underlying issue was 
one of “public perception." He concluded, “The risks associated with pesticides are 
manageable.” When challenged over reaching only a small percentage of all farmers, 
similar to the quotation of Christian Verschueren, the Global Director of Crop Life 
International, that opened this dissertation (page 1), he admitted that his work was only a 
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"grain of sand on the beach" if one considered the millions of farmers in Latin America, 
not to mention the billions in the world. Nevertheless, he pointed out, “AgroVida is a 
clear demonstration of Bayer's commitment to small farmers.” In the end, SUP was less 
about actually protecting farmers from the toxins of pesticides and more about 
demonstrating to the public an interest in protecting farmers. 
 
Contradictions 
 
If you have the knowledge and the power to regulate the industry, it will respect 
your authority. And, I have made the industry respect my authority. – M. Bolaños, 
former Director of SESA and consultant to the FAO’s SUP program in Ecuador 
(Dying to Make a Living) 
 
The pro-pesticide alliance’s concern for public well-being fell into doubt as a result of 
three deeds: 1) aggressive sales tactics, 2) refusal to promote pesticide-use reduction, 
especially of the highly toxics, and 3) cooption of public agencies.  
 
Aggressive sales 
 
Over time, the pesticide companies have adopted increasingly aggressive sales tactics. One 
salesman explained that in the early days sales depended on having a useful product and 
being a good friend to farmers: 
 
To sell you need to be a friend, to be able to talk and tell a joke. I could entertain, 
just like I am entertaining you here tonight. The people would never leave when I 
started to talk. Once I got sick, I was in a car accident, and was in the hospital and 
all the farmers came to visit me in the hospital and buy products off of me. I sold 
149,000 Sucres; it was my best sales year ever. 
 
By the late 1980s, however, competition grew and the number of técnicos needing to sell 
their products increased. In some instances, vendors were forced to promote older 
products of questionable value. As a result, being friendly was no longer enough, and 
vendors resorted to more aggressive means of reaching their targets. A salesperson in San 
Gabriel explained: 
 
They told us we had to push “bad” products; I had to meet my quotas even when 
we knew that what we were selling was no longer of any use. As a result of this 
situation [of over-application], we caused the pests – both insects and diseases – 
to develop resistance. For this reason, no conventional product is going to lead to 
results. The companies know how to take advantage of this situation... So, how 
was I going to sell useless products? I'll tell you how...We started buying pigs to 
roast and gave out hats and t-shirts, and gave away backpack sprayers. I've done 
everything to sell my products. I even bought aguadiente out of my own pocket, 
because I could not turn in receipts for alcohol. If the farmers have a good time, 
they buy my products. I've organized more fiestas than all of Carchi put together, 
and won a prize as the best salesman in the area. 
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A vendor privately admitted to me that the companies promoted over-use of highly toxic 
pesticides through high application rates: “In the US it [carbofuran labels] says the 
application rate is 500 ml/ha [for potato]. Go look for a bottle. What happens in 
Ecuador? In Ecuador, we use four to six litres per hectare. Go make your own 
comparison. Imagine what that much red label product can do in a hectare.” Additionally, 
international companies used their brand name to sell highly toxic pesticides at inflated 
prices: 
 
How was Bayer? It paid better. The products were the same. Bayer had to sell its 
products expensively as a matter of principle. I had to sell Curater, a red label 
product, and since it was Bayer I had to sell it expensively. At Farmagro, first we 
sold products cheaply; secondly, I was told not to give too much emphasis to red 
label products. In Bayer, there was a lot of pressure to sell Curater and Bulldog. 
And the competition was very difficult. Bayer could never sell a product at a cost 
cheaper than the competition. It went well for the company, but it was extremely 
difficult for us to sell. We had to sell our face to nail a deal. At Bayer, the 
products were purchased patents, but they did not send the product from 
Germany. Our product was no different than the other national products. For 
example, only Taiwan is producing methamidaphos these days. Bayer buys from 
them like all of the rest. 
 
Companies encouraged heightened sales through financial rewards and other incentives:  
 
I did so well that they sent me to Cartagena as the best salesman. Yep, I went to 
sleep eight nights in Cartagena. Colombia was the destiny when you won an 
award, because Dow and Novartis were in Colombia. Three times I was selected 
the best vendor at the national level.... I gave my life to the company. I spent the 
day in the store and the nights in the communities. I was trying to convince the 
people to buy my products. I have always been a perfectionist. I was more 
perfectionist that my German boss. They loved me. The job was motivating. The 
more you worked, the more you earned. 
 
When asked who was responsible for the problems associated with pesticides, a 
salesperson in San Gabriel responded:  
 
The same salespeople are responsible. Sure they worry about burning a farmer’s 
field, but they worry more about not selling that litre. So they know the farmer 
only needs 400 ml to cover his field, but if I sell him a litre that shouldn't burn his 
field, and I will have nailed another litre of product. Everyone wins – he cures his 
problem and I sell my litre… Being ethical only pays if you are going to be 
around for a long time. 
 
In practice, pesticide sales were less about helping farmers to solve their problems and 
improve production than wealth extraction from farmers as a means of accumulation for 
salespeople and their companies.  
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Refusal to eliminate highly toxics or promote pesticide-use reduction 
 
In addition to the difficulty of reaching more than a small percentage of farmers with 
training, diverse international organizations, including FAO, USAID, World Bank, and 
Novartis, have concluded that SUP campaigns – the cornerstone of Ecuador’s policy 
response to acutely toxic pesticides – are ineffective. Through focusing on managing the 
effects (i.e., exposure), rather than the fundamental cause (highly toxics in the 
environment), SUP may please policy makers, but it does little to prevent intoxications in 
rural communities. Farmers regard PPE as uncomfortable and “suffocating” in humid 
warm weather, leading to the classic problem of compliance associated with individually 
oriented exposure reduction approaches (Murray and Taylor, 2000). 
 
The research in Carchi reconfirmed the ineffectiveness of SUP. Even when PPE was 
used, product isolation was deemed difficult to impossible in the open environment of 
field agriculture, where farming infrastructure and housing were closely connected and 
exposure inevitable. Well aware of this reality, the occupational health literature (Plog et 
al., 1996) as well as industry studies (Atkin and Leisinger, 2000) agreed that the most 
promising means of addressing pesticide exposure problems was one single measure: 
eliminating the most toxic compounds from the work and living environments.  
 
Initially, the industry proposed to work through INIAP's IPM program in Carchi, which 
centred on Farmer Field Schools. Joel, the head of INIAP's provincial office and its IPM 
champion, was a staunch advocate of FFS as a means to pesticide-use reduction. Joel told 
me that he was not against receiving funds from CropLife, as long as INIAP could 
conserve its independence and run the project "technically," which meant FFS would be 
used as a means to reduce pesticide use and in particular the elimination of the highly 
toxics. After learning about this, CropLife’s representative informed us that he could not 
finance a project that promoted pesticide-use reduction. Instead, he proposed that the 
industry complement INIAP’s FFS training with SUP. Seeing the contradictions between 
SUP and FFS, Joel turned down the offer stating, "INIAP will never work with CropLife 
in Carchi." When Joel accepted a two-year leave of absence to enter a MSc program, 
however, the door opened for new INIAP leadership in Carchi and policy change. 
 
Shaping the State 
 
All the specialists we consulted, including from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
argued that less toxic pesticides were equally effective [as the more toxic 
products]; and as a result, they argued that the country should not wait to prohibit 
the importation of products classified as extremely dangerous. – Rodolfo Asar, 
Día a Día programme 
 
On the surface, government officials maintained a discourse against the highly toxics and 
in favour of public health. For example, in mid-2001, INIAP was prepared to declare that 
alternative technologies existed for the Andean weevil and foliage pests and that highly 
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toxic pesticides were not necessary for potato production and other highland crops.16 
Nevertheless, the industry continually mobilised to block such proposals. 
 
The BBC met with Carlos Navas, the Head of Pesticide Product Registration and 
Regulation at SESA in the Ministry of Agriculture, to ask him one question (BBC, 2004): 
“Does Ecuador need these dangerous [red label] chemicals or should they just be 
banned?” Navas answered: 
 
We need scientific support to conduct studies in order to complete the forms for 
prohibiting the importation or manufacture of certain products. As well as 
scientific and technical support, we need substitutes for certain pesticides. And 
when alternatives become available, then we can replace the product and ban the 
use of dangerous pesticides, but there is no possibility of doing that without new 
or different products. 
 
Navas, the man who could ban pesticides, was an active member of the National Pesticide 
Committee and therefore was knowledgeable with the research outcomes in Carchi, 
including the existence of alternatives. Nevertheless, he had adopted essentially the same 
position as the industry: all pesticides were indispensable. The industry’s penetration of 
MAG dated decades, so SESA’s allegiance came as no surprise. At CIP we were surprised, 
however, to discover that our long-time collaborators at INIAP were similarly vulnerable. 
 
Since 1991, Vicente had become the principal government partner of the CIP-led 
pesticide research in Carchi. He proved an invaluable ally, capable of navigating the 
complex government bureaucracy and getting things done in the field. Later, I would learn 
that he also was an old friend of FMC's National Sales Representative and CropLife-
Ecuador’s treasurer. Their history extended back to university, the National College of 
Agronomists, and family. Vicente was an economist and self-described pragmatist. He 
once told me that when it came to projects, whatever functioned or worked became the 
truth. As Head of INIAP's Technical Assistance Unit (in Spanish, NAT) in the highlands, 
he was formally in charge of the Institute’s interface with farmers and communities. He 
became respected throughout INIAP as a strict disciplinarian. One of his colleagues told 
me, "Vicente knows how to make his people toe the line.” Additionally, Vicente was 
effective at “capturing funds” from donor agencies, which won him much esteem and 
appreciation at INIAP, particularly when the Institute suffered funding cutbacks as a 
result of Ecuador’s “government modernisation” policies of the late 1990s. 
 
At the end of 2001, Pumisacho and I contracted Vicente to conduct an in-depth case 
study on the impacts of the Farmer Field Schools in Ecuador. Unbeknown to us, Vicente 
would make a secret pact with the industry to co-publish the impact of its interventions in 
Carchi. While CropLife refused to finance FFS because of its emphasis on pesticide-use 
reduction, it was eager to link up with FFS as a result of the methodology’s growing 
popularity. When I informed colleagues at the Global IPM Facility of the cooption of 
                                                       
16 Gustavo Vera, INIAP Director of Research, personal communication. 
   Learning from Carchi 208 
FFS, they informed me that the industry had applied similar tactics elsewhere.17 By the end 
of 2002, Vicente, and thus INIAP, explicitly joined forces with the pro-pesticide alliance, 
proclaiming, “We need the resources.”18 
 
The EcoSalud project ended in 2001, creating a funding void. In February 2002, Manuel 
Pumisacho and Vicente came to my home to discuss potential conflicts of interest with a 
proposed CropLife project in Carchi. We talked about the primacy of pesticide-use 
reduction as well as Joel’s negative experience with CropLife over FFS. Additionally, I 
provided them with diverse documentation on the problematic nature of public-private 
collaborations over pesticides, including highlighted sections of the FAO’s Code of 
Conduct, the WHO’s hazards policy, and the World Bank’s IPM policy guidelines. When 
they left, I thought we had agreed that INIAP should keep a safe distance from the 
industry. 
 
Several weeks later, however, CropLife invited Vicente to a global SUP meeting at a 
luxurious five-star hotel in Miami, Florida. Included in that meeting was an expert from 
the FAO's pesticide program who sold Vicente on SUP and public-private collaboration 
over pesticides, citing the FAO’s collaboration with CropLife as well as that of the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).19  
 
CropLife-Ecuador highlighted its “strategic alliance” with INIAP in its 2002 annual 
report, including a photograph of the signing at the Santa Catalina Research Station and a 
summary of its innovative public-private partnership to promote SUP in Carchi: 
 
Through the project “Correct use and management of crop protection products 
and integrated pest management” we propose to overcome the limitations of the 
[development] work-to-date by improving human health and the conservation of 
ecosystems. The project proposes a series of strategies that serve as a support to 
the activities of a sustainable agriculture, in such a way that it achieves an 
abundant food production by efficient and responsible means, thereby fulfilling 
the basic norms of security for man and the environment. 
 
The central objective of the proposal was "to promote the importance of correct use of 
CPP [in English, Crop Protection Products] and IPM" as well as “to train farmers, 
housewives and técnicos in CPP and IPM."20 The project employed the Scarecrow design of 
training primary school teachers and children so that they would "grow up with clearer 
criteria with respect to using pesticides.” 
                                                       
17 See for example, Bayer Corporation’s evocations of IPM and FFS in Courier Magazine, Special Issue 1997. 
In 2007, Bayer would employ essentially the same tactics in Peru. 
18 Personal communication. 
19 IFAD and CropLife, 2001. “Una iniciativa publica-privada en pro del desarrollo,” 16 pp. 
20 Sources at INIAP in Carchi said that due to criticisms over "Safe Use of Pesticides,” it had decided to use 
the term "Uso Correcto de los Productos para la Protección de Cultivos" (in English, "Correct Use of Crop Protection 
Products"). Nevertheless, the change did not include a re-thinking in training content, other than a linkage 
with IPM. Later, the Director of INIAP informed me, "We know and understand the inter-institutional 
politics against the ’indiscriminate’ use of pesticides. Our institutional policy is adequate use of the same 
[pesticides], according to established schemes that you know very well." 
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After learning about this, I sent an e-mail message to Vicente and Lorenzo, the head of 
INIAP's Santa Catalina Experiment Station, outlining my concerns.21 In it, I highlighted a 
number of contradictions between earlier INIAP studies, which concluded that “highly 
toxics could not be safely used under the socioeconomic conditions of Carchi,” and the 
central design of INIAP’s new initiative with CropLife. Vicente responded that he had the 
full support of the INIAP's Directors, and he threatened me with legal action for "placing 
into question his honour."22 A week later, the Director of Santa Catalina sent me a follow-
up message stating:23 
 
With much preoccupation I have read the electronic message you sent to 
Vicente... in reference to the relationship between INIAP and CropLife. I should 
indicate to you that the relationship is institutional – EESC [the Santa Catalina 
Experimental Station] with CropLife – more than personal – Vicente-CropLife. 
 
The head of the research station went on to defend the decision: 
 
...The relationship between INIAP and Crop Life does not represent a conflict of 
interest, and worse an anti-technical and more so anti-ethical relationship, terms 
that I reject up front due to our morally technical training that we have received 
in our institute during the length of our professional career. 
 
Citing an unspecified IFPRI study on the value of public-private collaboration, the 
Director General of INIAP subsequently informed me that the organization had ample 
justification for working with the pesticide industry and that he personally had supported 
the agreement. By then, an industry técnico had long ago moved into the INIAP office at 
San Gabriel, under Vicente’s direct supervision. Despite the obvious contradictions with 
INIAP’s earlier research and especially Vicente’s own publications, CropLife and INIAP 
had agreed to work together on SUP, thereby safeguarding the market for all pesticides – 
including the highly toxics. 
 
Similarly, in 2004, the FAO financed a project that ignored the studies on the problematic 
nature of SUP and the priority of eliminating highly toxic pesticides (Box 7.3). Maria, the 
earlier mentioned toxicologist from SESA who lobbied on behalf of the Carchi 
Declaration, was in charge of this project. Since the national forum in Quito, the industry 
had financed her extended sabbatical in Switzerland. Upon return to Ecuador, her 
position shifted from “the elimination of highly toxic pesticides” to the "correct use of 
pesticides." 
 
Growing public awareness over the pesticide-induced epidemic in Carchi combined with 
the explicit approval of MAG, SESA, INIAP, and the FAO of the pesticide industry’s 
activity raised doubts over the integrity of public authorities and their institutions. Such 
examples provided fodder for competing organizations, such as the Pesticide Action 
Network and the Coordinadora Ecuatoriana de Agroecologia, as they organized to call attention 
                                                       
21 Electronic mail correspondence, 11 March 2004. 
22 Electronic mail correspondence, 13 March 2004. 
23 Electronic mail correspondence, 22 March 2004. 
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to the complicity of técnicos, government, and international organizations in the promotion 
of harmful technology. 
 
Box 7.3 The FAO finances the pro-pesticide agenda in Ecuador 
 
In April 2004, the FAO financed a one-year, $230,000 project entitled, "Support to the 
application of the Specifications of the International Code of Conduct in the Registry and 
Control of Pesticides" in collaboration with SESA (FAO/TCP/ECU/2903). The 
objectives were to train SESA personnel in "the correct use of pesticides" and to 
"contribute to the harmonization of legislation associated with the International Code of 
Conduct for the Distribution and Utilization of Pesticides.” More specifically, the project 
sought to train the SESA staff in the FAO's Code of Conduct over the Distribution and 
Utilization of Pesticides, the registry of products, and laboratory skills in testing for 
pesticide residuals in food. The project emphasized the percentage of active ingredient as 
the "indispensable requisite" for product registry. It also sought to improve the registry of 
pesticides through quality control of agricultural products using pesticide residuals on 
commodities as its indicator. It did not take into account socioeconomic exposure 
conditions and the resulting health effects on rural populations. Its environmental studies 
were limited to a study on the use of pesticides in order to produce a national system of 
monitoring pesticide use and a database of registered agrochemicals. This included 
recommendations for the elimination of pesticide containers. The project also produced 
technical recommendations for the Ecuadorian government on the fulfilment of the 
FAO's Code of Conduct. Through this project, the FAO's position became essentially 
identical to that of Crop Life. 
 
Rise of dissent 
 
Divergence: breakdown of allegiances 
 
Pro-health alliance 
 
The decision of NAT to collaborate with CropLife was not universally accepted at INIAP. 
The Head of the National Potato Program told me the decision "went against recent 
advances towards clean production." Further, the leader of the Legume and Quinoa 
Program believed, "The CropLife collaboration jeopardized our program on organic 
agriculture." Both mentioned that collaboration with CropLife could perpetuate negative 
stereotypes towards INIAP as “stuck in the green revolution,” despite many recent 
changes. 
 
Knowledge of the INIAP-CropLife collaboration reached a number of research and 
development organizations working in Carchi, including CIP, Randi Randi, Eco-Par, and 
the Network for Community-Based Natural Resource Management (MACRENA). CIP 
found the contradictions of the INIAP-CropLife collaboration irreconcilable and 
informed INIAP and IDRC that if the collaboration carried on, CIP would have to 
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discontinue its work with INIAP in Carchi.24 Nevertheless, due to its mandate to support 
INIAP, the leadership at CIP-Ecuador felt it could not altogether sever ties with the 
organization. Instead, it re-centred the EcoSalud around nutrition and moved it to the 
Central highlands. In response, Vicente declared that he and his unit would not 
collaborate with EcoSalud in Carchi or anywhere else. As a result, the second phase of 
EcoSalud became more closely aligned with non-INIAP actors, including local universities, 
NGOs, and CBOs and moved to less controversial regions where pesticide exposure was 
not a major concern. 
 
Having won the allegiance of SESA, INIAP, and FAO, CropLife attempted to enlist the 
provincial offices of the Ministry of Agriculture. Nevertheless, Freddie, a MAG 
extensionist, and MAG’s Provincial Director remained committed to the pro-health 
agenda. When asked about this, Freddie explained that the FFS Training of Trainers was a 
"profound personal experience, which fundamentally changed my view on things." He 
mentioned, "In the absence of Joel, INIAP was quick to sell-out.” Meanwhile, the 
Provincial Director with MAG, Federico, was a recent political appointee, so he had no 
long-term ties to the Ministry. Additionally, he explained, his background with the 
Humanist Movement led him to view pesticides as a means of violence.  
 
INIAP and CropLife attempted to enrol municipalities, grade schools, and NGOs in 
Carchi. Nevertheless, local dissent blocked municipalities from signing letters of 
agreement. A project leader from EcoPar explained that despite her willingness to work 
with INIAP, as a result of INIAP’s collaboration with CropLife over SUP, her 
professional and organizational commitments to environmental interests would not permit 
her to work with the Institute in Carchi.25 Similarly, the situation obligated me to 
personally break ties with INIAP as well as the FAO in Ecuador. 
 
Pro-pesticide alliance 
 
During a Bayer-sponsored event, a colleague at CIP and I spoke with the Bayer 
representative for Latin America. We asked him about the company's continued sale of 
methamidaphos in Ecuador. He said that while methamidophos was important for Bayer 
in the 1970s and 1980s, in recent time the German public had become very demanding 
over environmental and health concerns, and the company was making an effort to 
respond with "safer, green label products." In fact, the public demanded that companies 
only sell abroad products permitted in Germany. He explained that Bayer was making an 
effort to distance itself from its older, “red label” products. He said that Tamaron, Bayer's 
commercial formulation of methamidaphos, represented less than five percent of its sales 
in Ecuador. As such, Bayer felt that the continued sale of methamidaphos brought "little 
profit, and high liability." He thought that it could be of strategic value for Bayer to 
distance itself from such risks by removing its red label products from markets in the 
developing world. This, he explained, would allow Bayer to focus on its newer and safer 
products. 
                                                       
24 Personal communication with Donald Cole, the EcoSalud principal investigator and Graham Thiele, CIP-
Ecuador, 24 May 2004. 
25 K. Ambrose, EcoPar, personal communication, 5 April 2004. 
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The APSCA representative in Ecuador confided to me that the Ecuadorian companies 
had formed a block against the international companies. The national companies relied on 
sales of generic (and especially red label) products that were off-patent, signifying that 
third parties could legally synthesize the active ingredient and repackage and sell it as new, 
competing products. The companies purchased these active ingredients and formulated 
their own products that were often of lesser quality but considerably cheaper than the 
products of the original manufacturers. For example, the national company Ecuaquimica 
sold the commercial product Carbofuran at 20 to 50 percent below Furadan – FMC’s 
commercial formulation for the same metabolite carbofuran. Similarly, off-patent 
formulations of methamidaphos commonly sold for about 30 percent less than Bayer’s 
commercial product Tamaron. Over time, the national industry had gained growing 
market shares around the sale of old products and, as a result, had come to financially 
depend on them.  
 
I was privately told that after a Bayer representative suggested publicly distancing itself 
from methamidophos, the national pesticide industry threatened to block the company’s 
access to the Ecuadorian market. Provided that the political elite was involved with the 
national pesticide industry, including an ex-President and Head of Congress as well as 
numerous other influential public officials, there was no doubt that the national industry 
could create difficulties for even a powerful international company. 
 
In July 2004, I was surprised by an e-mail communication from a confidant in INIAP 
informing me that, "EESC has reconsidered its work with CropLife, and INIAP has made 
a clear step to sever its ties with the pesticide industry." The message went on to explain 
that NAT would fulfil its current contractual obligations with CropLife through March 
2005, and that the arrangement would not be renewed thereafter. Several days later the 
FAO Country Representative shed light on the factors behind INIAP's new policy. He 
told me that he had just returned from a meeting with industry representatives in 
Guayaquil and learned that a rupture had developed between the national and 
international industry over the sale of generic products.  
 
A newspaper article appearing shortly thereafter provided further details (Box 7.4). In 
brief, the Ecuadorian industry had decided to disassociate itself with the international 
companies over the right to purchase generic active ingredients for local formulations, as 
part of the US-led Fair Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. Even though the FTA 
provisions would apply only to new products,26 the motion was sufficient for the national 
industry to want to withdraw its support to the CropLife-led campaign in Carchi. In the 
article, the President of CropLife-Ecuador had reverted back to using the previous name 
of his organization: APSCA. As a result of this conflict, INIAP’s collaborative SUP 
project temporarily ended.  
                                                       
26 Allan Hruska, FAO regional IPM specialist, personal communication on 1 August 2005. 
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Box 7.4 The pesticide industry clashes over the sale of generic products27 
 
A major concern for pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals of the US-supported "Free Trade 
Agreement" in Ecuador was the free sale of generic products that, while cheaper for 
consumers, was anathema to international corporations. Patent laws governing intellectual 
property rights over pesticides allow a company monopoly control over its product for a 
period of 17 to 20 years, depending on the date and country where the patent was filed.28 
Once a product becomes off-patent, essentially anyone with the know-how can copy the 
chemical formula for an active ingredient and sell it on his or her own. Asian countries 
with highly developed chemical industries, such as China and Taiwan, make hearty profits 
from the sale of active ingredients from expired chemical patents, much to the benefit of 
independent companies in lesser-developed countries.  
 
Since 1996, a number of Ecuadorian companies have imported active ingredients from 
third parties and reformulated them as new pesticide products. Often this results in a 
product that is of similar quality than the original at a fraction of the cost. As a result of 
the 250 percent inflation that followed dollarisation, in March 2000, sales of generic 
products increased dramatically due to their comparative advantage in cost, and the 
Ecuadorian agrochemical industry became increasingly dependent on the reformulation 
and sale of off-patent products. Of the 30 most popular pesticides in Ecuador, all but one 
had an expired patent, and essentially all pesticides used on potato production in Carchi 
were off-patent.29 The Ecuadorian industry claimed that between 1996 and 2003, it had 
saved producers over $240 million in pesticide costs through the provision of cheap 
products. 
 
In April 2004, the United States delegation on Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations 
demanded an increase on restrictions of the sale of generic agricultural products in the 
Andes, calling for a ten-year period of exclusivity on new products, followed by five 
additional years of royalties. The US negotiators maintained that this was justified for 
industry to recover research costs and to assure incentives for continued product 
development. The US drew on private negotiation strategies to successfully push through 
such provisions in Central America and Chile.  
 
“In solidarity with Ecuadorian producers,” the national agrochemical industry decided to 
break with CropLife-Latin America. As a result of the conflict over generics, CropLife-
Ecuador temporarily reverted back to using its original name: the National Association of 
Plant Protection and Animal Health Industry (APSCA).  
 
                                                       
27 Based on: "Más costo al agro? Un mercado de 126 millones se pone en debate.” El Comercio. Saturday, 7 August 2004. 
Section B-1, Agromar. Also see, Gaybor, Nieto, and Velastegui (2006). 
28 Previously, patent protection for agrochemical products in the US was 17 years, but recently it was increased 
to 20 years. For more information see: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/consolidated_laws.pdf 
29 According to SESA’s pesticide registration database, of the 30 leading pesticides sold in Ecuador, only the 
fungicide trifloxistrobin is under patent with the German company Bayer. 
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Reactions 
 
The government says that it does not have the research or the resources to take 
action on the most toxic pesticides, and the chemical companies say they cannot 
control how products are used in the field. So, it seems that the farmers will have 
to take measures to help themselves... – Dying to Make a Living, BBC World 
Service 
 
Ulrich Beck (Beck et al., 1994: 22-23) distinguishes sub-politics from politics in that agents 
lying outside the political or corporatist system appear on the "stage of social design." He 
describes how sub-politics shape society from the grassroots, involving the citizenry, 
social movements, expert groups, and even courageous individuals who temporarily step 
outside the norms of their organizations, often at great personal risk. Sub-politics may 
arise spontaneously, often out of the wake of emotional events such as environmental 
disaster or disease events when people feel intimately, if not unfairly, affected by the 
external environment. Beck argues that modernity's tendencies towards individualization 
and globalization foment the rise of sub-political movements in response to a sense of 
fragmentation between the formal political agenda and peoples' lives.  
 
Chapter 4 revealed how modern technology caused nature to reach its biological limit in 
Carchi to the point where agrochemicals and mechanized tillage were transformed from 
symbols of abundance and freedom to tokens of scarcity and debt. This generated 
growing natural and societal forms of rebellion. From an environmental perspective, 
agricultural intensification led to increased pest and disease outbreaks as well as soil 
degradation. Government-encouraged growth of the agricultural frontier led to 
destruction of forests and the páramo, interrupting hydrological systems and drying up 
water sources. Over time, the famously robust environment of Carchi and its markets 
began to turn on farmers, and farmers turned on government and authority. 
 
Local movements 
 
Some people blamed themselves for modern productivity declines, for example, when a 
farmer from San Gabriel privately told me, "We are brutos. They gave us the land, and we 
destroyed it. Now, we are all going to have to migrate to the cities." A growing number, 
however, began to look more critically at their recent history, which led to protests against 
the government and professionals. Paredes (2001) found that this was particularly true for 
FFS graduates. During a meeting on pesticide health effects in El Angel, an FFS graduate 
stood up and shouted, "First the ingenieros told us to use agrochemicals. Now they are 
telling us not to use them. Whom are we supposed to believe?"  
 
Escalating concern over the general situation fuelled protests. In November 2003, entire 
communities descended from the mountainsides to the Pan-American Highway 
demanding that the national government declare the province a “state of economic and 
agricultural emergency" (Box 7.5). The district Centro Agrícola from Montúfar and Espejo 
led the protest. They demanded attention to the pest and pesticide crisis, control over 
Colombian contraband, subsidized credit, seed, fertilisers, and machinery. The strike grew 
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to nearly 10,000 participants, eventually shutting down the province as well as trade 
between the countries of Ecuador and Colombia.30  
 
Box 7.5 Potato farmers take the Pan-American Highway31 
 
Faced with falling potato prices, growing pest problems, and increasingly aware of the 
health effects of pesticides, the farmers of Carchi were moved to protest in late 2003. The 
leadership of the county agriculture centres of Montúfar and Espejo won the support of 
the Provincial Governor and farmers elsewhere. In a letter to President Lucio Gutierrez, 
they demanded that Carchi be declared a zone of "agricultural and economic emergency." 
Farmers sought controls over the importation of potato and milk from Colombia due to 
unfair competition as a result of dollarisation. They also demanded technical assistance, 
machinery, inputs, seed, and credit. 
 
In response, the President signed a decree declaring the banana sector of the Province of 
El Oro and other agricultural sectors in a “state of economic emergency.” The farmer 
leadership of Carchi called the decree a betrayal. On the 5th of December, they gave the 
President 24 hours to respond to their concerns, else they would close down Carchi 
indefinitely. Several days later, they lived up to their threat and thousands of farmers 
blocked the Pan-American Highway, the single artery connecting Ecuador to Colombia. 
The highway remained closed for five days, until the rains came and the participants 
returned to their communities for planting season. 
 
The Sub-secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, who was assigned the task of quelling 
the protest, told me that it was difficult to negotiate with the farmers because, “They 
seemed to be angry about everything.”32 In the end, the Government offered to donate 
several tractors from the Chinese government, but according to one of the leaders, little 
else was accomplished.33 
 
Following the strike, community organisers from the Humanist Movement arrived with 
the intention of blocking CropLife and INIAP’s efforts to recruit municipalities onto the 
SUP agenda. Together with FFS graduates, EcoPar, the Carchi Consortium and 
MACRENA, the Humanist Movement sought to expose the contradictions of public 
collaboration with the pesticide industry and the proposed SUP campaigns. Through 
dozens of in-depth workshops in communities and stakeholder meetings with 
municipalities, the public deepened its understanding of the pesticide crisis. Subsequent 
activities in the counties of Montúfar, Espejo, and Mira led to a boycott of the proposed. 
                                                       
30 Personal communication with Juan Carlos Landázuri, President of the Centro Agrícola of Montúfar, 12 
December 2001. 
31 Dos opciones para superar el conflict en Carchi. El Comercio, 5 November 2003. 
32 Personal communication with Fausto Merino, Sub-secretary for the Highlands and Amazon, Ministry of 
Agriculture, 12 January 2002. 
33 Juan Carlos Landázuri, 12 December 2001. 
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CropLife-INIAP activity34 as well as municipal ordinances against the sale of highly toxics 
in Espejo and Mira.35 
 
Agroecologists and environmentalists 
 
The news of INIAP's collaboration with CropLife arrived at the National Coordinator of 
Ecological Agriculture (CEA), a network of NGOs and CBOs, including the Pesticide 
Action Network (PAN-Ecuador). Following a series of meetings in March and April 2004, 
CEA and PAN-Ecuador drafted a position statement to the Director General of INIAP.36 
The letter highlighted the World Bank and the industry’s own conclusions on the Safe Use 
of Pesticides, stating, "The promotion of safe use of highly toxic pesticides is at best 
irresponsible." The letter cited the previous INIAP and CIP research emphasizing, 
"INIAP should play a more pro-active role in research for the elimination of highly toxic 
pesticides." Further, the CEA went on to question INIAP's collaboration with the 
industry: "There exists a conflict of interest between the commercial priorities of the 
pesticide industry and the public mandate of INIAP." The letter closed by demanding that 
INIAP "terminate its contract with CropLife" and that it "focus its research on decreasing 
dependencies on pesticides and especially the elimination of highly toxic products."  
 
The CEA organized a Congress in November 2005, to update the national agroecology 
agenda. A discussion table dedicated to pesticide concerns, which included about 60 
representatives of organizations from the coast, highlands, and the Amazon, produced the 
“Declaration of Active Non-complicity in the Use of Highly Toxic and Dangerous 
Pesticides,” calling for:37 
 
• information campaigns on the human health and environmental affects of highly 
toxic pesticides 
• boycotts on produce, such as tomato, potato, and banana, that does not include 
guarantees that they were produced without dangerous pesticides 
• demands that the government label produce that has been produced with highly 
toxic pesticides 
• demands that public entities, including SESA, INIAP, the Ministry of Education, 
municipalities,, and provincial governments, do not collaborate with industry-led 
SUP campaigns; rather they should support campaigns centring on the reduction 
of use of pesticides and, in particular, highly toxics 
• linkages between Ecuador and similar initiatives elsewhere in Latin America, 
Europe, and the United States for the elimination of dangerous pesticides 
 
In 2006, the bilateral negotiations between Ecuador and the United States over the Fair 
Trade Agreement subsumed health concerns over pesticides. CEA, PAN-Ecuador, and 
partner organizations reorganised around intellectual property rights and national 
                                                       
34 Personal communication with Luis Gonzalez, Project Expert, EcoPar and advisor to the Environmental 
Unit for the Municipality of San Gabriel, 11 August 2005. 
35 Personal communication with Mauricio Proaño, President, Grupo Randi-Randi, 11 August 2005. 
36 Letter to the Director General of INIAP, Ecuadorian Coordinator of Agroecology (CEA) and the Pesticide 
Action Network, 17 May 2004. 
37 CEA, Proceedings from the National Congress on Agroecology, Quito, Ecuador, 27-29 November 2005. 
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sovereignty, controversial issues that were not inconsistent with the aforementioned 
demands of private industry over the sale of generic products (Box 7.5), leading to unusual 
alliances and wide scale criticism of the FTA negotiations. The Ecuadorian System of 
Training on Management of Renewable Natural Resources (CAMAREN) published an 
investigation that concluded, “...the FTA does not provide a competitive market for 
pesticides, inputs that are widely used in Ecuadorian agriculture. On the contrary, what is 
sought [by the FTA] is monopoly control over markets” (Gaybor et al., 2006: 128). By the 
end of the year, the FTA negotiations were successfully blocked, but the open sale and 
distribution of highly toxic pesticides continued. 
 
Modes of enactment: determining technology in Carchi 
 
The public interprets science; it does not misunderstand it. – John Law (2004: 2) 
 
The pro-health lobby produced information that exposed serious human health, 
productivity, and environmental problems associated with highly toxic pesticides. It 
argued that under the socio-economic conditions of Carchi, safe use of the highly toxics 
was an impossibility, with or without SUP practice. Studies elsewhere, including those of 
the industry, concurred. The pro-health lobby also provided substantial quantitative and 
qualitative evidence supporting the viability of alternatives, such as the Farmer Field 
Schools in IPM. Despite such contributions, the policy in Ecuador continued to be: the 
highly toxics should not be banned. Further, it became accepted that the highly toxics 
essentially could not be banned. How did this occur? 
 
Enrolment and alliance building 
 
Let's work together. – a Bayer Corporation slogan38 
 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) describe enrolment as a process of “inscribing" interests into 
new symbols with mutually acceptable meaning. Once inscribed, translations can be 
manipulated and transferred – they become socially mobile. This process leads to the 
creation of new co-constructions or naturecultures. Mol (1999) suggests that the aim of 
enrolment is not to merely describe or tell, but to influence a body or a life. In the case of 
Carchi, a whole set of practices were involved in the co-production of pesticide-dependent 
agriculture. These emerged through a number of means, particularly truth construction 
through translation of prestigious symbols. 
 
Expert black-boxing: torredor of truth 
 
We understand that there are people who approach pesticides with a different 
ideology and we accept that. I am sorry that our visitors had to leave so promptly, 
because I wanted to thank them for adding some excitement to my presentation. 
I know how fond people in Ecuador are of bullfights, but sometimes it is difficult 
for me to know whether I am the bull or the torredor. – Director of Global 
Regulatory Affairs, FMC Agricultural Products 
                                                       
38 Bayer Corporation. 1997. Courier Magazine. Special Issue on IPM. 23 pp. 
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In its questioning of the status of information on pesticides, the pro-pesticide alliance 
adopted a view of science as one unified, unquestionable body of knowledge. In so doing, 
it classified alternative perspectives as other, i.e., outside of the accepted reality and 
therefore unreal and invalid. Further, the alliance cited prestigious individuals and 
institutions, such as the Director General of the FAO, in support of its claims. 
 
Through establishing a dichotomy between “backward” rural societies that needed 
“modernisation” and “food security” by a centre of power, the need for outside 
intervention was legitimized. This justified the priority of transforming ruralities through 
“improved technologies.” The pesticide industry, public officials, researchers, and farmers 
commonly argued that the highly toxics were necessary for production and that no viable 
alternatives existed. While commonly accusing the opposition of being “romantic” and 
“ideological,” the pro-pesticide alliance commonly nurtured ideology of its own, 
particularly around the value of technology for “feeding the world” as well as the notion 
of “safe-use” of pesticides.  
 
Latour (1987) makes a compelling argument about the “constructedness” of science, i.e., 
how scientists or experts strategize to create truths. Far from submissive actors who 
obediently follow pre-established protocols, they present scientists as “entrepreneurs” 
capable of indiscriminately pursuing political and economic objectives. Focusing on the 
early stages of scientific process, they describe how scientists create oversimplified 
abstractions or “black boxes”39 around their activity and organize to enrol others into 
support networks. 
 
The experience in Carchi demonstrates how similar activity occurred in the realm of 
ready-made agricultural technologies. Pesticide technology was built on Latour’s mythical 
“black boxes”: what people come to rely on but do not question. Black boxes became a 
way of managing the complexities of biological and social worlds associated with farming. 
Relatively closed socio-technical systems were simplified to structures of black boxes that 
legitimized new practices and rule systems on problem definition and solutions (e.g., 
purchase, application, mixing, etc.), and it established new mediating roles, with 
agricultural researchers, extensionists, and agrochemical salespeople as key knowledge 
brokers. This may have been good for generating new industry, but eventually it proved to 
be bad for the environment, food production, and society. 
 
Instead of revealing insights into how to autonomously manage ecologies, the experts 
framed phytosanitary problems around urgencies, many of which were generated by 
modern technologies themselves. (This later fact was systematically deemphasised.) The 
effect was a shift from management to “control” as a priority and the knowledge of the 
técnicos and their pesticide technology as the “saving grace.” 
 
                                                       
39 Latour (1987:2) borrows the term 'black box', a metaphor that cyberneticians use to simplify highly complex 
machinery. He explains that, "They draw a little box about which they need to know nothing but its input and 
output." Throughout the experience presented in this chapter, many aspects of agro-biology (e.g., insect and 
disease cycles, 'pests', and soil biota) and agrochemicals (chemical fertilizers and pesticides) were effectively 
'black boxed' by science and technology brokers. Arguably, such activity represented attempts to turn farmers 
into passive operators of technology. 
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The disposition of science – in this case, the pesticide industry and a national research 
institution – to ignore obvious contradictions shows that more important than adherence 
to research claims was the motivation to create new truths that were in line with evolving 
purposes. Over time, the multiple black boxes that bolstered pesticide technology 
effectively came to blind many farmers to the past as well as other alternative farming 
realities. Farmers prioritised the proscribed corrective inputs (basic purchasing and 
application knowledge) and outputs (quick, convenient ways of killing pests) deemed 
necessary for “economy” and “security.” In the process, millennia of experience on 
“feeding” the plant and the soil became supplanted.40 Over time, the environmental and 
social systems co-evolved to the point where farmers became dependent on external 
actors and their technology, thereby charting an indelible course for the future: more of 
the same. 
 
Processes of translation 
 
The industry in Latin America has long drawn on a tactic of framing the pesticide problem 
as one of “perception” and “radical ideals” of urban-based environmentalists, rather than 
one of substance (Jansen, 2000; Murray and Taylor, 2000). One means of achieving this in 
Carchi was through interpretation of experience and translation of meaning.  
 
The pro-pesticide alliance went to great lengths to reinterpret the research outcomes and 
to transform concepts such as toxicity and intoxication for the public. During an INIAP 
and CropLife organized course for university students, a CropLife training specialist 
argued that pesticides "actually were no more dangerous than water" and equally essential 
for life (Box 7.6).  
 
Box 7.6 “Pesticides are as safe as H20” 
 
During an INIAP-CropLife course for university students, Arturo, the CropLife employee 
in Carchi, gave a four-hour session on Safe Use of Pesticides. To open, he drew out the 
basic chemical formula of H20, water, on a whiteboard and asked the class, "What are the 
dangers of this chemical?" Assuming that the formula belonged to a chemical pesticide, 
people in the class volunteered responses, such as: "It kills beneficial insects;" "It pollutes 
water." Arturo said that despite the beliefs of the growing movement of "radicals" and 
"ecologists" in Ecuador, this formula was responsible for life and that no one in the class 
would be there if it did not exist. He explained that the formula was that of H20 or water, 
which brought him to his point: "Chemical pesticides, like water, were essential for life." 
 
Additionally, the pro-pesticide alliance organized to translate contested concepts, such as 
SUP and even pesticides, into seemingly more attractive euphemisms. I first learned of 
this when an INIAP field staff in Carchi explained to me: "We are not working with 
CropLife to promote SUP. We are working for the "Correct Use of Crop Protection 
Products." In 2002, we noticed that the industry and its associates similarly began to 
produce new nomenclature for SUP, such as “Correct Use of Crop Protection Products.” 
                                                       
40 Primavesi (1980) and Chauboussou (2004) provide scientific arguments behind the age-old rationale of 
working with (rather than against) biologies and ecologies to manage plant and soil health.  
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Meanwhile, the Bayer AgroVida project used “Management and Safe Use of Phytosanitary 
Products,” which later became “Safe and Effective Use of Crop Protection Products.”41 
Field staff at the INIAP office in San Gabriel and the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) 
informed me that the change of language was made in coordination with CropLife; the 
goal of this activity was to continually “improve the image of the industry and appeal to a 
broader public.” 
 
A Brazilian woman and head of FMC's regulatory program in the region explained that 
the central purpose behind “the reengineering of concepts” was not to mask pesticides 
but to demonstrate that the industry was "acting with responsibility." She explained, 
"Each country uses it own name, but the philosophy is the same. What we want [to 
achieve] with this is to act in a responsible manner during all stages, from research, to 
registry, to product transport, product marketing and sales so that there is no other 
behaviour but responsible behaviour.” In reference to the earlier described PAN-Ecuador 
protest, she added, "As we saw with our friends who we saw in the morning, with all of 
the pressure that we are facing, it is important because it is part of democracy and therein 
lays our challenge of continuing to improve and provide responses." 
 
Eventually, the pro-pesticide alliance began to strategically link SUP with Integrated Pest 
Management, something that had happened years before in Southeast Asia.42 This 
occurred at CropLife-International in Europe, CropLife-Latin America, CropLife-
Ecuador, a public multinational (FAO-Ecuador), and the national government 
(MAG/SESA and INIAP). Beyond mere wordsmithing, the pro-pesticide alliance sought 
to create robust, publicly attractive concepts. Following my explanation of FFS as a means 
of “ecological literacy,” a regional FMC representative explained to me that her company 
applied the same understanding to IPM: 
 
It is very important for us to include information on plant biology. For example, 
here I have [information on] cotton and potato. People also should have 
information on possible dangers [to the environment] caused by applying. They 
should also have information on biology because we also use Integrated Pest 
Management. We do not want only our products to be applied all the time. It is 
exactly the opposite. 
 
She added, “We want that our product is applied at the necessary moment. It is very 
important to provide this type of information for people so that they know what is 
available for what pest and so they know of other FMC products, and not just Furadan." 
FMC utilised IPM to emphasize pesticides, including highly toxics, their “correct” and 
“responsible” use, and above all, the proliferation of FMC product lines. 
 
An FFS graduate who participated in a CropLife course on “Integrated Pest Management 
and the Correct Use of Crop Protection Products” told me that they were treated well 
                                                       
41 AgroVida course documents prepared by Bayer consultant, Dr. Alfredo Ramos Angel, Professor at ANDI 
and Specialist in Safe and Effective use of Pesticides. 
42 Personal communication, Kevin Gallagher of the FAO's Global IPM Facility in Rome and observed in 
Bayer Corporation, 1997, Courier Magazine. Special Issue on IPM. 23 pp. 
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during courses: "The food was much better than that during the training provided by [the 
CIP and INIAP-led] EcoSalud and the FAO [projects]." He added, "But we did not learn 
anything we did not already know."43 When I asked him whether the project promoted the 
reduction of pesticide use, he said that they were being asked, "… to promote Safe Use of 
Pesticides. No one talked about not promoting a particular pesticide." Devoid of an 
emphasis on pesticide-use reduction, INIAP and CropLife essentially were using the term 
IPM outside its original designs and purposes. Such translation enabled CropLife and 
INIAP to claim that they were champions of the increasingly prestigious symbol of IPM.  
 
In addition to IPM, the pro-pesticide alliance adopted the terminology of the agroecology 
movement, especially FFS (Box 7.7). As described in Chapter 6 and in Schut and 
Sherwood (2007), CropLife and INIAP came to value these approaches as prestigious 
symbols, but not necessarily their content, and they worked to transform such symbolism 
into the designs of the pro-pesticide alliance. INIAP and CropLife co-produced a greatly 
reduced version of the Farmer Field School methodology that consisted of five, two-day 
sessions over several months designed to "teach farmers technologies, so that they would 
in turn teach them to other farmers in their communities." This training of trainers was 
substantially less intensive than the 400 plus hours that had become the standard in 
Ecuador. These “Farmer Field Schools” also did not include essential processes of the 
methodology, such as learning plots, agroecosystem analysis, and open-ended 
experiments. As a result, the transformed FFS operated outside the proposed 
epistemological boundaries. The strategic distortions of concepts such as IPM and FFS 
demonstrated that the pro-pesticide alliance indiscriminately utilized approaches and 
methodologies to advance its purposes.  
 
Building allegiances 
 
According to Star and Griesemer (1989), “boundary objects” cross into intersecting 
worlds, satisfying the informational needs of each. Boundary objects are both robust 
enough to encompass needs and plastic enough to adapt the local needs and constraints of 
involved parties. In addition to continual processes of black-boxing, translation, and the 
cooption of prestigious symbols, the utilization of boundary objects became a means of 
socializing specific perspectives and building allegiances. Each boundary object had a 
different meaning for each actor, but their gradual emergence slowly facilitated the 
construction of collaborative platforms and continual claims to truth, impact, and public 
advocacy (Box 7.8). Within these constructs, the interests of actors slowly became 
transformed and assimilated into evolving networks of influence.  
 
The pesticide conflict played out as a battle, with the protagonists attempting to get more 
and more allies on their side. As such, the enrolment of actors became central to success. 
Most of us assumed that CropLife had enticed INIAP with project funds, but when we 
learned the amount – $6,000 for the first year and up to $12,000 thereafter – we realized 
that their relationship was built on another foundation. As described earlier, we 
discovered that the Head of NAT had long-standing personal and professional ties with 
people at FMC and CropLife. Further, having lived first-hand the decline of public 
                                                       
43 Personal communication, 10 April 2003. 
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support for research and extension and observing the climb of the agrochemical and 
flower industries, many agriculture professionals long before had reached the conclusion 
that the future lay in ties with private industry. 
 
 
Box 7.7 Gaining ownership over FFS in Carchi 
 
In mid-2003, I learned that INIAP planned to include CropLife's logo on the FAO-
financed FFS impact study, which to me represented a dramatic pesticide industry “co-
option” of FFS. I informed the Head of NAT of what I saw as conflicts of interest that I 
felt would lead CIP, FAO, and IPM-CRSP to withdraw financial support to IPM and FFS. 
He said that he did not agree, so I proceeded to consult others. 
 
Officials at the FAO's Global IPM Facility (GIF) sent me documentation from the FAO 
and World Bank that articulated emerging policies against this sort of public-private 
collaboration. The GIF was careful to explain that, nevertheless, the policy was 
controversial and had not been fully accepted at the FAO. In May 2004, the head of the 
IPM-CRSP project, an economist at Virginia Tech, responded by e-mail, "We support 
your request that INIAP sever its ties to CropLife as we agree that our project does not 
wish to be associated with an organization that promotes the use of toxic Class I and Class 
II pesticides. We do not want our IPM-CRSP or the USAID logo on publications with the 
Crop Life logo or our money to be spent on joint activities with CropLife." He wrote 
INIAP informing it of the same policy. The Legal Representative of CIP-Ecuador 
explained that the CGIAR had not developed a policy. He asked CIP's Deputy Director of 
Research, an entomologist with a long history in IPM, to investigate the matter. She 
informed the Director General of INIAP that CIP did not collaborate with the pesticide 
industry and, like the IPM-CRSP, requested the CIP's logo not be included on the 
publication. 
 
When the August 2004 publication appeared (Barrera et al., 2004), it included in order the 
following logos: CropLife, INIAP, IPM-CRSP, and FAO. As per its request, CIP’s logo 
was not included. Not only did the Head of NAT include the IPM-CRSP's logo, but he 
also added two international project leaders to the list of authors. In the eyes of the public, 
the pro-pesticide alliance gained a degree of ownership over FFS. 
 
 
Pressure groups educated themselves in their own perspective of the pesticide situation in 
Carchi and then mobilized to reify positions. A power centre, often organized around the 
interests of a prominent actor such as CropLife, emerged to challenge findings. At one 
level, the political battle over pesticide health effects became one of truth and truth-
making. Eventually the pro-pesticide alliance made SUP its mobilization platform, 
followed by strategic action to tie SUP to prestigious symbols, claims of defending the 
public good, and public sanctioning through involvement of government agencies. 
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Box 7.8 (Mis)informing the public 
 
On 3 September 2005, Ecuador's most widely read newspaper, El Universo, based in the country's largest city, 
Guayaquil, published an article with the title "Potato activity improves in Carchi: the indiscriminate use of 
crop protection products intensified the support of capacity-building entities, alleviating farmers difficulties." 
On 7 October 2006, the same newspaper published a second article, “Healthier crops at less cost.” According 
to the people who were interviewed and cited in the articles, both authors worked in close coordination with 
the CropLife project coordinator in Carchi. The articles grossly misrepresented information, declaring that 
CropLife was “responsible for improvements in potato production” and “the alleviation of farmers’ 
problems” as a result of its activities for "integrated and safe management" of pesticides. Examples from the 
articles include: 
 
• “INIAP, the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Bureau of Crop Life 
Industries (CropLife-Ecuador), the Ministry of Agriculture, and others supported farmers so that they 
could improve crop production, reduce costs, and improve management of agriculture inputs.” 
• “At this time, the Institute [INIAP] and CropLife are conducting experiments on the control of pests 
that attack the tuber in order to offer better alternatives in integrated and safe management of 
phytosanitary products with which they have been able to reduce problems by up to 40 percent.” 
• “As a result of its collaboration with CropLife, INIAP has been able to educate producers on the 
importance of utilizing the necessary dosage for particular pests and the protection for preserving the 
health of farmers. With this farmers have been able to reduce production costs by 30 percent.” 
• “More than 70 percent [of farmers] take necessary precautions in fumigating, storing, and destroying 
pesticide containers.” 
• “The leader of the CropLife project indicated that they have been working three and one-half years in 
the zone training farmers, housewives, and high school and university students so that they become 
aware of good utilization of phytosanitary products that are used in the province and that they create 
awareness among children.” 
 
The FAO and MAG did not directly participate in the initiative in Carchi, and in fact, MAG-Carchi explicitly 
opposed INIAP's collaboration with CropLife. As such, the article created an image of broad institutional 
support, thus falsely claiming a degree of public sanction for the INIAP-CropLife collaboration. The articles 
framed the problem in Carchi as a lack of "awareness of good utilization" of pesticides, here diversely called 
"crop protection" and "phytosanitary products.” The health problem was framed as one that could be 
addressed through using "necessary dosage and protection." The concept of Integrated Pest Management 
became "integrated and safe management" of pesticides. 
 
The cited data did not pertain to CropLife-supported Farmer Field Schools, but rather the CIP-supported 
Farmer Field Schools,44 which were conducted from 1999-2002, prior to CropLife's arrival. As published in 
Barrera et al. (2001) and widely reported in Ecuador, the studies on the CIP-supported FFS showed that 
through more detailed knowledge of soils, insects and diseases combined with improved field scouting, 
farmers could reduce overall fertilizers use by 50 percent and pesticides by 46 percent (including a 75% 
reduction in the use of highly toxic products) without harming production per area, thereby contributing to 
decreased outlays and increased overall productivity by about 36 percent. In contrast to the information 
reported in the article, the most significant improvements in productivity did not come from pesticide use 
“improvements,” but rather through decreasing fertilizer use and associated labour costs. The research 
suggested that farming changes may not have been primarily due to capacity building alone, but more so 
"dollarisation" of the national currency in 1999, which led to a triple digit inflation of agrochemical costs over 
the ensuing three years. No studies support the claim that 70 percent of farmers are taking necessary 
precautions to avoid exposure to pesticides. 
                                                       
44 From 1999-2002, Farmer Field Schools in Carchi were diversely financed by the IDRC-supported EcoSalud 
project as well as by USAID-supported IPM/CRSP, COSUDE FORTIPAPA, and FAO projects. The FFS 
during this period closely followed the methodology as established in Southeast Asia and outlined in 
Pumisacho and Sherwood (2005). These were co-designed and -implemented by CIP and INIAP-Carchi as 
well as by other local partners, including MAG, Randi-Randi, and independent local leaders.  
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Entrenchment through regulation 
 
In San Gabriel, there is not a single ingeniero who sells agrochemical products – 
just Pancho Leon [the owner of a store], who is never around. He puts cute girls 
in mini-skirts at the counter to attend to his customers. – a farmer from San 
Gabriel 
 
In Ecuador, pesticides are regulated through a provision that states that highly toxics can 
only be purchased with a prescription from an Ingeniero Agrónomo. Nevertheless, the Día a 
Día investigations in Carchi concluded, “Unfortunately, this is just one more regulation 
that is not fulfilled in our country; even a small child could purchase these products 
freely.”45  
 
In his study on the continued use of highly toxics in Honduras, Jansen (2000: 16) found 
that by opposing all opposition to pesticides and through the development of complex 
regulations, "The industry can successfully build upon a set of internationally accepted 
criteria for regulation which practically exclude the possibility to ban most of these 
pesticides."  
 
When confronted on the issue of weak national regulatory mechanisms, the Director of 
Regulatory Affairs from FMC responded, “We cannot be responsible for the flaws in a 
country’s regulatory system.” In response to his claim that carbofuran did not represent a 
risk for farmers, a CIP social scientist asked, "How do you calculate the risk? What do you 
factor in, because the calculus would change from country to country? For example, in 
Ecuador the socio-economic exposure conditions are very different than those in the 
United States, and, if you included that factor, it could lead you to a very different 
outcome." The FMC representative responded:  
 
I am very glad that you asked that question, because it helps to explain how things 
are done in the US. The FQPA [Food Quality Protection Act] deals with all 
exposures, except occupational exposure. Occupational exposure is not dealt with 
in the risk test. It is dealt with the 1988 Law of Re-registration. That is a very 
careful calculation based on all of the conditions of use in that locale: tractor, 
rates, formulations, crops, etc. All is determined, and determination of what is 
acceptable under re-regulation. The EPA is issuing a risk exposure document that 
takes into account all of those risk factors to avian populations, the environment, 
humans, etcetera. 
 
The FMC representative conveniently limited the company’s risk criteria to that not 
including occupational exposure, which was the central health concern associated with 
carbofuran use among farmers in Ecuador. Rather than address exposure, he buried the 
question in the details of regulatory complexities and framed the concern as a government 
policy matter and not the responsibility of the pesticide industry. In addition to EPA 
standards, when challenged over pesticide concerns, for example with regard to the 
                                                       
45 Amargo cosecha (Bitter harvest), a 20 minute documentary produced by Adolfo Asar of the Día a Día 
Program, first aired in Ecuador in September 2001. 
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continued sale and distribution of highly toxics, the pro-pesticide alliance – from the 
national and international corporations to public servants in regulatory agencies – 
frequently referred to the FAO’s Code of Conduct in order to demonstrate “compliance 
to international standards.” Jansen (2000: 15) also observed this tactic underway in Central 
America: "In fact, the [FAO's] Code [of Conduct] legitimizes the actions of authorities 
and strengthens the idea that they are not responsible for misuse and accidents with 
pesticides." 
 
The Ecuadorian State legitimized the “externalities” of technologies through its system of 
civilized controls and regulation. Nevertheless, the actual life-world of SESA, the 
regulatory agency, was not just composed of its civilized mechanisms of control, but also 
the unwritten outcomes of what it sanctioned. Through its regulatory system, Ecuador 
granted permission to pesticide companies to introduce toxins into the environment. A 
shadow effect was the contamination of the environment and the poisoning of its public. 
Only by means of reference to established norms and SESA sanctioning could the socio-
technical regime achieve this. As a result, the shadow effects of technology regulation 
were not mere “externalities” of the system, but intrinsic elements of it. 
 
In summary, it was not pesticides that degraded the environment and poisoned people. It 
was technology linked to the notion of effective regulatory mechanisms that formed the 
basis of power. In this way, the image of regulation against harmful technologies became 
complicit in sustaining the continuation of highly toxics.  
 
The reflex 
 
Interests arrived to the networks, but they were malleable and, as we saw with INIAP, 
vulnerable to change, which in turn produced either further entrenchment of perspective 
or development of new relationships, opinion and direction. When confronted by 
contradictions, the bureaucracy transformed causality and guilt into acquittal, thereby 
undermining claims to representing the public interest and opening the door for the 
arrival of competing forces. 
 
Despite growing appreciation for the need to eliminate the highly toxics, SESA and 
eventually INIAP adopted the position that they would support the distribution and sale 
of these products, which resonated with the status quo of the day. Due to growing public 
concern over pesticides, the continued sale of highly toxics demanded a coordinated 
response with private industry, for example, through SUP programs and propaganda 
activities with grade school children and adults. Appreciation that such public-private 
collaborations violated the public trust led to diverse forms of questioning: television 
documentaries, newspaper articles, encounters during events, street protests, and boycotts. 
As a result, the cost of keeping the highly toxics on the market climbed. 
 
Despite the pro-pesticide alliance’s success at networking, the increasingly apparent social 
and environmental products of the technology at hand inevitably produced constraints 
that would require more radical developments: a degree of integration with the pro-health 
alliance via transformed versions of IPM and FFS.  
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Nevertheless, dissenting sub-political movements began to organize around underlying 
contradictions. At different moments, members of the pro-pesticide alliance perceived 
that a “tipping point” was being reached, leading to new activity. In reference to the May 
2001 national forum of pesticide impacts in Carchi, for example, this led to a rapid 
mobilisation of industry representatives from Ecuador, Central America, and the United 
States who had organised to block proposals for eliminating the highly toxics. Faced by a 
threat of shifting public opinion, however, some members of the pro-pesticide alliance 
began to publicly portray a softer position on the highly toxics. For example, in a 
newspaper article, Carlos Garcia, the Andean regional head of sales for AGRIPAC, the 
largest distributor of pesticides in the country, publicly stated that his company was ready 
to replace highly toxic pesticides once they became prohibited.46 Further, during an 
informal conversation with a high-level Bayer representative from Europe, I was told, 
“The industry has known for years that the highly toxics must go. My company already 
has stopped selling them back home. But our colleagues in the South are going to 
continue to sell them until it is either no longer profitable or politically viable to do so.”47  
 
Perception and perception making were at the heart of pesticide policy matters. Risks 
associated with pesticide exposure were essentially invisible. The immateriality of the 
threats meant that knowledge about them would be mediated and, as such, was dependent 
on interpretation. Perceptions were tied to an understanding of what constituted danger. 
Pesticides, not unlike nuclear technology or genetically modified organisms, produced 
effects that were characteristically abstract – i.e., difficult to perceive and track. As per the 
risk society literature (see Adam et al., 2000), this quality presents one of the great 
challenges to socially constituted industrial phenomenon: all interpretation is inherently a 
matter of perspective and hence political. 
 
In Carchi, the politics and sub-politics of risk definition became extremely important. It 
was not just interest that dominated the political agenda, but claims about the legitimacy 
of particular forms of expertise and knowledge, for example, over putative aspects of 
agriculture, toxicity, products, and policy. Inter-determinacy and the inevitability of 
political involvement produced multiple truths and, even in the presence of seemingly 
objective science, there were no facts outside of the relativizing influence of interpretation 
based on context, position, perspective, interest, and the power to define and advocate 
interpretation. Knowledge was principally embodied, contextual and positional, and taking 
up a position, for example, on the effects of pesticides on human health or the 
continuation of the highly toxics, inevitably became a question of ethics. 
 
The work of Ulrich Beck and his colleagues informs that a society that endlessly spins off 
technologically induced risks eventually undermines the legitimacy of its institutions, 
which leads to the emergence of new social forms. In other words, the “bads” of risk 
society produce backlash, in this case both ecological and social. The result of this 
phenomenon in Carchi was a public questioning of its professionals and their institutions. 
                                                       
46 "Cuatro pesticidas cuestionadas por la FAO.” El Comercio. Seccion Vida Diaria, 3 May 2002 
47 Personal communication with a representative of Bayer CropScience, AgroVida Inauguration, 19 October 
2001. 
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Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994) describe the dis-embedding and re-embedding of society 
as “reflexive modernisation,” a process that appeared to be underway in Carchi.  
 
Giddens (1990: 134) believes that the awareness that the ecosystem is in collapse creates 
existential angst that interrupts the “ontological certainty” of normal existence. He finds 
that people react differently when faced with modern uncertainties, exhibiting four 
patterns of reaction: pragmatic acceptance, sustained optimism, cynical pessimism, and 
radical engagement. Giddens explains that “pragmatic acceptance" emerges as the result of 
an inability to cope with the knowledge that risks are beyond the bounds of human 
control. The more people are aware of impending harmful or even fatal events will lead 
them to search for security and consolation, which given the potential for economic or 
food insecurity, nuclear war, or disease, are hopelessly allusive. As a result, many people 
choose to repress their anxiety or angst by focusing on the practicalities of survival. They 
repress all emotion of impending doom behind a veil of hope. Faced with the threat of 
modern risks, some believe that with the aid of technology humankind endlessly can 
escape the perilous future that it crafts for itself. Provided the growing severity of 
environmental changes, such “sustained optimism” is built on perhaps extreme faith in 
rationality and science. Others cope with environmental angst through “cynical 
pessimism.” This approach leads to contemptuous attitudes towards human nature, 
sincerity, or the goodwill of others. “Radical engagement” has similarities with Beck's 
description of sub-political movements. This involves meeting problems with optimism 
and activism leading to increasingly conscious activity around social change.  
 
While certainly all four patterns were expressed in the public pesticide debate, the radical 
engagement of a number of sub-political movements, including the Humanists, farmer 
organizations and NGOs, emerged as potentially transformative forces. At the time of the 
close of this research, this growing group of actors disfavoured by the socio-technological 
developments of the day, in conjunction with coinciding effects of ecological disturbance, 
appeared to gain momentum. The fact that certain industry representatives began to 
publicly acknowledge the inevitability of a shift with regard to the sale and distribution of 
highly toxics suggested that proposals for change had become less radical than previously. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Researchers working in Central America stated, “Documentation of pesticide poisonings 
during several decades never induced any decision to ban or restrict a pesticide” 
(Wesseling et al., 2005: S697). Similarly, after presenting their research at multiple public 
forums on pesticide concerns, the CIP-led group of collaborators discovered that the issue 
at hand was not a lack of high quality information or alternatives. The pesticide socio-
technology trajectory depended on far less rational and far more social and political 
factors. 
 
We encountered a cultural power-matrix surrounding the use of pesticide technology, 
which organized to shape public opinion and policy and ultimately assure an open market 
for harmful technology. An alliance of actors, often led by private industry, operated to 
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entrench present regimes of thinking, organizing, and doing, even at the cost of the health 
of the majority of rural people in Carchi. 
 
After people learned about the evidence of pesticide health effects, the social “playing 
field” temporarily levelled, and the pro-pesticide alliance forged new reasons for 
complementary action. The continual framing and reframing of Safe Use of Pesticides and 
the translation of prestigious symbols, such as FFS and IPM, as well as a relatively small 
investment of funds built and rebuilt a safe, attractive platform for collaboration over an 
increasingly controversial theme. 
 
Highly dynamic networks of competing and colluding actors defined and re-defined the 
public agenda. Interests arrived to networks, but they were malleable and even the most 
entrenched stances (e.g., those belonging to the national research institute, INIAP) and 
seemingly strong positions (of the pesticide industry) were vulnerable to change and 
indeed, changed. In addition to the national regulatory agency, SESA, which by the late 
1990s had become a strong pro-pesticide ally, CropLife managed to enlist INIAP and the 
Ministry of Education onto its increasingly problematic agenda of sustaining harmful 
technology. In the process, the industry won degrees of legitimacy, and it gained public 
sanction for the policy of SUP as the appropriate public response to the latest wave of 
concern over pesticide technology. 
 
The trajectory of pesticides depended on the success of scientists and técnicos as 
entrepreneurs – indiscriminately mixing economic, political, natural, and cultural claims to 
truth. In addition to “black boxing,” continual enrolment was a central activity. This 
involved network-building through processes of translation, leading to new relationships 
around relatively unproblematic sets of interests. Success depended on the capacity of 
networks to grow, strategically influence perspective and positions, and change. 
 
Organizations and institutions operated as boundary objects (i.e. inter-institutional spaces 
of encounter and negotiation), where perspectives were both consolidated and 
transformed. Over time, networks evolved into coherent, well-defined regimes with visible 
faces and organizations, exercising authority and exerting influence. At any given time, a 
particular alliance appeared as a mature structure, consolidated around a particular set of 
positions. Upon becoming overly consolidated and rigid in administration, content, or 
activity, however, networks became vulnerable to competing interests. 
 
The uncontrollable and unwanted products of pesticides exposed contradictions between 
the public discourse of the influential and their policy outcomes, leading to public 
questioning of authority. Sub-political actors, especially social movements and NGOs, 
organized around ideals of agroecology, arose as transformative forces. Ironically, it 
appeared that the entrenchment of institutional claims to knowledge and technology and 
the deepening and broadening of pesticide effects on society and the environment 
provided the pre-conditions for demise and change. 
Chapter 8 
 
Learning from Carchi: The Production of Decline 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation has explored ecosystem decline and associated human health problems in 
Carchi, summarised as the pathology of modern agriculture. Tendencies were not mere 
externalities or accidents but dangers that increasingly became the expected result of 
agriculture. The State was the sanctioning agent. Dangers did not just emerge from the 
environmental world, but rather they had become an inner product of society. Beck (2000: 
221) argues, “The loss of boundaries between these realms [nature and culture] is not only 
brought about by the industrialization of nature and culture but also by the hazards that 
endanger humans, animals, and plants alike.” A central theme of modern society in Carchi 
had become what Beck described as a “manufacture of uncertainty” from within. 
 
In this dissertation I iteratively pursued a series of questions as a means of unveiling 
central features behind the pathology of modern agriculture. This final chapter 
summarizes the findings on the major research questions that I posed at the onset: 
 
1. What historical events preceded agricultural decline in Carchi? 
2. What social and institutional factors prevented the uptake of recommended “best 
practice,” in the form of cross-disciplinary research (i.e., the EcoSalud project) 
and knowledge-based, people-centred interventions (Farmer Field Schools)? 
3. How did institutional actors respond to policy proposals for the elimination of 
highly toxic pesticides? 
 
Thereafter, I move on to address a final pair of questions as an extrapolation of my 
experience: 
 
4. What are the institutional features behind the production and continuity of 
agricultural decline in Carchi?  
5. What lessons does Carchi hold for more sustainable agriculture? 
 
Findings 
 
Chapter 2 summarized a decade of multidisciplinary research in Carchi that raised 
concerns over the sustainability of agriculture as a result of its effects on the environment 
and especially the health of rural people. Between 1990 and 2001, a number of national 
and international organizations worked with communities in Carchi on projects to assess 
the role and effects of modern agriculture in potato production and to identify 
opportunities for reversing its harmful consequences. The research-action initiatives 
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contributed to numerous academic publications and graduate-level theses that were 
summarized in two compendia: Crissman et al. (1998) and Yanggen et al. (2003a). 
 
Provided its natural endowments, generally educated population, infrastructure and 
market access to both Colombia and Ecuador, Carchi is potentially one of the most 
productive agricultural regions in the Andes. Potato farming there has evolved to become 
a major source of livelihoods, dominating the modern landscape. On less than a quarter of 
the country’s area dedicated to the crop, in the 1990s Carchi came to produce about 40 
percent of the yearly national potato harvest. Nevertheless, today's farming does not just 
produce a lot of potatoes; it also produces ecological disruptions. 
 
The researchers found that the use of modern technologies generated worrisome 
environmental, productivity and human health consequences. Tractors and total tillage 
were the leading cause of soil erosion, displacing some 80 t/ha each cropping season. 
Each year farmers spent more on agrochemical inputs and received less for their crop, 
leading them to lose money on well over half of their plantings. Meanwhile, two-thirds of 
the rural population – including men, women and children – suffered measurable 
neurological damage due to exposure to highly toxic pesticides. Economic studies 
identified a relationship between pesticide exposure and low productivity. After 
automobile accidents, suicide by pesticide ingestion was the second leading cause of death 
in the province. Further, as per an elderly man from La Libertad, “Our farms are dying.” 
The forests were disappearing or already gone. Farmers no longer controlled their varieties 
and farms had lost their biodiversity. Decades of mechanical tillage and heavy 
agrochemical use had disrupted soil ecosystems. It had become increasingly difficult for 
farmers to financially survive. Something had gone wrong with agriculture. 
 
1. What historical events preceded agricultural decline in Carchi? 
 
After summarising a lengthy list of data as evidence of a “Third World crisis,” Arturo 
Escobar (1995: 213) concluded, “Statistics tell stories. They are techno-representations 
endowed with complex political and cultural histories.” While highly informative on the 
present state of the ecosystem and its effects on human well-being, the wealth of 
biological, economic, and health research did not, however, explain how the present-day 
situation came to be. Devoid of historical insight, we are blind to the roots behind the 
modern-day situation, greatly limiting our ability to reorganize around more sustainable 
futures. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 aimed to summarise the major events leading up to present-day 
agriculture in Carchi. I researched historical records and literature and interviewed key 
informants on the general history of the province. Carchense farming evolved to exploit 
niches distributed across ecological floors, a practice called “micro-verticality,” which 
permitted slow but relatively stable development in the highland Andes. Since that time, 
increasingly distant and exogenous influences have come to drive rural developments. The 
brief arrival in Carchi of the Incas followed by the Spanish Conquest and the feudal 
hacienda system radically changed Andean agriculture. By the decline of the hacienda 
system in the mid-twentieth century, traditional community structures had undergone 
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dramatic transformation, and the system of vertical farming was replaced by extensive, 
horizontally distributed agriculture, which in mountain environments proved vulnerable to 
the elements as well as pest and disease epidemics.  
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, processes of colonization and land reform 
ended the hacienda era in Carchi and provided smallholder farmers title to land and high 
expectations for the future. Generally, the land areas of the fertile valley floor remained in 
the hands of hacendados, though their landholdings were considerably smaller than 
previously. Meanwhile, new classes of farmers became relegated to steeper and lesser 
fertile hillside land. Aggressive “agricultural modernisation,” built on the promises of 
market integration and industrial-era technologies as means of progress, followed. Not 
unlike the Incan and Spanish arrivals, actors and institutions of the post-hacienda period 
commonly were socially distant from ruralities. A deepening of agricultural development 
away from localities and towards distant markets and externally based technologies 
became a central feature of the rural landscape. 
 
Modern-day Carchi is a clear example of the spread of industrial agriculture technologies 
in the Americas during the “green revolution” that began in the late 1950s. A tradition of 
planting in partnership between the landowner and landless labourers provided unusual 
access to financial resources and credit conditions for the rural population. Furthermore, 
as a result of new revenues from the oil boom of the 1970s, the Ecuadorian government 
invested in the province’s transportation and communication infrastructure. Provided 
these conditions and market-oriented policies, an emerging agricultural products industry 
was quick to capitalize on the availability of a new and growing population of smallholder 
producers. Many of the owners and salespeople of the agrochemical industries were 
previous hacienda owners and their descendants. As such, rural development in Carchi 
often represented a transfer in roles, rather than a change in social position. 
 
Smallholder potato production based on monocropping and energy-intensive 
technologies, specifically mechanized tillage, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, quickly 
transformed farming. Production, both by area and by labour input, intensified 
dramatically. A prominent study by Barsky (1984) showed that between 1954 and 1974, 
production increased by about 40 percent and worker productivity by 33 percent. 
Production by area in the province continued to increase into the 1990s, from about 12 
t/ha in 1974 to about 21 t/ha in the early 1990s – three times the national average 
(Crissman et al., 1998). Nevertheless, this progress did not occur without costs. 
 
To further place modern developments in context, I consulted diverse age groups from 
four rural villages on the critical periods of their history. Different than other regions of 
the highland Andes, most generally did not identify strongly with indigenous populations, 
instead feeling that their cultural history largely began with the haciendas. Collectively, 
they agreed upon four major periods of modern change: the hacienda, land reform, 
technification/market integration, and dollarisation. The characteristics of these periods 
were explored during home visits and interactive workshops, at community as well as 
inter-community levels. 
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This research found that market integration and “technification” led to potato 
intensification, mechanized tillage, the introduction and increased reliance of 
agrichemicals, and a shortening of fallow periods. Over time, market forces led to greatly 
reduced on-farm biodiversity. By the early 1990s, a very fragile, total tillage, external input-
intensive monoculture of a single, dominant variety, Superchola, occupied much of the 
landscape. These changes destabilised biological systems and, due to a compensating and 
then aggravating intervention of agrochemicals, spurring soil degradation and a public 
health epidemic. By the mid-1990s, this situation had become endemic – an integral part 
of rural life. 
 
Most recently, production by area and productivity levelled, followed by a decline. Real 
prices for inputs grew at an accelerated rate and commercial prices for potato showed 
rising rates of variability. Increasingly, farmers began to lose money on their crops, with 
financial failures on about 43 percent of plantings during the 1991-1992 season (Crissman 
et al., 1998) to more than 60 percent in 2004-2005 (Chapter 4). At the same time, farmers 
and their families suffered harmful health effects from acute and chronic exposure to 
chemicals (Cole et al., 1997a and b; Cole et al., 2002) that adversely impacted their 
economies (Antle et al, 1994; Antle et al., 2003). In summary, agricultural modernisation 
undermined ecosystems and eventually worked against the health and economic well-
being of rural people.  
 
The social effects of modern agriculture appeared equally dramatic. Some thirty-five years 
after market integration and technification, farmers found themselves in a crisis they called 
“dollarisation,” which led to increasingly volatile compensation for commodities, losses, 
and debt. As a result, the turn of the twentieth century in resource-abundant Carchi was 
marked by the growth of two sectors: the landless labourer and the urban migrant. 
 
Further analysis with communities showed that patterns of development were at once 
conserving and dynamic. Change was not abrupt but rooted in combinations of 
continuities and discontinuities as a result of structural coupling to co-evolving social and 
biophysical conditions. Participants described a “memory” effect: past legacies that carried 
on into the future. As a result, diverse aspects of the hacienda period, for example, 
remained until today, such as the surviving legacy of the patrones who continued to hold 
prestigious positions in Ecuadorian society through both old and new social forms: 
continued land ownership and exploitative labour arrangements, political position in local 
and national government, the sale of agrochemicals, or through the banks and credit 
systems. Nevertheless, some farmers felt that the present social environment provided 
greater “freedom” or room for manoeuvrability than previously, and as a result, they were 
able to exert greater influence over their futures than under the haciendas. Meanwhile, 
others emphasized that in modern society their families and communities effectively had 
been “re-enslaved.” 
 
Undesirable products of modern agriculture led to social and ecological outcomes that in 
turn sparked new directions of change. Examples of perceived external environmental and 
social forces of change were: late blight (caused by an exotic pathogen, that most now 
considered endemic), the Guatemalan tuber moth (an exotic insect pest that arrived in 
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1996) and, most recently, new weather events, in particular, longer dry spells and 
unpredictable rainfall patterns. Externally sourced forces of change were: increasing price 
fluctuations in for potato, the loss of the Sucre, increases in agrochemical prices, and 
increasing political instability (i.e., seven Presidents in less than a decade and a greater 
number of agriculture ministers). Examples of perceived internal forces of change were: 
land reform, the creation of communities, the “settling” of the forest, soil degradation, 
“rebellious youth,” and a “loss of control” over families and community. 
 
From a biophysical point of view, modern technology had enabled farmers to structurally 
break with nature, leading to subsequent environmental backlash. From a socio-cultural 
perspective, people and their communities were increasingly fragmented (both 
individually/psycho-socially (a sense of detachment) and collectively (a tendency towards 
valuing the market over neighbour, neighbourhood, and community). These two 
phenomena interacted to produce socio-biological decline characterized by increasing 
environmental and social uncertainties. Farmers expressed a growing sense of frustration 
as a result of recent experience. One participant seemed to represent many when he 
declared, "We have done everything the ingenieros have told us to do, and look where we 
are.... We are going broke." In recent time, a growing number of people had begun to 
abandon agriculture and migrate to urban centres in search of work. An undetermined 
number of youth in each of the communities where we worked had joined armed guerrilla 
forces in nearby Colombia. 
 
2. What social and institutional factors prevented the uptake of recommended “best practice,” in the form 
of cross-disciplinary research (i.e., the EcoSalud project) and knowledge-based, people-centred interventions 
(Farmer Field Schools)? 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 were retrospectives on the three-year EcoSalud project and the 
introduction of Farmer Field School methodology in Carchi. Under the demands of 
project implementation, professionals from both research and development camps 
involved in EcoSalud were forced to confront differences and negotiate interests. While 
this interaction sometimes led to unsatisfactory results for some, it also contributed to 
new skills and understanding of previously conflicting perspectives. We found cross-
disciplinary research particularly challenging at the field level, where contradictions were 
most stark. Working cultures for staff members (e.g., agricultural extension, participatory 
research, feminist social change, and health services) were built on different sets of 
assumptions, methods of resolving conflicts, planning, and perceived roles in 
development. The mediation of differences often carried high transaction costs. 
 
Through sometimes-difficult processes of accommodation, the staff gained insight into 
divergent perspectives. With new understanding, participants learned to work in 
complementary ways that advanced project purposes, for example over more integrated 
use of research data and interactive, “participatory” methodologies capable of addressing 
the priorities of both scientists and development practitioners. When confronted by 
external obstacles, for example over pesticide policy matters, staff joined force and 
collaborated to foster a common agenda, framed around the elimination of highly toxic 
pesticides. 
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Despite much cross-disciplinary learning and practice, we could not hide from the fact 
that the vast majority of rural people in Carchi continued to be chronically exposed to 
harmful pesticides, and as a result, they suffered serious neurological damage that affected 
farm productivity and family well-being. The research generated a wealth of high quality 
information on the dramatic health problems associated with pesticides as well as 
scientifically informed and replicable alternatives. We proactively communicated this 
experience to policy makers and the public. Nevertheless, very little was achieved in 
improving the situation in rural communities.  
 
This experience exposed fundamental conflicts of paradigms and process that 
circumscribe institutional capabilities of addressing complex ecosystem health concerns. 
Specifically, this includes the priority of continual social and environmental coupling. 
Enhancing the accountability of science and development to localities requires new ways 
of thinking, organizing, and doing that arguably lie outside of current institutional 
constraints. 
 
To explore the experienced tensions between our staff and professionals in general, I drew 
on a taxonomy of scientific paradigms based on the mapping of ontological and 
epistemological extremes (Figure 5.2). My colleagues and I found that the mediation of 
differences became a priority. In retrospect, a common concern over the public health 
crisis – especially public confrontations with competing actors over pesticides – generated 
reasons for wanting to collaborate between previously competing perspectives. By the end 
of EcoSalud, we gained appreciation for the role of generalists, capable of bridging 
disparate positions and perspectives. 
 
Reflective analysis over five years of experience with Farmer Field Schools provided 
insights into the potentials and limitations of methodology-based interventions. FFS 
provoked new thinking and creative practice at the farm level. While showing much 
potential early on, the methodology faced limitations at leveraging institutional change. A 
series of critical studies found that FFS practitioners were systematically “cutting corners” 
and pulling the methodology towards more expert-centred designs. My colleagues and I 
found that FFS scaled-up in name, but not in meaning. This tendency had become a 
dominant phenomenon in Carchi, as elsewhere, and thus, it arguably was no mere 
oversight or accident, but the outcome of a cultural knowledge battle – the methodology 
was at conflict with dominant research and development paradigms that informed 
institutional designs. Apparently, conflicting purposes led actors and their organisations to 
systematically erode Field Schools to the point where much of the methodology’s 
epistemological identity fell into question.  
 
Based on the experience with EcoSalud and FFS, I reached the conclusion that the major 
obstacles to change were not due to mere lacks of information, knowledge, technology, or 
market alternatives, as farmers, experts, and policy makers commonly argue. Instead, more 
subtle social forces were at play, requiring further attention for sustainable development. 
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3. How did institutional actors respond to policy proposals for the elimination of highly toxic pesticides? 
 
Experiences from the EcoSalud project and FFS methodology exposed contradictions and 
raised doubts about the existing order of science and development practice at levels of 
farming, science, and government. Chapter 7 explored the social and political processes of 
keeping highly toxic pesticides on the market. I encountered a cultural power-matrix 
surrounding the use of pesticides that informed public opinion and policy and ultimately 
enabled a continuation of self-destructive agriculture. It operated to entrench present 
regimes of thinking, organizing, and doing, even knowingly at the cost of the health of the 
majority of rural people in Carchi. 
 
While powerful actors were effective at translation of prestigious symbols and enrolling 
public actors to win legitimacy and public sanction, increasingly obvious contradictions 
between public discourse and local experience fomented a reflexivity that fed back on 
existing order. The arrival of sub-political forms, particularly farmer and social 
movements, sometimes supported by NGOs, rose to become transformative forces. At 
the close of this research, the proposals of these groups were yet to take social hold, but it 
was evident that local social movements were having a growing influence on communities, 
government, and industry. Whether or not a tipping point had been reached remained to 
be seen, but aggressive responses by the powerful, especially the national pesticide 
industry, suggested that the existing order had been shaken. 
 
The trajectory of socio-technical change around pesticides depended on the success of 
scientists and técnicos as entrepreneurs capable of indiscriminately mixing economic, 
political, natural, and cultural claims on truth. In addition to “black boxing” or myth 
creation, continual enrolment was a central activity. This involved network building 
through processes of translation of interests leading to relationships around relatively 
unproblematised sets of interests. Success depended on the capacity of networks to 
strategically grow and shape perspective. This activity, however, was continuously 
vulnerable to changing public perceptions, which in part were influenced by the sub-
products of technology – socio-environmental uncertainties and their spin-offs. In the 
case of pesticides, these sub-products undermined existing order. 
 
Exploration of the structuration of the pesticide technology regime found that institutions 
behaved as boundary objects, where perspectives were both consolidated and 
transformed. Over time, certain networks matured into coherent, better-defined regimes 
with visible faces that exercised authority and exerted influence. At any given time, a 
particular alliance of actors appeared as a well organized structure consolidated around 
collections of positions and interests. Upon becoming overly consolidated and rigid in 
administration, content, or activity, however, networks became vulnerable to emerging 
interests, especially those of sub-political actors that laid outside well-established power 
structures. Ironically, it appeared that the entrenchment of institutional claims to 
knowledge and technology and the deepening and broadening of technological effects on 
society and the environment provided the preconditions for the demise of existing order 
and change.  
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Looking deeper 
 
4. What are the institutional features behind the production and continuity of agricultural decline in 
Carchi?  
 
Carchi as a theatre of risk 
 
The dangers of agriculture technologies in Carchi became so far-reaching and generalized 
that it was no longer possible to blame any particular individual. The guilty party had 
become the “System.” 
 
In their quest for a social theory that encompassed reflexive modernisation (i.e., "… the 
inescapable self-confrontation that accompanies the contemporary industrial way of life."), 
Adam, Beck and Van Loon (2000: 2) summarized five central features of modern risk: 
 
1. Risk perception is socially constructed. 
2. Risk is invisible and subject to interpretation. 
3. Risk crosses disciplinary boundaries and demands bridging between arbitrary lines 
dividing knowledge and practice. 
4. Conceptualization and management of risk needs to progress from notions of 
calculation (binary logic) to mediation. 
5. Society that endlessly spins off technologically induced risks eventually 
undermines the legitimacy of its institutions, thereby producing new social forms. 
 
I observed these five factors actively at play in Carchi. 
 
The text of Adam, Beck and Van Loon (2000) points out that, distinct from 
environmental uncertainties, people manufacture risks through the application of 
technologies as well as the very making of sense by a society that defines and prioritizes a 
particular danger, harm, or threat. Risks include the empirical world of social fact as well 
as the less tangible world of social construction. That is so because technologically 
constituted hazards include a virtual domain of latency, invisibility, and contingency. 
Furthermore, socially constructed risks are lived as potential and not actual harming. As 
Van Loon (2000) argues, perhaps more important than the social construction of risk is 
the “becoming of risk,” – i.e., how people become increasingly aware of and concerned 
about previously damaging but unperceived threats to their well-being.  
 
This thesis examined how risks associated with modern agriculture technology were 
manufactured through the construction of agricultural practice that involved farmers, but 
also broader society. The problem was so far-reaching and generalised that it was no 
longer possible to place the blame on an individual, such as a farmer or pesticide 
salesperson. At first, the abstractions of pesticide poisonings and environmental 
degradation made their effects “invisible” and difficult to tract and perceive. This factor 
may have played a role in the establishment of pest and soil management technology. 
Nevertheless, once research made explicit those effects, for example through quantitative 
measurement of neurological damages or soil losses, a powerful class of brokers that had 
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grown around the causal technology organised to block public understanding of that 
information. These actors – farmers, chemists, agriculture researchers, extension agents, 
salespeople, and regulatory officials – made their living off the proliferation of the 
technology. A cynical researcher once told me that “environmentalists” (i.e., myself) made 
their living off questioning existing technology. Actors on all sides manoeuvred, 
strategised, collaborated, and colluded to influence public opinion around particular 
agenda and purposes. In light of the aforementioned features of modern risk, this brings 
me to a conclusion around the Carchi experience: Social constructions – not the “facts” of our 
biophysical or economic research – primarily configured pesticide risk perceptions. 
 
The immateriality of the threats inherent in a risk society means that knowledge about it is 
mediated and thus dependent on interpretation. Perceptions of risks were tied to 
understanding what constituted danger. Pesticides, not unlike nuclear technology or 
genetically modified organisms, produced effects that were characteristically abstract – i.e., 
difficult to perceive and tract. As Beck (1992) argues throughout his thesis, this quality 
presents one of the great challenges to socially constituted industrial phenomenon: 
interpretation inherently is a matter of perspective and hence political. As described in 
Chapter 7, the politics and sub-politics of risk definition with regard to pesticides became 
extremely important.  
 
It was not just interest that dominated the political agenda, but claims about the legitimacy 
of particular forms of expertise and knowledge. Inter-determinacy and the inevitability of 
political involvement produced multiple truths. Even in the presence of seemingly 
objective science, no facts lay outside of the relativising influence of interpretation based 
on context, position, perspective, interest, and the power to define and advocate 
interpretation. Far from being neutral, knowledge was situated. The experience in Carchi 
shows how knowledge is principally embodied, contextual and positional. Taking up a 
position, as we saw for example with regard to the effects of pesticides on human health, 
ultimately became a question of ethics. In conclusion: The risks associated with pesticides were 
essentially invisible and subject to interpretation. As a result, it was not rationality but the successful 
entrepreneurship of actors that informed public perception and determined policy outcomes. 
 
Critical of disciplinary boundaries and the attendant dualistic choices between culture and 
nature, local and global, public and private, Beck (1992) argues that risk demands new 
thinking in cross-disciplinary areas that previously have been out of bounds for particular 
scientific disciplines. Indeed, the risks associated with farming practice in Carchi crossed 
traditional knowledge domains and demanded interaction among different schools of 
thought and practice. The study on the activity of the pesticide power matrix revealed how 
broader sectors of society became involved, for example from different sectors of local 
and national government, private industry, the media, as well as the general public. The 
reach of pesticides was far. In conclusion: The risks associated with modern agriculture practice 
crossed disciplinary boundaries and demanded bridging between arbitrary lines dividing knowledge and 
practice; policy and action; internalities and externalities. Expert-oriented institutions were incapable of 
mediating these differences, and, in fact, they played a central role in creating and representing the myths 
and conceptual blindfolds that prevented people from finding alternatives. 
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The experience in Carchi suggests that societies need to go beyond conceptions of risk 
and technology as social constructs and grasp instead how specific technologies influence 
futures and in what way associated risks are experienced, perceived, defined, mediated, 
legitimized, or ignored. Created for specific functions and without cognizance of the 
networked interconnectivity of life, Adam (1998) explains that technological products 
enter the living world as “foreign bodies.” Once inserted into the ecology of life, they 
begin to interact with their networked environments, and from that point onwards, 
scientists and engineers inescapably lose control over the effects of their creations. The 
research showed how innovative, disembedded technology with impacts that were 
temporally and spatially unbounded rendered traditional assumptions about planning and 
managing the future inappropriate. Science was incapable of predicting a priori the effects 
of modern technology on rural life in Carchi, and that capacity greatly decreased after 
those technologies were released into local culture and the environment. Effectively, 
technology had taken on a life of its own. In conclusion: The directions taken by the modern 
agriculture technology in Carchi were essentially unpredictable and their effects unknowable. 
 
In this thesis, I presented how a multitude of public stakeholders, including farmers, 
pesticide industry, local government, regulatory agencies, and purchasers, as well as the 
general public, played roles in diverse forms of managing risks – from suffering harmful 
consequences, organising around emerging opportunities generated by the consequences 
of technology, to shifting the investment of material and social resources. In practice, risk 
management demanded multi-actor social interaction and learning, demanding continual 
mediation. It also required advocacy, particularly on behalf of less favoured members of 
society, such as marginalized rural people, so that they could gain voice in mutually 
acceptable outcomes. In conclusion: The conceptualization and management of risk needed to 
progress from notions of calculation and prediction to mediation. 
 
According to Beck (2001: 275), “…dangers are being produced by the legal system, 
externalized by economies, individualized by the legal system, legitimized by the natural 
sciences and made to appear harmless by politics.” When people become aware of 
changing context, they act. In agriculture, the environment likewise “responds.” In Carchi, 
we observed that the “bads” of risk society led to backlash, in this case clearly both 
ecological and social. The result was a public questioning of its professionals, authorities, 
and institutions. Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994) describe the dis-embedding and re-
embedding of society as “reflexive modernisation,” a process that appeared to be 
underway in Carchi and leading to new social forms. In conclusion: Society that endlessly spins 
off technologically induced risks eventually undermines the legitimacy of its institutions, which catalyzes 
reorganizations. The effect in Carchi, however, appeared to go beyond a mere reorganization 
of society to a more fundamental socio-environmental breakdown and system decline. 
 
5. What lessons does Carchi hold for more sustainable agriculture? 
 
If disease is an expression of individual life under unfavourable circumstances, 
then epidemics must be indicative of mass disturbances. – Rudolf Virchow 
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Generally acknowledged as the father of modern pathology, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Rudolf Virchow authored more than one thousand books and papers 
on diverse aspects of cell pathology as well as the anthropology of medicine and its 
politics. He drew heavily on metaphor to describe disease not as an individual event but a 
holistic phenomenon. Studying what he called “typhus,” in 1847 Virchow quickly figured 
out the epidemiology of the disease. Nevertheless, he argued that the solution did not lie 
in managing the pathogen (a bacterium) or the vector (fleas), but rather addressing the 
underlying social causes: misgovernment and disparity. As such, his treatment plan 
became “full and unlimited democracy.” If Virchow were in Carchi today, he would argue 
for looking beyond the modern-day symptoms of agricultural decline – the “exhausted” 
soil, the pests, or even the low market prices – to the underlying social roots of the 
situation. 
 
The reflex 
 
Beck (2000) identified three correcting reflexes common to risk societies: 1) society 
becomes aware that it is a risk to itself, 2) there is an impulse towards cooperative 
international institutions, and 3) political boundaries erode, leading to constellations of 
sub-political forces. 
 
The people of Carchi increasingly became aware of a universal pathology – technology-
induced ecosystem decline – that diversely undermined its environment, economy, and 
social systems. The natural system had evolved to become less diverse and more 
vulnerable to change in ways that triggered unexpected and undesired chains of event. 
Commoditisation of rural life had distanced people from their communities and their 
environment, leading to unsustainable ways of living. Most recently, dollarisation led to 
increases in the prices of technologies, which in turn led to heightened production costs, 
labour cost-cutting and unemployment, and migration, creating scarcity of workers and 
feedback in the form of increased labour costs, and so on. At the same time, 
agroecosystems had become less “able” to buffer events, such as pest outbreaks or 
weather fluctuations. Meanwhile, local companies had grown dependent on product sales, 
and they increasingly sought to inform public policy in ways that would sustain those 
sales. As the public became aware of the contradictions and their predicament, it lost faith 
in government. 
 
The rules of responsibility – causality and guilt – broke down in Carchi. The routines of 
decision-making, regulation, and production generated ecosystem collapse as well as 
legitimized and sanctioned it. As Beck (2001: 271) explains, “… it is not rule-breaking but 
the rules themselves which ‘normalise’ the death of species, rivers, or lakes.” He described 
the self-destructive feature of modern societies as “organised irresponsibility.” The 
question follows: how do modern institutions deal with a self-generated ecosystem crisis? 
The answer from Chapter 7, on the dynamics of pesticide politics, was clear and 
resounding: they do not. Transformative change must come from outside the System. 
 
Beck (2001: 272) explains, “[In a risk society] the legal order no longer guarantees social 
peace, because it generalizes and legitimizes the threats to life.” While CropLife, SESA, 
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INIAP, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Public Health, the FAO, and the 
WHO argued over meanings of safe levels of exposure, the people of Carchi continued to 
systematically suffer serious degrees of neurological damage. Government officials and 
professionals could continue to obey the rules, but in the eyes of the public, authorities 
became “criminals” and “murderers.” 
 
Nevertheless, there was some movement at the level of government. Recently, the 
municipalities of Carchi had established new “healthy eating” programs and different 
forms of environmental protection units, supporting organic food markets, reforestation, 
and protection of watersheds. In addition, two municipalities in Carchi approved 
ordinances calling for the elimination of highly toxic pesticides. While INIAP’s field office 
continued to collaborate with CropLife, the institute’s National Potato Program began to 
promote “alternative technologies,” such as conservation tillage, native cultivars, and 
“clean” and “organic” production. The 2008 constitution included a promising “food 
sovereignty” law that, at the time of this writing, was undergoing vigorous debate, 
involving a number of actors from northern Ecuador and the agroecology movement. 
While Ecuador may have become increasingly aware that it was a risk to itself, it was 
unlikely that those institutions structurally tied to the past would lead society to a more 
sustainable future. The underlying organised irresponsibility – in particular, externally 
based knowledge and technology as well as the strategic distancing of markets – remained. 
 
While undermining the sale of highly toxics was tantamount to economic suicide for 
national corporations and, thereby, an unlikely political prospect from within Ecuador, it 
was possible for individuals at certain international organisations, such as the International 
Potato Center, World Bank, and FAO, to begin to question their sale and distribution. In 
December 2006, Shivaji Pandey, the FAO’s Director of Plant Production and Protection, 
in a bold move, called for the global elimination of highly toxic pesticides.1 In a public 
statement, he said, “There is no way to ensure the chemicals involved would be used 
within acceptable margins of risk in developing countries.” He added, “Use of the [highly 
toxic] pesticides has been prohibited or severely restricted in OECD countries and FAO 
would like to see them banned at the earliest date in developing countries, where farm 
workers often lack adequate personal protection.” A handful of developing countries, 
including China, Thailand and Viet Nam, had made plans for prohibiting the use of Class 
I pesticides. Mr. Pandey called upon other companies and governments to follow these 
examples and expedite the withdrawal of WHO Class I pesticides from their markets. 
Nevertheless, the FAO, at the organisational level, showed no movement in supporting a 
Pandey’s call for a global ban on the highly toxics. Despite courageous leadership from 
within, large organizations were slow to change. 
 
Meanwhile, a growing number of actors in Carchi emerged to challenge the existing order. 
These included charismatic individuals, such as farmer leaders and progressive 
professionals, as well as organizations, such as NGOs (EcoPar, Randi-Randi, Acción 
Ecológica), networks (the Carchi Consortium, MACRENA, the Pesticide Action 
Network), and less formally structured social movements (the Humanists). While the 
                                                       
1 FAO encourages early withdrawal of highly toxic pesticides: Assurances given by Danish company. FAO 
Newsroom. 20 December 2006. (viewed at: www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2006/1000471/index.html) 
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NGOs were more vulnerable to the whims of donors and thematic- and time-bound 
projects, local leaders, networks, and movements demonstrated greater flexibility in 
questioning the established order as well as in sustaining positions over longer periods of 
time. Lying outside the bounds of the nation-state or industry, these actors represented 
what Beck described as a “self-organization of politics” and often generated agenda that 
went against officialised government programmes. In fact, the identities of these actors – 
the sub-political – were often tied to their ability to publicly challenge government, 
regulatory agencies, research institutions, and international corporations. 
 
Sub-political actors often lay outside the protection of law, making them vulnerable to 
public sanctions. Industry representatives, government officials, and the media were quick 
to label sub-political actors “controversial” and “radical.” For example, during protests 
over the Free Trade Agreement, which included negotiations over agrochemical imports, 
the Ministry of Government decided to target NGOs as organizations that “manipulated 
the Indians,” thereby encouraging further strikes and protests. As matters intensified, the 
government threatened to revoke diplomatic visas of international staff and change the 
tax-free status of NGOs.2 In March 2006, several foreigners attending the protests were 
arrested and deported from the country. It became clear that the certain government 
agencies (as well as the US State Department) had grown intolerant of dissent to their 
policies. In 2008, the Correa administration continued to display an intolerance towards 
dissension, for example in response to the sharp criticisms it received over its rural 
development program based on the building of agrochemical plants, introduction of 
genetically modified crops, and the re-orientation of production around biofuels.3 
 
Beck (2001) finds that the global consequences of risk society – i.e., the systematic 
violation of basic rights – have led to a weakening of societies, making possible the 
emergence of not just local but also global sub-politics. In making public the concerns in 
Carchi, my colleagues and I made contact with networks of colleagues confronting similar 
circumstances elsewhere in Ecuador and the Andes as well as Central America, Africa, and 
Asia. Individuals who had a long history of addressing such concerns at the grassroots 
level were part of growing international networks and organizations. We quickly identified 
common agenda, exchanged information, and coordinated activity by e-mail and 
telephone. We wrote publications together and collaborated on efforts to reach the 
popular media. We strove to influence the policies of bilateral donors and international 
organizations and movements, such as CIP, FAO, and the World Bank as well as the 
regional agenda of the Humanist Movement in Europe and Latin America. While our 
strategies sometimes focused on countries, they also targeted farmers, consumers, and the 
media. Beyond being part of local sub-politics, we became part of what Beck (2001: 276) 
describes as “the new constellation of global sub-politics.” Marginalised and estranged by 
                                                       
2 In 2005, the network of international NGOs operating in Ecuador hired a team of lawyers to counter the 
government’s proposed revisions to established legal contracts with international agencies. Concerns were 
outlined in the document, “Legal regime for NGOs in Ecuador: analysis of the proposed legal agreement,” 
VGYLEX Abogados, 6 June 2006, 4 pp. 
3 The CEA, RAPAL-Ecuador, and the Agroecology Collective regularly voiced concerns over the Correa 
administration’s agriculture and environmental policies during the debates over the “Food Sovereignty” law. 
For an example, see: “AsíCea” Boletín Electrónico, Coordinadora Ecuadoriana de Agroecología. Noviembre, 
2008 (available at: www.ceaecuador.org) 
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country-level bureaucracy, the emergence of global sub-politics appeared to represent a 
growing liberalizing and emancipating force. 
 
The question of alternatives 
 
By this point, my colleagues in rural development would be impatiently shifting in their 
seats, waiting for the opportunity to ask: This criticism is well and good, but what is the 
alternative? By now, the answer should be clear: there is no single alternative for all places 
and situations. As Escobar (1995: 222) makes clear, “To think about alternatives in the 
manner of sustainable development, for instance, is to remain within the same model of 
thought that produced Development and kept it in place.” The solution is to not fall into 
the trap of providing abstract or macro-level answers. This does not mean that there is no 
role for expert knowledge and technology or researchers, development practitioners, and 
policy makers. The alternative emerges from understanding the role of the outsider in 
providing the non-alternative – i.e., to strategically not feed the development process with 
answers. The answer lies in questions. 
 
In this thesis, I have argued that agricultural development in Carchi worked against the 
viability of social and environmental ecologies, and in so doing, it undermined “life.” 
Based on the ideas of Westley et al. (2002) and Stepp et al. (2003), Box 8.1 summarises 
examples that challenge common assumptions on humans as “ecological animals.” It must 
be acknowledged that humans may embody unique social and cultural qualities that 
ultimately undermine their ability to live sustainably. Our nature, if indeed a nature exists, 
may include self-destruction. If we were to co-exist among ourselves and with the 
environment, however, how must we learn to organize? 
 
Despite curative claims, today’s institutions are structurally tied to the same logic and 
value systems that induce and sustain the problematic qualities of modernity – i.e., 
organised irresponsibility. In fact, rather than look to experts for a way out of the modern 
predicament of ecosystem decline, a growing body of literature has come to acknowledge 
the place of experts and their institutions at the centre of the global crisis (for example, 
Röling, 2002). Holling (2000) highlights a number of problems underling expert logic: 
 
• Preoccupation with the norm – a focus on central tendencies rather than 
probability distributions and extreme events 
• Existence of isolation – belief that different sectors do not interact or, if they do, 
those interactions are not important for affecting change 
• Power of rationality – expectation that change will be incremental and linear 
• Human as supernatural – an objective of some optimal state of the system, 
usually human conceived and managed, that will deliver sustainable development  
 
As a result of such misconceptions, in its attempt to address the ecosystem crisis, expert-
based science and development inevitably contribute to socio-environmental decline. The 
first task for more sustainable futures becomes reorganization around logic more 
consistent with the requirements of sustainability. 
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Box 8.1 Evidence from Carchi that humans may not be ecological creatures (based on 
Westley et al., 2002 and Stepp et al., 2003) 
 
• Belief systems – Religious beliefs, for example, can influence what people think and do, 
despite the feedback that individuals may receive from the biological world. In Carchi, 
farmers applied pesticides to their potatoes based on deep-seated beliefs in the calendar or 
lunar cycle, regardless of weather conditions or visual feedback from fields. 
• Externalised human cognition – Humans perceive and provide meaning to objects and 
actions based on interpretive experience with the outside world. Farmers refused to plant 
on a particular date because of a negative past experience, despite seemingly favourable 
environmental conditions for plant growth. 
• Techno-substitution – Increasingly, people impose techno-structure on bio-structure. 
Since land reform, Ecuadorian society has promoted market-oriented agricultural 
intensification, which can produce ecological disruptions and place a thermodynamic 
strain on the ecosystem (Pimentel el al., 1992).  
• Historical and political determinism – Social and political histories can determine human 
ecosystems. The institutional consolidation of the pesticide industry came to influence 
modern government in ways that prioritised short-term food production interests over 
longer-term human health and environmental interests. 
• Lock-in – Once embedded in a culture or belief system, a technology can be reproduced 
and proliferate even beyond its immediate usefulness. The highly toxic pesticides 
carbofuran and methamidophos became part of farming culture in Carchi. Ability to 
withstand neurotoxins defined aspects of masculinity, a clear example of self-destructive 
behaviour from a human health perspective. The popularity of these products financed a 
powerful network of actors that organised to proliferate their use, even after the harmful 
effects of these products became explicit and alternatives became known or knowable. 
• Belief in the supernatural – A powerful belief system is built on the aspiration to 
transcend the natural world through supernatural experiences. A network of actors in 
Carchi organised around modern technologies with the expectation of controlling nature – 
plants, pathogens, insect populations, etc.  
• Destruction of wealth – Throughout history, cultures have systematically removed or 
destroyed stores of wealth – material, energy, or information. Researchers as well as 
farmers purposefully withhold information, and sometimes they engage in useless or 
harmful activities, such as questionable Safe Use of Pesticide initiatives, despite knowledge 
that such behaviour would continue to undermine production and the well-being of 
people. Villages organise to destroy forests, water and soil resources. 
• Intra-specific aggression – Intra-specific violence and kill-off actually may be a latent 
cultural survival mechanism. Human aggression, such as that displayed at multiple points 
by the hacienda elite, researchers, government officials and farmers in Carchi consolidated 
group identity and favoured certain groups over others. 
• Material fetishism – Objects can obtain symbolic value well beyond their intrinsic value, 
and material exchange can hinder or obscure social relationships. In Carchi, farmers spoke 
of pesticides “saving lives” and “providing security,” thereby assigning the chemicals 
religious-like qualities. Mera-Orcés (2000) and Paredes (2001) identified how pesticides 
played a role in determining degrees of manhood. 
   Learning from Carchi 244 
The literature draws on a wealth of metaphors to explain the pathologies associated with 
modernity. For example, health professionals describe an “affliction of inequality” 
(Wilkinson 2001), ecologists an “environmental cognitive dissonance” (Gunderson et al., 
1995), and social scientists a “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1987) and a 
“virtualization of farmers” (van der Ploeg, 2003). These diverse perspectives share at least 
one commonality: sustainability depends on a seeming paradox of persistence and change. 
At one level, it requires constant “coupling” or “embeddedness” in localities, and, at 
another level, it demands responsiveness to endless socio-environmental dynamics. 
 
Gunderson and Holling’s (2002) research on socio-biological development finds that the 
tension between persistence and change is maintained by relationships among nested sets 
of adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring and renewal arranged in a 
dynamic hierarchy or “panarchy.” They argue that modern activity has caused the self-
organizing mechanisms of the system to work against human interests. For example, 
attempts that to hold a system in some perceived optimal state (i.e., command-and-control 
management) reduces both resilience and adaptability. In contrast, sustainability in a 
panarchic world of endless adaptive cycles depends on institutions containing high 
degrees of local “conservation” (i.e., coupling) and global “creativity” (dynamic 
innovation). As described in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, such redirection in research or 
development practice would face serious social obstacles, but that does not deny the 
substance of the argument for a redirection. 
 
Gunderson and Holling (2002) emphasize that socio-environmental change is highly 
unpredictable and occurring at “moments of vulnerability.” They describe three types of 
change in adaptive cycles: resilience, adaptability, and transformability. Resilience is the 
capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganise while undergoing change so as 
to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks. Adaptability 
is the capacity of actors in the system to “manage” resilience for maintaining stability (i.e., 
move thresholds or make it easier or harder to change the system) or guide trajectories 
towards a desired range of outcomes. Transformability is the capacity to reorganize 
towards a fundamentally different system when ecological, social or economic conditions 
make the existing system untenable. Their general proposal for sustainable development is 
the organization of societies around resilience, adaptability, and transformability. In the 
case of Carchi, where a high degree of self-destructive human organisation was obtained, 
transformability would be the priority. 
 
Holling (2000) argues that “resilience management” depends on sustaining a stability 
landscape (i.e., increasing the resilience of desirable outcomes and decreasing it for 
undesirable ones) and guiding a system’s trajectory (i.e., keeping the system within a 
desirable range of behaviour). “Resilience governance” depends on increasing and 
sustaining adaptability as well as understanding and guiding social embedding in "rules.” 
In practice, this re-direction would demand new professionalism and institutions 
organised around socio-environmental accountability, in turn requiring new degrees of 
cross-disciplinary learning and action as well as localised coupling and self-correcting 
mechanisms. In particular, Holling argues that effective change will require: 
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• Identification and reduction of destructive constraints on change, such as 
perverse laws and regulations that entrench self-destructive organisation  
• Protection and preservation of the accumulated knowledge and experience on 
which change will be based 
• Stimulation of locally-led innovation 
• Encouragement of new foundations for renewal that build and sustain the 
capacity of people, economies, and nature for dealing with change 
• Encouragement of new institutional foundations for consolidating and expanding 
new directions of change 
 
Due to the historical moment in Carchi, I find that the back “learning and innovation” 
loop (see Figure 4.15) merits special attention. More sustainable rural development not 
only depends on achieving institutions with higher degrees of adaptive capacity and 
resilience. Regulatory mechanisms are sorely needed for continually coupling agricultural 
developments to local cultures and the environment. In order to move beyond the 
growing and deepening ecosystem decline in Carchi, the present policies for producing 
accumulated uncertainties must become reversible. 
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Summary 
 
 
Provided its natural endowments, generally educated rural population, infrastructure and 
market access to two countries, the Province of Carchi, located in the northernmost 
highlands of Ecuador, is potentially one of the most productive agriculture regions in the 
Andes. In the 1960s development experts and the government targeted the region as a 
model for agricultural modernisation. Following land reform and rapid organisation 
around industrial era technologies, potato farming in Carchi boomed during the 1970s, 
evolving to dominate the landscape and become the major source of livelihoods in the 
province. By the early 1980s, Carchi came to produce nearly half the national potato 
harvest on less than a quarter of the country’s area dedicated to the crop. In the 
early1990s, however, production and productivity began to fall off, leading a growing 
number of rural families in Carchi to fall into debt and abandon potato farming. 
 
The research reported here is the outcome of the author’s ten years of research and 
development practice in Carchi with the International Potato Center, the FAO’s Global 
IPM Facility, and World Neighbors. It reflects unfolding experience with different phases 
of hope, discovery, and ambition. Many aspects of the experience have been published 
elsewhere (see Appendix A). The resulting dissertation is not a case study in the sense of a 
case that tests a hypothesis. It is a monograph that attempts to produce a single coherent 
story over seemingly unrelated events, focusing on a second-generation problem: despite a 
decade of highly rigorous, scientific research on the pathologies of Carchi and multiple 
public demonstrations of feasible alternatives, little significant change was achieved. 
 
The dissertation begins with a description of today’s landscape and agriculture followed by 
an analysis of the pathology associated with modern potato production, in terms of 
human and environmental health, with major conclusions about longer-term economic 
feasibility and ecological sustainability. Twenty-five years following the onset of 
agricultural modernization, a multidisciplinary team of researchers found that the use of 
industrial era technologies had generated worrisome environmental, productivity and 
human health consequences. Tractors and total tillage became the leading cause of soil 
erosion, moving some 80 tons per hectare each season. Farmers spent progressively more 
on agrochemical inputs and received less for their commodities, leading them to lose 
money on well over half of their crops. Two-thirds of the rural population – including 
men, women and children – suffered measurable neurological damage due to exposure to 
highly toxic pesticides. Economic studies identified a relationship between pesticide 
exposure and low productivity. It had become increasingly difficult to grow a crop and to 
financially survive as a farmer. The research concluded with the identification of 
promising “impact points” for the development of scientifically supported and replicable 
best practice. 
 
Before presenting the experience with the proposed interventions, the dissertation takes a 
step back in time to provide historical perspective on the emergence of the pathology in a 
high-potential agricultural area such as Carchi. Traditional Carchense agriculture evolved to 
exploit niches distributed across ecological floors, a practice described as “micro-
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verticality,” which permitted slow but relatively stable development in the highland Andes. 
Since that time, increasingly distant and exogenous influences had come to drive rural 
developments. The brief arrival to Carchi of the Incas followed by the Spanish Conquest 
and the feudal hacienda system increasingly externalised the environmental and social 
products of agriculture. By the decline of the hacienda system in the mid-twentieth 
century, traditional Andean community structure essentially had undergone 
transformation and the system of vertical farming was replaced by extensive, horizontally 
distributed agriculture, which in mountain environments proved vulnerable to the 
elements as well as pest and disease epidemics.  
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, processes of agrarian reform ended the 
hacienda era in Carchi and provided smallholder farmers title to land and high 
expectations for the future. Generally, fertile valley floors continued in the hands of 
hacendados, though their landholdings were considerably smaller than before. Meanwhile, 
new classes of farmers became relegated to steep, though highly arable hillsides. 
Aggressive market integration and “technification” led to potato intensification through 
mechanized tillage, the introduction and increased use of agrichemicals, and a shortening 
of fallow periods. Over time, market forces reduced on-farm potato biodiversity. By the 
early 1990s, a very fragile, total tillage, external input intensive monoculture of a single, 
dominant variety, Superchola, dominated the landscape. These changes severely impacted 
the environment. Due to a compensating and then aggravating intervention of 
agrochemicals, they spurred ecosystem decline in the form of soil degradation, production 
declines, and a public health epidemic.  
 
Research showed that from a biophysical point of view, industrial era technology enabled 
farmers to structurally break with nature, leading to subsequent environmental backlash. 
From a sociocultural perspective, people and their communities became increasingly 
fragmented. Individuals become detached from their psychosocial context, and 
collectively, people emphasized the value on the market and de-emphasized the value of 
neighbours, neighbourhood, and community. These two phenomena combined to 
produce increasing environmental and social uncertainties. By 2000, many families had 
experienced frustration with modernisation and the institutions championing it, with one 
farmer declaring, "We have done everything the ingenieros have told us to do, and look 
where we are...We are going broke." In recent times, a growing number of families 
decided to abandon agriculture and migrate to urban centres in search of work. 
Additionally, many youth joined the revolutionary groups across the nearby border with 
Colombia. 
 
The dissertation continues with an ex-post examination of the implementation of the 
prescribed best practice aimed at addressing the pathology in Carchi, in particular through 
the EcoSalud project involving cross-disciplinary research-development practice as well as 
the introduction of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) through Farmer Field Schools 
(FFS) and policy interventions. Under the demands of project implementation, 
professionals from both research and development camps involved were forced to 
interact and negotiate interests. While this interaction sometimes led to unsatisfactory 
results for some, it also contributed to new skills and understanding of previously 
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disparate perspectives. The different professional cultures of staff members (e.g. 
agricultural extension, participatory research, feminist social change, and health services) 
were built on different sets of assumptions, methods of resolving differences, planning 
and perceived roles in interacting with project participants. The mediation of such 
conflicts often carried high transaction costs. 
 
Reflective analysis over the Farmer Field Schools provided insight into the potentials and 
limitations of methodology-based interventions. FFS initially provoked new thinking and 
creative practice at the farm level and demonstrated great potential for improving practice. 
Over time, however, the methodology faced limitations at leveraging broader institutional 
change. Following release into the “social wild,” practitioners systematically cut corners, 
pulling FFS towards more expert-centred designs. This tendency became a dominant 
pattern in Carchi (and elsewhere) and thus was no mere oversight or accident, but rather 
the outcome of a cultural knowledge battle. The research found the methodology 
incompatible with dominant research and development paradigms that informed 
institutional designs, in particular over competing modes of knowledge production. 
Ultimately the conflicting perspectives of actors and institutions led them to systematically 
erode Field Schools to the point where much of the methodology’s epistemological 
identity was lost. In the end, FFS scaled up in name, but not in meaning, and thereby the 
methodology lost much of its initial effectiveness. 
 
The empirical experience with research-development interventions showed that the major 
obstacles to change in Carchi were not due to a lack of information, knowledge, 
technology or market alternatives, as farmers, experts, and policy makers commonly 
claimed. Fundamental conflicts of paradigms and process circumscribed institutional 
capabilities to resolve complex ecosystem health concerns. In particular, externally based 
proposals undermined mechanisms of social and environmental coupling. Moving 
towards greater accountability among science and development actors toward their 
localities of influence required new ways of thinking, organizing, and doing. 
 
Critical analysis of EcoSalud and FFS exposed contradictions between the discourse and 
practice of the existing order of science and development in Carchi, at the levels of 
farming, science and government. A cultural power matrix surrounded the use of 
pesticides that informed public opinion and policy and ultimately enabled a continuation 
of self-destructive agriculture. It operated to entrench present regimes of thought and 
practice, even knowingly at the cost of the health of the majority of rural people. Socio-
technical trajectory depended on the success of scientists and técnicos as entrepreneurs – 
indiscriminately mixing economic, political, natural, and cultural claims to truth. In 
addition to “black boxing” or myth creation, continual enrolment of new converts was a 
central activity. Success depended on strategic capacity of networks to continually grow 
and shape perspective.  
 
The findings led to the major conclusion that best practice and public knowledge of the 
same are not enough to foment social change, be it at the level of farmers, extensionists 
and facilitators, commercial companies, public agencies or politicians, such as ministers of 
agriculture. In fact, at all levels, major stakeholders seemed to be locked into a non-
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adaptive, lethal, and eventually self-destructive system of food production. Over time, 
Carchi had become a theatre of risk, as described by Beck (1992) and Beck et al. (1994). 
The dangers of agriculture technologies became so far-reaching and generalised that it was 
no longer possible to place the blame on an individual, such as a farmer or pesticide 
salesperson. The guilty party had become “The System.” At first, the abstractions of 
pesticide poisonings and environmental degradation made their effects “invisible” and 
difficult to track and perceive. Nevertheless, once research made explicit those effects (for 
example, through quantitative measurement of neurological damages and soil losses), a 
powerful class of brokers that had grown around agriculture technologies kept them 
invisible. These actors – chemists, agriculture researchers, extension agents, salespeople, 
and regulatory officials – manoeuvred, strategised, collaborated and colluded to influence 
public opinion and sustain harmful technology. 
 
Integrated analysis of the experience identified a number of conclusions over the 
institutional features of modern agriculture in Carchi, including:  
 
1) The risks associated with pesticides were essentially invisible and subject to 
interpretation. As a result, it was not rationality but the successful 
entrepreneurship of actors that informed public perception and determined policy 
outcomes.  
2) The risks associated with the practice of modern agriculture crossed disciplinary 
boundaries and demanded bridging between arbitrary lines dividing knowledge 
and practice, policy and action, internalities and externalities. Expert-oriented 
institutions were incapable of mediating these differences, and in fact, they played 
a central role in creating and representing the myths and conceptual blindfolds 
that prevented people from seeing alternatives.  
3) The “bads” (i.e., harmful outcomes) of industrial-era agriculture led to backlash, 
in this case clearly both ecological and social. The effect appeared to go beyond a 
mere reorganization of Carchense society to a more fundamental breakdown and 
system decline.  
4) Ultimately, modernisation in Carchi psychologically and socially distanced people 
from their locality, leading to diverse forms of fragmentation with local 
experience and a sense of alienation from family, community, and broader 
society. As a result, it appeared that people had lost the ability to regulate change 
or collectively respond to the accelerating events of modern times, leading to 
different forms of violence. 
 
Based on these outcomes, the research concluded that today’s institutions are structurally 
tied to the same logic and value systems that induce and sustain the problematic qualities 
of modernity. As a result, in their attempt to address ecosystem crisis, science and 
development inevitably contribute to its deepening. Such tendencies produce 
contradictions that undermine the legitimacy of institutions. Nevertheless, due to the 
effectiveness of the socio-technical regime as a social networker and powerbroker, self-
destructive policy became entrenched. From the experience in Carchi, it appears unlikely 
that profound change could emerge from within present frameworks. 
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According to the “adaptive management” and “resilience” literature, as summarised in 
Gunderson and Holling (2002), sustainability depends on a seeming paradox of 
persistence and change. At one level, it requires constant “coupling” or “embeddedness” 
in localities, and at another level it demands responsiveness to endless socio-
environmental dynamics. Sustainability in a “panarchic” world of endless adaptive cycles 
depends on institutions containing high degrees of local “conservation” (i.e., coupling) 
and global “creativity” (dynamic innovation). The experience in Carchi showed that such 
movement in research or development practice would face strong resistance, but that does 
not deny the substance of the argument for redirection. According to this perspective, a 
general proposal of sustainable development becomes the organization of societies around 
resilience, adaptability, and transformability. Resilience is the capacity of a system to 
absorb disturbance and reorganise while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially 
the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks. Adaptability is the capacity of actors 
in the system to manage resilience for maintaining stability or guide trajectories towards a 
desired range of outcomes. Transformability is the capacity to reorganize towards a 
fundamentally different system when ecological, social or economic conditions make the 
existing system untenable. In the case of Carchi, where a high degree of self-destructive 
human organisation had been obtained, institutional transformation had become the 
priority for more promising futures. 
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Resumen 
 
 
Dados sus recursos naturales, una población rural mayormente educada, infraestructura y 
acceso al mercado en dos países, la provincia del Carchi, localizada en la Sierra Norte del 
Ecuador, es potencialmente una de las regiones agrícolas más productivas en los Andes. 
En los años 60 los expertos en desarrollo y el gobierno ecuatoriano enfocaron en la región 
como un modelo de modernización agrícola. Luego de la reforma agraria y una rápida 
organización alrededor de las tecnologías de la era industrial, la producción de papas en 
Carchi floreció durante los años 70, desarrollándose hasta dominar el paisaje y 
transformarse en la principal fuente de ingresos en la provincia. Al inicio de los años 80, 
Carchi llegó a producir cerca de la mitad de la cosecha nacional de papas en menos de la 
cuarta parte del área nacional dedicada a este cultivo. Al inicio de los 90, sin embargo, la 
producción y la productividad comenzaron a caer, llevando a un número creciente de 
familias rurales en Carchi a endeudarse y a abandonar el cultivo de papa. 
 
La presente investigación es el resultado de diez años de investigación e intervención del 
autor junto con el Centro Internacional de la Papa, la Facilidad Global de MIP de la FAO 
y Vecinos Mundiales en Carchi. Esta refleja la experiencia desplegada con diferentes fases 
de esperanza, descubrimiento y expectativa. Muchos aspectos de la experiencia han sido 
publicados en otras partes (ver el Apendice A). La disertación resultante no es un caso de 
estudio en el sentido de que busca probar una hipótesis. Es mas bien una monografía que 
trata de producir una historia coherente sobre eventos aparentemente no relacionados 
entre sí, enfocando en un problema de segunda generación: a pesar de una década de 
investigación científica altamente rigurosa sobre la patología del Carchi y la demostración 
pública de alternativas factibles, se han logrado poquísimos cambios significativos.  
 
Esta disertación comienza con una descripción del paisaje actual y de la agricultura, 
seguida por un análisis de la patología asociada con la producción moderna, en términos 
de la salud humana y ambiental, con conclusiones importantes sobre la factibilidad 
económica y sostenibilidad ecológica de largo plazo. Veinte y cinco años luego de la 
llegada de la modernización agrícola, un equipo multidisciplinario de investigadores 
encontraron que el empleo de las tecnologías de la era industrial había generado 
consecuencias ambientales, de productividad y salud humana preocupantes. Los tractores 
y la labranza total se convirtieron en la causa principal de erosión del suelo, removiendo 
unas 80 toneladas de suelo por hectárea en cada ciclo de producción. Los agricultores 
gastaban progresivamente más en insumos agroquímicos y recibían menos por sus 
productos, conduciéndoles a perder dinero en una buena mitad de sus cultivos. Dos 
tercios de la población rural – incluyendo, hombres, mujeres y niños- sufrían daños 
neurológicos medibles debido a la exposición a plaguicidas altamente tóxicos. Estudios 
económicos identificaron una relación entre exposición a plaguicidas y baja productividad. 
Se había hecho crecientemente difícil producir un cultivo y sobrevivir como agricultor. La 
investigación concluye con la identificación de “puntos de impacto” prometedores para el 
desarrollo de “mejores prácticas” replicables y apoyadas científicamente. 
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Antes de presentar la experiencia con las intervenciones propuestas, la disertación da un 
paso atrás en el tiempo para proveer una perspectiva histórica sobre la emergencia de la 
patología en un área con alto potencial agrícola como es Carchi. La agricultura tradicional 
carchense se desarrolló para explotar nichos distribuidos a través de pisos ecológicos, una 
práctica descrita como “micro-verticalidad,” la cual permitió el desarrollo lento pero 
estable en los altos Andes. Desde ese tiempo, crecientes influencias distantes y externas 
han llegado a dirigir el desarrollo agrícola. El breve arribo de los Incas a Carchi seguido 
por la conquista española y el sistema feudal de hacienda externalizaron crecientemente 
los resultados ambientales y sociales de la agricultura. Al declinar del sistema de hacienda a 
mediados del siglo 20, la estructura tradicional de la comunidad Andina sufrió 
transformaciones esenciales y el sistema de agricultura vertical fue reemplazado por una 
agricultura extensiva distribuida horizontalmente, la cual, en ambientes montañosos ha 
probado ser vulnerable tanto a los elementos como a las epidemias de plagas y 
enfermedades. 
 
En la segunda mitad del siglo 20 los procesos de reforma agraria dieron fin a la era de la 
hacienda en Carchi y proveyeron a los pequeños agricultores de títulos de propiedad y 
altas expectativas para el futuro. Generalmente, los suelos fértiles de los valles continuaron 
en manos de hacendados, aunque sus propiedades quedaron considerablemente mas 
pequeñas que antes. Mientras tanto la nueva clase de agricultores fue relegada a laderas 
pendientes aunque también altamente arables. La integración agresiva a los mercados y la 
“tecnificación” dirigió la intensificación de la producción de papa a través de la labranza 
total, la introducción y el creciente uso de agroquímicos y un acortamiento de períodos de 
descanso. Con el tiempo, las fuerzas del mercado redujeron la biodiversidad de papas en 
las fincas. A inicios de los años 90, un muy frágil monocultivo de uso intensivo de 
insumos externos, de labranza total y uso de una sola variedad principal, Superchola, 
dominó el paisaje. Estos cambios impactaron severamente al ambiente y, debido a la 
intervención agravante y compensatoria de los agroquímicos, fomentaron el declinar del 
ecosistema en forma de degradación de suelo, caídas de producción y una epidemia de 
salud pública. 
 
La investigación demuestra que desde un punto de vista biofísico, la era tecnológica 
industrial permitió a los agricultores romper estructuralmente con la naturaleza, 
provocando así una fuerte respuesta ambiental. Desde una perspectiva socio-cultural, la 
gente y sus comunidades se fragmentaron crecientemente tanto a nivel de individuos sico-
socialmente (un sentido de desconexión del contexto) y colectivamente (una tendencia 
hacia valorar el mercado por sobre los vecinos, el barrio y la comunidad). Estos dos 
fenómenos combinados para producir el declinar socio-biológico se caracterizó por una 
creciente incertidumbre ambiental y social. En el año 2000, muchas familias 
experimentaron frustración con la modernización y las instituciones que la promovían 
como lo explicó un agricultor, “Hemos hecho todo lo que los ingenieros nos dijeron y 
miren donde estamos… Estamos yendo a la quiebra.” En tiempos recientes un número 
creciente de familias decidieron abandonar la agricultura y migrar a centros urbanos en 
búsqueda de trabajo. Adicionalmente, muchos jóvenes se integraron a grupos 
revolucionarios a lo largo de la frontera cercana con Colombia.  
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La disertación continúa con un examen ex post de la implementación de las mejores 
prácticas prescritas orientadas al tratamiento de la patología en Carchi, en particular a 
través del proyecto EcoSalud que involucró investigación-desarrollo transdisciplinario así 
como la introducción del Manejo Integrado de Plagas (MIP) a través de las Escuelas de 
Campo de Agricultores (ECAs) e intervención en políticas. Bajo las demandas de 
implementación del proyecto, profesionales involucrados tanto en el campo de 
investigación como de desarrollo se vieron obligados a interactuar y negociar intereses. 
Mientras la interacción algunas veces condujo a resultados insatisfactorios para algunos, 
esta también contribuyó a nuevas habilidades y entendimiento de perspectivas antes 
distantes. Las diferentes culturas profesionales de los miembros del equipo (por ejemplo 
de extensión agrícola, investigación participativa, cambio social feminista y servicios de 
salud) se construían en diferentes supuestos, métodos de resolución de diferencias, 
planificación y roles percibidos en la interacción con los participantes del proyecto. La 
mediación de tales conflictos a menudo significó altos costos de transacción. 
 
El análisis reflexivo de las Escuelas de Campo de Agricultores permitió la comprensión de 
los potenciales y limitaciones de las intervenciones basadas en metodologías. Las ECA 
inicialmente provocaron nuevas ideas y practicas creativas a nivel de finca y demostraron 
gran potencial para mejorar la práctica. En el tiempo, sin embargo, la metodología 
enfrentó limitaciones para promover cambios institucionales más amplios. Luego de 
liberadas en el mundo social, los practicantes sistemáticamente “cortaron esquinas,” 
llevando las ECA hacia diseños más centrados en los expertos. Esta tendencia se volvió el 
patrón dominante en Carchi (y otros lugares) y no fue descuido o accidente, pero el 
resultado de una batalla cultural de conocimientos. La investigación encontró a la 
metodología incompatible con los paradigmas dominantes de investigación y desarrollo 
que informaban los diseños institucionales, en particular sobre los modos de producción 
de conocimientos en competencia. Finalmente las perspectivas conflictivas de los actores y 
las instituciones condujo a erosionar sistemáticamente las escuelas de campo al punto de 
que mucho de la identidad epistemológica de la metodología se perdió. Al final las ECA se 
difundieron por su nombre pero no por su significado y la metodología perdió mucho de 
su eficiencia inicial. 
 
La experiencia empírica con intervenciones de investigación-desarrollo demostraron que 
los mayores obstáculos al cambio en Carchi no fueron debido a “faltas” de información, 
conocimiento, tecnología o alternativas de mercado, como agricultores, expertos y 
formadores de políticas comúnmente afirmaban. Los conflictos fundamentales de 
paradigmas y procesos circunscribieron las capacidades institucionales para resolver 
problemas complejos de salud del ecosistema. En particular, las propuestas externas 
socavaron los mecanismos de acoplamiento social y ambiental (i.e., prácticas agrícolas mas 
comunitarias y ecológicas). Moverse hacia una mayor “responsabilidad” de la ciencia y el 
desarrollo con lo local requería de nuevas formas de pensamiento, organización y práctica.  
 
El análisis crítico de EcoSalud y de las ECA expuso las contradicciones entre el discurso y 
la práctica en el orden existente de la ciencia y el desarrollo en Carchi, al nivel de la 
producción, la ciencia y el gobierno. Una matriz cultural de poder rodeó el uso de 
plaguicidas e informó la opinión pública y las políticas y finalmente permitió la 
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continuación de la agricultura auto-destructiva. Ello operó estancando los regímenes 
existentes de pensamiento y practica, aun conociendo el costo que representaba para la 
salud de la mayoría de la gente rural. La trayectoria socio-técnica dependió del éxito de los 
científicos y técnicos como empresarios – mezclando indiscriminadamente pretensiones 
de verdad económica, política, natural y cultural. En adición a la creación de “cajas negras” 
o mitos, el enrole continuo fue una actividad central. El éxito dependió de la capacidad 
estratégica de las redes para crecer continuamente e informar las perspectivas. 
 
Los resultados de la investigación llevan a la conclusión principal de que la mejor práctica 
y la demostración pública de lo mismo no son suficientes para fomentar el cambio social, 
sea a nivel de los agricultores, extensionistas, facilitadotes, compañías comerciales, 
agencias públicas o políticas, tales como el ministerio de agricultura. En realidad, a todos 
los niveles, los principales interesados parecen estar acoplados a un sistema de producción 
no-adaptativo, letal y eventualmente auto-destructivo (i.e., del punto de vista financiero, de 
salud humana y fertilidad del suelo). En el tiempo, Carchi se ha vuelto un teatro de riesgo, 
tal como lo describen Beck (1992) y Beck et al. (1994). Los peligros de las tecnologías 
agrícolas se han vuelto generalizados y difíciles de sobrellevar que no es posible echar la 
culpa a un solo individuo agricultor o vendedor de plaguicidas. El culpable se ha vuelto el 
“Sistema.” Al inicio, la abstracción sobre las intoxicaciones por plaguicidas y la 
degradación ambiental tenían efectos “invisibles” y difíciles de tratar y percibir. Sin 
embargo, una vez que la investigación hizo explícitos esos efectos, por ejemplo a través de 
medidas cuantitativas de los daños neurológicos y pérdidas de suelo, una clase poderosa de 
agentes que ha crecido alrededor de las tecnologías agrícolas los siguieron manteniendo 
“invisibles.” Estos actores –químicos, investigadores agrícolas, agentes de extensión, 
vendedores y oficiales de agencias reguladoras- maniobraron, armaron estrategias, 
colaboraron y confabularon para influenciar la opinión pública y mantener las tecnologías 
dañinas.  
 
El análisis integrado de la experiencia identificó conclusiones sobre las características 
institucionales de la agricultura moderna en Carchi las cuales incluyen: 
 
1) Los riesgos asociados con plaguicidas fueron esencialmente invisibles y sujetos a 
interpretación. Como resultado, no fue la racionalidad científica pero la capacidad 
empresarial exitosa de los actores lo que informó la percepción pública y 
determinó los resultados en políticas. 
2) Los riesgos asociados con la práctica de la agricultura moderna cruzaron las 
fronteras disciplinarias y demandaron vínculos entre líneas arbitrarias dividiendo 
conocimiento y práctica, políticas y acción, internalidades y externalidades. 
Instituciones centradas en los expertos fueron incapaces de mediar estas 
diferencias, y en realidad, ellos jugaron un rol central en la creación y la 
representación de los mitos y las vendas conceptuales que evitaron que la gente 
vea las alternativas. 
3) Los “males” de la era industrial agrícola condujeron a una respuesta fuerte, en 
este caso claramente ecológica y social. El efecto parece ir mas allá de una mera 
reorganización de la sociedad carchense pero hacia un quiebre mas fundamental y 
un declinar del Sistema. 
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4) Finalmente, la modernización en Carchi distanció a la gente sicológica y 
socialmente de su localidad, conduciendo a diversas formas de fragmentación con 
la experiencia local y un sentido de alienación de la familia, la comunidad y la 
sociedad. Como resultado, parece que la gente perdió la habilidad de regular el 
cambio o responder colectivamente a los eventos acelerados de los tiempos 
modernos, llevándola a diferentes expresiones de violencia. 
 
Basados en estos resultados, la investigación concluyó que las instituciones presentes 
estaban estructuralmente vinculadas a la misma lógica y sistemas de valor que inducen y 
sostienen las cualidades problemáticas de la modernidad. Como resultado, en su intento 
de dirigir la crisis del ecosistema, la ciencia y el desarrollo inevitablemente contribuyen a su 
profundización. Tales tendencias producen contradicciones que socavan la legitimidad de 
las instituciones. Sin embargo, debido a la efectividad del régimen socio-técnico como un 
armador de redes y agente de poder, la política auto-destructiva se mantiene. De la 
experiencia de Carchi, parece poco probable que el cambio profundo podría surgir desde 
el interior de los presentes escenarios. 
 
De acuerdo a la literatura de “manejo adaptativo” y “acoplamiento,” como se resume en 
Gunderson y Holling (2002), la sostenibilidad depende de una aparente paradoja de 
persistencia y cambio. A un nivel, requiere de constante “acoplamiento” o “inmersión” en 
la localidad, y a otro nivel demanda “responsabilidad” con la interminable dinámica socio-
ambiental. La sostenibilidad en un mundo “panárquico” de ciclos adaptativos 
interminables depende de instituciones que contengan altos grados de “conservación” 
local (i.e., el acoplamiento ecológico de algunos agricultores con la localidad) y 
“creatividad” global (innovación dinámica coherente con los potenciales ecológicos y 
sociales de la localidad). La experiencia en Carchi demostró que tal movimiento en 
investigación o en la práctica del desarrollo enfrentaría una fuerte resistencia, pero eso no 
niega la necesidad de una redirección. De acuerdo a esta perspectiva, una propuesta 
general de desarrollo sostenible se transforma en la organización de sociedades alrededor 
del acoplamiento, adaptabilidad y transformabilidad. Acoplamiento es la capacidad de un 
sistema de absorber perturbaciones y reorganizarse mientras enfrenta cambios, de manera 
que aún retenga esencialmente la misma función, estructura, identidad y retroalimentación. 
Adaptabilidad es la capacidad de los actores en el sistema para “manejar” el acoplamiento 
y mantener estabilidad (i.e., mover umbrales o hacer mas fácil o difícil cambiar el sistema) 
o guiar trayectorias hacia un rango deseado de respuestas. Transformabilidad es la 
capacidad de reorganización hacia un sistema fundamentalmente diferente cuando las 
condiciones ecológicas, sociales o económicas hacen del sistema existente insostenible. En 
el caso de Carchi, donde el resultado ha sido un alto grado de auto-destrucción de la 
organización social, la reorganización institucional alrededor de la transformabilidad se ha 
vuelto una prioridad para futuros más prometedores. 
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Samenvatt ing 
 
 
De provincie Carchi ligt in de meest noordelijke hooglanden van Ecuador. Het is 
potentieel een van de meest productieve regio’s in de Andes dankzij de vele natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen, de in het algemeen goed opgeleide bevolking, de aanwezige infrastructuur 
en toegang tot markten. In de jaren zestig gingen ontwikkelingsdeskundigen en de 
regering deze regio gebruiken als model voor landbouwmodernisering. Na 
landhervormingen en een snelle invoering van technologie uit het industriële tijdperk, 
groeide, in de jaren zeventig, de aardappelproductie in Carchi snel. De aardappelteelt werd 
een dominant element in het landschap en een van de belangrijkste inkomstenbronnen in 
de provincie. In de vroege jaren tachtig produceerde Carchi bijna de helft van het 
nationale volume op minder dan een kwart van het nationale oppervlak voor 
aardappelproduktie. In het begin van de jaren negentig begonnen de productie en 
productiviteit echter af te nemen. Dat leidde tot een groeiend aantal boerenfamilies met 
schulden. Vele van hen verlieten de landbouw.  
 
Het hier gepresenteerde onderzoek is het resultaat van tien jaar werk voor de volgende 
organisaties: “International Potato Center, “Global IPM Facility” van de FAO, en “World 
Neighbours.” Het geeft verschillende periodes weer van hoop, ontdekking en ambitie. 
Veel hiervan is elders gepubliceerd (zie Appendix A). Dit proefschrift is geen “case study” 
in de zin van een onderzoek naar een specifieke situatie die een hypothese test. Het is een 
monografie die een poging doet om een coherent verhaal te vertellen over schijnbaar 
ongerelateerde gebeurtenissen met aandacht voor het volgende tweede generatie 
probleem: ondanks een decennium van intensief onderzoek naar de pathologien in Carchi 
en vele publieke demonstraties van werkbare alternatieven voor de aardappelteelt is weinig 
significante verandering bereikt.  
 
Dit proefschrift begint met een beschrijving van het huidige landschap en landbouw. 
Daarna volgt een analyse van de manier waarop de moderne aardappelproductie de 
gezondheid van mens en omgeving aantast. Er worden een aantal hoofdconclusies 
getrokken over economische haalbaarheid en ecologische duurzaamheid op lange termijn. 
Vijfentwintig jaar na het begin van de landbouwmodernisering vond een multidisciplinair 
team van onderzoekers dat het toepassen van technologie uit het industriële tijdperk in 
Carchi tot schadelijke effecten had geleid voor het milieu, de productiviteit en gezondheid. 
Tractoren en intensieve grondbewerking veroorzaakten bodemerosie, met verlies aan 
bodemmateriaal van 80 ton per ha per seizoen. Boeren gebruikten steeds meer chemische 
gewasbeschermingsmiddelen. Ze  ontvingen steeds minder voor hun producten, waardoor 
verlies werd geleden op meer dan de helft van hun oogsten. Bij tweederde van de 
boerenbevolking – mannen, vrouwen en kinderen – was meetbaar neurologisch letsel 
vastgesteld veroorzaakt door blootstelling aan sterk toxische pesticiden. Economische 
studies gaven een relatie aan tussen blootstelling van de boerenbevolking aan pesticiden en 
lage productiviteit. Het was steeds moeilijker geworden om aardappelen te verbouwen en 
daar financieel van rond te komen. De studies mondden uit in conclusies over de relatie 
tussen pesticidengebruik en productiviteit. Ze gaven aanbevelingen in de vorm van 
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veelbelovende “actie punten” voor de ontwikkeling van wetenschappelijk bewezen en 
herhaalbare “beste landbouwmethoden” (best practice). 
 
Voordat de ervaringen met deze beste landbouwmethoden worden gepresenteerd in dit 
proefschrift, wordt er een historisch perspectief gegeven van de opkomst van 
ziektenbeelden  in een landbouwgebied met groot potentieel zoals Carchi. De traditionele 
Carchense landbouw ontwikkelde zich door niches te gebruiken over verschillende 
ecologische hoogtezones. Deze praktijk, die wordt omschreven als “micro-verticaalheid,” 
stond een langzame maar relatief stabiele ontwikkeling toe in de hooglanden van de 
Andes. In de loop van de tijd werd een toenemende en verder reikende invloed van buiten 
een belangrijke sturende factor voor de agrarische ontwikkeling. Een kortdurende 
aanwezigheid van de Incas, gevolgd door de Spaanse verovering en het feodale haciënda 
systeem, externaliseerden in toenemende mate de natuurlijke en sociale 
landbouwproducten. Toen het haciënda systeem in het midden van de twintigste eeuw in 
verval raakte, had de traditionele gemeenschapsstructuur een transformatie ondergaan en 
was het systeem van “micro-verticaalheid vervangen door extensieve, horizontaal 
verspreide landbouw. Deze landbouw is juist in bergomgevingen kwetsbaar voor de 
elementen, plagen en ziekten.  
 
In de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw maakten landhervormingen een eind aan de 
haciënda tijd in Carchi. Kleinschalige boeren kregen eigendom van hun land en hadden 
hoge verwachtingen voor de toekomst. De vruchtbare grond in dalen bleef in handen van 
de eigenaren van de haciënda’s maar de hoeveelheid land die ze bezaten was aanzienlijk 
minder dan voorheen. De grond van de nieuwe klasse kleinschalige boeren was beperkt 
tot steile, maar makkelijk bewerkbare hellingen. In dezelfde tijd vond een agressieve 
integratie in markten plaats, gelijktijdig met een intensivering van de aardappelproductie 
door mechanisering, toenemend gebruik van chemische bestrijdingsmiddelen en steeds 
kortere rotaties. Het compenserende en toenemende gebruik van chemische middelen 
veroorzaakten een verval van ecosystemen door bodemdegradatie, afname van de 
productie en epidemieën in de publieke gezondheid. De marktwerking zorgde voor een 
afname van het aantal aardappelvariëteiten. In het begin van de jaren negentig begon de 
Superchola variëteit in monocultuur te domineren. Dit was een zeer kwetsbare variëteit die 
verbouwd werd na intensieve grondbewerking en afhankelijk was van externe  
productiemiddelen als pesticiden en kunstmest. 
 
Onderzoek liet zien dat de nieuwe technologien en druk van buitenaf  boeren verleidde 
om structureel te breken met de natuur. Dat had zware gevolgen voor het milieu. Tevens 
raakten mensen en gemeenschappen steeds meer gefragmenteerd, zowel 
individueel/psychosociaal (een gevoel van gebrek aan verbondenheid met de context) als 
collectief (een ontwikkeling richting voorkeur voor de markt in plaats van voor de buren, 
buurtschap en gemeenschap). De combinatie van deze twee fenomenen leidde tot een 
verslechtering van de sociale en biologische situatie. Deze verslechtering werd 
gekarakteriseerd door toenemende onzekerheid over het milieu en de sociale 
omstandigheden. In 2000 waren er reeds vele families gefrustreerd door de modernisering 
en de organisaties die de modernisering aanmoedigden, zoals blijkt uit de woorden van 
een boer: “We hebben alles gedaan wat de ingenieurs ons hebben verteld en kijk eens hoe 
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we er voor staan..... we gaan failliet.” De laatste jaren hebben een toenemend aantal 
families besloten de landbouw te verlaten en naar steden te migreren op zoek naar werk. 
Ook hebben vele jongeren zich aangesloten bij revolutionaire groeperingen over de grens 
in Colombia.  
 
Na dit historisch perspectief van de opkomst van pathologien vervolgt dit proefschrift 
met een ex-post onderzoek naar de toepassing van aanbevolen beste landbouwmethoden 
die het ziektebeeld van Carchi probeerden op te lossen. Het gaat, in het bijzonder over het 
EcoSalud project waarin multidisciplinair onderzoek, ontwikkeling, geïntegreerde 
bestrijding van plagen (Integrated Pest Management, IPM), Boeren Veld Scholen (Farmer Field 
Schools, FFS) en politiek beleid wordt toegepast. Bij dat project waren deskundigen in 
onderzoek en ontwikkeling gedwongen samen te werken en over hun belangen te 
onderhandelen. Hoewel dit voor sommigen soms onbevredigend was, hielp het ook om 
nieuwe capaciteiten te ontwikkelen en uiteenlopende meningen beter te begrijpen. De 
verschillende betrokken  projectmedewerkers (bijvoorbeeld vanuit landbouwvoorlichting, 
participatief onderzoek, feministische sociale verandering, gezondheid hanteerden bij 
aanvang elk hun eigen, beroepscultuur bepaalde aannames, methodes voor het oplossen 
van geschillen, planning en rollen in de interactie met projectdeelnemers. Het oplossen 
van zulke verschillen was tijdrovend en bracht vaak hoge kosten met zich mee.  
 
Een analyse van FFS gaf inzicht in de mogelijkheden en beperkingen om vanuit 
methodologische hoek interventies toe te passen. FFS bracht in het begin een nieuwe 
manier van denken op gang. De daardoor ontstane creatieve toepassing van nieuwe 
methoden demonstreerde een groot potentieel voor verbetering. Maar met de tijd werd 
duidelijk dat de methodologie beperkingen had voor het tot stand brengen van 
veranderingen in de instituties. Het bleek dat na het toepassen van FFS in de sociale 
praktijk, de deelnemers systematisch op zoek gingen naar ontwerpen gebaseerd op 
deskundigenkennis. Dit werd de overheersende tendens in Carchi (en elders) en was 
eerder het gevolg van een veldslag van cultureel bepaalde kennis dan toeval. Onderzoek 
liet zien dat de FFS methodologie niet compatibel was met de overheersende onderzoeks- 
en ontwikkelingsparadigma’s waarop institutionele ontwerpen gebaseerd waren, vooral 
wat betreft verschillende modellen voor kennisproductie.  
De botsende perspectieven van actoren en instituties leidde ertoe dat FFS systematisch 
werd uitgehold totdat veel van de epistemologische identiteit van de methodologie 
verloren ging. Op het laatst was de naam FFS steeds bekender maar betekende FFS steeds 
minder. De methodologie had veel van zijn effectiviteit van de begindagen verloren  
 
De praktijkervaring met onderzoek en ontwikkeling interventies liet zien dat de 
belangrijkste obstakels voor verandering in Carchi niet het gevolg waren van gebrek aan 
informatie, kennis, technologie of markten, zoals boeren, deskundigen en beleidsmakers in 
het algemeen beweerden. Fundamentele verschillen in paradigmas en processen beperkten 
de institutionele capaciteit om complexe problemen met de gezondheid van ecosystemen 
op te lossen. Vooral voorstellen van buitenaf ondermijnden de mechanismen die van 
oudsher het milieu met de sociale processen verbonden. Meer oplossingsgerichte 
wetenschap en meer verantwoordelijkheid voor de locale bevolking vereisten nieuwe 
manieren van denken, organiseren en doen. 
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Een kritische analyse van EcoSalud en FFS toonden tegenstellingen aan tussen de gestelde 
bedoelingen en de praktijk van de bestaande instituties in Carchi, zowel op het gebied van 
landbouw, wetenschap als regering. Een culturele machtstructuur beheerste het gebruik 
van pesticiden en informeerde tegelijkertijd de publieke opinie en de politiek. Zo werd een 
voortzetting van zelfdestructieve landbouw mogelijk. Het zorgde voor het consolideren 
van bestaande systemen van denken en doen, zelfs terwijl het duidelijk was dat dit ten 
koste ging van de gezondheid van de meerderheid van de boeren bevolking. Het 
sociaaltechnische traject hing af van het succes van wetenschappers en technici als 
ondernemers. Zij legden zonder onderscheid economische, politieke, milieu gerelateerde 
en culturele claims op de waarheid. Naast het presenteren van “zwarte dozen” en het 
creëren van mythes, was het verzekeren van nieuwe gebruikers een centrale activiteit. Hun 
succes hing af van de strategische capaciteit van netwerken om continue te groeien en 
nieuwe perspectieven te vormen. 
 
De bevindingen van dit onderzoek leidden tot de conclusie dat beste methoden en het 
publiekelijk aantonen ervan niet genoeg waren om de daaruit voortvloeiende 
noodzakelijke sociale verandering teweeg te brengen bij boeren, voorlichters, commerciële 
bedrijven, publieke instellingen of politici, zoals ministers van landbouw. Op alle niveaus 
leken de belangrijkste betrokkenen opgesloten te zitten in een niet flexibel, lethaal en 
zelfdestructief (vanuit financieel, gezondheids en bodemvruchtbaarheids perspectief) 
voedselproductiesysteem. Met de tijd was Carchi het “theater van de risico’s” geworden, 
zoals Beck (1992) en Beck et al. (1994) het beschrijven. De gevolgen van de ontstane  
landbouwpraktijken waren zo verreikend en algemeen geworden dat het niet mogelijk was 
om een individu de schuld te geven, zoals een boer of een verkoper van pesticiden. Het 
“systeem” was de schuldige partij geworden. In het begin waren door de abstracties van 
pesticidenvergiftigingen en milieudegradatie de effecten moeilijk te traceren en waar te 
nemen. Toen wetenschappelijk onderzoek de effecten aantoonde, bijvoorbeeld door 
kwantitatieve metingen van neurologische schade en verlies van bodems, werden de 
effecten buiten beeld gehouden door machtige groepen “makelaars” die waren ontstaan 
rond landbouwtechnologie. Deze actoren – chemici, landbouwonderzoekers, voorlichters, 
verkopers en regulerende instanties – manoeuvreerden, zochten strategieën en werkten en 
spanden samen om de publieke opinie te beïnvloeden en schadelijke technologie in stand 
te houden. 
 
Een geïntegreerde analyse van de ervaringen heeft geleid tot een aantal conclusies over de 
institutionele karakteristieken van de moderne landbouw in Carchi:  
 
1. De risico’s die samenhangen met pesticidengebruik waren onzichtbaar en 
onderwerp van interpretatie. Dit had tot gevolg dat het niet de redelijkheid was 
maar succesvol ondernemerschap van actoren dat de publieke perceptie 
informeerde en de politieke resultaten bepaalde. 
2. De risico´s die samenhangen met moderne landbouw overschreden disciplines. 
Dat vereiste het overbruggen van de grenzen tussen kennis en praktijk, beleid en 
actie, internaliteiten en externaliteiten. Deskundigheid-georienteerde instituties 
waren daartoe niet in staat. Ze speelden in feite een centrale rol in het creëren en 
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vertegenwoordigen van de mythes en conceptuele blinddoeken die er voor 
zorgden dat mensen geen alternatieven zagen.  
3. De slechte kanten van de op het industriële tijdperk geënte landbouw leidden tot 
een terugslag, zowel ecologisch als sociaal. Dit effect ging verder dan alleen een 
reorganisatie van de Carchi gemeenschappen en veroorzaakte een fundamentele 
instorting en verval van het produktiesysteem.  
4. Uiteindelijk ontwortelde de modernisering in Carchi mensen zowel psychologisch 
als sociaal van hun locatie, hetgeen leidde tot verschillende vormen van 
fragmentatie met locale ervaring en een gevoel van onthechting van familie, 
gemeenschap en de maatschappij. Als gevolg daarvan leek het dat mensen de 
capaciteit hadden verloren om met verandering om te gaan of om collectief te 
reageren op de snelle opeenvolging van gebeurtenissen gerelateerd aan moderne 
tijden, hetgeen leed tot verschillende vormen van geweld. 
 
Gebaseerd op deze resultaten, concludeert dit onderzoek dat de huidige instituties nog 
steeds structureel vasthouden aan dezelfde logica en waardesystemen die de 
problematische kwaliteiten van moderniteit intensiveren en in stand houden. Het gevolg is 
dat wetenschap en ontwikkeling in hun poging om een ecosysteem crisis op te lossen, 
onvermijdbaar bijdragen tot verergering. Deze tendenties produceren tegenstellingen die 
de legitimiteit van instituties ondermijnen. Desondanks wortelde dit destructieve beleid 
zich sterk door de effectiviteit van het sociaaltechnische regime als sociaal netwerker en 
machtsmakelaar. Op basis van de ervaring in Carchi lijkt het onwaarschijnlijk dat er 
grondige veranderingen zullen komen binnen de huidige structuren.  
 
Volgens de literatuur over veerkracht (“resilience”), samengevat door Gunderson and 
Holling (2002), hangt duurzaamheid af van een schijnbare paradox van persistentie en 
verandering. Op één niveau behoeft het een constante verbinding of verbondenheid met 
lokaliteiten en op een ander niveau heeft de responsiviteit nodig op eindeloze sociale en 
omgevingsdynamiek. Duurzaamheid in een panarchistische wereld met eindeloze 
adaptieve cirkels hangt af van de een hoge graad van lokale “bescherming” 
(verbondenheid) en globale “creativiteit” (dynamische vernieuwing) van instituties. De 
ervaring in Carchi liet zien dat zulke verandering in wetenschap of ontwikkelingswerk 
sterke weerstand zou oproepen, maar dit weerspreekt de basis voor het argument voor 
nieuwe richtingen niet. Vanuit dit oogpunt, wordt een algemeen voorstel voor 
duurzaamheid de organisatie van gemeenschappen rond veerkracht, aanpassingkracht en 
transformatiekracht. Veerkracht is de capaciteit van een systeem om verstoring op te 
vangen en om te transformeren onder verandering om zo in essentie dezelfde functie, 
structuur identiteit en terugkoppeling te behouden. Aanpassingskracht is de capaciteit van 
actoren in het systeem om veerkracht toe te passen voor het behoud van stabiliteit 
(verandering van drempels of het makkelijker/moeilijker maken om het systeem te 
veranderen) of trajecten te begeleiden richting gewenste uitkomsten. Transformatiekracht 
is de capaciteit om te reorganiseren in de richting van een fundamenteel verschillend 
systeem, op het moment dat het huidige systeem onhoudbaar wordt door de ecologische, 
sociale of economische condities. In het geval van Carchi, waar een hoge mate van 
zelfdestructieve menselijke organisatie was ontstaan, waren institutionele reorganisaties 
rond transformatiekracht de prioriteit geworden voor een betere toekomst. 
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